Managing the Bosses: Aspects of the Proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management System

Appropriate phrases to describe the continuing calls for modernization of the basic structure of defense personnel policies are “ increasingly frequent” and “ever more strident.”¹ Continued reliance on policies prescribed by laws adopted for the military of another era is perceived variously by critics as anachronistic, wasteful, unjust, cumbersome, detrimental to a volunteer force, conspiratorial, or some combination of all these pejoratives. Ironically, some of the most vociferous critics ma be surprised to discover that the Department of Defense views the situation in much the same way. Faced with large-scale decreases in force levels and particularly serious fluctuations in the population of commissioned officers, personnel managers at the Department of Defense are perhaps more acutely aware of the problems relating to current personnel policies than some of their Congressional critics.

It is, of course, the Constitutional responsibility of the Congress to provide the armed forces such flexible and efficient management tools as are required to administer appointments, promotions, separations, and retirements of all members of the armed services.² However, since World War II the manner in which Congress has discharged its responsibility and the way in which the services have interpreted and applied the laws have led to a veritable patchwork quilt of personnel legislation and policy, particularly in areas relating to the administration of officers.

It is the patchwork quilt of defense officer personnel policies that this article addresses in three steps. First, it will describe some current defense officer personnel laws and policies with a view toward evaluating their usefulness in today’s armed forces. Next, the proposals made by the Department of Defense to render the policies uniformly understandable to its members and to the Congress will be examined. Finally, observations will be offered on a few of the facets of the proposals that may influence the probability of their eventual adoption. It is hoped that, armed with the information presented, the reader will be better able to judge for himself whether this portion of the proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management System (DOPMS), which was submitted to Congress in January 1974, promises a bright new era of administration for commissioned officers or an attempt to gain too much at once.

It might appear reasonable to assume that creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 would have made standard such matters of fundamental importance as the promotion of officers of the three military departments. Yet, for reasons valid at the time of their adoption, the managerial needs of the three services dictated over several years different systems for selection for temporary and permanent promotion.

For example, permanent promotions—those that govern an officer’s tenure—were prescribed by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.³ Temporary promotions—those that allow an officer to assume higher rank, receive increased pay and allowances, and fill positions of greater responsibility—were and are made within restrictions specified by the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954.⁴ Not surprisingly, legislation enacted at different times, to provide for particular situations here or peculiar occurrences there, spawned varying policies on promotion. In the Army and Air Force the two legislative acts were interpreted as requiring that an officer be selected by separate promotion boards on separate occasions for advancement to the same visible rank—once for temporary or insignia-change promotion and a second time for permanent (regular) promotion relating to tenure. Conversely, law and policy as they pertain to the advancement of officers of the Navy and Marine Corps provide for but a single selection for promotion to both temporary and permanent grade as vacancies occur within respective statutory limitations.⁵ Thus grade, pay, and tenure of these officers are governed by single selections for promotion throughout their careers.

Another patch in the quilt relates to the differences in retirement and separation criteria as they are prescribed by Congressional direction. Mandatory separation or retirement of regular officers after certain lengths of commissioned service is required by law. Even so, depending upon the rank attained, statutory tenure differs among the services. To illustrate the point, the cases of two officers can be hypothesized. A Navy officer whose permanent rank is that of commander has failed on two successive occasions to be selected by promotion boards for advancement to regular Navy captain. An Army lieutenant colonel has likewise failed of selection on two successive occasions for promotion to regular colonel. The Navy officer will be involuntarily retired upon completion of 26 years of commissioned service, but his colleague in the Army may not be involuntarily retired until he has completed 28 years of commissioned service. The apparent inequity might have been compounded if the hypothetical incidents had occurred in the early 1960s. At that time Congress authorized the Navy officer up to $2000 in extra compensation while his Army colleague was not authorized extra separation pay.⁶ Whether up to $2000 in extra compensation offsets the deficit of two years’ active duty in the mind of the Navy commander will remain unexplored. The point is that if the cited variations in officer personnel administration defy the logic of the reader, they may transcend logic to produce displeasure, annoyance, suspicion, and confusion for the legislator who attempts to discharge his Constitutional responsibility of making “rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”⁷

