Document created: 27 April 03
Air University Review, January-February 1976

Dove in the Cockpit

peace in today’s Europe

SCENE of frequent war and struggle, the plains of Belgium and northern Germany have been called "the 'Cockpit Europe."² But the dubious honor is contested. In Roman times, Iberia was known as the cockpit of war, while more recently the world wars of our century have seen sufficient blood spilt at such places as Caporetto and Stalingrad to give southern and eastern Europe some claim to the painful title, also. Europe's many fronts seldom have been quiet.

The perch of peace in contemporary Europe is still perilous. Echoes of Soviet tanks rumbling through the streets of Prague have not yet wholly subsided. News headlines include references to undeclared war in Northern Ireland, disrupting leftist tensions in Portugal, work of urban terrorists in West Germany. More important for our purposes is the fact that today in Central Europe there converges the largest concentration of opposing forces in the world. They are superbly trained, formidably equipped, and ready for instant combat. There is ample reason that the dove's flight at times should be skittish.

My thesis can be stated neither simply nor without paradox. Like one of Horace's subjects, it deals with harmony in discord. Nonetheless, because my purpose is to try at least to illuminate rather than to riddle, a statement must be attempted. It might go something like this: In order to preserve a second generation of relative, though fragile, peace in Europe, we must be prepared there for the possible use of violence against us. If the dove is to find a safe haven, it cannot be through measures aimed exclusively at such safety. Our policy must be both dynamic and irenic. There must be give as well as take if an equal order is to be maintained in Europe, and the military, of course, will continue to figure prominently in this exchange.

The tragic scenario of Southeast Asia cannot be tolerated either for Europe or, indeed, for any place where our major interests and commitments are inextricably interconnected. Europe cannot be defended by waiting until it is the only continent outside North America left to defend. Detractors of this position might too glibly call it a preoccupation with "dominoes"; yet not to heed this approach is to participate in a far more dangerous game of chance, in which possibly the highest of stakes and gravest of losses may be involved. 

Though peace in Europe is yoked strongly to our national honor and commitments, we should realize that honor is also linked to peace. Since the stakes are immense in Europe, so too is the price we are willing to pay in order to protect them. Certainly, this is not to indulge in the absurd and nihilistic syllogism that suggests, because Europe matters greatly, we must be prepared to destroy it if necessary in order to save it. Rather, our position simply must be that the highly industrialized, culturally invaluable continent, which is home for over 300 million of our NATO allies, demands an unyielding commitment on our part. But total commitment is conceivably translatable into total war. Therefore, we must recognize that, just as, given Europe's intrinsic worth, there can be no peace without honor; likewise, given the nature of large-scale war in Europe, there can be no honor without peace.

This, then, is the elusive context. Lest I find myself in the position of the hapless philosopher who, after speaking on the secret of Hegel, was wryly congratulated for having kept the secret, let me move now to more specific issues. What are our objectives in Europe, the resources available to achieve those objectives, the obstacles involved, the shape of the future there?

Objectives in Europe

What we hope to achieve in Europe is largely a function and reflection of our foreign policy. That policy is determined by Presidential decision. Its development is primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The present Secretary, perhaps more than his recent predecessors, has been actively engaged in the role of chief architect of U.S. foreign policy. He has done so with a masterful, if at times temperamental, hand. It is too early to judge if the structures he has had a significant part in building will stand as great monuments to diplomatic genius.

The medium of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's construction is granite. He has expressed the objective as the building of a lasting international order, though, in an existential vein, he as much as anyone seems to recognize that such orders have a way of not enduring.

Still, a vision of a stable European order is part of Kissinger's outlook and dates back as far as his first major work, A World Restored (1957). This book possibly reveals much about Kissinger, especially as it mirrors his fascination with that great architect of early nineteenth century Europe, Prince Klemens von Metternich. Yet the temptation should be resisted to view the Secretary as an intentional copy of the Austrian statesman. No, Kissinger is not Prince Metternich, nor was meant to be. ³

But what should be derived from the book is Kissinger's hypothesis that the fundamental objective in Europe since Napoleon's defeat has been the establishment of "a legitimate order."⁴ The word "legitimate" is important for Kissinger, and by it he means that which is "accepted by all the major powers."⁵ One can conclude, therefore, that he hopes to assist in achieving a European diplomatic order that is acceptable to both sides, East and West, and particularly to the protagonists, the Soviet Union and the United States. This is not to say that such countries as Bulgaria and Belgium are not very much a part of the European order. Nonetheless, if another important objective (to turn one of Kissinger's own phrases) is to demonstrate the necessity of peace by proving the impossibility of war, then that proof must be demonstrated at the level where it is most meaningful. Only an order and peace agreeable to the two superpowers are likely to endure for any length of time.

