Someone Has Got To Listen

Document created: 29 September 03
Air University Review, May-June 1974

Someone Has Got to Listen

A major problem looms on the horizon unless someone begins to listen to what military and civilian leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are saying.

For the past year responsible NATO officials, from Secretary General Joseph Luns and Supreme Commander General Andrew J. Goodpaster on down, have issued repeated warnings against any unilateral troop reductions by Alliance members without a definite reciprocal reduction by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites.

They have warned and warned and warned. Before Congressional committees, to visiting political figures, in the press—to anybody who would listen.

In case you haven’t been listening, here is a brief sample of what is being said:

“If NATO’s already stretched military position were to be reduced while the Warsaw Pact’s military capability continued to grow in quality and quantity, there would be a de facto unilateral reduction by NATO without any compensation by the other side, with the result that the Alliance would be weakened and the security balance that safeguards the peace would be upset.”—Dr. Joseph Luns¹

“It is necessary not only to maintain the level of our forces but also to modernize and improve them. Soviet Russia . . . allocates large and increasing resources to research and development and to modernizing military equipment. Thus, if we in the West should stand still, we would actually soon fall behind. The net result would be the same as a reduction in strength. This we must avoid.” —General Andrew J. Goodpaster²

“The military commander is not allowed to base his assessment and his advice on the political climate or on speculation. He is expected to assess the facts, and in this field no détente can be seen. On the contrary. The gun which is directed point blank at the heart of the Western Alliance, that is the Central European region, has a greater calibre than ever in the past.”—General Juergen Bennecke³

“It is simply not realistic today, given this strategic balance between East and West, to consider that nuclear weapons would be a credible deterrent to the varieties of aggression with which we [NATO] could be faced. Active or passive aggression, in war, or in the blackmail and coercion that could be imposed without war. We simply must have a better conventional capability in Allied Command Europe.”—General Russell E. Dougherty⁴

These are the types of warnings against any reduction in the North Atlantic Alliance that are coming at a time in history when all indicators seem to point toward the dismantling of military commitments.

Moves are being made on many fronts to bring some sort of détente between East and West. Diplomatic contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union are flourishing, as is the economic exchange between the two superpowers. A nuclear war between East and West is now considered highly unlikely. Discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions are taking place in Vienna. The 35-nation conference on security and cooperation in Europe is now under way in Geneva.

Despite all these indicators, officials within the NATO Alliance have continued to call for a strengthening and modernization of NATO forces and equipment, as well as a halt to any further unilateral force reductions.

Why?

Why would responsible leaders with a genuine desire for peace promote such a course of action if today’s political trend is toward meaningful reductions in the chances of military confrontation? Why this insistence on maintaining a strong military posture when nations are striving for reductions in military spending?

Why? Because military and Alliance leaders judge situations according to their evaluation of military estimates. In this regard there are some rather curious statistics that should be examined.

While NATO strength figures have remained relatively constant, Soviet and Warsaw Pact totals have increased. Force cutbacks and dual-basing programs, according to one NATO commander, cut the number of on-the-spot NATO forces by 25 percent since 1967, but capabilities remain the same.⁵

NATO-committed forces are now outnumbered nearly four to one in battle tanks, two to one in manpower, and approximately three to one in combat aircraft.⁶ The proficiency of Warsaw Pact forces is constantly being improved, as is the standard of their equipment. The Soviet navy is now second only to that of the United States and growing stronger at a rapid rate, particularly in the area of nuclear submarines.⁷

Why, NATO leaders ask, should the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact find it necessary to continue to improve and expand their military might if they are sincerely interested in joining in a new atmosphere of peace and cooperation? Why, to paraphrase General Goodpaster, should the stick get bigger all the time while the talk keeps getting softer?

That “why” is something that worries members of the Alliance because they judge the answer on the basis of military capabilities, not political speculation. On one hand they see the potential danger posed by the military strength of the East, while on the other hand they are aware of elements within their borders that are not as interested as they should be in maintaining NATO capabilities at their present level.

Look at it for a moment from the Soviets’ point of view. Thus far they have reached two important goals. They have gained numerical superiority and approximate nuclear parity in Europe over the United States and its NATO Allies. Secondly, they have gained recognition by the West of the postwar boundaries of Soviet expansion in eastern Europe.

If you were a Soviet leader, wouldn’t your next logical goal be the removal of U.S. forces from Europe, with its resultant impact on NATO solidarity? Why worry about fighting a war when you can sit back and wait for the other side to defeat itself?

The dangerous slide has already begun. Several of the 15 NATO nations have announced troop reductions or cuts in conscriptee length-of-service rules.⁸ Belgium, for one, plans to remove two of its four brigades stationed in West Germany and cut back its total force level.⁹ The two brigades will be transferred to the Belgian strategic reserves and will remain available to NATO. Denmark has announced an 8 percent reduction in its defense spending and a cut of 50 percent in its armed forces. Canadian soldiers in Europe are scheduled to trade battle tanks for armored reconnaissance vehicles by 1974, while the total Canadian strength in Europe is 50 percent lower than in 1970.¹⁰ West Germany plans to cut back the number of its Army brigades and has already reduced the length of service for conscripts from 18 to 15 months.¹¹

The United States commitment to Europe is also under growing pressure. Some members of Congress seek to ease the balance of payments and dollar devaluation problem by a cutback in American troop strength in Europe. Figures ranging from 7 to 50 percent are being discussed.¹² Yet proposals for such reductions have been strongly opposed by the President, and there is strong Congressional support for NATO.

