Document created: 2 September 03
Air University Review, May-June 1975

On Deterrence

a broadened perspective

…the maintenance of deterrence has become a far more subtle and complex task than in the past and will require continuing in-depth study, thought, and analysis by the military.

Those today who are responsible for military planning and strategy must deal with an increasingly complex world, one in which political, economic, and military power is far more diffused than in the Cold War period. In retrospect, the relative simplicity of the black-white world of the Cold War era stands in sharp contrast to that of today. Not only was it a simpler world for the planner and strategist but it was a time when strategy captured the imagination of much of the civilian academic world, resulting in a great outpouring of strategic thought and literature. More recently, however, strategic thought seems to have stagnated, the older strategists moving on to other interests and the younger generation apparently preoccupied with totally different problems. Within the military, concern with strategy and new strategic concepts has also languished, first out of preoccupation with the Vietnam war and more recently with the need to adjust military force levels and programs to fit the realities of budget constraints. In addition, there is the natural tendency to cling to past solutions and concepts.

The fashioning of military strategy today is a far more difficult and challenging task, given the impact of changes that have occurred in the domestic and international environments. The most significant of these is the change in U.S. force posture, relative to the Soviet Union, from one of superiority to one that is essentially equivalent. Strategy needs to be brought abreast of these changes. It is the principal purpose of this study to focus on this need, to highlight the spectrum of significant threats and postulate major features of a deterrent strategy for countering them. Finally, certain broad principles of deterrence are postulated as a background so that future planning can develop the kinds of essential capabilities needed for an effective deterrent posture across the spectrum of potential conflicts.

For the foreseeable future in the international arena, U.S. national policy will continue to be pursued effectively, largely to the extent it can be supported by military power.

Basic national security policy for rendering that support will continue to be the deterrence of armed conflict. The focus of this policy will be on the Soviet Union and its allies as the primary threat to the security of the United States and its allies. At the minimum, then, the military power of the United States and its allies must balance that of the Soviet Union and its allies and have sufficient reserve and flexibility to deal with Nth country threats. Deterrence will remain as the fundamental objective and basic strategy of U.S. military forces. Given the increased domestic demands on tax resources, priority in defense spending must be on those military forces and programs designed for deterrence of the primary threat. Furthermore, to insure maintenance of a military balance, U.S. efforts must increasingly be aimed at sharing responsibility for deterrence below the nuclear threshold through programs that recognize, complement, and reinforce capabilities of U.S. allies. In short, with respect to its military force posture, the United States has entered an era of bipolar military balance, a balance that includes allied capabilities. Whether this U.S./Allied balance can he translated into an effective combined instrument of deterrence against armed conflict or coercion by the Soviet Union and its allies rests in large measure upon devising military strategies relevant to deterrence across the spectrum of significant threats ranging from general nuclear war to localized conflict.

In an era of nuclear parity, deterrence cannot be founded solely upon a mutual assured-destruction capability. While this capability is an absolute prerequisite to a deterrent posture, alone it offers only two untenable options: nuclear holocaust or capitulation. To the extent that all-out nuclear war is made incredible, the threat of conflict tends to move down the spectrum, giving rise to the need for countervailing deterrent capabilities and strategies at lower levels of conflict. Moreover, the unpredictability in an uncertain world where nuclear weapons do exist makes a spectrum of deterrent capabilities and options an essential prerequisite to the pursuit of U.S. policy.

It is a relatively simple task for the strategist to define and describe the inherent military capabilities available to the United States and its allies. Similarly, given the quality of today's intelligence information, he can make reasonably accurate assessments of a potential enemy's inherent capabilities. The actual capabilities that can be derived from the inherent capabilities of these forces depend upon a combination of factors, one of the most important being the strategy and concepts governing their use.

Just as nuclear parity and the bipolar military balance made a broadened concept of deterrence imperative, it is likewise imperative that supporting military strategies and concepts be developed if inherent military capabilities are to provide the actual capabilities necessary for a spectrum of deterrence. Additionally, under the conditions of parity and balance, it is essential that military strategy be brought into a much closer relationship with policies and strategies for use of all other elements of national power. For the foreseeable future, there will not be a surplus of military power, and diplomacy and economics will play an increasingly important role in the deterrence process. Definitive development of the necessary strategies and concepts to support spectrum deterrence will require much study, thought, and analysis. A look at the range of significant threats, however, suggests major features of military strategy for coping with this spectrum.