In response to Congressional demand and its own discomfiture with the unwieldy system in existence, the Department of Defense formed a study group in 1972, the findings and conclusions of which formed the basis for a report to Congress entitled Report on Officer Grade Limitations.⁸ In the report the Secretary of Defense made proposals that, if enacted in legislative form, would significantly modify both the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954. According to the Secretary, the ends sought were those of

—allowing the services to meet requirements for officers in the various grades at ages conducive to effective performance,

—providing career opportunities that effectively attract and retain the number of high caliber officers required, and

These ends, the Secretary stated, would be best served if the Congress were to provide flexible and effective management tools to the Department of Defense and to the armed services. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense asked that the Congress take action to

—establish new permanent statutory limitations on the numbers of officers who may serve in certain grades,

—provide common rules for the appointment of regular officers and for the active duty service of reserve officers,

—enact uniform provisions of law for the promotion of officers, eliminating the existing system of temporary promotions, and

—establish universally applicable statutes governing tenure and mandatory separation or retirement for reasons other than physical disability.¹⁰

If considered superficially, the goals sought appeared little different from the objectives of both of the previous officer personnel management acts. However, beneath the surface the proposals contained some provisions that, if enacted, would represent major changes in current policy and law.

In the first place, the proposals relating to statutory grade limitations would apply to all officers between the ranks of first lieutenant (Navy lieutenant, junior grade) and colonel (Navy captain). A feature of the proposal relating to grade limitation that bears noting is that officers in the ranks mentioned who are recalled to active duty in emergencies would not be included in computations for specified grades for two years following their recall.¹¹

Provisions for a single standardized promotion system for each service, with promotions made on a permanent basis as vacancies occur within the grade limitations discussed previously, represent the second major change included in the proposed legislation. The need for Army and Air Force officers to undergo two separate selections for promotion to a given rank has long been questionable. The temporary promotion system determines the active duty rank of the vast majority of officers in those two services, and temporary promotion currently precedes permanent promotion by several years. If the proposed plan is enacted by Congress, promotion timing and opportunities would be as follows:

Commissioned Service in Years	Grade Achieved	Survivors of 100 Career Officers	Promotion Opportunity
0	Second Lieutenant/Ensign	100	—
2	First Lieutenant/Lieutenant (JG)	96	Fully Qualified
4	Captain/Lieutenant	87	95%
10-11	Major/Lieutenant Cmdr	65	80%
16-17	Lt Col/Commander	41	70%
22-23	Colonel/Captain	18	50%

The declining number of survivors is attributed to several factors other than voluntary resignation. Attrition resulting from death or disability accounts for some of the decline, but a greater role in attrition would be played by the forced resignation or retirement of those officers who twice failed to be selected for promotion.¹²

In addition to providing for the involuntary separation or mandatory retirement (if eligible) of officers in the grades of captain (Navy lieutenant) or below who twice fail of selection for promotion, the proposed statute would authorize the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to convene boards to weigh the desirability of retaining those officers in the grades of major (Navy lieutenant commander) and lieutenant colonel (Navy commander) who have failed on two successive occasions to be selected for promotion. Similarly, continuation boards for officers who have served as colonels or Navy captains for at least four years would be convened by the Secretaries, and those not selected for continuation on active duty would be involuntarily separated or retired. In both the latter cases, a minimum of 70 percent of the officers considered would continue on active duty.¹³

The proposal for altering existing statutory guarantees of tenure appears to be of fundamental importance to the accomplishment of the goals of the Defense Department’s officer personnel management system. A significant item in the Secretary’s proposals would provide that in each service’s corps of officers those with more than eleven years’ commissioned service would be regulars.¹⁴ Hence if the respective services are to remain within prescribed grade ceilings, particularly during periods of rapidly declining officer strength, removal or substantial modification of existing guarantees of tenure will be imperative. An example of the importance of changing the existing statutory provisions relating to tenure may be drawn from the current AF predicament.