On the other hand, great or small, statesmen do not abide. For good or ill, neither do their policies. The grand design that might be used for a legitimate order and peace in Europe can be overturned by time and events. Neither diplomats nor strategists have unlimited tenure in office as decision-makers. Everywhere whirl is king.

Despite the transient nature of our designs, however, certain measures must be undertaken in Europe if our policies are to approximate success. All these objectives must be sounded on a pragmatic note, and for many of them expeditious accomplishment can only be termed critical. Four of the most apparent and pressing of these objectives follow, listed from the general to the specific:

• NATO demands immediate rejuvenation. It was said more than six years ago that "NATO is far gone on the road to extinction." ⁶ If this were true then, there can be no doubt now that, without swift change, NATO—at least the NATO of old will—soon be ready for the taxidermist. The southern flank is not as steady as it might be: Greece and Turkey are finding that it remains difficult to end old differences; Italy has severe economic problems; and Portugal is a capital Question Mark. Canada has cut its defense spending, expressed as a percentage of gross national product, by more than half since 1960. Thus, NATO as a military body comes very close today to being an alliance solely between the United States and northwestern Europe. Astute critics have noted recently that NATO needs more combat manpower, a higher "teeth-to-tail" ratio—particularly in Central Europe. ⁷ This is doubtless true, and improvements are being made. But what is also needed for the Alliance as a whole is drastically better participation, willingly accomplished.
• Continued additional improvements are still needed in financial burden-sharing arrangements for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe. Progress has been made in this area. As Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has noted, the U.S. share of spendings for NATO military construction has been reduced of late. The most recent of these infrastructure programs "have provided, on the average, over $5 worth of facilities for U.S. forces for every $3 of U.S. contributions."⁸ Yet, still further improvements are necessary. With the United States in the most narrow economic straits since the Depression, it becomes difficult to justify, especially to the unemployed, why Europe should not do more by way of cost sharing. Such formulations may seem simplistic, both militarily and economically, but not to American voters, who continue their demand to be heard—and rightly so.

• Increased standardization is overdue in such fields as procurement and logistics. This subject is presently being given attention within the NATO complex. Even so, NATO'S European nations conduct themselves today in a manner not unlike that which characterized the American states under the Articles of Confederation (and, for alliance purposes, to similarly unsatisfactory effect). Each member originates its own budget, maintains its separate armed forces, and promulgates its distinct schedule of priorities. Understandably, the results are often separateness and redundancy rather than unity and coordination. Of course, it would be utterly naïve to suggest that the differences between, say, Italy and Denmark are no greater than those between Georgia and Connecticut. But it is almost as foolish to assert, in the area of standardization, that differences between European support systems cannot be surmounted.

- General Andrew J. Goodpaster, retired Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), has estimated "that lack of standardization costs NATO 30 to 50 percent of its potential capability." ⁹ This represents a truly appalling waste.

- It is obvious that there will not soon be a United States of Europe or, for that matter, even an economic and monetary union in the near future.¹⁰ What is not obvious is why there cannot be a common wrench, turned on a common engine, by mechanics schooled at a common training center, in accordance with directions in a common technical manual. It would be one of the benign ironies of history, and a welcome one, if smudged mechanics might show elegant statesmen the way to concrete cooperation.

• Command and control has recently been the subject of intense discussion and concern, all of it well deserved. At this moment, construction is under way to modify an existing facility in Germany into an elaborate, hardened (against conventional attack) wartime headquarters for the NATO air commander in Central Europe. I am old enough to know better when it comes to the "Emperor's new clothes," but I must confess that when I view this array I discern not a stitch.

- The lessons of warfare are far from clear. History mumbles; there is noise in the background; we are beguiled by half-truths; we hear what we want to hear. Yet one lesson that does come through without phantom-like form is that where a force can be fixed, it can either be circumvented or, with modern weaponry, destroyed. Such a target would be extremely attractive, so much so that an enemy might succumb to the nuclear temptation with a "surgical strike."

- This mode of operation worked in Southeast Asia, where the Air Command and Control Center in Saigon was known as "Blue Chip." But there it was not subjected to the sophisticated threat that would fill the skies in an air campaign over Germany. When the chips are down in Central Europe, a semihard "Blue Chip" might be worthless, since it could be one of the first targets on which a determined enemy will cash in.