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation. Because the threat of an all-out nuclear attack places the survival of the United States at risk, it is the highest priority for deterrence. An effective force to deter strategic nuclear attack is not only absolutely essential to the preservation of the United States, it is also a prerequisite capability in deterring conflicts at lower levels. An assured second-strike capability is at the heart of such a posture. It will remain the most clearly defined and easily understood requirement of deterrence. Alone, however, it is inadequate in meeting future nuclear deterrent needs of the United States.

The existence of U.S. and U.S.S.R. assured second-strike capabilities has made an all-out strike the least likely form of nuclear conflict. Such capabilities also provide strong incentives for both sides to avoid the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Even so, the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent posture and strategy cannot be oriented solely on the assured destruction role. Strategic nuclear warfare could result from miscalculation, deliberate escalation, or evolution from some lower category of conflict and be limited in scope and intensity. In light of this, there is a need for options, concepts, and supporting strategies that do not lead to either extreme of high-intensity general nuclear war or capitulation. In short, given the extent of the threat posed by current Soviet nuclear capabilities and improvement efforts and Nth country proliferation, a more objective-oriented nuclear deterrent strategy is called for. Some of the more important features pf this strategy may be described as follows:

·First of all, the all-out attack option is, of course, central to deterrence. Under an objective-oriented strategy, however, this option would he designed to place at risk those elements of an enemy's political, economic, and military structure essential to his ability to function as a postwar power. With respect to the Soviet Union, placing its power base at risk would very likely have greater deterrent value than placing some given level of population and industry at risk. That is, shifting the focus of general nuclear war strategy to affect the Soviet postwar power status could help mitigate any apparent advantages the Soviet Union might have or perceive itself to have in terms of its population densities, civil defense measures, and geography.

·Second, strategy for executing the general nuclear war option should not be so rigid as to rule out opportunities for negotiation and bargaining at the general nuclear war level. Hence, the flexibility to destroy critical economic, military, or political structures selectively is fundamental to a more objective-oriented strategy. Should the enemy take a gradual or piecemeal approach to general nuclear war, our responding selectively could provide a means to deny him any advantage he might seek below the all-out level and concurrently create conditions for negotiation and bargaining for conflict termination. At the same time, this approach would be contributing to the objectives of the all-out attack option should it subsequently be deemed necessary to invoke it Admittedly, ambiguity and uncertainty as to enemy intentions would abound in such an approach to general nuclear war. The important point is, however, that strategic thought, planning, and strategy be sufficiently flexible in the face of these ambiguities and uncertainties to exploit any opportunity to seek the best possible outcome for the United States.

· A third feature of an objective-oriented nuclear deterrent strategy would be to deal with the situation wherein the Soviet Union possesses forces, in addition to those adequate to sustain an assured destruction capability, that are also sufficient to mount nuclear attacks concurrently against other objectives. In this situation, the prospects for limited nuclear provocations, coercion, and strategic confrontation give rise to the need for countervailing U.S. force options and supporting strategies. Strategy, here, would be formed around highly discrete, limited nuclear options designed to deny the enemy limited objectives, to counter coercion, and to deter further escalation and intensification of nuclear conflict. To better support achievement of specific political objectives in this scenario, strategies must be especially sensitive to the need to minimize collateral damage and control escalation. To realize maximum deterrent value from this subset of the overall objective-oriented deterrent strategy, the capability to reach out and put at risk any target, any place in the world, at any specific time is needed. Moreover, the flexibility to employ the option of non-nuclear precision weapons in the face of a severe provocation or attempted coercion through threats to use nuclear weapons should be maintained. This kind of option could provide a means to demonstrate the political will, skill, and military capability that would be brought to bear at the nuclear level should the enemy attempt to follow through on a Specific threat or provocation. In short, a competition of wills, it could be the sine qua non for avoiding nuclear war.

