Document created: 18 August 03
Air University Review, March-April 1975

An American Dilemma

Empire or Containment?

WHAT have been the aims of American diplomacy since the Second World War? Were they achieved, and, if so, were the results meritorious, or do they justify accusations of incompetence or imperialism? Did the United States use its economic superiority in the cause of global order and security, or was it used to promote the expansion of capitalism? Despite Vietnam and Watergate, is the United States still willing to accept the responsibilities incumbent upon a great power? These are among the many important questions Raymond Aron raises in a critical essay on the foreign policy of the United States.*

*Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973, translated by Frank Jellinek (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974, $10.00), 339 pages.

Professor Aron, of the College of France, a longtime political affairs analyst and author of many books, is well known to American students of contemporary affairs. In this work he examines the meaning and results of American foreign policy since 1945, attacking the subject from two points. In the first he deals chronologically with some of the fundamental diplomatic issues, such as the origin and outcome of the cold war, the reconstruction of Europe, and the containment of Communism in Europe and Asia. In the second part he surveys the role of the United States in world economics. Aron makes no pretense of having written a diplomatic history of the period examining every twist and turn of policy; instead he has focused on the larger issues in Europe and Asia, with lesser attention to the nature and impact of U.S. policy regarding the Third World. A quick summary of his assessments of American policy might be: in Europe, success; with the Third World, indecisive; in Asia, failure.

Professor Aron divides American diplomatic history into three periods. The first began with the Peace of Paris in 1793 and extended through the Spanish American War of 1898. It resulted in the geopolitical continental hegemony of the United States; i.e., continental supremacy, yet insulated by oceans, interests, and traditions from the larger theater of interstate affairs. The second period, he states, ended either in 1941, when the United States entered World War II, or in 1947, a year he accepts as the beginning of the cold war. Aron characterizes this period as one of indecisiveness in American foreign policy, a period of inconsistency when, against its will, the nation participated in world affairs yet failed to accept "the role imposed upon it by destiny." (Shades of John L. O'Sullivan! How interesting to see a mid-twentieth-century scholar, and a European at that, extolling America's manifest destiny!)

For the chronological and policy parameters of the third period, the central aspect of his essay, Aron argues that the critical elements are the Marshall Plan of 1947 at one end and, at the other, the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 together with President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow the following year. Within this time span he considers American policy to have been very consistent, featuring the containment of Communism by economic, political, and military means. It was a policy ideologically negative and marked, although with important exceptions, by moderation toward its chief rival. He does maintain that American judgment was faulty in several instances during these years, including President Roosevelt's lack of interest in political settlement during World War II, the decision to carry the Korean War north of the thirty-eighth parallel, the new China policy of 1950, the withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project, and the intervention in Vietnam. Nevertheless, Aron's overall assessment is complimentary, attributing the general international economic well-being of the last twenty-five years to the success of capitalism, and he observes that, although the United States was the leading world power for most of that period, it did not aspire to rule.

In approaching the issues immediately associated with the Second World War and the beginning of the cold war, Aron, unlike many other analysts, sees no purpose in searching for culprits. In fact, throughout the book his treatment of all individuals is moderate. Even Stalin, of whom no commendable quality is mentioned, is not personally vilified. As for the origins of the cold war, Aron rejects the "revisionist" thesis that holds America responsible, as he rejects all revisionist arguments. He concludes that the division of Europe was inevitable and that both Stalin and the Western leaders acted consistent with their own values. He cites Stalin's remark, "Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach," (nevertheless, the United States rejected that contention, and Truman ignored Churchill's advice and withdrew American forces from their forward positions in Europe at the end of the war).

While Aron finds no fault with Roosevelt's desire for postwar cooperation among the Big Three, a position he credits to the President's universalist ideals of interstate relations, he does criticize the emphasis placed on military victory instead of an attempt to reach a political settlement with Stalin. One wonders if that was possible. As Aron himself notes, after signing the Yalta agreement, Stalin almost immediately violated it in Poland and Rumania. What kind of agreement would he have accepted that would have been more equitable for either East or West Europe? To have placed any leverage on Stalin, the United States, at a minimum, would have had to retain sizable forces in Europe, and Aron's comment that, had Truman wished to do so he would have found some way, does not appear realistic. It would have been contrary to American tradition and to the thrust of wartime propaganda which had created a favorable public image of "Uncle Joe" and Soviet requirements. Moreover, as Aron indicates in another context, American policy consistently rejected direct confrontation with the Soviets.