- More feasible, I believe, for a secure command and control center is one that is mobile. This might be achieved either by motor on the ground or by jet engine in the air, perhaps something in the class of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Although the AWACS has been criticized for alleged vulnerability to enemy air attack, its flight plan at least is not already a matter of record at Warsaw Pact military headquarters in Potsdam.

Resources and Obstacles

The resources available to achieve our objectives in Europe and the obstacles to such achievement will be dealt with jointly for two reasons. To begin with, our resources and strengths assume real meaning only when measured against that which stands in opposition to them. Next, there is an occasional tendency to forget something quite fundamental: that the chief obstacle in our path is in fact the opposition. Resources are necessary because we have resourceful adversaries.

Although outnumbered in what is known as the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA),^* the West's ground forces do not compare unfavorably with those of the East. However, as can be seen in the following table, the East's numerical lead is more substantial in aircraft and tanks: ¹¹

* The NGA includes West Germany  and Benelux as well as, curiously, the non-NATO countries of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Two observations can be made readily from this table. First, the Pact's tank advantage is commanding. These are primarily offensive weapons, used for shock, breakthrough, and rapid battlefield exploitation. This heavy emphasis on armor suggests that the East does not plan to fight any future engagement by hanging back. Their objective likely would be to seize the offensive from the beginning. Some have tended to discount the East's numerical advantage in armor by pointing to NATO'S solid antitank defenses and the superior quality of its tank. Issues of this type ultimately are resolvable only through the gunsight, not through spilt ink, though it might be noted in passing that at some early point in a contest, given reasonably equal weapon systems, sheer numbers are as determinative of the outcome as technology. Indeed, simplicity can be a virtue, and mud does not always discriminate between this year's model and last.

The second observation concerns the striking fact that in this NATO Guidelines comparison the Soviet Union represents by the largest national military presence. The Soviets provide half of the Pact's NGA strength in troops and tanks (compared to the U.S. share for NATO of 24 and 30 percent respectively), while in aircraft the Soviet share for the Pact is 45 percent (versus the U.S. input of 14 percent for NATO). These Soviet forces are among the best combat personnel in the world. Their equipment is first-rate. They are not ten feet tall, but neither are they midgets. They are, Motherland's finest.

If there were a mutual withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from the NGA, then a more approximate parity would exist between those forces remaining in the area. But the NGA is not fairyland, and the Soviets have no intention of total withdrawal. The plain fact is that they are in eastern Europe as much for reasons of political stability, otherwise known as occupation, as for forward defense. Still, if the NGA is not fairyland, neither is there reason that it must be no-man's-land. It need not necessarily continue as harsh, vestigial ground of the Cold War. To ease some of the tensions that have gripped this region for thirty years and to promote détente, East and West began Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in October 1973.

The purpose of MBFR is to lessen the size of opposing forces maintained in the Guidelines Area. After eighteen months, the talks have deadlocked, as announced in the following press release: "Vienna, April 17 (UPI). —The fifth round of East-West talks on troop cuts in Central Europe ended today with no agreement in sight. Each side blamed the other for lack of progress."¹² That such news was relegated to page five is perhaps indicative of hopes entertained for the talks. The West, seeking a ceiling of 700,000 ground troops for each side, claims that it cannot accept a position of permanent numerical inferiority in Central Europe. The East, claiming that its numerical superiority derives from factors of historical providence (whatever that means), states that the West's figures are incorrect but offers no figures of its own. Apparently, champagne for toasts flows more freely than does true concord.

the economics of détente

One of the driving forces behind both MBFR and the appeal of détente in general is economics. It has become frightfully expensive to behave like a world power. It always has been expensive to be a world power. Like Senator Mike Mansfield, I cannot claim expertise in economics--micro, macro, or echo. Nonetheless, some of the economic lines on the face of détente seem to warrant elementary inspection.

The first fact to be dealt with, one of basic importance, is that the economics of détente thus far have seen the United States spend less and the Soviet Union more on defense. From FY70 to FY75, U.S. defense expenditures fell, in terms of 1973 dollars, from $92 billion to $72 billion (a decrease of 22 percent), while in the same period and terms the Soviet defense budget increased from $88 billion to $95 billion (an 8 percent increase).¹³ Too often, especially to the uninitiated, charts and figures tend to mesmerize. Yet we should clear our heads long enough to realize that, according to these DOD figures, the Soviets are outstripping our comparative defense spending by almost a third.