·A fourth aspect of strategic nuclear deterrence that will be of increasing concern is Nth country nuclear threats, the most significant being the People's of China. As these threats proliferate, the U.S. nuclear deterrent posture will need to have sufficient capability flexibility to deal with them while remaining predominantly oriented to the threat. In the event of nuclear war, a residual capability during the initial, trans-attack, and post-attack will be an important requirement in relation not only to the engaged enemy but also to Nth country forces. Thus, strategic reserves, withholds, and the ability to recover and reconstitute forces will become increasingly important in maintaining a future strategic nuclear deterrent posture.

The quest for viable arms controls measures inherent in contemporary foreign policy will likely be an enduring feature of future U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Arms control efforts will continue to impact on strategic policy and planning, particularly in terms of research, development, and weapon system procurement initiatives. These initiatives will increasingly be judged in relation not only to their qualitative merits but also to their bargaining value in securing meaningful arms control agreements. There is, however, a broader, more fundamental issue inherent in the attempts to stabilize the nuclear deterrent posture of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The central issue concerns whether or not a U.S. nuclear force posture sufficient for the tasks outlined in the foregoing discussion on strategy but numerically inferior to the Soviet Union is adequate to serve the international needs and responsibilities of the United States. It could be argued that forces excess to these tasks represent unneeded "surplus security." This argument obscures the very real possibility that the Soviet Union could perceive political advantage accruing from its superior nuclear posture and attempt to exploit it in diplomatic dealings with nations other than the United States. Moreover, these nations might believe that such a nuclear posture does give the Soviet Union an advantage and thus be more amenable to Soviet political influence. Over the long term, this could prove to be very destabilizing. For the foreseeable future, then, the United States must prudently maintain two hedges against false deténte: (1) strategic nuclear forces with the breadth and depth of capabilities that clearly foreclose any apparent political advantage in the Soviet nuclear posture; and (2) a stable of research and development (R&D) strategic options.

In the foregoing overview of strategic nuclear deterrence and supporting strategy, the basic thrust was to emphasize the need for a range of strategic nuclear capabilities that might better deter the use or threat of use of strategic nuclear weapons against the United States, its forward deployed forces, and its allies. While these capabilities are absolutely essential for the security of the United States, they are also the ultimate source of U.S. ability to pursue a range of national security objectives at the theater, regional, and local levels. That is, there is an implicit linkage between the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent and those capabilities for deterring and defending against theater and subtheater threats. It serves more as a "shield" against the use or threatened use of strategic nuclear weapons than as an operative deterrent at the local level. At theater and regional levels, the advent of mutual nuclear vulnerabilities has given rise to the need for much greater reliance on conventional military capabilities as the operative deterrent against threats. These capabilities are necessary in order to maintain the nuclear threshold at the highest possible level while at the same time protecting those security interests where it is neither desirable nor credible to resort to a nuclear conflict. Furthermore, the capability to conduct military operations across the spectrum of possible conflict, particularly where nuclear-capable powers are involved, is fundamental to the concept of escalation control. Hence, the successful pursuit of U.S. national security objectives at the theater, regional, and local levels will depend more and more upon building and maintaining, in concert with allies, a spectrum of conventional deterrent capabilities. From these, appropriate response options can be fashioned that do not necessarily rely on early resort to the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

Failure to provide for high-confidence theater and subtheater conventional capabilities could invite nuclear blackmail, coercion, and piecemeal aggression out of fear of the consequences of a nuclear response. On the other hand, the maintenance of a strong initial conventional defense posture against theater, regional, and local threats is a key index of the will and confidence of the United States and its allies to protect their vital interests in these areas.

In comparison with the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, the form and scope of a U.S. deterrent posture below the strategic nuclear level is less well understood and defined in the public's mind. This lack of understanding suggests the need for better articulation of the role of credible conventional forces as an essential element in the strategy of deterrence. That is, if U.S. national security interests and those of its allies are to be protected without resort to nuclear conflict, a spectrum of credible conventional capabilities for theater and subtheater use will be required.

Theater defense. Deterrence of conflict at the theater level is perhaps the most complicated and demanding of the various deterrent tasks facing the United States. For the foreseeable future, Western Europe will remain the theater of most direct and important concern to the United States. The threat confronting the North Atlantic Alliance is real and formidable, both conventionally and in nuclear terms; but the threat is by no means beyond the capability of the Alliance to continue to deter or defend against successfully if necessary. Also for the foreseeable future, the strength of the NATO Alliance is the only rational basis on which the nations of Western Europe can continue to provide for their individual security and sovereignty. To persevere in this collective task in the face of growing economic constraints will necessitate increased military interdependency, cooperation, and national will among all member countries. Strong leadership will continue to be required, to balance and harmonize the interests of the Alliance as a whole. This leadership is fundamental to NATO effectiveness and must of necessity continue to be provided in large part by the United States.