The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 specified lower ceilings for the numbers of lieutenant colonels and colonels in the Air Force than for the Army and Navy. Although the Congress accepted the stipulation of the younger (in terms of years of active service) officer population of the Air Force in 1954, the legislators recognized that, as the Air Force officer population “matured,” the ceilings on lieutenant colonels and colonels would have to be adjusted.¹⁵ Since 1959 the Congress has had to grant the Air Force relief from strict adherence to the law no less than six times in order to keep Air Force career opportunities comparable to those of the other services.¹⁶ Given the current mood of Congress toward what some perceive as “top-heaviness” in the services and the fact that the latest relief granted the Air Force from the ceilings on lieutenant colonels and colonels expires on 30 September 1974, the ability to weed out less productive officers in these two grades takes on added significance. The repugnant alternatives might be for the Air Force to stop promoting entirely or revert to the provisions of the Act of 1954, with accompanying severe debilitation of the Air Force to attract and retain high-caliber young officers for years to come.¹⁷

Notwithstanding the closely reasoned arguments for new officer grade limitation ceilings, the Secretary’s proposals regarding tenure have generated a certain amount of controversy and criticism. Reasoned criticism centers around the inequities of adopting an “up or out” administrative system whose purpose is perceived as that of sacrificing experience and skill for the purpose of allowing promising younger officers to advance in grade.¹⁸ Rising costs associated with military retirement programs are seen by other critics as attributable to the services’ mandating separation or retirement of their members at early ages. The argument made by both critical groups is that money, skill, and experience are forfeited simply because certain officers reach their limits of potential for advancement in rank.¹⁹ One reaction to the legislative proposals cites the provisions for recalling to active duty certain involuntarily retired officers as a means of conserving the human resources otherwise lost through implementation of the proposals. Recalled on the basis of their individual abilities, such officers would serve in an unpromotable status outside the career stream of those who compete for continued advancement.²⁰ It appears that such a procedure would have to be employed in numerous cases to offset significantly the human and financial problems created by changed tenure and grade limitation laws. Whether the Congress would approve of the exercise of such an option on a broad basis appears questionable.

Legislative proposals related to officer personnel management may generate even greater emotional heat and controversy when they are deliberated in conjunction with separate proposals for a modernized retirement act and an act regulating special pay. The Department of Defense is hopeful that its proposals will be considered by the second session of the 93d Congress so that grade imbalances aggravated by recent force reductions can be corrected, but there are several stumbling blocks to be overcome.²¹

The legislative proposals made by the Department of Defense were predicated on the assumption that active duty forces would remain at the authorized strengths projected in the Administration’s fiscal year 1974 budget. However, in its first session the 93d Congress may have signaled that it demands even harsher measures to force attrition of officers.²² If similar decreases in service strength are prescribed as the Congress considers the FY 1975 budget, the Department of Defense may be forced to alter its legislative recommendations to provide for some even more drastic means of coping with overages in officer strength.

Retirement costs, a subject about which members of Congress are, with increasing frequency, declaring their astonishment and concern, may emerge as a very significant criterion on which the Congress bases its decisions regarding officer strengths. If consciousness of the high costs of military retirement programs does become predominant, the present legislative proposals may be less than warmly received by the Congress simply because the proposed statutes do not promise substantial near-term reductions in the costs of military manpower.

Historical precedent appears not to be on the side of recommendations for far-reaching reform in the administration and management of officers in the armed forces. The fate of the all-encompassing proposals of the Bolte Program of 1960 may have served as a warning to those charged with shepherding the current proposals through Congress. The Bolte Program, formally entitled the Department of Defense ad hoc Committee to Study and Revise the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, languished and died largely because it represented such a major departure from existing law and policy.

