Document created: 2 September 03
Air University Review, May-June 1975

The Other SOS

For a generation of Air Force officers, the abbreviation "SOS" has meant the school at Maxwell Air Force Base where lieutenants and captains advance their careers through professional military education. Also, as a molder of character and a seasoning experience for junior officers, Squadron Officer School has done its job well. But this article is not a chronicle of Squadron Officer School’s achievements; rather, it is a look at the "other SOS."

The "other SOS" is the Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field in a part of west Florida known as the Playground area. Hurlburt Field is officially designated Auxiliary Field #9 of Eglin AFB, which somehow implies that the activities there art connected with the Air Force Systems command’s functions at Eglinmain. In fact, Hurlburt is a Tactical Air Command base, managed by the 834 Tactical Composite Wing (TCOMPW) and has the responsibility to organize, administer, train, and operate forces in the conduct of Air Force Special Operations. It also acts as the USAF focal point for Air Force Special Operations matters. The Special Operations School, part of the 834 TCOMPW, not only assists the wing in training its forces but also serves as a source for developing and evaluating doctrine to support its mission. (The 834 TCOMPW will be redesignated 1st Special Operations Wing on 1 July 1975.)

This other SOS has been jokingly referred to by some of the staff as "TAG's Ivory Tower." Although that description is not accurate, it does convey the notion that the school is not a tactics school in the usual sense but an academically oriented institution.

The SOS catalog has the usual stuffy mission statement which says that the school is " . . . to provide selected personnel with a knowledge of the geographic, psychological, sociological, and military implications of . . .," and that is about as far as most people read. School catalogs are sterile instruments that rarely reflect a school's distinguishing character, guiding beliefs, or the nature of its instruction. What, then, are the springs that make the Special Operations School vibrate?

The commonality of the two SOS’s extends to their like origins within Air University, both having been spawned by AU at different times and for different purposes. The first was instituted to train and develop leaders for a fledgling Air Force, the second to meet the unique challenges of a new method of warfare. When "wars of national liberation" and "people's war" burst on the international scene in the early sixties, the U.S. military, from both the viewpoint of tactical doctrine and military forces, was geared mainly to fight either a World War II type of conventional war or an all-out nuclear war. In spite of the fact that our great nation had grown out of a revolutionary experience, we found the concept of political warfare to be an unsettling challenge. How to cope? How to respond? Those were the questions. Insurgency and counterinsurgency were coined as the labels to be affixed to the threat on the one hand and the solution on the other.

Many from the vantage point of the mid-seventies say that Khrushchev's 1961 "Wars of National Liberation" speech was directed toward the Chinese, who had accused the Russians of going soft on revolution. We overreacted to the nature of the threat, so say the critics of our Vietnam involvement, as we also did to Lin Piao's pronouncement on "people’s war" in 1965. That statement, it is concluded, was to settle internal debate and to let other revolutionaries know (presumably the Vietnamese) chat "self-reliance" would he the name of the game in the future. With 20/20 hindsight, much of the debate surrounding the efficacy of establishing special military forces to counter an insurgent threat may seem like so much rhetoric now. Nevertheless, the perceived threat during the early sixties seemed to justify unhesitatingly a unique response to an uncommon challenge. The gauntlet had been tossed down; it was up to us to pick it up! Some alternative to thermonuclear war had to be found; thus the doctrine of flexible response and its corollary, counterinsurgency, came into being.

The impetus for military response grew out of President Kennedy's direction in January 1962 to establish at the national level the Special Group Counter-Insurgency (CI). Among other things, this group was charged (1) to insure that subversive insurgency as a political-military conflict was recognized as being of equal importance to other forms of conflict; and (2), further, to insure that its threat was reflected in the organization and training of the armed forces, particularly among the more senior officers and service schools.

Three months after the implementing directive (National Security Action Memorandum #131, March 1962) was promulgated, the first Air Force Counter-Insurgency Course was conducted by the Air University's Air Command and Staff College on a one-time basis. By the fall of the same year, AU had been directed to conduct a regular Counterinsurgency Course for assignees to attaché position to Military Assistance Advisory Group and to the Second Air Division in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the Special Operation Force concept was being developed Hurlburt Field under programs known as Project Farmgate, Jungle Jim, and later the Air Commandos. This group and its subsequent evolutionary organizational forms, was charged with the responsibility for establishing counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, testing its concepts, developing the necessary hardware, and selecting the personnel needed to do the job.