Deterrence of conflict against Western Europe has been successful as a NATO objective due in the main to the credibility of NATO-committed and appropriately linked forces and the willingness of member nations to persist in this common defense effort. It is this shared perception of the need for a common defense effort that has given NATO its sound core. This core is reflected in the form of a credible integrated military command structure and in the in-being, coordinated, combat-ready forces of the various member nations. Fundamental to the continued soundness of this core are the respective commitments of member nations to a high-confidence conventional deterrent posture. As noted earlier, the advent of nuclear parity makes a conventional deterrent and defense in Europe much more important. This is not to suggest that the nuclear deterrent has lost utility. Rather, a capability to mount and sustain a strong initial conventional defense in NATO is an indispensable approach to controlling and limiting escalation. Not only is a conventional defense a more desirable precursor to subsequent use of nuclear weapons; it also places the Alliance in a far more tenable and confident position to consult, negotiate, and bargain at the lowest possible level of conflict.

NATO's deterrent strategy is well developed and not at issue. The basic security issue affecting the Alliance concerns primarily the means of deterrence. Specifically, can NATO achieve a high-confidence conventional deterrent without incurring additional costs? This question has already been much studied and debated. The purpose here is not to recapitulate the data except to note the clear indication that a highly credible conventional deterrent posture is within NATO's grasp at little additional cost. Achieving this will involve some very hard choices aimed at optimizing the defense capabilities of individual member nations to better fit Alliance strategy. For example, rather than most of the member nations maintaining an array of limited capabilities, the objective would be to have individual members optimize whatever they could do best. Admittedly, individual national interests and political separateness will tend to constrain this approach, and persistent, dedicated leadership will he required to harmonize these interests with the higher security interests of the Alliance as a whole. In this regard, the Alliance core--the Council, Military Committee, and NATO commanders and staffs--must continue to play a crucial leadership role in advancing toward this goal. Through their efforts, there can emerge practical proposals to use available resources better for conventional defense, to correct command and control deficiencies, and to show the additional steps necessary to achieve a high-confidence conventional deterrent posture.

To generate and sustain momentum toward the goal of a credible conventional defense, NATO needs a more realistic assessment of Warsaw Pact capabilities and deficiencies. Such an assessment could help dispel certain ingrained perceptions of inevitable Warsaw Pact superiority in mounting and sustaining a conventional attack against NATO. If unchecked, these perceptions can, over the long term, undermine NATO's vitality.

For the foreseeable future, a strong U.S. presence in NATO will be required in the form of forward deployed forces. Future U.S. decisions may, however, reduce the size of its in-theater forces. Should these decisions be made, a close linkage and interface between CONUS-based forces and the NATO command structure would be a vital requirement. Establishing command arrangements that would link U.S.-based rapid reaction and central readiness forces to NATO would he advantageous in mitigating any adverse implications of a decision to redeploy certain U.S. forces from Europe. Moreover, should mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) bear fruit, NATO linkage to quick-reacting and sustaining follow-on forces in the United States would help offset Warsaw Pact reinforcement advantages. In this regard, the rapid responsiveness and mobility inherent in air power are key assets that can he exploited to help insure preservation of a high-confidence NATO conventional deterrent posture.

