Document created: 3 September 03
Air University Review, July-August 1975
Tactical air forces have been in the recoverable drone business since 1968, when the COMBAT ANGEL Task Force (CATF) was established to perform a chaff-dispensing mission in Southeast Asia, although the force was not deployed. In July 1971 the CATF was formalized into the 11th Tactical Drone Squadron (11 TDS) and assigned to the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The 11 TDS is an operational squadron assigned an electronic warfare support mission as well as a low-level photoreconnaissance mission in support of tactical air forces (TAF). The squadron has also been committed to support several development and operational testing programs managed by the USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center (USAFTAWC).
These testing programs have been designed to improve the operational aspects of the squadron’s electronic warfare equipment and to develop the tactics and techniques required to employ the drones in support of TAF. This brief article on TAF experience in the drone business concerns where we are today, what are we looking at for the future in recoverable drones, and why.
What is a recoverable drone? A recoverable drone is defined for the purpose of this discussion as a mission drone in the 3500- to 6000-pound class that is controlled from a ground station or a launch aircraft and designed to perform electronic warfare, reconnaissance, or weapon delivery missions. The drone can be launched from a ground launcher or cargo-type aircraft such as the DC-130. Parachute recovery of the drone is accomplished by descent to ground impact or by helicopter midair recovery methods. This definition of the recoverable mission type of drones is not intended to exclude advanced launch and recovery methods but is a description of today’s drones.
Why drones?
The two questions most often asked about drones are, Why do you want them and what are they going to do? The why can be answered best by four issues that impact on any weapon system in the Department of Defense: the decreasing availability of dollar resources; the increasing cost of men and machines; a continually increasing enemy threat; and the newly emerging sensitivities, national and international, on the value and presence of man.1 By introducing a low-cost recoverable drone system to perform tactical missions in support of manned aircraft, TAF primarily is hoping to reduce the overall costs of performing these missions and, secondly, to eliminate man from high-risk environments.
expanding missions
Historically, drones have not been introduced into the force structure under conditions similar to those for manned aircraft. The drone program to date has been characterized by quick reaction to urgent national priorities and needs.2 Specialized management procedures have been the rule, and capability advancement by improvement and modification of existing vehicles and equipment has been the norm .3 The operational use of drones in low-altitude reconnaissance was successfully demonstrated in Southeast Asia. The success of the reconnaissance mission there led to formation of the CATF and addition of the electronic warfare role to missions performed by drones.
In 1970 the feasibility of drones delivering guided weapons against fixed targets led to the further modification of an existing recoverable drone with sensors designed to acquire the targets and improved avionic systems to launch the weapons. The feasibility demonstration was successful, and the 11 TDS was assigned strike drones for further testing and evaluation.
The promise of drones to perform an increasing number of tactical missions resulted in the TAF requirement for a multipurpose drone. The requirement is for a single drone airframe to perform electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and strike missions. The drone would accept various sensors and equipment to perform the specified tactical missions. The advantages of a single drone airframe to perform various missions are to eliminate the proliferation of single-purpose vehicles; simplify maintenance, operations, supply, and training; and reduce overall costs. The development of a multipurpose vehicle is currently under way, designated Advanced Multi-Mission Remotely Piloted Vehicle (AMMRPV).4 In addition to the AMMRPV, which is being developed for the 1980s, a recent review of the Mideast conflict resulted in the start of an interim multipurpose recoverable drone program titled BGM-34C.
interim systems
The BGM-34C interim multipurpose drone program is designed to give TAF an operational capability in minimum time; therefore, the vehicle will incorporate the best avionics, engine, and airframe from existing equipment and technology. The interim vehicle will enable TAF to develop the concepts and tactics for future multimission vehicles. This is essential to the long-range use of multipurpose drones in TAF because, while the reconnaissance mission has been proven and the electronic warfare mission is relatively free of major problems, the air-to-ground strike role is not as clear. This was well stated by Secretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas regarding the air-to-ground role:
There are fundamental questions
about effectiveness, vulnerability, and cost that have yet to be answered.
Certainly we don’t want to build a large force with an obvious Achilles’ heel.
I see a series of prototype or interim systems with extensive test and
evaluation required as we enter each new mission area. In this way we can build
on our past experience and pursue an orderly expansion into new uses for RPVs.
Demonstrated operational concepts will pace our future growth because I don’t
think that Technology presents any major barrier.5
The interim BGM-34C multipurpose vehicle will allow TAF to refine operational and maintenance concepts and provide additional insight into effectiveness, cost, and vulnerability as well as focus on reliability and maintainability. From our experience with our current drones, coupled with data from the BGM-34C, we hope to establish a data base for advanced multimission drones as well as demonstrate that the drone can perform various tactical missions.