THE major events which established the nature of the postwar interstate relations were, Aron believes, the Marshall Plan for Europe and the Korean War in an even larger context. With Stalin's refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan, bipolarity was fully established. For the American policy that shifted from advocacy of a universalist world community to acceptance of a balance of power and for America's acceptance of the role as the West's leader, Aron has high praise, toasting that policy revision as "the 'finest hour' of American diplomacy in Europe." "What other policy," he asks, "save containment was open after cooperation with Stalin had proved impossible?"

In regard to Korea, Aron criticizes America's political abandonment of the peninsula, citing Secretary Dean Acheson's January 1950 speech as an error. Professor Aron believes that the United States should have maintained a more forceful policy and should not have eliminated Korea from its defensive perimeter until it had insured that the Republic of Korea had sufficient military strength to resist aggression. One might suggest that that is easier said than done. Defense spending was under heavy fire in America, and the nation lacked the troops to garrison South Korea; and to have given President Syngman Rhee greater military strength for himself might have encouraged an attack on North Korea. Even during the Korean War, when Rhee was more dependent upon American support, he proved to be a difficult ally.

More significant is Aron's declaration that the Korean War "set in motion a chain of events in Asia and Europe which is still running out its course today and has determined some of the main characteristics of the period 1950-1972." He states that it was Korea that escalated the cold war to military and global dimensions. Not only did American policy dramatically shift with the establishment of a large, standing peacetime army and the rearming of Europe; now two military blocs stood face to face. Nevertheless, Aron maintains that those military measures were necessary for American credibility and to provide a climate of security and confidence in Europe.

For America, Korea was its first experience with limited war and peace without victory, and, most significantly, says Aron, "it was in Asia far more than in Europe that the American republic assumed the imperial burden." From the Korean involvement he sees direct policy links to American intervention in Vietnam. Despite his reservations about American policy toward Korea prior to the war, Aron agrees that President Truman was correct in intervening militarily once the South was attacked. However, once it was engaged, Aron charges America with grievous policy errors. The decision to carry the war north of the thirty-eighth parallel not only prevented a limited victory in 1950 but led to a new China policy that was disastrous—a "time bomb," says Aron, which ultimately exploded into the American intervention in Southeast Asia. Prior to that time, he notes, the United States had avoided taking sides in the Chinese civil war; now it would elevate its hostility to Mao's regime into an anti-Communist tirade. What was the paint, he asks, if China was merely a Soviet satellite? He declares that it would have been a more rational policy to seek an accommodation in Asia similar to American policy in Europe. Instead, the United States compounded the error and plunged into the war in Indochina. It had been providing modest assistance to the French there before the Korean War began, but now massive aid would be provided, and the nature of the war in Indochina was transformed. France had been resisting the independence movement and fought to protect its empire; but with the entrance of the United States, the war became another aspect of the global effort to contain Communisms.

Some comment is in order regarding the definitive date when this third period of American foreign policy began, the period in which, says Aron, the United States achieved global hegemony. He writes rather loosely about this. In the prologue he states that the period began either with Pearl Harbor or the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Later, he argues that Truman continued Roosevelt’s universality policy, and he dismisses the Truman Doctrine as being of slight significance, declaring that far Europe "the major turning point was in fact the Marshall Plan." He supports that contention by citing a number of events that occurred, in the summer of 1947, including the creation of the Cominform, the treaties concluded between the Western power and Soviet satellites signifying de facto recognition of the sovietization of East Europe, the French decisions to join Britain and America in the unification of their zones in Germany, and Stalin’s rejection of the Marshall Plan. Other scalars differ. Robert H. Ferrell suggested about ten years ago that Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan together signified the change in policy.¹ More recently, John Lewis Gaddis, like Aron, dismissed the Truman Doctrine as more rhetoric than policy. Gaddis did credit it as being a "real revolution," but only in the sense that it was accompanied by a "sense of exhilaration" in demonstrating that "for the first time in recent memory the State Department had actually done something, quickly, efficiently and decisively." But, unlike Aron, Gaddis does not offer the Marshall Plan as the turning point for Europe; instead he argues that the Korean War was the decisive event. After that, American policy no longer differentiated between Communism and Communist countries (except far Yugoslavia) but treated it as a monolith to be contained everywhere. ² Inasmuch as Gaddis's conclusions concerning the significance of the Korean War are substantially the same as Aron’s one wonders if the Professor has not selected the Marshall Plan largely to give symmetry to his argument; that is, to more sharply delineate a distinction in American policy between Europe and Asia than was really there. Perhaps it indicative of a native European’s bias.

HAVING already failed to take advantage of the overtures toward a thaw in the relationship with the Soviet Union that followed Stalin's death in 1953, Professor Aron believes that the United States erred again the following year when it refused to accept a draw and a demarcation in Vietnam similar to the one it accepted in Korea. He discredits the "domino theory," arguing that while Southeast Asia may have succumbed to Communism as far west as Thailand, there was no likelihood of its success beyond that point. And the loss to the United States, he believes, would not have been significant, pointing out that the expenditures to defend Korea and Vietnam have far exceeded the returns.

