Document created: 15 September 03
Air University Review, November-December
1975
a cargo capability shortfall
AIRLIFT is one our key national assets, like manpower, industrial capacity, technology, even the gold at Fort Knox. The United States faces the most difficult challenges for airlift of any country on earth, in case of a major war.
One of the top-priority programs needed by the armed forces is added muscle for America’s strategic airlift force. We are in a period of vexing economic problems that demand employment of the most efficient ways to meet defense requirements effectively. Enhancement of our airlift capability for cargo and equipment is an important step in acquiring that kind of efficient force.
Over half of today’s strategic airlift capability is represented by a turbine-powered force of C-5s and C-141s that numbers just over 300, together with about 290 of the smaller C-130 tactical airlifters, some of which could be used in the initial stages of a crisis deployment before converting to their theater airlift role. All are assets of the United States Air Force’s Military Airlift Command (MAC), which manages Department of Defense airlift worldwide.
The other—and equally essential—part of our national emergency airlift capability is provided through a contractual arrangement with twenty civil air carriers to provide both peacetime and greatly increased emergency airlift services for DOD personnel and materiel. These nearly 340 turbine-powered commercial airliners, of which about 245 are of the long-range intercontinental variety, can almost double MAC’S long-range crisis airlift capability if fully activated as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
So, at a glance, it appears that the United States possesses the world’s greatest strategic airlift armada, by far. But, on the closer examination, the shocking fact is that this nation does not have enough strategic cargo airlift, also by far, especially in terms of civil augmentation of the military force. Here’s why.
One of the cornerstones of the military “right arm” that backs up our diplomats in the conduct of foreign relations is the policy of strategic mobility. This is the capability for the United States to apply its armed forces in the right combinations of men and equipment, wherever they are needed, if diplomacy should fail and armed conflict were to break out.
How do we do this? There would seem to be four choices open to us:
But there is the obvious point that these caches of American arms would make ideal targets for an attacking enemy. It must also be recognized that this approach would be almost prohibitively expensive in terms of the duplication necessary to keep equipment stored overseas while providing identical equipment to the fighting units for training purposes at home. In addition, who can say whether the fight will take place in a location reasonably convenient to our storage points?
Only air power can deliver quickly the reinforcements that can dramatically affect the outcome of an operation. It is in this ability to respond to the initial surge requirements in the early days of an emergency that the nation’s strategic airlift capability must be increased. Unfortunately, this surge capability is, at present, a constant value that has a finite capability to expand in a crisis. While we have an impressive usable capability in our force of military cargo aircraft, economic considerations and Congressional guidelines restrict MAC in aircrew-manning ratios and flying-hour utilization rates, which directly relate to our surge capability duration. Conversely, the commercial carriers have sufficient aircrews and support facilities to expand flying-hour capability, but they do not have the necessary cargo-capable aircraft in sufficient numbers to provide all the augmentation needed.
The most cost-effective and practical solution at this time would be to provide for greater emergency oversize-cargo capability from this country’s civil airline fleet. In other words, we need to buy a standby civil cargo capability. The need is not to “take over” civilian aircraft but simply to modify existing long-range, wide-bodied passenger aircraft and program the modifications into the newer jumbos that are not yet built, so that they could be quickly and easily converted to military airlifters capable of moving vehicles and large cargo, as well as smaller bulk cargo items.
Some commercial augmentation of the MAC force is already an everyday
occurrence. It reached a peak of 3.6 billion ton-miles per year in 1968
and 1969, at the Vietnam war’s peak, and today it runs about 900 million
ton-miles annually. Even without the modifications we’d like to see in the
civil aircraft, the CRAF still represents about half of the nation’s wartime
strategic airlift capability and can provide up to 14 ½ million cargo ton-miles
and 7 ½ million passenger ton-miles a day.
But that is far short of the capability that is desirable to counter a full-scale European contingency. The majority of the aircraft available to the CRAF today are passenger-only varieties. Though there is plenty of space in their main deck compartments, floor strengths and door-size limitations render movement of oversize and outsize items impossible. And that’s the crux of the problem.
