Document created: 27 April 03
Air University Review, January-February 1976

Military Concepts for Political Objectives

THE most profound change in the use of military forces in recent years has been the sharply diminished importance of military power as a regulator of international behavior. Nearly ten years ago Klaus Knorr predicted decreased opportunities for the application of military power to achieve national objectives. ¹ Long-range destructive power and distribution of modern weapons, approaching feared nuclear proliferation, are making independent military forces inadequate to defend most countries. At the same time military technologies are making mutual defense pacts less valuable to the superpowers and less reliable for the weaker members of these superpower coalitions. Compared with other forms of power, military threats have little or even negative utility in bargaining over the nonsecurity issues, around which these coalitions will be forming and reforming in the future world system. ²

Recent statements have also criticized U.S. strategic nuclear weapons for lacking any " . . . rational or possible use . . . . It would appear that the U.S. is fast approaching, if it has not already reached, the point where, for all intents and purposes, its strategic nuclear weapons are politically unusable." ³

The decreasing use of military force faces growing economic and political problems. For example, the competition of foreign trade is extremely important to Japan and to Western Europe. Certainly the question of international monetary system shortcomings, the balance of payment difficulties and the offset payment demands, in Europe, and now a large balance of payments deficit to Arab oil producers—all bear heavily on our foreign relations. Along with these economic questions has been growing awareness that military measures have a limited ability to secure economic objectives.⁴ This argument was succinctly put by Senator Walter Mondale, who argued that risk of international economic collapse outweighed the major international security issues as a "top external challenge." He argued that the time has come to "face the fact that fundamental security objectives underlying the process of detente are now linked to the world economic situation." ⁵

These growing problems suggest that if U.S. military forces are to be useful at all, they will have to be used for nonmilitary objectives within the overall framework of deterrence.⁶ The national security challenge is thus a challenge for deterrence and strategic forces, plus the application of strategic and general purpose military capabilities to nonmilitary objectives.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has stated that the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is "the most complex in all history."⁷ President Ford has explained that part of this relationship is "to achieve peace through strength and meaningful negotiations." ⁸ Admiral Thomas Moorer, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reasoned that détente required strength enough to negotiate with confidence and to insure that goodwill was not misconstrued as a lack of will. ⁹ Recent statements by Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas pointed out the same idea: ". . . we must remain prepared so that we can negotiate from strength, help maintain international stability and defend vital national interests." ^l0

It seems clear from these statements of national leaders that the main explanation of the relationship between our strategic deterrent power and nonmilitary Use of force capabilities lies in the realm of political objectives, negotiating from strength.

Nuclear employment concepts also embrace a similar interrelationship in the seeking of political or negotiated objectives through the use of nuclear force. Secretary Schlesinger's discussion of selective targeting has been analyzed as a way to "preserve strategic nuclear weapons as a positive political instrument," even though his policies have been criticized primarily for lacking a developed link "between strategic power and political purposes."¹¹ In the realm of nuclear employment as well as conventional force capabilities, the most farsighted strategic concern today is with possible use of military forces in seeking political, i.e., negotiated, objectives.

Concepts of force application in foreign policy are encumbered with several intellectual blinders, both military and antimilitary. The former prevents perception of any nonmilitary purpose for the use of force, while the latter screens out any conflict issues for which force would be an appropriate solution. Neither restricted viewpoint can understand the prevailing terms. The gist of this discussion is directed to the military issue. What is needed is new clarity about political purposes in the international arena for which military forces may be the best available tool of persuasion. Military planners will need to learn how to calculate force requirements and weapon systems to achieve political objectives in various crisis situations, besides the more traditional purposes of defeating enemy forces or destroying targets.

These new political-military Objectives could be a much more persuasive argument for development of the B-1 bomber than previous thinking which regarded it exclusively as the inheritor of the B-52' s role in a triad of strategic deterrence. In fact, some civilian strategists have already suggested that discussion should turn to the need to equip B-1 aircraft as a "weapon of negotiation instead of a weapon of destruction. "¹² Political utility arguments about the B-1 have already appeared in the news, but a military discussion on such terms is only just beginning.