BGM-34Cmission roles
The missions planned for the BGM-34C are tactical electronic warfare support (TEWS), reconnaissance, and air-to-ground strike. In all three mission areas, drones will be used primarily to support manned aircraft conducting tactical interdiction missions. A separate drone force is not planned.
The BGM-34C, modularized for electronic warfare support, will jam selected defense network radars and dispense chaff or expendable jammers to aid strike aircraft penetrating high-threat areas. The combination of both manned and unmanned aircraft carrying electronic warfare equipment and devices offers TAF a cost-effective alternative to larger electronic countermeasure pods. In addition, the combination provides a synergistic electronic warfare capability against defense radar networks.
In the reconnaissance area, the BGM-34C will perform special purpose surveillance, prestrike reconnaissance, and bomb damage assessment to complement the TAF RF-4C capabilities.
The air-to-ground strike role of the BGM-34C will encompass primarily the destruction of high-priority fixed targets; however, if the fixed target requires a weapons payload beyond the carrying capability of the strike drone, the drone’s mission will be suppression of the defense systems surrounding the target. When the drones have suppressed the defenses in tandem with manned defense suppression aircraft, then strike aircraft will attack the fixed target. Although other roles have been investigated, strike drones appear to offer more potential in attacking fixed targets rather than the mobile targets encountered in the close air support role.
cost reduction
To accomplish these missions, multimission RPV’s have to be cost effective; therefore, TAF is looking at several cost-reduction solutions to near- and far-term RPV problem areas. These areas are ground launch; ground recovery; contingency operations; command, control, and communications; sensors; simulators; and joint Army-Air Force drone development.
Ground Launch. In order to design future AMMRPV’s with lower life-cycle costs, alternative drone launch and recovery methods are mandatory. Current launch and recovery costs are approximately 55 percent of the yearly operating costs of the Air Force drone program.6 The launch capability of DC-130 aircraft limits the number of drone sorties that can be flown in support of TAF manned forces. Although the airborne launch of drones from DC-130s adds flexibility to operations, the disadvantages of limited drone sortie rates and higher operating costs dictate alternative launch methods to complement the airborne launch of drones.
The use of ground launch methods for target drones is standard operating procedure. Although there are problems in ground-launching the heavier-weight mission drones, the technology should be available to apply the target drone launch techniques to the mission drones. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) are currently conducting a joint Development Test and Evaluation/Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (DT&E/IOT&E) to ground-launch a 4500-pound mission drone. Until this test no ground launch capability has existed to launch 4500-pound tactical drones with variable weight/center of gravity parameters.7 A booster rocket thrust-vectoring system has been developed that solves the variable weight/center of gravity problems and maintains the proper drone attitude during the boost phase of the ground launch.8 The first ground launch was completed successfully on 27 November 1974. Five more launches are scheduled to complete this joint test. The results provided by the ground-launch DT&E/ IOT&E will provide data toward the BGM-34C program to make that drone weapon system ground-launchable.
Ground Recovery. Another high-cost area in current drone operations involves recovery methods. The primary drone recovery method presently in use is the Midair Retrieval System (MARS), which employs specially equipped CH-3/HH-53 helicopters. The current reliability of the system is 98 percent. The MARS is ideal for operations with a low sortie rate; however, it has several inherent limitations. The recovery operation is limited to one helicopter for one drone. As drone sortie rates increase, more helicopters would be required if dependence on MARS continues. As the drones are increasing in weight, which limits the use of the CH-3, TAF would need the larger HH-53 helicopter. The limited recovery capabilities of MARS, coupled with cost considerations, necessitate other recovery systems to reduce life-cycle costs for drone systems.
The current alternative to MARS is ground recovery. There are several factors that adversely affect both maintenance and operations when drones are ground-recovered. The drone usually sustains unacceptable ground impact damage, which increases maintenance workloads and directly affects turnaround times, thereby decreasing drone availability. Additionally, there is no current method to insure that a drone intended for ground recovery will impact the ground in the area planned for recovery. This is because once the chute is deployed the drone can no longer be controlled or directed toward the recovery area. Several proposed methods are under way or envisioned to improve ground recovery. These proposals include inflatable impact bags or attenuation devices attached to the drones to reduce impact damage. Steerable chutes could more accurately control the drone during descent into the recovery area. A dual chute system is under investigation to slow the drone descent rate to lessen impact damage.