The proposal the Department of Defense is taking to the Congress is to modify the equivalent of 110 or more Boeing 747-type passenger aircraft (the 747, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10, and the Lockheed L-1011) by installing either a nose or side cargo door and a cargo floor or a treadway flooring system to accommodate vehicles. While the DOD must retain its unique airlift capacity and characteristic to deal with strictly military considerations, nonetheless portions of the requirement to meet foreseeable contingencies can be satisfied through judicious application of selected U.S. civil air carrier resources. To date, the civil cargo industry has not generated the requirements for new outsize-capable cargo aircraft suitable to both military and civil use, but such aircraft are on the horizon. In the meantime, the CRAF modification program remains the most cost-effective manner of acquiring that important reservoir of cargo airlift needed to move ready fighting forces. To more than double our emergency cargo capability within the DOD would require very high dollar expenditures, while the same capability could be obtained at relatively low cost through modification of selected civil aircraft. The savings result from the civil carrier’s absorbing the normal peacetime cost of operating aircraft and paying for maintenance, crew, overhead, and system support functions. The government investment includes the price of the modification and the additional operating and maintenance expenses resulting from operating the modified aircraft at a higher gross weight. Conservative estimates are that to produce the same airlift capability through organic Air Force means would cost a minimum of thirteen times the estimated cost of the proposed airlift modification and enhancement program. Thus, that program is the most cost effective way of improving the national strategic cargo airlift capability. It can provide a potentially meaningful improvement in our nation’s ability to deploy quickly the military forces and supplies required during an emergency.
Except in time of crisis, the modified airlifters would be operated in their normal civilian role by the commercial carriers. The carrier would retain ownership and would be paid at Civil Aeronautics Board rates for assisting the military during an emergency.
With this added airlift capacity, we would enhance our ability to provide balanced emergency deployments of land or air fighting forces, delivering the right people and the right supplies and equipment on a timely basis to the right place simultaneously. For example, during a 30-day deployment period, we could halve the time to deploy or double the numbers deployed in the same amount of time, or we could provide the capacity to transport high-priority items by air that are now relegated to the slower sealift mode, whichever the events of the moment demanded.
Of course, modification of existing aircraft must be viewed as a near-term solution to this airlift enhancement problem.
Complementing the CRAF modification plan are other proposals to increase our cargo airlift capability. These include requirements to modify our existing military strategic airlift aircraft. Also there is the need for acquiring additional advanced ground-handling equipment; rapid response depends on the proper equipment to onload and offload the aircraft.
Two proposed new military aircraft are also key elements of the plan to develop additional cargo capability. They are the Advanced Tanker-Cargo Aircraft (ATCA) and the Advanced Medium Short Takeoff and Landing Transport (AMST).
Procurement of the ATCA will enhance the responsiveness of our strategic military airlift force by making air refueling more readily available. This, in turn, will reduce our reliance on enroute bases and allow us the flexibility to skirt countries that might deny overflight rights. It will also allow us to increase cargo loads in many cases.
The new Advanced Medium Short Takeoff and Landing Transport, currently in prototype development by both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, is essential to improved cargo airlift capability. The planned capabilities of this new airlifter would feature the ability to operate from runways as short as 2000 feet, with up to 40,000-pound payloads. At reduced load factors, using longer runways, the aircraft will carry outsized cargo weighing more than 60,000 pounds. A production version of the prototype should be able to carry a 50,000-pound payload 2600 nautical miles without refueling. The McDonnell Douglas YC-15 prototype rolled out this August and is in flight test now.
While these new military aircraft are essential for the future, more must also be done in long-term improvements to the civilian air cargo fleet. The most ideal solution for the period ten to 15 years from now, and beyond, is development by industry of a completely new generation of freighters designed exclusively for the cargo market. (Today’s civil freighters are no more than passenger aircraft modified to move freight.) This new concept for a cargo aircraft requires considerable mushrooming of the commercial air freight market, an expansion which was forecast for the ‘60s and ‘70s but which has failed as yet to reach expectations.
If industry increases its demands for air transportation of goods sufficiently to inspire development of the new aircraft—it appears inevitable that that time will come—and if the military’s requirements are taken into consideration during the early design phases of the development, an aircraft could be built that would satisfy the needs of both the armed forces and industry, at little additional cost.
