Document created: 4 September 03
Air University Review, September-October
1975
More than Just an Airlift
Every year the U.S. Air Force cooperates with the U. S. Army for the massive airlift of American dual-based forces from the United States to forward bases in Europe. The annual exercise is called Reforger, an acronym for “Redeployment of forces to Germany.” It is a complex logistical operations involving Military Airlift Command aircrews, who shuttle between the United States and air bases in Germany.
Reforger 1974, the sixth such airlift operation, is being hailed by officials as the most successful to date. More than 12,000 men and 1261 tons of equipment were flown from bases in the U.S. to Ramstein, Rhein-Main, and Echterdingen airfields in Germany.
Once in Germany, the soldiers, from two brigades of the 1st Armored Division joined with Canadian, German, and Europe-based American Army units for a field training exercise called “Certain Pledge.” During the 11-day exercise, the combined force of more than 40,000 men practiced the role they would fill should the Warsaw Pact launch an attack against the West.
The intent of this article is not to detail the success of Reforger 1974 but rather to point out that military men often becomes so involved with the means that the ends may become lost amid an impressive welter of statistics. If we judge Reforger simply by how many men, how much equipment, how fast the transportation, or how many sorties, the critical principle upon which reforger is based becomes hazy.
Instead, we must evaluate Reforger from a strategical or political viewpoint. Reforger then symbolizes far more than just the regular practice of modern tools of war. Reforger is, in the final analysis, one of the cornerstones of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s philosophy of flexible deterrence.
From a NATO point of view, the Reforger exercise yields military dividends that are rather hard to calculate but whose implications are profound.
To begin with, the orthodox military considerations of Reforger create an operational nightmare for the Soviet/Warsaw Pact planner who might be charged with calculating the necessary force levels for an invasion of Central Region territory.
NATO commanders are confident that their in-place defensive forces cannot be overcome without extensive Warsaw Pact buildup behind the demarcation line but in close proximity to it. Such a strengthening of Eastern assault forces would automatically sound a warning bell to NATO intelligence sources. The time required for the Warsaw Pact to bolster its force levels would then yield the vital warning period in which the West can use the proven flexibility of Reforger-perfected aerial reinforcement to beef up NATO’s on-the-spot forces quickly.
The heart of the problem confronting a potential enemy planner is the complex “Reforger factor.” Although the factor is multifaceted, the mechanics of the problem can be reduced to basic mathematics.
Most strategists have concluded that an aggressor must possess an overall
force advantage of 3 to 1 if he is to have a reasonable chance of winning a
conflict. A brief comparison of unit strength between American and Warsaw Pact
ground units illuminates the essential importance of the Reforger factor in
enemy military calculations.1
A Soviet armored division, for example, is listed as 9000 men and 335 tanks. The American armored equivalent, however, consists of 15,400 men and 351 tanks. Each U.S. division is formed from three brigades, each totaling approximately 5000 men and 117 tanks.
On the basis of the 3 to 1 overall force advantage required, it becomes apparent that for every armored brigade deployed from the U.S. to forward positions in Europe, the Soviet Union must allocate an additional 12/3 armored divisions. For every full U.S. armored division brought to Europe, the enemy must counter with an additional five full armored divisions.
The deployment of all three U.S. divisions earmarked as reserve for U.S. Army Europe would require a l5-division force in enemy planning. This would be a mammoth logistical task, even considering the shorter lines of communication enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact.
Additionally, the enemy strategist must now try to establish predetermined objectives for his assault forces without knowing for certain what kind of resistance they will face or even where the defensive force reserve will be employed. He must also try to fix time requirements based on a series of unknowns: how many combat troops will be deployed and what kind (infantry, armor, or airborne), where will they be used, how quickly will they be ready for battle, and whether they will be offensive or defensive in nature, to name just a few.
Other important considerations also have a bearing, not the least of which is the three-brigade ready-reaction force of the British Army that is dual-based in England. This force can be moved to the Continent and ready for action in a matter of days. Nor does this take into account the reserve forces of other Central Region nations.
One other spectre must lurk in the minds of their planners: the American forces that may be deployed are as strong in an offensive role as they are on defense. That poses the critical question of flank protection for assault forces and the possibility of counterattack by NATO forces. This offensive implication of American forces that might be rushed to Europe is a major roadblock to an effective invasion plan based on a headlong Russian plunge to the West with its resultant weak flanks.
Calculations such as 3 to 1 overall force advantage, number of brigades available for deployment, reinforcement times, etc., are, of course, abstract figures that can be viewed only as a beginning point for discussion. It is a military reality, however, that planning demands a concrete starting point from which all other factors flow. The Reforger factor robs the enemy of certain vital information, such as knowing how many, how fast, and where the reserves will flow into Europe to man forward defensive positions. This uncertainty alone is a vital element in the deterrent effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.