To fulfill training need, in October 1964 a Special Air Warfare Indoctrination Course (SAWIC) was inaugurated by the Special Air Warfare Center and was conducted jointly with the Air University and the Air Ground Operations School at Hurlburt Field. This course and the Counterinsurgency Course were destined to meet in the then evolving Special Operations Force's school by December 1966, when COIN training was transferred from AU to TAC at Hurlburt Field. Instruction in the SAWIC, renamed Southeast Asia Orientation Course (SEAOC), and in the COIN course was quite understandably slanted toward the conflict in particularly Vietnam. The SEAOC was structured for aircrews, whereas the COIN course was geared to the broader aspects the political, social, and economic uses of insurgent movements in general and Communist insurgencies in particular. To build a broad philosophical base, as well as to enhance the prestige of the course, prominent members of the academic community, the State Department, various government agencies, and military services helped develop the course and still lecture regularly in the COIN course. Over the years this approach, matched with a well-educated experienced in-house faculty, has helped to produce a high degree of academic excellence. The COIN course's read recognition throughout the services as a professionally conducted one is a tribute to the dedicated efforts of scores of people.

As the conflict in Southeast Asia wound down, the thrust of the COIN course was shifted from the relatively respective of Indochina to the world at large. Understandably, today some analysts view the future of insurgent movements with skepticism. Chalmers Johnson, in his book Autopsy on People's War; makes a strong case for the demise of revolutionary warfare while at the same time allowing that ". . . some staff officers of Western 'Special Warfare' schools, will find it impossible to agree that an autopsy on people's war is as yet appropriate."

Realistically, we must admit that dissatisfaction among the people of the world is on the rise. Urban guerrilla movements are replacing peasant-based insurgencies. When one looks around the world today he finds much fertile ground to nurture the seeds of revolutionary warfare, which is without doubt a potent force in the human experience. The Communists believe in the inevitability of revolution; that is the message of their slogan, "Long Live the Victory of People's War." It is the nature of history, in their view, and deserves our continued study and attention. As we examine the potential trouble spots throughout the world, we find that the future is not very bright. It is true that some lesser-developed countries (LDC's) are making economic progress, but it is at a rate slower than that of the industrialized nations. The gap is widening, not narrowing. The factors that exacerbate internal strife--inflation, hunger, deprivation--are increasing throughout the world, not diminishing. And modern technology has placed the weapons of war--automatic rifles, hand-held missiles, etc.--within easy reach of dissident groups. These are the themes, the problems, the conditions that continue to be examined in detail in the COIN course.

Since its inception, the COIN course has graduated more than 6000 students. Formerly, most of them were senior officers and middle managers who were on their way to Indochina. Now most are junior officers who are scheduled for Special Operations organizations, intelligence, or similar assignments requiring a knowledge of counterinsurgency. This trend reflects a changing emphasis as priorities are reassessed and experience levels shift.

Just how well has the COIN course succeeded over the years? There is no precise means of proving that its graduates better understand politically motivated and psychologically sensitive warfare as a result of their attendance or that they are better prepared to counter the threat. There are few specific facts or statistics to show that those attending the course are more aware of the goals and aims of insurgents and the problems inherent in transitioning societies. There is little empirical evidence to support the belief that individual attitudes have been changed one way or the other. Nevertheless, the SOS faculty believes that as a forum for debate, a vehicle for study, a medium for the exchange of ideas on the subject of insurgency, it has been a useful experience and must be kept alive and viable within the Air Force framework of education for its officers. We may be sanguine about the future in the light of our disengagement from Vietnam, but a backward look at civilization and human experience does not provide us with the evidence to justify such optimism. It is unlikely that man has finally decided to settle differences through reason, compromise, and an honest respect for differing opinions. The record of history just does not support that view.