Why did containment succeed in Europe but not in Asia? Aron offers two explanations: First, that once Europe was protected against the threat of external aggression, it proved capable of coping with internal Communism; but that was not true of Asia, where nationalism was less developed. Second, in the matter of economic assistance, he finds no common denominator providing guidance—other than that such aid has been beneficial for the reconstruction of war-ravaged developed nations but far less successful in stimulating the economic growth and stability of underdeveloped countries. One factor that he might have elaborated upon is the question of grants versus loans. The reconstruction of Europe, he observes, was greatly assisted by U.S. economic grants, but the Third World more often has been extended only loans. In terms of the best interest for America, Aron suggests that the United States might have been better off had it merely provided loans for Europe, for then its own economic situation would be stronger today. However, that is questionable; although the recovery of Europe and Japan has provided competition for this country, the policy of "guns and butter" during the Vietnam war was the beginning of American economic woes today. One may suggest that, instead of questioning the economic policy toward Europe, Aron might have seen the value of a similar grant rather than a loan policy with the Third World. Certainly to have attempted to contribute to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II through loans would have raised again, and legitimately, the cry of "Uncle Shylock." It is difficult to believe that a strong Atlantic alliance could have been erected on such a policy. Furthermore, economic conditions in the Third World also justified the provision for grants there.

On the question of imperialism, Aron exonerates the United States of the revisionist charge that it has used its economic strength to further the nation's capitalist expansion. The evidence shows, he believes, that what motivated the United States was the threat of Communism, and while America may have been mistaken in the way in which it extended the scope of its counter-Communism crusade, its economic strength was used for that purpose rather than to expand capitalism. Defining an imperial state as one that uses its strength "to defend its protègès rather than to enslave its clients or dictate its will to the weak," he observes that "as the paramount state, the United States has not ruled." Aron wonders why, when it is generally accepted that neither a colonial policy nor military domination is necessary for growth and prosperity: "If this is true for the vanquished or the secondary powers, why should it be false for the dominant state. . . ?" He dismisses charges that the United States created a new economic imperialism through multinational corporations, excessive consumption of foreign raw materials, or exorbitant profits realized from overseas investments. Instead he argues that neither foreign trade nor profits from foreign investments were that significant to the American economy. Moreover, the existing lag in the economic growth of the underdeveloped countries, Latin America in particular, Aron attributes to internal problems of their own doing rather than to U.S. policy. In support of that argument one may read with profit Karl M. Schmitt's analysis of the differing development of Mexico and the United States in the decades after 1821. Comparable in size of population and territorial domain and both possessing appreciable natural resources, political turmoil and social inequities have had more to do with the retarded growth of the Mexican economy than did the interference of its northern neighbor.³ Aron states that the United States has been generally indifferent to the Third World and for the past decade has been investing more heavily in the developed countries. Surely America's policy in regard to the Middle East, he notes, has not been conducive to easy access to oil. And only in the Caribbean and Central America does he believe that the U.S. has followed an "imperialist" policy, continuing to intervene in accordance with its historic interpretation of a legitimate, preeminent role there. It would seem, however, from the recent disclosures as to the expenditures made to undermine Allende's government in Chile, Professor Aron has underestimated the Nixon administration's determination to influence the affairs of South America. In regard to that continent, William P. Bundy's proposal that the United States withdraw from the security aspects of the Organization of American States (OAS) has merit. ⁴

In the 1950s Aron sees important changes occurring within the rival power blocs. That was evident in the Hun and Suez crises of 1956 and in the American conflict over Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. In their actions during those events it was apparent that Soviets and the Americans had reached an accommodation so that neither unduly exacerbated situations unfavorable to the other. Moreover, the actions of the lesser allies of both great powers revealed their independent-minded and were indicative of emerging dissension within the rival alliance systems.

Professor Aron believes that under Kennedy the United States reached the height of its hegemony as the world power. Nevertheless, he does not accept Robert Osgood's assessment of America's cold war policy as "a striking success, " noting that within a few years the conditions were dramatically altered as Soviet Union also achieved global power status. It was the Kennedy administration's "propensity to a dynamic policy" that led it to test its counterinsurgency capability, for which, declares Aron; it must share "the responsibility for the misfortunes of Gulliver in the quagmire of the rice paddies of Vietnam." Having refused to accept the nationalism issue wracking Vietnam and having failed to discover a leader there similar to Rhee in Korea who was both nationalist and a Communist, the United States was seriously handicapped for the achievement of a political victory.