Pact planners faced with the Reforger factor must therefore carefully consider their alternatives. If they are to crank into their data the potential reserves that can be funneled quickly from the United States to Europe, they will be faced with two logical choices: (1) they can assign very limited objectives to forward forces presently in place; or (2) they can go for a massive overkill capability in the assault force to take into account the possibility of strong American reserve forces being deployed from the U.S.
Limiting the campaign objectives is not an appealing choke because the aggressor would risk the chance of a general war to achieve gains that would not be worth the possible consequences. Furthermore, a campaign of limited objectives carried out by Warsaw Pact forces now in forward positions along the demarcation line—estimated to be some 56 divisions—would most certainly be stopped cold by NATO forces presently in place. A cardinal rule of military operations is to concentrate one’s force at the point of attack. Concentration, however, takes time and gives warning to the defender. If we assume that the Warsaw Pact would therefore launch a surprise attack without force concentration, it would of necessity be conducted piecemeal along the entire front. That would be a suicidal form of military strategy, and you can be sure they know it.
A massive overkill conducted by huge Warsaw Pact forces is a scheme that well suits Soviet military operational characteristics. What makes such a stratagem unlikely is that the massing of huge forces would be like a road map to their intentions—something the West could hardly overlook.
In addition, enormous troop marshaling areas would present lucrative targets for counterattack by the West.
In short, no matter which alternative the Pact planner considers, the Reforger factor sends him back to square one: no logical chance of certain success that would warrant the risks involved. Take away the Reforger factor and you have removed one of the basic building blocks to the credibility of the NATO defensive deterrent.
Reforger must also be examined in regard to its psychological value in Central Region defensive strategy. The fact that American dual-based forces are returned annually to Europe is vital in reinforcing the credibility of NATO’s deterrent in the minds of the Warsaw Pact.
Donald Atwell Zoll, writing in Strategic Review, defined a special
need that is filled by Reforger: “Another object of strategy,” he wrote, “is to
provide an explicit military demonstration of the political resolution of the
national will. Collective security arrangements require the occasional ‘combat’
demonstration on the part of such a collective alliance system.”2
The success of any defensive alliance based on deterrence is inescapably linked with its own credibility. Modern military strategy demands believability by the other side if that strategy is to be effective. Reforger demonstrates in practical, easy-to-understand terms that the credibility of NATO’S flexible response is not limited to decisions that will be made on some future battlefield. The annual Reforger operation sounds a clear warning to the East that nations of the West will not tolerate aggression; that NATO’S military capabilities are as strong in time of detente as in time of crisis.
General Michael S. Davison, former commander of U. S. Army Europe, pointed
out the psychological necessity of Reforger when he stated: “Without exercising
the capability annually, it will erode not only in terms of the Army’s
expertise, but also in the minds of our. . potential enemies.”3
The Vicomte de Turenne wrote that strategy is the art of influencing the enemy so that he will change his mind and leave the battlefield. Reforger serves this axiom by helping to persuade the Warsaw Pact not to come in the first place.
The political aspects of Reforger are also crucial in helping NATO to maintain its deterrent against Soviet aggression. Yet the political implications of the Reforger exercise are perhaps the least recognized.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was fond of telling his staff officers that “preparedness is the key to success and victory.” In this regard the Reforger exercise fills a political requirement that transcends the physical act of transporting troops and equipment to Europe for annual maneuvers.
One of the basic weak spots in the dual-basing philosophy is the speed with which political decisions are made actually to begin the redeployment. This time factor is crucial in times of real tension. It is a question that goes directly to the core of how effective the dual-basing concept will be if it ever needs to be put to the acid test.
Defense Minister Georg Leber of West Germany defined the political aspects
of the problem: “If, in times of tension, American troops had to be redeployed
to Europe, this would confront the U.S. government with a difficult political
decision between the possibilities of failing to move up the necessary
reinforcements in time, or of escalating a critical situation by early action.”
4
It is not difficult to tell when something is too late; however, how does one judge when something is too early?
The failure to exploit quickly the Allied landings at Anzio during the Italian campaign of World War II points out how opportunity can be lost by waiting. At the other extreme, the Canadian debacle at Dieppe in August 1942 paints a vivid picture of the results of “too early.”
The judgment that will have to be exercised if and when East and West stand on the brink of armed confrontation is purely political in nature; the military consequences that will ride on the decisions made are critical in the extreme. For example, what would have been the Soviet reaction if American dual-based forces had been rushed to Europe during the 1968 Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia? The West could have justified such a move as prudent military precaution. Would the Soviets have taken the action in the same spirit? Or would they have concluded that the West was preparing for a quick pre-emptive attack while Soviet forces were busy in the streets of Prague?