MAC has made information available to the aircraft industry as to those characteristics and requirements needed and desired in order for such an advanced aircraft to perform both the military and civil cargo roles most effectively.
One interesting and potentially effective idea in the civilian domain is embodied in the International Husky Corporation’s concept for air freighters. One of these pure freighter aircraft is envisioned as capable of airlifting a 200,000-pound payload over intercontinental routes. As part of a total air distribution system, the Husky concept involves not only a special freighter aircraft but also automated loading facilities, the supply and control of bimodal containers, support capabilities, a sophisticated service for logistics reservations and control for heavy freight, and a simple and efficient land/sea interface.
Most of the basic research and development necessary to produce this new generation of cargo aircraft has been done. No startling breakthroughs are needed on the technological front.
A breakthrough that is needed, however, lies in the legislative area. Enabling legislation will be required before all aspects of the airlift enhancement program can be realized.
DOD has proposed that airlines be compensated for the downtime of the aircraft during modification and for out-of-pocket expenses incurred because of the added weight of the modified aircraft. In addition, there would be an added payment for each such modified aircraft committed to CRAF. Approval of this program is fundamental to the nation’s ability to deter aggression with conventional forces. This approach will exploit existing national assets at a fraction of the cost of acquiring new organic military aircraft.
No one, not even the staunchest air power advocate, would claim that airlift will be able to do it all in an emergency. Even at the peak of the Vietnam war, less than ten percent of our supplies and equipment moved by air. But it was this small percentage, which was so highly responsive, that made the important difference in the conduct of operations. During the much publicized Israeli airlift of late 1973, sealift actually transported three-quarters of the total tonnage America supplied the Israelis. However, airlift provided the crucial supplies and equipment that were needed in hours, not days. In fact, the airlift was virtually complete when the cease fire was signed, but sealift had scarcely begun.
Presumably, over the long run, the same would be true in a future contingency, with sealift moving the overwhelming majority of the cargo but with airlift bearing the initial brunt. (Control of the seas would still be vital, and its loss would immensely increase the reliance on airlift.)
The Middle East example also provides dramatic evidence that airlift can allow us to affect the outcome of some wars without involving American combat troops.
EFFICIENT, RESPONSIVE airlift is a national asset upon which we must be able to count fully in times of crisis. We have a fine military airlift force in MAC. But the aircraft of our civil carriers must be able to convert to a military role effectively, if we are to meet the demands that may be placed upon us.
Thus, support of our airlift enhancement efforts, both military and civil, is essential to our national interest.
The problems are complex and time-consuming, but the steps already taken plus support of those proposed, should provide for a better balance between military and civil capabilities. To achieve this important balance, we need better understanding by all those involved; we need legislation that will enable future progress to insure our continuing leadership in global air mobility; and finally, we need the Civil Reserve Air Fleet modifications as an important near-term solution to our cargo airlift shortfall.
The military’s requirement is only a portion of the total national need for airlift. Every facet of our economy, and numerous official agencies, must become involved if our country is to overcome this problem. The national deficit in cargo airlift capability requires a broad solution, and government and industry must cooperate in reaching that solution if our nation is to maintain its industrial and military punch. Indeed, we must maintain that punch if we expect to be able to control our own national destiny.
Hq Military Airlift Command
Contributor
General Paul K. Carlton is Commander of the Military Airlift Command, Commissioned in April 1942, he was a B-17 instructor pilot with Air Training Command until 1944 when he flew B-29s against Japan. Since World War II he has served principally in Strategic Air Command: with the first atomic bomb organization; as aide-de-camp to General Curtis LeMay; as Deputy Commander, 93d Bombardment Wing; Commander, 4126th Strategic Wing, 379th Bombardment Wing, and 305th Bombardment Wing; at Hq SAC as Assistant Deputy and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; and as Commander, 1st Strategic Aerospace Division, then at Fifteenth Air Force until September 1972, when he assumed command of MAC. A command pilot with more than 12,000 flying hours, General Carlton is a graduate of National War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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