Although it differed fundamentally from the Bolte Program, submission of the proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management System in its entirety to the Congress in early 1974 elicited a similar legislative response. Three months after the bill was introduced, Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, foresaw little chance of the measure’s receiving prompt Congressional attention. Moreover, the Senator added that he had “. . . learned enough about it to know that [he did] not think it will be satisfactory to the committee.”²³

Prospects for adoption of at least parts of the total Defense Department proposal may be brightened if two other bills successfully negotiate the Congressional process. The two bills, essentially interim measures dealing with tenure for regular colonels, lieutenant colonels, and Army captains, were introduced earlier than the bill proposing the Defense Officer Personnel Management System.²⁴ In certain respects, they offer the Congress opportunities to modify on a narrower basis current law and policy as they pertain to officer personnel management. However, their prospects for legislative adoption appear as uncertain as those of the broader bill. On a more optimistic note, success in obtaining approval of interim measures which complement the entire system could spawn additional piecemeal submission of bits and parts of the whole legislative package. In this way the risks of overwhelming the Congress with seemingly massive and intricate recommendations for reform might be lowered, and the Department of Defense and the services would gain the management tools they need.

Whatever strategy the Department of Defense adopts as the 2d session of the 93d Congress proceeds, the emphasis will necessarily be on time. In an era marked by the cyclical expansion and contraction of the armed forces at intervals of from ten to fifteen years, to delay further the modernization of the basic structure of defense officer personnel policies means only that the Department of Defense and the military departments will continue to improvise on the patchwork quilt. Stopgap measures taken in an atmosphere of crisis-management are no longer adequate given the changed nature of today’s armed forces, the uncertainty of current international relations, and the mood of the Congress. In the matter of managing the bosses, something must be done—and soon.

1. Henry H. Beam, “Needed: New Personnel Policies for the New Military,” Armed Forces Journal International, December 1973, pp. 30-31; New York Times, August 16, 1973, p. 7; New York Times, November 5, 1973, p. 31; New York Times, November 19, 1973, p. 23.

3. Officer Personnel Act of 1947, Statutes at Large, LXI, sec. 507-510, 795-913 (1948).

4. Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954, Statutes at Large, LXVIII, sec. 180,65-70 (1955).

5. U.S., Department of Defense, Report on Officer Grade Limitations, May 1973, pp. 31-40, 58 (hereafter cited as Report on OGL).

17. Ed Gates, “Is a Big RIF Inevitable?” Air Force Magazine, December 1973, p. 135.

18. Lynn D. Smith, “Up or Out: The Cost in Dollars and Sense,” Army, December 1973, p. 16.

19. “Letters to the Editor,” Army Times, November 14, 1973, pp. 12, 18; July 11, 1973, pp. 12, 20; August 1, 1973, p. 20.

21. “Is the Shake Fair?” Armed Forces Journal International, July 1973, p. 44.

22. Randall Shoemaker and Gene Famiglietti, “ ‘Small’ Soldier Cut Predicted,” Army Times, November 28, 1973, p. 2.

23. U.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Amend Titles 10 and 37, United States Code, Relating to the Appointment, Promotion, Separation, and Retirement of Members of the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 12405, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974; Lee Ewing, “Officer Plan Dead; Grade Relief Asked,” Air Force Times, May 15, 1974, pp. 1, 11.

24. U.S. Congress. House, A Bill to Amend Title 10, United States Code, to Authorize the Selective Continuation of Certain Regular Commissioned Officers on the Active Lists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force upon Recommendation of a Selection Board, H.R. 11113, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973; and A Bill to Amend Title 10, United States Code, to Provide That Commissioned Officers of the Army in Regular Grades below Major May Be Involuntarily Discharged Whenever There Is a Reduction in Force, H.R. 11745, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973.

Major James K. Evetts, Jr., USA (USMA; M.A., Duke University) is a 1974 graduate of Air Command and Staff College. Previous assignments have been with 1^st Calvary Division, Korea; with a Special Forces operational detachment, Republic of Vietnam; as airborne/infantry adviser to Bolivian Army; battalion staff officer and DAC/S, Personnel, 101^st Airborne Division, Vietnam; and assistant professor, Department of History, United States Military Academy.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.