Document created: 29 October 2003
Air University Review,
November-December 1973
Lieutenant Colonel
Charles W. Roades
Bring together a group of Air Force officers of similar rank, allow them to engage in casual conversation, and almost without fail the topic of promotions will come up. What’s more, once that subject starts being scrubbed over, it’s a cinch that someone will relate a story about somebody he knows who has been promoted far below the normal zone of promotion eligibility: the deep selectee, or, as such people are popularly known now, “the fast burner.”
It’s a fascinating topic of conversation, the fast burner, and if the underlying feelings and sensations during such discussions could be identified, there would be among them the sense of awe, a feeling of nonbelieving wonderment, a little reverence, a good deal of jealousy, some quiet tones of aspiration, regret, incredulity, etc., etc. The gamut from professional acceptance to nonacceptance could be found—and inevitably so. Our promotion system has spawned the fast burner, and certainly such a phenomenon is to be expected. What is expected, however, is not always understood. What characterizes the fast burner? How did he get to be one? What did he do differently to get where he is? What does he do now? What do I do with one if he works for me? And perhaps most important, what if I am one?
These are all questions that need to be objectively considered, to bring the reality of the fast burner into sharper focus, not just for the sake of passing interest but because the fast burner is a reality in the contemporary Air Force officer structure and will probably become even more so under the coming all-volunteer concept.
Accelerated promotion is the essence of the fast burner. Where the temporary promotion system has certain designated phase points for normal rank progression, the achievement of a temporary promotion before that established phase point represents a leap forward from the contemporary group. In effect, a man promoted ahead of his contemporaries acquires a new group of contemporaries, a group that entered the Air Force before he did, a group that is usually older both in age and in professional experience. This leap in contemporary groups can be as much as three years, and with more than one below-the-zone promotion an officer could conceivably be as much as seven years ahead of the year group with which he originally entered the Air Force by the time he reaches the grade of colonel. However, just as one swallow does not make a summer, one accelerated promotion does not make a fast burner. On the other hand, if by sustained performance an officer should be selected a second time for early promotion, or a third, or even a fourth, then clearly a fast burner has been identified and recognized. By fast burner, then, and certainly without an officially sanctioned definition, is meant an officer who has been twice or more promoted from the secondary zone of eligibility. He represents an established record of demonstrated excellence along with the other factors that make up the opportunity spectrum to be considered early for promotion.
How does it happen? What combination of talent and circumstance produces an individual extraordinary enough to leap ahead of his peers? Does he, as Thoreau suggests, march to the sound of a different drummer?
Central to the fast burner’s success is his approach to and performance of his work. His whole ethic of work is one of the fullest possible understanding of what he is expected to do. Work is not an end, it is a means; it becomes a dynamic involvement that is studied, practiced, performed, and then assessed for the quality of its completion. The fast burner doesn’t do his work to be done with it; he thrives on it, he gives it his central energies, and he keeps a constant awareness of how he could and will do it better the next time.
Some work seems painfully lacking in the sort of stimulation that could motivate an officer to perform at such a pace. But if that be the case, then the fast burner resorts to his own creative capabilities in an attempt to make the work more challenging. Even to the most routine of tasks, he can and will bring the refreshing relief of these thought processes because he thinks and thinks seriously about his work, and in doing so he can see it in new perspectives. Not, however, without clearly understanding that new perspectives bring new responsibilities.
This application is all very appropriate, because such officers thrive on increased responsibility. Not in a self-centered sense of “See what I have to do now” but with the idea in mind that new responsibilities either bring with them ways to improve the work being done or perhaps lend themselves to unifying separate tasks that seemed otherwise unconnected. They provide new levels from which the work being done can be more easily seen in its total mission perspective. The fast burner seeks the “big picture,” not because the shorter focus is less meaningful but because he is intent on seeing his worth in the entire working scheme of activities. What is more significant, however, is that after seeking the “big picture” the fast burner understands it when he sees it and can integrate his responsibilities into the making of such a grand view.
Does that make him superhuman? No, it simply means that, with the finely tuned abilities he possesses to do his job, the fast burner has a broadened focus not only on his known responsibilities but also on those which his excellence might create.
One very vital quality characteristic of the fast burner is his firm understanding of the leader-follower relationship. In consistently demonstrating his ability to work hard, long, and efficiently, he quickly grasps the most minute nuances of where his leadership lies and to whom he owes most firm allegiance. It is only natural that he do this, because, as stated before, he is able to integrate his own position and functions into the Air Force hierarchy. Furthermore, he is well aware that his achievements as a fast burner have been made because of the evaluations given to his work by his leaders. He knows whom he works for, he appreciates the responsibilities that his superiors have, and his allegiance to them is firm. Because of these traits, he himself demonstrates the kind of leadership that is important at all levels of staff and command.