Nevertheless, some things do change. One change has been a clear-cut decision on the part of the United States to lower its military profile throughout the world and pursue a policy of encouraging self-reliance in our security assistance programs to the third world. In keeping with the changing world situation and U.S. foreign policy, SOS was tasked in 1971 to develop a Military Assistance Advisory Course (MAAC). This course grew out of a recognition by the Air Staff that security assistance assignees enroute to Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG’s) and Military Groups (MILGps) would be more effective with additional specialized training. (Previously this type of training was given by the Military Assistance Institute, Department of Defense, but was discontinued in 1968.) The MAAC was created as a two-week course, offered ten times per year, to be mandatory for all USAF personnel in the grade of colonel and below en route to MAAG's, MILGps, and military missions. The course strives to assist an adviser in developing motivation, acquiring cultural sensitivity, learning about his country of assignment, and knowing the technical requirements of his job. It is the school's contention that today's ambassadors in blue, whether they be sergeants or colonels, will be better representatives of our country than they have been in the past. Increasing demands are placed upon our people to operate effectively in a foreign culture. Consequently instruction in the MAAC includes not only the security assistance system, its technical programming aspects and procedural details, but also an extensive geographical area and individual-country orientation with special emphasis on how to interact with host country counterparts.

It is recognized that there may be honest and legitimate differences of opinion regarding the best training to be provided a future adviser. Most frequently, selectees to these important jobs are picked on the basis of their proven ability to perform well within the framework of the U.S. military system. But that kind of background does not necessarily provide him with the best experience to operate well within his host country's military establishment. The judgments on the subject are mixed, the results inconclusive. A recent RAND Corporation study on the subject of U.S. Security Assistance stated:

Whether the challenge of developing adequate manpower for the management of Third World security assistance can best be met by existing institutions within the military establishment or will require new service schools and special training assignments overseas is an organizational questions that cannot be easily answered. But just as tailored defense postures and military aid programs are required, specially-tailored training is also needed.¹

It is just that kind of tailored training which the Special Operations School is attempting to provide. Thus far, more than 650 students, including Army and Navy personnel, have attended the MAAC and have been assigned to more than forty countries. Because of the role military attachés have in countries that have no MAAG’s or MILGps, these assignees have been attending the MAAG also, and the future of the MAAC as a valuable course attaches seems well established.

The next course that was added to the expanding course offerings of SOS was he Unconventional Warfare Course (UW). Historically, UW has been a pretty nebulous term, having been defined very broadly at times and very narrowly at others. Unconventional warfare operations, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, involve:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-denied, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional Warfare includes, but it is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct-action missions, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature.²

While UW operations are not confined to low-intensity conflicts and may be used at any level of warfare, they are perhaps best suited in areas requiring limited engagement options. Unconventional warfare is almost exclusively a joint venture, and the role of the Air Force in a UW scenario is to infiltrate personnel, resupply long-range patrols, locate targets for air strikes, and support psychological operations.

SOS developed its one-week UW course in response to Air Staff direction and first offered it in October 1972. Designed primarily as an orientation for those assigned to UW contingency planning positions at various staff levels, the course is presently the focus of USAF unconventional warfare expertise. The curriculum includes historical background of UW, national policies and command responsibilities, U.S. military and paramilitary activities, and responsibilities of different services and nonmilitary agencies in the fields of subversion, evasion and escape, guerrilla warfare, and psychological operations. The course uniquely serves as a forum for the advancement of new UW concepts, as a means of exchanging ideas, as an opportunity for the refinement of doctrine and tactics, and, most significantly, as a means for the resolution of real world UW planning and operational problem areas among students from the unified commands as well as from the different services.

A recent addition to the SOS curriculum is a three-day orientation course provided for personnel en route to assignment in Iran as part of a Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT). Because of the unique status these team members will have in assisting the Iranian armed forces in their modernization and expansion program, some culture and country orientation was necessary. TAFT members are assigned to more than 15 bases in Iran, a country about the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi and having extreme ranges in geography, climate, and development. During the three days these students are at the school, they are treated to a rather intensive exposure to Islamic religion, Muslim culture, and Persian history, as well as the customary instructions on "what to bring," "how to get along," and "what the country looks like." The results of this type of orientation have already paid dividends in the reduction of "culture shock" and friction within the alien environment, better working relationships with the Iranians, and increased productivity by Americans. Recently the course has opened its doors to Army and Navy personnel, who have given, along with Air Force assignees, their wholehearted support to the program. As of the second annual training cycle that ended in August 1974, more than 450 students have attended the TAFT/Iran Orientation Course.