It may seem remote in this age of détente, jet plane diplomacy, and Washington-Moscow hot lines that the Soviet Union could ever make such a tragic mistake. Yet history is filled with wars that were fought because of errors in judgment.
There is always the chance, slight though it may be, that the East could misjudge our purpose if dual-based forces were suddenly returned to Europe during an international crisis. Given the historical Russian mistrust of Western intentions, it becomes impossible to rule out completely the chance of a Soviet overreaction. Far too often we fail to perceive an action through the eyes of those toward whom the action is directed.
The “too early” consideration is especially critical should events in the East give the appearance that a Western move might be made to aid a Russian satellite country—Yugoslavia, for example—at a moment when the Soviets were in the process of enforcing their political grasp on that country, as in Hungary or Poland (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968).
Reforger directly attacks this time element problem in the dual-basing deployment strategy. By practicing the movement of forces to Europe each year, political leaders and military planners in the United States can develop realistic parameters within which the political decision-making process can operate.
For an American president and his advisers to form logical thresholds for decisions with which they may be faced, they must know how long it will take the dual-based forces to get into their European positions. Once the parameters are established, the diplomats have room for maneuver.
Once the last critical deployment threshold is reached, the political leaders will know that it is time to stop talking and start rattling the dual-based sword. It is, ultimately, the military power of a nation that prevents war when efforts at the diplomatic level have failed. We live in an age of negotiation and rational approach to problems between conflicting national ideologies.
The importance of negotiation as an alternative to constant military confrontation was clearly identified in the Nixon Doctrine by its approach to the realities of the nuclear age. As former President Richard M. Nixon explained his view of international relations:
The classic concept of balance of
power included continual maneuvering for marginal advantages over others. In
the nuclear era this is both unrealistic and dangerous. It is unrealistic
because when both sides possess such enormous power, small additional
increments cannot be translated into tangible advantage or even usable
political strength. And it is dangerous because attempts to seek tactical gains
might lead to a confrontation which could be catastrophic.5
Mr. Nixon qualified this philosophy by reminding that détente does not imply
that military capability is no longer necessary. “They require vigilance and
firmness and exertion,” he said. “Nothing would be more dangerous than
to assume prematurely that dangers have disappeared.”6
The benefits of a new foreign policy must be balanced against the requirements to support that policy. If the United States is to move away from the traditional “balance of power” philosophy in foreign affairs, then new methods of employing our military capability must come to the forefront. In addition, the United States incurs a special responsibility to its allies: it must put credibility in its commitment.
One highly visible method of reconfirming our commitment to the NATO Alliance is by the annual redeployment of dual-based forces to Europe. Those C-5A Galaxy and C-141 Starlifter transports carry far more than men and equipment when they make that long journey across the Atlantic. They are bringing to Europe a symbolic reminder that our pledge to help maintain a free and sovereign Europe is as strong today as it was in 1949 when the NATO partnership was formed. The fact that American forces return each year helps strengthen in the eyes of Europeans, and confirm in the eyes of the world, that the U.S. commitment to its allies remains unaltered.
Besides this result of Reforger, the practice gained by air transport personnel and Army combat forces sharpens the skills needed to make dual-basing a flexible tool in the hands of the political leaders of the United States. Should a crisis arise, they, in consultation with their European allies, can use Reforger to the degree necessary under the circumstances: a single battalion might be deployed in one instance to halt a crisis, while a full division might be the last step before full mobilization were declared.
Military capability has always played a vital role in the foreign policy of the United States. From the gunboat diplomacy of the late nineteenth century to the Cuban confrontation of the 1960s, it has been the military potential of the United States that has put muscle into its foreign policy. Reforger serves the same need but in a more flexible, less brutal manner. Its means are as much implied as demonstrated, but its significance to détente is critical in this age of nuclear overkill potential.
Hq Allied Forces Central Europe
Notes
1. Unit strength comparisons are based on data found in “The Military Balance 1973-1974,” published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p. 80.
2. Donald Atwell Zoll, “New Aspects of Strategy,” Strategy Review, Fall 1978, p. 43.
3. A quoted by David Minthorn, “Reforger ‘74 Maneuver Not Satisfying Strategist,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 31, 1974.
4. Georg Leber, “Defence Is Definitely a Two-Way Street,” Transatlantic Crisis: Europe & America in the ‘70s, p. 105.
5. Richard Nixon, “U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace,” a report to Congress, May 3, l973.
6. Ibid.
Master Sergeant Dick Larsen is a writer for the Public Information Office, Hq Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The Netherlands. He served five years as a photographer and had assignments in England, Vietnam, and the United States. In Vietnam as journalist and combat historian, he was named best combat historian in Vietnam for two consecutive quarters. He is author of more than 20 magazine articles in Air University Review, Army, Airman, British Army Review, Air Force Magazine, etc.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position
of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or
the Air University.
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