A frequent criticism of the fast burner from those who assess his achievements with something less than objective consideration is that he allies himself to the one man for whom he works to the exclusion of all others.
Not so.
This sort of criticism is simply trying to substitute the word “obsession” for “allegiance.” Little if any work in the Air Force is done without collateral responsibilities to agencies, organizations, offices, etc., outside of the immediate chain of command. The fast burner, more perhaps than other officers, recognizes not just the need to work for his own superior but also the necessity to work with many others. It becomes a contradiction in terms to criticize the fast burner for narrow allegiance—the very talent that brings an officer to such status includes a broad sense of working responsibility. As a matter of fact, one of the traits that helps an officer achieve fast burner status is his awareness of the need for working harmony.
Finally, the fast burner has obviously needed one very important input in achieving his level of success: a consistent, careful assessment of his work, coupled with a clear understanding of his outstanding potential for more responsible jobs. While these may be the unanimous opinions of many who work with him, it falls the task of one individual to reflect this excellence on a rating form. But, more important, once that rating document has been submitted, that same individual, or one senior to him, must continue to monitor the progress of the fast burner’s career. In other words, somewhere some one person must be impressed enough by the excellence displayed that he becomes a sponsoring patron for the young officer. This is an absolute necessity for the simple reason that, in the competitive system making up the officer corps of the Air Force, individual excellence will never surface without the exposure provided by the directed interest of high officials in the hierarchy. Sponsorship is nothing new to the Air Force; it has been with us as long as there has been an Air Force. It is a necessary aspect in the sequence of events that surfaces the excellence of fast burners from within the vastness of the officer population.
The criticisms, myths, and fabrications about the sponsor system make fit material for a separate article, but the system does exist; more important, however, is the fact that it must exist and that it renders a vital service to the personnel structure of the Air Force. One of the most important functions of the senior military officer is to insure that capable, effective younger officers are recognized and promoted for their excellence.
The obvious answer to the question of where the fast burner goes from here is up. By definition, it should be evident to the officer that his accelerated promotions are not occurring by magic, nor are they something he knows little about. To have achieved one or more below-the-zone advancements has been a central part of the fast burner’s aspirations, and any such success has naturally whetted his desire for more.
The fast burner will undoubtedly go to more broadening assignments, to more responsible positions, or to advanced levels of assignment within his particular general (not specific) area of expertise. For an officer with the proven effectiveness of a fast burner, advancement represents the promise of broadened work demands and an intensification of his involvement within the general confines of his career field, with an eye toward achieving the highest possible rank and responsibility levels in the line of the Air Force. As he advances, this officer deals more and more with the abstractions of his career area and less and less with the specifics, since he has clearly established his excellence in them. He enters then into positions in which he assumes the responsibility for preparing, training, and evaluating the specific expertise of others.
Characteristically, the fast burner recognizes the limits to which he can advance in any one career area, and he begins early to widen his professional opportunity spectrum systematically through personal study, through educational courses, and by carefully (not frivolously) volunteering for those additional duties and responsibilities that will increase his experience but not divert it. A career conversation with a fast burner is inevitably a discussion with a man with a plan for himself. It is one he has carefully considered and structured, one that he constantly revises. He has projected for himself a realistic, achievable set of time-attainable goals, and he is on track to achieve them. He is a producer who clearly understands that naked, unchecked ambition must be tempered by firm achievements in whatever jobs he has to do. Further, he knows that courage is an important aspect of his plans: courage to set his goals and the foresight to know how to achieve them.
Probably the most welcome and refreshing characteristic of the fast burner in today’s Air Force is his positive, assertive, “can do” attitude. This is not to say that he foolishly believes everything is possible; he is, after all, a realist. What he does believe firmly is that everything is worth trying, in order to see if the way exists. The signposts of this attitude are obvious: first, he refuses to be caught responding negatively to requests to do anything. He won’t make excuses or refusals to do things; rather he will question his requester and himself to find how he can do the job. And if he can’t do it because of priorities or limitations, he’ll do whatever he can to direct the work where it can be done. Second, he invariably infuses the same sort of working spirit into his people; his determination and theirs become one. Simply stated, the burner is a doer; and God knows, in an environment of dollar constraints and personnel cutbacks, he is more and more the man who makes the Air Force go.
These remarks are by way of a checklist of attributes of the fast burner. If you are one, then you can easily see yourself represented here. If you think you may be one, then check your own profile against these. If you are not one, then you are best advised to find an officer who is one and study his methods.