Against this sobering background, we might examine the economic picture as it relates to defense in Europe. Here the economics of détente translate into reduced defense spendings, when expressed as a percentage of GNP: ¹⁴

From an American vantage point it might be argued that some NATO members need to do more in sharing the financial burden of defense expenditures. Although the subject was touched on previously, it is important enough to merit reiteration here. The Benelux, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, all relatively prosperous military members of the Alliance's northern tier, should be requested to increase their defense budgets. Even West Germany, which has sustained the greatest increase in defense spending, should be encouraged to do still more. Such an initiative is justifiable because of both the strong economy of Germany and its proximity to the threat. The Germans seem acutely aware of this proximity, but more awareness is needed by many of the other members of NATO.

In attempting to describe desired levels of economic support for NATO members, one cannot be mechanical or categorical. The general prescription of "more and faster" is unsatisfactory; it might well serve only to choke rather than to stimulate the defense effort, particularly for a country already reeling from economic difficulties. The United States, with vast resources and with a per capita income almost nine times that of Turkey and actually twice that of the United Kingdom, should reasonably be expected to do more, both absolutely and proportionately.¹⁵ But how much more? For how long? And does this same formula of economic justice, however crude, apply also to such nations as West Germany, Canada, and Denmark, where the standard of living is only slightly below that of the United States? Should the average American bear, by any measure, more than twice the economic burden for defense as the average Dane? These are obviously broad and intricate questions, and they will not be answered in this limited space, nor soon possibly even in the expansive chambers of NATO headquarters in Brussels. But answered they must be, and without inordinate delay.

Given the lack of reliable economic data on the East, it is difficult to compare precisely their economic resources with those of the West. Certain facts, of course, are relatively well known. For example, Western Europe is much more industrialized than Eastern Europe; but in the last few years the economic growth rate has been generally larger for the East. One factor, though, that looms large in East-West comparison is that the West currently is suffering serious economic problems. With the exception of Germany, inflation has strained most Western economies. Although scant learned consensus exists on how best to counter inflation, there is little mystique about its nature. Its woes are known to everyone, and its effect in the West has been wrenching, especially in such countries as Italy and the United Kingdom.

There are many complex reasons for this inflation, but a major one is the fivefold increase in prices by the oil cartel. A few countries, chiefly West Germany, have been able to forestall adverse economic effects through significant sales of industry and technology to the increasingly wealthy oil-producing nations. But for most in the West, oil has become a source of friction. The gears of Western economics have slowed, in part because of the price spiral of this vital lubricant. Oil, in fact, has been used by the Arab states as both an economic and a political weapons, at times even as a slick Sword of Damocles over selected Western heads.

In contrast, the economies of Eastern Europe have been buffeted by few of these inflationary winds. The East has been largely insulated in that most of its oil is obtained from the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, this could be a consideration of fundamental importance in future growth patterns. While much of Western Europe may be subjected in coming years to the interplay of whim and responsibility among oil sheikdoms, the East can look to a more constant, if monolithic, source. To the discomfort of many Western observers, particularly in an Age of Energy, the Soviet Union has up to 60 percent of the world's oil and coal reserves, along with the world's largest potential mineral resources.¹⁶ That such statistics are deeply significant cannot be doubted; that they will not prove decisive can only be hoped.

Shape of the Future

Fortunately, the future seems to have no predetermined shape, perhaps not even a determinable one. Or, if it does, surely, that shape must be etched upon water—very difficult to decipher. The safest prophecy is that the shores of the future will be littered with the bones of dead prophets.

In looking, though, to future shores, we are likely to find them peaceful in Europe. But it well may be the same tenuous peace found there today. It may be indeed a continuation of that peace suggested in an ancient Anglo-Saxon legal maxim, "Buy spear from side or bear it," that is, buy off the feud or fight it out. The Europe of the future, like that of past and present, probably will not be without feuds. Therefore, if future Europeans are found at peace, it will be because modem feuds remain prohibitively expensive: it is cheaper to buy them off than to fight them out. This is not to say that the maintenance of peace will be inexpensive. Far from it. Yet if, as King Henri IV of France once said, "Paris is well worth a Mass," then Western Europe is certainly worth the entire liturgy of defense spending. 