All the proposed launch and recovery alternatives are based on feasible modifications to existing drone systems and have application to the BGM-34C. Modifications to existing systems do not solve the longer-range problems of the AMMRPV because new concepts and ideas are required that do not focus on parachute recovery systems or rocket ground-launch techniques, since these methods are inherently costly and do not appear to promise low life-cycle costs for the AMMRPV.
Contingency Operations. TAF requirements for drone weapon systems vary significantly from previous Air Force drone programs. The current concept for overseas operations does not involve contingency operations that require short-notice deployment and subsequent employment operations. The operating locations overseas are established organizations conducting special-purpose missions that do not require high sortie rates. The current drones were designed to perform a low-sortie-rate type of operation, and they have been successful. For this type of mission, airborne launch and midair recovery systems are sufficient and relatively economical.
Why do the TAF requirements differ significantly from the aforementioned operations? TAF will require a stateside operation that will train for contingency operations requiring standard deployment practices. Future RPV systems will have to be designed against these mobility requirements, that is, compact packaging for drones, aerospace ground equipment, sensors, and other support equipment. The advanced systems will require minimum maintenance turnaround times to reduce the number of drones required for deployment. If turnaround times can be improved significantly from the present-day systems, fewer drones will be required to support the necessary employment sortie rate.
Current drones are not designed for mobility and require an inordinate amount of airlift relative to their combat contribution in the employment theater. The DC-130 aircraft can be deployed readily; however, the MARS helicopters would require packaging for deployment or be limited by an interminable delay if they were flown to the overseas deployed base. The current drone deployment capability is being studied by USAFTAWC, and a recent overseas movement of the 11 TDS is being evaluated for deployment, employment, and redeployment to identify areas for improvement and simplification of mobility requirements.
Command, Control, and Communications. The next area of concern for employing drones is the command, control, and communications required to interface the unmanned vehicles with the manned force. We have had some experience with these areas in exercises such as CORONET ORGAN and GALLANT HAND and have been successful in partially integrating drones into the Tactical Air Control System (TACS); however, the drone operations were conducted in sterile airspace so as not to conflict with the manned forces. USAFTAWC, in conjunction with the 11 TDS, is conducting a test designed further to evaluate the integration of drones in direct support of tactical fighter aircraft. Hopefully, this test will answer some key questions and enable the drone force to develop initial tactics required to support manned forces with electronic countermeasures and chaff.
Another element of control considerations is the direct control of drones from the airborne control aircraft (DC-130) or the ground control van. The two control systems are basically the same. The current control system was designed to control one drone in real time and up to two drones on a sequential basis. For the Air Force drone program to date, with its special purpose reconnaissance missions, the control system was adequate.
As TAF expanded the drone mission application to electronic warfare support, the control system became inadequate. To correct this situation, an interim multiple drone control system has been installed in a DC-130. During the initial operational testing of the system, a sufficient number of airborne drones were controlled to demonstrate that multiple flights of drones could provide electronic warfare support to tactical fighters. Although the multiple drone control system works, further modification to significantly increase its capabilities does not appear to be cost effective. This consideration led to studies of future candidate control systems under the AFSC-directed Drone Control and Data Retrieval System (DCDRS).
The future DCDRS will increase the real-time control capability and include data links with antijam protection. The DCDRS program will also investigate the required features of a ground Drone Control Facility (DCF). This facility would be interfaced with the Tactical Air Control System. The DCF will increase the navigation accuracy of the drones being controlled through the use of Time of Arrival/Distance Measuring Equipment (TOA/DME) techniques. To extend the range of a DCF beyond the line of sight, a manned or unmanned high-altitude relay vehicle is required. The overall advantage of a DCF, a high-altitude relay, and a drone ground-launch and ground-recovery system is the elimination of dependence on drone launch aircraft and MARS helicopters. Higher rates of launch and recovery can be supported. If the eventual future systems are built with low acquisition cost and low life-cycle costs as the driving factors, the overall logistics problems should decrease, resulting in increased effectiveness.
Sensors. With the advent of the strike drone (BGM-34A/B) and its television and other types of sensors, a requirement was created for reception stations in the DC-130. The drone sensors are used for both navigation and target acquisition. The drone relays the sensor information to the DC-130, where the Weapons Control Officer Station (WCOS) provides both visual and telemetry readouts. The WCOS also provides control over the weapons and strike drone interfaces, enabling the WCO to launch the strike drone’s weapon(s) against the desired target. The DCDRS program includes secure data links to improve the sensor and telemetry reception capability for future drone weapon systems.