In the matter of theater deterrence and strategy relative to the Pacific, some important distinctions between that theater and Europe deserve comment. The Pacific is not a coherent theater in the same sense as Western Europe. Overt threats to U.S. security interests in the Pacific have been primarily along the Asian rimland, most notably Korea and Southeast Asia. Given the geography of the Pacific, our level of national interest in the area, the Sino-Soviet split, and the capability of Asian allies to deal with local threats, the need for U.S. general purpose deterrent forces in Pacific forward deployments is considerably more limited than for Western Europe. Provided that South Vietnam and South Korea can maintain a domestically viable governmental framework, a reduced U.S. military presence in the Far East should be an acceptable risk, at least in the short run. The potential danger to be guarded against is that a reduced U.S. military presence might be interpreted as a reduced U.S. commitment to the security of non-Communist Asian countries. To offset this possibility, U.S. aid-specifically, tailored military support-will continue to be required, to allow U.S. allies to realize their full military potential. Not only will such action increase their own military capabilities; it will also enhance deterrence through increasing interdependence with the U.S. In sum, placing greater reliance upon allied military capabilities can compensate for a smaller U.S. force posture, provided there are appropriate security assistance and credible U.S. reinforcing and counterintervention capabilities. In the future outlook, these tasks will probably fall most heavily upon air support forces that can provide the degree of responsiveness and technological advantages not normally within the ability of most indigenous forces.

Regional defense. It is essential that sufficient and appropriate military capability be provided for regional stability and deterrence where U.S. interests are at stake. In the absence of such a capability, the United States would be subject to coercion. The proper objective for the U. S. in a strategy of regional deterrence is to encourage and assist its allies to provide for their own national security. If credibility of means is to be established, concerned nations will have to invest adequately in their own defense and generally rely on U.S. support only in the event a major power threatens intervention that places vital U.S. interests in jeopardy. U.S. military support in peacetime can be provided most appropriately through active security assistance programs with emphasis on foreign military sales. These efforts should be designed wherever possible to provide the affected country with relatively inexpensive and unsophisticated military capabilities suited for the most likely defensive problem. Not only would increased military capability gained by the host country through such efforts enhance deterrence but their increasing interdependency with the U.S. through military supply and support channels could also increase the deterrent effect.

The credibility of U.S. national and political will and the ability to display intent could be crucial in the deterrence or containment of regional conflict. These active security assistance programs are a positive although indirect indication of commitment. When a more direct manifestation of U.S. intent to protect its security interest is required, forward deployed conventional forces are appropriate. Such an open display of military capabilities could reduce the initiation of regional conflict by conveying certainty of U.S. intent to honor its commitments, and the same forces could play a key role in countering aggression and deter-escalation should conflict erupt. For such forward deployed or "presence" to deter aggression effectively, they must possess a sufficiently credible military capability.

Another ingredient in the establishment of credible military means for regional deterrence is the maintenance of combat-ready, rapidly deployable, centralized reserve forces in the U.S. to fulfill the "high" portion of the force mix. Responsive strategic mobility is essential for the expeditious deployment of these forces to potential problem areas and for the establishment of credibility of U.S. means and will to honor its regional commitments and security interests.

Insurgency. Insurgency is the lowest level of conflict in the spectrum of war, but, even so, deterrence of insurgencies can be vitally important to U.S. interests. If insurgency is not deterred or contained, it may lead to regional conflict and direct U.S. involvement. The early phase of the Vietnam war is a prime example of this. In addition, insurgency can lead to an eventual takeover of business interests, which can destabilize the economic picture in a particular region and have adverse impacts on the U.S. internal economy. Insurgency can also threaten the overall U.S. defense strategy if it occurs in an area involved in our first line of defense.

As a first step, insurgency operations are usually designed to achieve political goals through psychological means. Failing this, military forces are employed in unconventional ways. For these reasons, deterrence of insurgency is a most difficult task for conventional military forces. A more appropriate counter is the effective use of political and economic measures by the host government to satisfy grievances upon which the insurgency is often based.

When and where U.S. national security interests are threatened, diplomatic, political, psychological, economic, and military aid assistance should he offered to reduce the effectiveness of the insurgent movement. Economic and military interdependence through strong security assistance programs can have a positive deterrent effect through the improvement of allied economic and military strength. These programs not only provide a credible means for allies to suppress insurgency but, by increasing U.S. involvement through resupply and training commitments to the host country, can have a corollary deterrent effect.

In summary, the maintenance of international stability will be a key concept in guiding U.S. strategy at the regional and local level. Military aid and sales, closely linked to a responsive U.S. logistic support base, will be the principal means for supporting this strategy. The primary U.S. military role will be less active and aimed at deterring major-power intervention where such intervention adversely impacts on important U.S. national security interests. All of which suggests that future strategy will come to be governed by a broad set of principles of deterrence.