Having created the phenomenon of the fast burner, the Air Force has made it clear that such officers are needed in the system to make it function effectively. That need continues and will continue even more crucially in the future. Not only will Air Force senior officer departures and retirements be large over the next three years, but dollar cutbacks will demand that officer-leaders over the coming years get even more done with fewer resources than seems possible at the present.
Perhaps the real “proof of the pudding” of the fast burner system will lie in its ability to perpetuate itself along with the normally constituted promotion cycles. If those who have leaped ahead because of their unique abilities are genuine, then they clearly understand the need to look back to identify and sponsor the talented younger officers in the force. The difficulties of the challenges of doing more with less are a perfect spawning ground for excellence in younger officers. The more testing the project, the greater will be the creative contribution of the young officer who is fast burner material. To keep it alive, he must be recognized and advanced in keeping with his demonstrated potential. And therein lies the greatest responsibility of the senior officer in assessing the work of the younger: Not only how much and how well has this officer performed, but what is his potential to do more and better in an ever rising function?
This naturally requires no small amount of objectivity to determine; but as was implied earlier, the sponsoring officer has to have an almost purely subjective gut feeling for the potential of a younger officer, and he must be willing to act on that feeling in recommending rapid promotion. The balance of the two is what creates and will keep creating fast burners.
No phenomenon such as this is wholly without problems, and here there are probably many. Three are worth mentioning.
First, it is patently obvious to anyone who studies the structure of the Air Force officer force that the promotion pyramid grows very narrow near the top. The laws, restrictions, and requirements governing the structuring of the general officer force make enlightening reading for anyone who feels that promotion probability is stable right up to the Chief of Staff. As a recent brigadier general promotee put it: “For every man who earns his first star, there are at least 250 individuals who are convinced he shouldn’t have!” Perhaps overdramatic, but painfully accurate: about that proportion of colonels, one in 250, is promoted to brigadier general each year. Obviously a number of those 250 will be fast burners; and, all other qualifications being generally equal, how is the one man chosen? The point is that at the grade of colonel a plateau exists which is not easily passed en route to star rank, and if the fast burner who has arrived early at colonel watches a number of promotion boards go by without selecting him, he can suffer from some sobering and sometimes uncomfortable thoughts. He fully comprehends the structuring of the general officer grades, but his own personal, prolonged assessment of himself and his chances may cause him no small amount of agony.
Second, although the percentage number of below-the-zone promotions is strictly controlled, the desirability of being promoted ahead of cycle is very high, not only for the officer concerned but for the unit and major command in which he serves. It is wholly expected that the senior officers of one major command will scan a below-the-zone promotion list to see how many officers of other commands are there. Certainly the whole question of retention, motivation, replacement of key positions, etc., hinges on those numbers. What results, however, is an almost predictable inflation of OER’s in ensuing rating periods, particularly those just preceding the next promotion boards. As a consequence, the entire shift is toward the 9-4 OER, and any aberration from those numbers can be, but will not always be, catastrophic for hopeful officers. When this happens, however, there follows (to the betterment of the service as a whole) a more careful and reflective scrutiny of the ratings being reviewed by both screening and promotion boards.
Finally, there is an unnecessarily false dilemma created by the fast burner phenomenon that works to the detriment of the officer and the system. A fast burner who receives two or more promotions below the zone comes to expect them because he has convinced himself that he has and is demonstrating great potential. If, at the first time he is eligible for the next rank in the secondary zone he is not selected, he tends to look on that as a passover and can suffer an immense blow to his perceived professional competence and self-confidence. Should he be eligible again below the zone and not selected again, he may be tremendously affected and understandably shocked. These sorts of things have happened—not with great regularity, but they have happened—and the affected officer may conceive of himself as on the verge of professional failure.
And there are still other problems, but not so great that they damage the intent of the fast burner system. It is, after all, a process that seeks the best, and as such it could not survive if it were only cosmetic in its intent. It is a system that affords the early rise of the most capable officers to positions of higher responsibility, and it represents the most credible judgment of senior Air Force leaders and managers about the potential of younger officers. Most important, though, the performance records of those who have become and are becoming fast burners demonstrate without question that the system works—for the good of the entire Air Force.
Air War College
Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Roades (USMA; M.A., University of Washington; M.S., Troy State University) is assigned to the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5). He has been a transport pilot in the Military Airlift Command and served as assistant professor of English, U.S. Air Force Academy. He was Chief of Plans, 56th Special Operations Wing, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and Executive Officer, DCS/Plans, Hq Aerospace Defense Command. Colonel Roades is a 1973 graduate of Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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