Extensive testing is being conducted by AFSC and TAF to gather data to improve the future sensors and control links for the AMMRPV. Target acquisition and the man/machine interface requirements to produce a viable strike drone weapon system are the key issues. Tests have been conducted to examine the WCO’S ability to acquire targets remotely with the strike drone and his ability to take the necessary steps to launch the weapon on the target. Technologically, the target acquisition can be achieved; however, the lack of the “pilot’s eyes” in the entire system does curtail the time available to the WCO after target acquisition to accomplish the physical and mental steps necessary to fire the drone’s weapon on the target.
The target acquisition process in adverse weather is another area that has been analyzed by TAF. Sensors compatible with RPV’S have been evaluated in the European weather environment to obtain data on the target acquisition process. The data obtained will determine the eventual sensors needed to make RPV’S operable in adverse weather.
As TAF is advancing into the new role of air-to-ground strike operations with RFV’S, the advantage of having prototype hardware to test and evaluate has been highly beneficial. It is difficult to be objective, and only theoretical results can be obtained from paper studies of remotely acquiring targets and delivering weapons. The prototype BGM-34A/B hardware has enabled both the developers and operators to gather the information and facts required to evolve the strike drone into a viable future operational weapon system.
Simulators. To reduce operating costs in today’s drone systems, the Air Force currently is investigating the use of simulators. Drone launch and drone remote control crew positions in the DC-130 are ideally suited to simulation. Initial training on the first strike drones introduced into the Air Force was conducted on a specially designed simulator at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The 11 TDS is continuing to send crew members to the simulator in an effort to reduce the number of drone flights required for proficiency training. The simulator at Wright-Patterson will be improved in capability and moved to Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, this year. Both Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command drone controllers will be able to simulate flights, thus lowering costs through reduction of drone free flights dedicated to aircrew training. For future drone systems the DCDRS will be capable of integrating simulation into its control systems.
TAC-TRADOC Joint Working Group. In further efforts to reduce overall RPV costs, TAC and the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, formed a Joint Working Group (JWG) in July 1974 to “promote mutual cooperation and collaboration between TAC and TRADOC in resolving joint issues as they pertain to the coordinated and integrated development and use of RPVs of the Army and Air Force.”9 The RPV JWG currently is investigating the possibilities and feasibility of joint Army—Air Force development and testing of prototype RPV’S where both services have common interests and requirements.
the future
Do recoverable drones have a future in tactical air forces? As described herein, the problems associated with drones and their integration into the manned tactical forces are not uncomplicated tasks, but these problems can be solved technologically. Through the aforementioned series of tests and exercises, TAF is increasing both the data base and experience with recoverable drones. If suitable launch, recovery, and control systems can be incorporated into future systems, the recoverable drone will be able to perform electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and certain types of strike missions. As Secretary McLucas stated in referring to RPV’s:
I see three basic reasons, and I
think we should constantly keep these in mind when we talk about the future. First,
RPVs can be used to reduce manned aircraft attrition in the very high
threat environments. . . . The second reason is to provide an acceptable
way to accomplish certain tasks when the mission or area of operation is politically
sensitive. . . . The third reason, and by far the most important for
the future, is to achieve a significant cost advantage over comparable
manned aircraft systems.10
TAF is concerned mainly about the significant cost advantage in RPV systems. This will be the determining factor for the future of recoverable drones in TAF.
Hq Tactical Air Command
Notes
1. United States Air Force Drone/RPV Mission Analysis Final Report, vol. I, February 1974, p. 30.
2. Ibid., p. 40.
3. Ibid.
4. No significant difference exist, between a drone and a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV); the terms are used interchangeably.
5. John L. McLucas, “The Role of Remotely Piloted Vehicle in the Air Force,” in Abbreviated Proceedings of the National Association for Remotely Piloted Vehicles, First Annual Symposium, 1 May 1974, p. 2.
6. Colonel James B. Killebrew, USAF, Air Force Systems Command Drone RPV Ad Hoc Group Briefing, 30 March 1974.
7. Captain Robert M. Kern, USAF, AQM-34H Ground Launch IOT&E Project Plan, Project Plan, May 1974, p. 1.
8. Ibid.
9. “Terms or Reference,” TAC/TRADOC Joint Ad Hoc Working Group on Remotely Piloted Vehicles, 12 July 1974, p. 1.
10. John L. McLucas, in Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 May 1974.
Major Donald C. Cunningham (B. A., California State San Bernardino) is an electronic warfare staff officer, Drone Requirements Division, Hq Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia. He has served as an EB-66 EWO in Europe, Southeast Asia, and CONUS; in a special category assignment at Hq USAF; and in tactical RPV operations and requirements for the past 3½ years. Major Cunningham is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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