There has been no armed conflict in Europe for more than 28 years. A mantle of peace and prosperity has settled over the 200 million Europeans protected by NATO. Living standards and personal incomes have risen sharply as European economies become more and more invigorated. Defense spending has increasingly had to take second place to social demands.

What everyone seems to have forgotten is that it is the strength of the NATO Alliance that has made it all possible. NATO was formed at a time when Russian armies appeared poised to plunge into the heart of Europe. NATO alone stood between the powerful Soviet Union and the war-weakened nations of Western Europe. Now those nations are powerful, and the need for a continuation of the very thing that made it all possible is being questioned.

What is happening can be compared to two giant companies that have been bitter rivals in the past but are now trying to move into a phase of cooperation; however, they must remain aware that renewed rivalry in the future is by no means impossible.

The NATO “company” has favored the payment of high dividends in the form of a higher standard of living, but it could have done more, in this writer’s opinion, in the way of capital investments—armaments in this context. The Warsaw Pact firm, on the other hand, has put most of its earnings into capital investments at the expense of dividends.¹³ Consequently, NATO’s ability to compete, should rivalry renew, is declining.

NATO leaders know that all too well. They have been trying to tell the people who control the purse strings exactly what is happening and what is at stake.

If the stakes were not so high, it could humorously be compared to the old story about the little boy who cried “Wolf” until no one listened. Only this time the danger is from a wolf with steel-tipped claws.

Someone has got to listen before it is too late.

Hq Allied Forces Central Europe

Notes

1. Address by Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO, to the Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Istanbul, Turkey, 11 September 1972.

2. Address by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to the Assembly of Western European Union, Paris, 21 June 1973.

3. Address by General Juergen Bennecke, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, to the Royal United Services Institute, London, 5 December 1972.

4. Address by General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF, Chief of Staff, SHAPE, to conferees at the Allied Command Europe Public Information Officers’ Conference, SHAPE, Belgium, 16 May 1973.

5. This figure is arrived at by the following method: French military withdrawal—a loss of three full divisions and a tactical air force; Belgium—transfer of two brigades (of six) to the strategic reserve; Canada—reduction of nearly two-thirds, from a full brigade to a battle group and from an air division to a wing; United States—return to the continental United States under the dual-basing concept of three full brigades plus five fighter squadrons.

6. This figure varies slightly, depending on the source. I have taken figures quoted by General Bennecke, CinC AFCENT, to a visiting group of German journalists at Hq AFCENT, Brunssum, The Netherlands, on 16 May 1973. This does not consider total assets of NATO countries.

7. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1971-72, p. 78. Included is the somber warning: “The only category of warship in which the U.S. Navy now and for the future maintains a decisive advantage is the aircraft carrier. . . yet even this margin over the Soviet Navy is narrowing.” Also see “Sea Power in the Mediterranean—The New Balance,” NATO’s Fifteen Nations, October/November 1972.

8. NATO’s Fifteen Nations, October/November 1972, p. 14.

9. This action was announced as one part of a larger military reorganization by the Belgian government in late 1972. The two brigades are now in the process of being repositioned within Belgium. Included in the plan was an overall reduction of the Belgian armed forces from 101,000 to 87,000 men and the lowering of conscriptee service time from 15 to 12 months.

10. International Defense Digest, vol. 5, no. 5 (October 1972), p. 450; The Military Balance 1972-73, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 18.

11. “The Force Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany, Analysis and Options,” report of the Force Structure Commission of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, published 1972/73. Under this plan the Bundeswehr would field an army of 24 full-strength brigades plus 12 reserve brigades.

12. Senator Mike Mansfield has annually introduced amendments to legislation calling for cuts not only in European-based forces but most recently in the worldwide U.S. military commitment. An excellent argument in favor of reducing troop levels is detailed in Section VI of “America’s Move” by Benjamin S. Rosenthal published in Foreign Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2 (January 1973).

13. Speaking to the Council of the British Atlantic Community, British Foreign Minister Sir Alexander Douglas-Home drew one comparison when he explained that roughly two-thirds of British expenditures on the forces is for pay and one-third is for equipment, while the Soviet ratio is just the reverse. This trend is not unique to our British allies. In FY 1964 the United States spent $12.9 billion on military personnel and $7.04 billion on research and development. By FY 72 this had changed to $20.16 billion for personnel and $7.888 billion on research and development. It is a trend that grows ever greater now that the U.S. is into the all-volunteer force concept. (The figures are from a report by then Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the House Armed Services Committee.)

Contributor

Master Sergeant Dick Larsen is a writer for the Public Information Office, Hq Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The Netherlands. He served five years as a photographer and had assignments in England, Vietnam, and the United States. In Vietnam was a journalist and combat historian, he was named best combat historian in Vietnam for two consecutive quarters. He is author of articles in Air Force Magazine, Airman, British Army Review, and Sentinel (Canadian Forces magazine), among others.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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