Aron is extremely critical of America military policy in both the bombing of North Vietnam and the "search and destroy" operations in the South. Neither had a chance of success, he argues, and the "only rational" policy should ha been a level of intervention sufficient" to gain time enough to consolidate a government capable of maintaining order in South Vietnam and of resisting both the insurgency and any attack by North Vietnam". Instead the destructiveness of change of the American military operations not only was unsuccessful in crushing the enemy but also led to revulsion in America and abroad and ultimately discredited the anti-Communist crusade.

For the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy he has high praise and writes of its "brilliant stokes " in reversing policy toward the Soviet Union and China. He says the new policy "aimed at creating a lasting peace and freedom by means of a strategy of national security contingent on a realistic deterrence and a diplomacy of active negotiation [Aron's italics]." The highlights of essay is American foreign policy and his the new policy were the President's trips to Peking and Moscow, which heralded détente, the withdrawal without defeat from Vietnam, and the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement. The ultimate issue in Vietnam, he maintains, was whether or not the Thieu government would be abandoned by the United States. But the accord of January 1973 signified, Aron believes, at least the temporary abandonment of Hanoi's insistence on unification of North and of the Eighth. In his chapter entitled South Vietnam under a coalition (Communist) regime. However, the continued level of warfare in South Vietnam belies the professor's contention. Hanoi has not temporarily abandoned its objective of unification according to its terms; instead it is playing for time and the internal collapse of the South. As for the first SALT agreement, there he believes the North Vietnam offensive that continued United States fully expressed its interest in détente by accepting Soviet nuclear superiority.

Aron also defends America's dollar devaluation of 1971, which he argues was overdue and did not represent an American attempt to exercise economic imperialism. The economic recovery of Europe and Japan and the inflation engendered by Vietnam forced the change in financial policy. And while that decision was to the disadvantage of America’s Asian and European allies, he insists that it was realistic. But dollar devaluation also symbolized that changed relationship between the United States and its allies. Now they compete as economic rivals, thus bringing into question other aspects of their alliance. Together these revised policies toward enemies and allies alike signify the end of Aron’s third period of American foreign policy.

While the subject of Raymond Aron’s essay is American foreign policy and his discussion necessarily centers there, he has no hesitation about stating his convictions, on other matters; for example, charging Stalin with the real responsibilities for the Korean War, or Castro for the Cuban missile crisis. There are some minor, nevertheless annoying, discrepancies in this book. Whenever there is a reference to the American ground forces engaged in Korea, they are mistakenly referred to as the Seventh Army instead of the Eighth. In his chapter entitled "Disciples of Metternich," which discusses the important Nixon policy shift to détente and withdrawal from Vietnam, the very first sentence states that the President visited Peking and Moscow in 1971—it was 1972. Later in the chapter the Peking visit is dated as March 1972—it was February. And the important North Vietnam offensive that continued while Nixon visited Moscow is first referred to as commencing in April 1971, and then as in April 1972—it was March 30, 1972.

Stanley Hoffmann has characterized Aron’s convictions regarding the interstate system’s inherent competitive nature and division into contesting units as today’s "best expression of this gloomy or sceptical philosophy," ⁵ Although in this book Aron declares that the modern complexity of international affairs requires relationships at levels further than merely a balance of power, the general impression given is that contemporary affairs still require a viable balance between the Soviets and the West. That impression is confirmed by Aron in a more recent interview in which he stated that "if the United States was to withdraw completely from Western Europe, there is a danger that the Communists would take power in Italy and maybe in France." ⁶ It is the security of the Western alliance that causes Aron to question the reaction to Watergate, which he sees as affecting the temper of the times and which, he fears, may lead the United States away from its commitment. Withdrawal from its responsibilities as a great power is impossible for the Unite States, he argues, and he insists that the nation must continue some middle ground policy between isolationism an global domination. But he is worried, and realistically so, that the backlash to Watergate may lead to undesirable restrictions upon Presidential direction of foreign policy. Citing numerous instance of what he considers unwarranted Congressional action since World War I, Aron confides "it is to the presidency rather than the Senate that Europeans look for an equitable policy."

Notes

1. Robert H. Ferrell, "Roosevelt and Truman Policy: Continuity or Change?" a paper read at the Organization of American Historians in Cincinnati. "

2. John Lewis Gaddis, "Reconsiderations: Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs, January 1974, pp. 386-402.

3. Karl M. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973: Conflict and Coexistence (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1974), pp. 44-50.

4. William P. Bundy, "International Security Today," Foreign Affairs October 1974, pp. 34-35.

5. Stanley Hoffmann, "The Acceptability of Military Force," in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics," Adelphi Paper, No. 102 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 3.

6. "A French View of Rising U.S. Power," U.S. News &World Report, April 29, 1974, pp. 50-51.

Contributor