As for the French, no view of Europe would be complete without them. They no doubt will remain the most independent and enigmatic of our European allies. They are likely also to remain outside the formal NATO military structure but very much involved in the total defense picture. One might sooner visualize Rumania remaining aloof from any future widespread engagement in Europe than France. Perhaps we should attempt something very daring--an attempt to understand the French. Perhaps we should realize that whenever we announce that the defense of Europe is second only in importance to the defense of the United States itself, such an announcement accomplishes two things: it rings well for publication of priorities, perhaps even for candor; but it also rings clearly for France's force de frappe.

Understandably, the French, and all Europeans, desire something very close to their hearts: an unconditional commitment to their survival. And it is ever so much better if the commitment is made as a true ally, an equal, rather than as a haughty chieftain. Justice Holmes has stated that the beginning of wisdom is recognition that we are in the universe and not that the universe is in us. The corollary for America in Europe is recognition that we are in NATO and not the converse.

Possibly, if remotely so, the future European scene will be a tranquil one. It may witness increased trade and cooperation between East and West. Already, West Germany's trade with Communist countries accounts for almost 9 percent of its total foreign trade, and by 1985 she is to receive 16 percent of her natural gas supply from the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In the coming decade Europeans may be more successful in achieving unity than they have been to date, perhaps in some joint venture such as a unified effort in space exploration or medical research. It even is conceivable, particularly if one tends toward euphoria, that the European scene will become more settled at its navel, that foreign armies will depart German soil, that as an extension of the bold Ostpolitik the two Germanys will yet merge, dissolving the perhaps artificial, externally imposed bonds of political alliance that separate their national identities and cultures. Perhaps, all perhaps.

But there is another scene: Dresden at the close of the last World War. The city is in ruin. From its cathedral promontory, a watchful, scorched Dresden angel looks down, as if in both disbelief and forgiveness. Beneath the angel's outstretched hand, the shell of the city stands desolate, silent, gaunt. Here 135,000 people perished in a single night of air attacks. Although the attacks were made with conventional weapons, this is the view of ultimate war. It is a scene, a European scene, that must not be viewed again. Not by angels, not by men.

Notes

1. The Gulag Archipelago, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 14.

2. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), I, p. 455.

3. The allusion to T. S. Eliot's "Prufrock" aside, Kissinger simply does not conform to the best description we have of Metternich: "Not a man of strong passions and of bold measures; not a genius but a great talent; cool, calm, imperturbable and calculator par excellence." Quoted in A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 11-12. Except for the last three words here, this passage would have to be stood on its head in order to be descriptive of Dr. Kissinger.

4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. Ibid., p. 5. Later, on p. 145, he states: "An order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is ‘legitimate’: An order containing a power which considers its structure oppressive is ‘revolutionary’. "

6. Morton A. Kaplan, "NATO in the International System of the 1970's," in The World in Fement, Stanley L. Falk, ed. (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1970), p. 14.

7. For one of the most recent in a series of intelligent articles by various authors, see Alain C. Enthoven, "U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many Doing What?" Foreign Affairs, April 1975, pp. 513-32.

8. Annual Defense Deportment Report: FY 1976 and FY 197T (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. IV-32.

9. Enthoven, p. 521.

10. See International Herald Tribune, April 23, 1975, p. 1. In two significant and related articles, framed together, announcement was made of the demise of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, along with the announcement that an expert EEC committee "told the Common Market today [April 22J that all its attempts at economic union have failed."

11. Source for comparison is "The Military Balance 1974/75" [by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London], in Air Force Magazine, December 1974, pp. 41-105.

12. "Vienna Talks on Troop Cuts Are Recessed," International Herald Tribune, April 18, 1975, p. 5.

13. Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1976 and FY 197T [chart opposite p. I-6]. Figures do not include spendings on military assistance and civil defense.

14. "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence," NATO Press Service Release, December 11, 1974.

15. Ibid. Estimated 19741 GNP per head for United States was $5997; United Kingdom, $2951; Turkey, $710; West Germany, $5427; Canada, $5298; Denmark, $5213.

16. James Partington, ed., The Book of the World 1973 (New York: Collier Books, 1972), p. 266.

17. "Focus on West Germany, 1975," International Herald Tribune, April 16 and 18, 1975, pp. 15A-28A and 17C-29C.

Major Edd D. Wheeler (USAFA; Ph.D., Emory University) is an action officer in DCS/Plans, Hq USAFE. He served in SEA as Special Assistant to Commanding General Deputy Chief, JUSMAGTHAI. Other assignments have been as a Titan II missile crew commander; missile programmer, Hq SAC; faculty, USAF A; and Executive Officer, Hq 7/13AF (PACAF). Major Wheeler is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School and has completed Air Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Air War College.

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