It has been argued by Paul Schratz, Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, that "the most serious deficiency handicapping both operational performance and the quality of advice to the civilian leadership is the continuing void in development of strategic and tactical doctrine."¹³ When the need for military force relationships to negotiated purposes is compared with current Army and Air Force doctrine, one would have to agree that there has been a void in the development of concepts of military force as a tool for negotiation. For example, basic Army doctrine emphasizes mobility, flexibility, and staying power as a general strategy to prevent escalation while seeking to negotiate a settlement. Army doctrine also recognizes that the termination of conflict may be possible through diplomatic negotiations.¹⁴ Air Force Basic Doctrine holds that force sufficiency enables a response in kind to enemy action or to "… have sufficient military capabilities available to provide a wide range of flexible options for military and nonmilitary conflict." (para 1-5)¹⁵

What this doctrine does not say is that military forces might be used to negotiate the settlement as well as to conduct the fight. In the past, Samuel P. Huntington noted, deterrence was a concept which avoided problems of the active use of military means to secure diplomatic means or political goals. But now, American security rests on "a set of relationships . . . as much the product of diplomacy as it is of armaments." Accordingly, he argued that this shift of emphasis from deterrence to negotiation " . . . requires increased responsiveness of military forces and programs to political and diplomatic needs." ¹⁶  

Air Force Basic Doctrine comes closer to this issue when it declares that the spectrum of potential international conflict "occurs in a variety of forms--political, military, economic, and psychosocial." (para 1-4)

"Although effectiveness of aerospace forces has traditionally been evaluated in terms of their ability to destroy targets, these forces should also be evaluated in terms of their contribution toward the attainment of other military and political objectives (for example: deterrence, persuasion, and coercion)." (para 2-4) Increased alerts, show of force, reserve mobilization options, force deployments, and reconnaissance flights are actions that might communicate national will and intention. (para 3-5) The doctrine indicates that the objectives of low-intensity nuclear operations include forcing an enemy to negotiate and signaling national resolve. Command and control in high-intensity nuclear operations must provide a capability for communicating intent "to persuade an enemy to end the conflict before his survival as an effective entity is endangered." (para 3-6)

These scattered doctrinal statements show that the necessity of relating military forces to diplomatic objectives is generally recognized, but there is little thought that could guide the employment of those forces to achieve such purposes. Recently there has been some "fundamental rethinking of United States strategic objectives and plans." The concept of " . . . 'essential equivalence' between the strategic forces the US and USSR . . ." was defined in recent paper as follows:

1) A second strike capability, invulnerable both in terms of survivability and penetration confidence; 2) a rough equivalence in counter force capability; and 3) perceived equality.

Of these requisites perceived equality has received the least attention in the past. However, in the present environment of strategic parity, US, allied, and Soviet perceptions of the balance will affect to a large degree what risks the Soviets feel they can take and how our friends and allies will react to US policies and initiatives . . . .¹⁷

One could argue that the doctrinal concepts of "signalling national resolve" and "perceived equality" are simply two sides of the same coin, in that the United States signals and the enemy perceives. The importance of the statement is its attention to military force concepts to achieve political effects—perception is, after all, a political state of mind. The broadened application of military forces from deterrence to include negotiation became obvious in the "bargaining chip" concept that pervaded the antiballistic missile debate in the SALT I talks. ¹⁸

Concepts for military force tactics and strategy should include the use of military forces in a process of violent bargaining. As Thomas C. Schelling pointed out, "the power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy." Military strategy has to encompass more than military victory and destruction of the enemy forces; Schelling added "the science of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. "¹⁹  

A current example of this technique has been seen in the Middle East negotiations. Here a diplomatic situation is being created through the commitment of American power in a way that conveys relevant messages to Israel and the Arabs. Among the actions that conveyed these messages were the agreements for clearing of the Suez Canal, the promise of economic and military assistance, and the strengthening of bilateral relations with the protagonists. Significant U.S. unilateral military moves were the Sixth Fleet deterrent posture opposing the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, the well-executed air and sea resupply of Israel’s pressing military needs, and, of course, the U.S. worldwide alert.²⁰ Future negotiated settlements may require even more explicit commitments of U.S. military resources, beyond the stationing of U.S. teams at the Sinai early warning posts.

The Diplomacy of 
Nuclear Violence

The relationship of diplomacy and violence is most critical in the extreme case of nuclear warfare. One might think of a crisis as a transitional zone between peace and war. In this transition, crisis behavior can be viewed as a spectrum of actions between physical coercion and peaceful accommodation. In peacetime diplomacy, negotiation is a principal means of reaching an agreement with an adversary; in a crisis, pressure involving the potential or threatened use of military forces becomes a more common characteristic. As the crisis approaches war, small doses of military action are designed for coercive political effects, rather than physical destruction and defeat. Other attacks might be withheld, to create implied hostages or to demonstrate limited interests.²¹ When a coercive attack clearly within the capabilities of a nuclear country is withheld, the decision may be taken as a sincere desire to avoid armed conflict.