The maturation of deterrence has established a foundation from which it should be possible to seek out and identify certain fundamental tenets underlying a strategy of deterrence. For example, experience in Korea, Berlin, Lebanon, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Southeast Asia, Middle East, and Cuba has greatly increased understanding of the dynamics of national power as an instrument of deterrence. In light of this experience and the avoidance of nuclear war, there is a sound basis for articulating a general set of principles to guide a successful strategy of deterrence. To explore a possible set of principles applicable to deterrence is the purpose here.

An appropriate departure in the development of a set of governing principles is a statement of the hierarchy of objectives underlying a strategy of deterrence. The uppermost objective is to deter conflict altogether while pursuing a range of national interests; or failing that, to deter escalation while denying the enemy the objective he seeks; or, if necessary, to control and limit escalation at the lowest possible level of conflict. It is toward these objectives that principles of deterrence should be directed.

In a discussion of specific principles of deterrence, the relationship between traditional principles of war and the concept pf deterrence deserves comment. Principles of war are still valid in a tactical sense at any level of conflict to the degree that, as a result of their application, the objectives of deterrence are not compromised. In short, the unconstrained application of the principles of war at a given level of conflict involving nuclear-capable powers could undermine deterrence of higher levels of conflict. Hence, the pursuit of deterrence requires identification of and adherence to a higher set of broad principles uniquely suited to a strategy that is aimed, in the first instance, at promoting the security of the United States and its allies by deterring war across the spectrum of conflict, and in the second instance at deterring, controlling, or limiting escalation should conflict occur.

In proposing a given list of principles applicable to deterrence, we recognize that this effort will be tentative at best. Valid principles must be derived from a wide range of collective knowledge representing the experiences, perceptions, studies, analyses, and evaluations of a number of individuals. Moreover, principles of deterrence will change over time and continue to evolve in response to changing military environments, concepts, and technology. This evolution must be a continuing process so that valid basic principles of deterrence can continue to be identified and brought to bear in the process. In light of this, it would appear to be an appropriate and worthwhile endeavor for the Air Force to develop and promulgate principles of deterrence for incorporation in future statements of its basic doctrine (i.e., Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine). Should that effort be undertaken, the principles discussed here may be of use.

The foremost principle of deterrence is that the various elements of national power dedicated to the deterrent task be credible. Of these various elements, the credibility of military means is of paramount importance because the objectives of a strategy of deterrence are achievable only to the extent that they are sup-ported by military power. Moreover, other instruments of national power that are brought to bear in the deterrence process are effective largely to the degree that they are supported and reinforced by military means. Military means must be broadly capable and encompass a range of deterrent options appropriate to the spectrum of possible conflict. A capability to deter general nuclear war is a fundamental requirement. But nuclear means alone may lack utility as an operative deterrent to certain other forms of warfare adversely impacting on U.S. objective. To be credible, then, there must be a variety of means, particularly military means, appropriate to the spectrum of U S. national security interest and objectives. Otherwise the United States could be faced with the hard choice of sacrificing certain interests and objectives or escalating the crisis to a level where it has credible means. When viewed in this light, credibility of means across the spectrum of conflict is an important prerequisite for promoting stability in the deterrent equation. The maintenance of a stable deterrence is a complex and dynamic task in a nuclear world. It requires that credibility of means be continually assessed against technological advances of potential adversaries so that timely stabilizing adjustments can be made.

National power is the product of force and will. In a strategy of deterrence the willingness to use national power must be perceived as credible by an adversary. Credibility of will is established in the main through persistent use of appropriate instruments of national power to further national security. In this regard, the will of the United States has been clearly demonstrated over a considerable period of time by its actions in support and defense of its security interests and its allies.

A key aspect of national will is the strength of political will to make the critical decisions when important national interests are at stake. In a crisis affecting national security, political will is the operative subset of national will, and much depends upon the assessments and perceptions of national command authorities as to what needs to be done. To persevere, however, political will requires the backing of a strong national will. It is essential to a strategy of deterrence in the nuclear age that credibility of will continue to be sustained over time. It is important that the variety of opinions, fissures, and cleavages inherent in and essential to the vitality of an open democratic society not be misconstrued by a potential adversary as the operative index for judging credibility of will. The more important index of credibility of will is the degree of support a nation provides to its military means.