In this respect the SOS is making a significant impact on the whole security assistance concept by helping to train these teams, whether they be short-term Mobile Assistance Teams or longer-duration Technical Assistance Field Teams. Clearly, under current U.S. foreign policy, the emphasis is to provide limited assistance, expertise, training, and materiel. These teams offer a unique capability to pass along advice, assistance, and skills that can be used to train a host country's forces in civic action roles or operational tasks such as upgrade training on new equipment, as in the case of Iran, or using U.S military hardware.

In order to satisfy a long-felt deficiency in the Air Force's arsenal of weapons, SOS has recently developed a psychological operations course which began in January 1975. PSYOP is designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of friendly, uncommitted, or hostile foreign groups to achieve support of national objectives. Many view the Air Force's role in PSYOP as merely a delivery system for leaflets and aerial broadcasts; however, this is an oversimplified, uninformed approach to what can be done in this area, especially in the light of what has been done in recent years in the field of behavioristic psychology and the use of mass media to influence public attitudes. Regrettably, the failure to appreciate the power of psychological operations as a valuable adjunct to waging conflict has been a serious omission since warfare began. In this new intensive week-long course, the school hopes to explore human motivation and behavior and techniques for psychological manipulation ranging from propaganda to psychological actions. The PSYOP capabilities of the other services will be studied, along with the theory and practice of Communist psychological warfare and the application of psychological operations to all forms of conflict.

An ambitious undertaking in the allotted, the course is not primarily e signed for the handful of USAF PSYOP specialists serving in a limited number Pentagon and Unified Command assignments. Instead it is aimed at officers the fields of special operations, intelligence, military civic action, and plans. Through exposure to this course, should more fully appreciate the psychological impact of all military actions and thus be able to magnify the results future military actions through the skillful use of psychological operations.

SOS is one of the few places in the Air Force that has benefited from the Area Specialist Program inaugurated a few years ago. This resident expertise permits the school not only to support all the catalog courses with quality instruction on all the geographical areas of the world but also to have an on-call capability to support area orientation for training teams and for meeting other specialized requirements.

We now see the world as much more complex than we did after World War II when we divided the world into "them and us" on the basis of ideological alignments. The world is comprised of many countries with varied cultures and different historical traditions, interests, and values. Each problem demands a much more sophisticated and specific approach than in the past. Area and country orientation, to include an appreciation for the differences as well as the similarities of other societies relative to our own, can contribute significantly to our overall objectives in the security assistance program.

Which way is the "other SOS" headed in an era of austerity and changing priorities? First, its doors remain open for interested personnel who meet the prerequisites listed in AFM 50-5 to attend its courses. Next, in an age when technology alone is thought to be the solution to all dilemmas, the "other SOS," like Air University's SOS, concentrates on the human element, seeking to show that well-trained people are equally as important as sophisticated weapon systems. In a period of recrimination and despair over the Indochina conflict, SOS seeks to distill the lessons learned and reaffirm the premise that revolutionary warfare is essentially political and therefore must be dealt with in those terms. In the process of readjustment of missions, SOS seeks to preserve a cadre of expertise to train personnel to counter low-intensity operations, specifically unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense operations, in the event such operations will be needed in the future. Faced with the trend toward substituting resource managers for field advisers, SOS hopes to provide assignees to the military assistance program with a broader view of their role in furthering U.S. objectives. Rather than be content with the status quo, SOS, as part of the TAC team, continually looks for new ways by which it can keep the curriculum dynamic and fully utilize its faculty's expertise to contribute uniquely to the Air Force's mission, as in the example of the new psychological operations course. In all endeavors SOS seeks to give meaning to its motto. "Strength Through Knowledge."

Special Operations School

Notes

1. Guy J. Parker et al., In Search of Self-Reliance: U. S. Security Assistance to the Third World under the Nixon Doctrine, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, June 1973, p. 63.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, Washington, D. C., 3 September 1974, p. 345.

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