In this sense negotiation in a crisis is not only talk but also involves communicating intent, manipulating expectations about terms, displaying evidence of capabilities, etc. Bargaining itself can be about the conduct of the war, about its cease fire, truce, or armistice. It might also extend to territorial dispositions, disarmament, the future regime within the target country, or its political status in blocs and alliances. Within a crisis environment, escalation to any use of nuclear weapons is not just limited or tactical but is also a political issue of risk at the highest strategic level. The principal evaluation is not only military effectiveness. Rather it is in terms of how these nuclear weapons affect the expectation of general war."²²

The common understanding about nuclear bargaining includes such tactics as withholding destruction of essential enemy communications, command and control facilities. This allows the enemy to assess the intention of the attack and to reach a rational decision regarding his response. Other withholds on possible enemy targets would be constraints for collateral damage; limitations on the size, basing, and type of weapons of the attacking force; the level of expected destruction, its geographic limits, etc.

All these escalation boundaries are designed to achieve some negotiating advantage. In fact, much of the discussion about limited use of nuclear weapons suggests a number of common political objectives which in turn would dictate the design of any limited nuclear strike option. First, and foremost, is the concern to control escalation and avoid a strategic nuclear exchange. A second major political objective is to seek to terminate a conflict at the lowest possible level of violence, preferably by some kind of political negotiation. Success in avoiding a general war after a limited nuclear attack would probably provide mutual terms for opening the negotiation stage. Both warring nations might believe that avoiding a total strategic nuclear War is in a sense the first step of a successful crisis resolution; therefore, so long as strategic capabilities are at least preserved, the tactical advantage now can be negotiated.

These two basic political objectives are supported by various political actions or constraints on any limited nuclear applications of military force. To begin with, military actions, particularly any limited use of nuclear weapons, must exhibit some form of constraint or limitation as the primary signal for willingness to negotiate the conflict. Overkill is a political danger more than a physical vulnerability. The limited nature and intent of these coercive military moves must be clearly portrayed to the enemy. Signaling this political limitation is a key factor in target selection and operational planning for any nuclear strikes.

Within this need for restraint, there is also the psychological need to allow a face-saving incentive to the enemy. Sun Tzu proposed "leaving an outlet free," and others have suggested that his strategy emphasizes such nonmilitary use of military forces. Sun Tzu recommended bluff, maneuver, and stratagem, avoiding direct fighting wherever possible. ²³ These are political constraints, in showing a limited nuclear posture, allowing a face-saving incentive to de-escalate, and reaching a negotiated end of the conflict. They stem from the ultimately political nature of any operations that work on the will of the opponent. Interestingly, current strategic operational doctrine discusses target considerations wholly in terms of eliminating "the enemy's immediate general warmaking capability" and of causing "such extensive damage and high casualty rates that the will and capacity of the enemy nation to continue the war will cease to exist."²⁴ (Emphasis added.) Thus, even counterforce strategic operations aimed at the will of the enemy are ultimately political. This ancient principle seems difficult to relearn. Target systems that directly affect the enemy's will to pursue an aggressive course need discovery.

Achieving political objectives requires that military force be based on a careful blend of political, psychological, and economic aspects. For instance, it is quite likely that the enemy will misinterpret the political signals and limited intent of a nuclear attack. Thus, it may be impossible to predict his perceptions or reactions, even within a fairly limited range of possible courses of action. Because of this possible misinterpretation, the application of nuclear force in a crisis bargaining atmosphere also requires the display of an immense amount of good faith. Negotiation, after all, implies that something of value will be bargained. Therefore, objectives and outcomes must be limited in terms of the enemy's interests as well as those of friendly countries. It has been suggested that the most important single factor in precipitating nations' going to war is misperception. ²⁵ Conveying of intent and understanding is the predominant issue in nuclear operation, short of a general nuclear war.

It seems clear that the importance of political perceptions increases as the level of conflict intensifies. Therefore political reading and signaling of perceptions is a necessary addition to military intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions.

Political constraints stemming from nuclear bargaining objectives also apply use of military forces at lower levels violence. This is true particularly in Asia, because the ending of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam has reduced military resources to achieve a wide range of nonmilitary objectives. Threats of political instability or economic collapse in the face of strategic pressures from Communist nuclear powers are powerful strategic challenges. How can military forces be used effectively to neutralize these threats?

THIS DISCUSSION has briefly outlined a possible answer. There is a critical need to apply military resources to the pursuit of nonmilitary objectives, within a framework of deterrent strength. Adaptation of the political considerations of nuclear bargaining would enable evaluation of weapons, forces, and bases for negotiation as well as for regional defense. Enemy perceptions and likely responses should be an essential element of intelligence collection and evaluation.