Under conditions of nuclear parity, clarity of intent is a key aspect of a successful deterrent strategy. The most important facet of intent is perception. For deterrence to be successful, opponents must perceive the level of each other's national interest in a given situation and accurately assess their credibility of means and will. In a situation adversely impacting on U.S. national security, the message transmitting U.S. national resolve should be unmistakably clear; and actions reinforcing stated resolve should be obvious and clearly support stated intent. Only in this manner can a nation be assured that an adversary will correctly perceive its level of interest and interpret its probable actions. It is important for the U.S. to understand the Soviet psychological and ideological framework of interpretation, as the penalty for misreading a major political, economic, or military action could be severe.

Certainty of intent plays a key role across the spectrum of war. Its importance increases as the actual or threatened level of conflict rises. It is paramount that intent he clearly evident as the nuclear threshold is crossed. The reason for and actions pursuant to a given escalatory step should provide evidence of an intent not to let a situation expand uncontrollably. The options open to protagonists at any level of conflict should be visible to all concerned. Deception normally is an operative concept only in a tactical sense in the conduct of war.

All elements of national power contributing to deterrence must be controllable by appropriate national command authority across the full spectrum of conflict. A successful deterrence strategy depends upon the orchestrated use of the proper weight and mix of various elements of national power to achieve national security interests.

Military forces require the highest degree of controllability because of their destructive potential and the attendant risk of rapid escalation. During crisis situations, controllable military forces may be the only adequate means of signaling true national interest and intent to allies and adversaries alike. Should deterrence fail at a given level, the ability to deter unwanted escalation or to influence the outcome would depend heavily upon the controlled use of military force. At the same time, should it be in the national interest to escalate a conflict to achieve an important security objective, precise control of military forces would be essential. In the consideration of nuclear parity and nuclear proliferation, escalation control becomes a key principle in a strategy of deterrence.

Whereas controllability of military forces is fundamental to deterrence of conflict at all levels, it is vital during operations involving limited employment of nuclear weapons. To be usable during crisis situations requiring limited nuclear options, forces need to be completely controllable from conception of the idea and the making of the decision until weapon impact on the designated target and receipt of damage assessment.

The capability of the various elements of national power to contribute to the achievement of vital security interests depends largely on their flexibility. In particular, flexibile military forces can provide a degree of insurance against the risks and uncertainty associated with accelerating technology that could adversely affect the nuclear balance. For a strategy of deterrence to be successful in such an environment, it must be served by a host of flexible capabilities and options involving all instruments of national power.

The probability of a declining defense purchasing power in the foreseeable future and the increasing cost of technology portend fewer military forces. Therefore, the need for broad applicability of a given force posture is Increasing. Moreover, a modern strategy of deterrence demands that military forces possess sufficient inherent flexibility to counter unforeseen capabilities or technological breakthroughs by an adversary. Finally, military forces must possess the adaptability to be employed passively in a static deterrent role, actively either in crisis-management or war-prevention situations involving allies, and finally in a war-fighting role as the ultimate instrument of national power.

The importance of negotiation as a means of preventing or settling armed conflict has been well established, and under conditions of nuclear parity, negotiation increases in significance. Historically, the results of armed conflict have on been moderated by negotiations between adversaries, either during armed confrontation or immediately thereafter. Vital national security interests can no longer be achieved with assurance through armed conflict, either among superpowers or through their surrogates, without the risk of escalation across the spectrum leading to nuclear war. Should bargaining fail in a given instance and armed conflict result, negotiation becomes even more critical, to offset the possibility of escalation to all-out nuclear proportions.

For a deterrence strategy to succeed, bargaining efforts and the application of the various elements of national power, especially the threat or use of military forces, must be finely orchestrated in a unified effort to achieve a given national security goal. Armed conflict at a given level should be planned and conducted to support negotiating efforts toward a solution while further escalation is being deterred. In the absence of a coordinated effort in support of negotiations by all appropriate elements of national power, substantial diseconomies in financial and human terms are probable; and, more important, vital national security interests may he needlessly placed at risk.