This discussion also has suggested that current doctrines for employment are not adequate guidance for nonmilitary objectives. They assume that the political decisions of military engagement will be issued instantaneously, and separately from questions of military employment.²⁶ Obviously, in limited crises that do not threaten national survival, such decisions will never be quick or easy. They cannot be reached in isolation from either political factors on the one hand or military capabilities on the other. Rather, these decisions will depend on the responsiveness of military forces to counter a myriad of nonmilitary threats or challenges. They will also depend on the politico-military acumen of the commanders who advise national political authorities. Perhaps the quality of such advice is the real test of the military professional at the highest levels.²⁷

A renewed effort to grapple with the politico-military policy issues could focus on existing doctrines as well as the debate over current force levels and weapon systems. The problem, of course, is broader than simply a rewriting of basic military service doctrines. Its solution will require new appreciation for the nonmilitary impact of military forces in a changing world arena. The continued future strategic defense and national security of the United States will be enhanced by its ability to develop new military concepts, force structures, and weaponry designed to cope with this critical relationship of political and military forces.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 75 ff.

2. Seyom Brown, New Forces in World Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 3 ff.

3. S. T. Cohen, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapon Policy," Air University Review, January-February 1975, pp. 15,21.

4. Charles L. Schultze, "Economic Content of National Security Policy "Foreign Affairs, April 1973, pp 528-29.

5. Walter F. Mondale, "Beyond Détente: Toward International Economic Security, "Foreign Affairs, October 1974, pp. 2, 7.

6. James A. Barber, Jr., Commander, USN, "Use and Nonuse of Military Force," paper presented to the Second Biennial Conference of the ISA Section on Military Studies, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 31 October-2 November 1974, p. 2. Quoted by permission.

7. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, "US-Soviet Relations," testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 September 1974, published in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, no. 11-1974, AFRP 190-2, Department of the Air Force, Internal Information Division, November 1974, p. 3.

8. President Gerald Ford, speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Chicago, 19 August 1974, quoted in Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, AFRP 190-1, Department of the Air Force, Internal Information Division, 15 September 1974.

9. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JCS Chairman's Posture Statement," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 7 February 1974, published in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, no. 3-1974, AFRP 190-2, Department of the Air Force, Internal Information Division, March 1974, p. l8.

10. John L. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, statement to the House Armed Services Committee, 19 February 1974, quoted in Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, AFRP 190-1, Department of the Air Force, Internal Information Division, 1 March 1974.

11. Laurence Martin, "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine—an Initial Interpretation," Survival, July/August 1974, p. 161.

12. Garry D. Brewer, Gaming: Prospective for Forecasting (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1974), p. 42. Brewer attributes this idea to a conversation with Thomas Schelling. The political utility of the B-1 was obliquely considered in the 1974 classified study carried out by an Air Force group for Congress. A summarized report of the study is Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Two Strategic Programs Key to Air Force Outlook," Aviation Week, 17 March 1975, pp. 26-27. A Congressional response by Senator Thomas J. McIntyre charged that the B-1 study proved only that the B-1 could attack enemy missile bases, instead of finding how to "destroy political-economic targets" most easily and cheaply. See the Chicago Tribune, 19 March 1975, p. 17.

13. Paul R. Schratz, "The Emerging Structure of American Defense," paper presented to the Second Biennial Conference of the ISA Section on Military Studies, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 31 October-2 November 1974, p. 14. (Published, in substance, as an article entitled "The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization" in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1975.) Quoted by permission.

14. Department of the Army Manual, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, October 1973, revised supplement, July 1974, paragraphs 1-3 and 1-12.

15. Citations in parentheses refer to United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, AFM 1-1, Department of the Air Force, Washington, 15 January 1975.

16. Samuel P. Huntington, "After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 406, March 1973, pp. 4, 6, &-9.

17. Major General William Y. Smith, "Arms, Arms Control and Strategy," paper presented to the Second Biennial Conference of the ISA Section on Military Studies, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 31 October-2 November 1974, p. 12. Quoted by permission.

18. Huntington, p. 8.

19. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 2, 32-34.

20. Barber, p. 17. For another account from a different perspective, see Nadar Safran, "Engagement in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, October 1974, pp. 61-62.

21. Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," Chapter Ten in Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 218.

22. Schelling, pp. 11, 136, 216.

23. Sun Tzu, Art of War, Griffith Translation, quoted by Barber, p. 8.

24. United States Air Force Strategic Aerospace Operations, AFM 2-11, Department of the Air Force, Washington, Change 1, 25 September 1972, para 2-3.

25. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York: St. Martins Press, 1974), pp. 3 ff.

26. Schratz, pp. 9-10.

27. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Ret), "The Military Professional," Air University Review, January-February 1975, p. 11.

Lieutenant Colonel Joel J. Snyder, USAF (Ret), (M.S., George Washington University; M.A., University of Hawaii) was a political-military affairs officer assigned to the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; at the time of his retirement in July 1975. Prior to that he served as an intelligence officer at Hq CINCPAC and as an adviser to the Hq Vietnamese Air Force Intelligence Directorate. Other assignments were in tactical reconnaissance and target intelligence and as an instructor at Squadron Officer School. Colonel Snyder has published two previous articles in the Review. He is now Academic Vice-President of International College, Honolulu, Hawaii.

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