Coordinated planning and application of the various elements of national power toward achievement of a common security objective are essential in a strategy of deterrence. Failing such an objective-oriented approach, inefficiencies are probable, and the possibility of failure increases. In a like manner, U.S. and Allied combined efforts toward common security objectives should he closely coordinated to insure maximum effectiveness. It is essential that sufficient military strength be available to undergird the use of other instruments of national power. However, the military element should be subjugated to and closely coordinated with other elements so that objectives can be achieved at the lowest possible social, political, and economic costs.

From a military perspective, two of the most important purposes to be served through unity of effort relate to economy and intent. First, military capabilities of the various services must he planned and acquired to achieve the necessary deterrent posture without regard to current service roles and mission assignments. If this leads to one service's dominating the overall force posture because it provides the best capability to deter and if necessary conduct war, then so be it. Second, unified politico-military actions can provide a positive means of conveying true intent in a given crisis situation. As an example, the successful outcome of the Cuban missile crisis was made possible through the unity of effort displayed by the various subelements of the military instrument in harmony with accompanying diplomatic actions.

The provision for national security should be at the lowest practical cost. To this end, the most cost-effective elements or combination of elements of national power should be developed and employed to achieve a given security objective. Active U.S. deterrent efforts at the lowest end of the conflict spectrum can often be effectively and efficiently pursued through the orchestrated use of diplomatic, psychological, and economic elements of power. As the threat or level of conflict rises, the military element increases in utility and expense to the point that strategic nuclear forces are essential, regardless of their cost.

Economy of effort is particularly important in the development and employment of military forces in that defense costs comprise 70 percent of "controllable" federal expenditures and are a logical target for reductions in the face of severe economic constraints. There is a need, then, to insure that force planning is sound and reflects a thorough examination of all relevant alternatives, including active/reserve and U.S./Allied force mixes for the essential mission areas. This planning should not be needlessly constrained by current roles and mission assignments. Failing such an approach, unwarranted redundancy and diseconomy will likely result.

As the industrialized countries of the Western world become increasingly interdependent, national interests tend to converge and reinforce the need to pursue common security goals. The continuation of this process makes it logical and prudent for the U.S. to broaden and extend the strategy of deterrence to protect mutual national security interests. Successful alliances depend on mutual interests, objectives, and security arrangements, which, in turn, can be fostered through interdependent relationships. The very facet of this mutuality strengthens deterrence. Moreover, the deterrent effect tends to increase with rising interdependence.

NATO is the foremost example of the value of interdependency to deterrence. Interdependency there is essential; no West European nation alone could successfully provide for its own defense. As the member countries have grown increasingly interdependent, the credibility of their combined means and will to deter war needs to increase also. It is to the advantage of the United States to capitalize on this phenomenon by encouraging increased economic, political, social, and military cooperation among NATO nations in order to enhance the defensive posture of Western Europe.

Finally, interdependency among the various instruments of national power, including the separate services, is a key factor in a strategy of deterrence. Within this context, interdependency can provide important synergisms in the application of all the principles of deterrence in achieving our national security interests.

In concluding this examination of deterrence, we appropriately note the marked change in the environment out of which U.S. foreign and national security policies are fashioned today. In the two and one-half decades following World War II there was a broadly based domestic consensus supporting unquestioned U.S. military superiority for the roles of containment and deterrence. Now, however, that domestic political and economic foundation has eroded, based in the first instance on a more realistic perception of the nature of the Communist threat and in the second on a recognition that non-Communist nations should share more in the responsibility for deterrence. In the process, containment and deterrence have given way to the concept of stability and deterrence centered on a high order of dependence of U.S. and Allied political, economic, and military capabilities. This interdependence, occasioned by the decline in the relative power position of the United States, is perhaps the preeminent feature of the current environment impacting on military policy and strategy. As a result, the maintenance of deterrence has become a far more subtle and complex task than in the past and will require continuing in-depth study, thought, and analysis by the military.

In the past, doctrine, concepts, and strategy for deterrence were heavily influenced and shaped by strategic thought emanating from the civilian academic community and research institutes. At the same time, military thought, proceeding from a basis of unquestioned U.S. military superiority, was concerned largely with "war fighting" doctrine, concepts, and strategy. Now, however, there appears to be a dearth of strategic thought emerging from the civilian community. Within the military, the twin requirements of stability and deterrence have generated the need for a much broader perspective on the nature of deterrence as it relates to the total spectrum of conflict. It was in recognition of that need that this study on deterrence was undertaken.