Document created: 11 December 03
Air University Review, March-April 1973

Human Communications 
and Air Force 
Supervision

Dr. Sterling K. Gerber

 Two concomitant, although not parallel, trends over the past several years have established a condition of possible impact and change on the internal functioning of modern military organizations.

The first trend, occurring within the Air Force, has been a change in the capability, experience, and maturity of enlisted men in supervisory positions. Because of policy shifts affecting the time required to advance from enlistee to supervisor—and this constitutes a considerable reduction in time—young men frequently are placed in positions for which they lack needed experience and maturity. Typically, they demonstrate sufficient capability and perhaps are more highly educated on entering the service than were previous generations. This constellation of factors in turn presents unique problems to senior noncommissioned officers who, themselves often similarly affected by relatively swift promotion through the ranks, must work through their subordinates to gain the high level of efficiency required increasingly by sophisticated equipment and the complex demands of today’s world.

Another trend, not occurring within the military but happening probably as an outgrowth of the business world or other segments of society trying to cope with problems similar to those of the Air Force, is an increase in knowledge and application of improved communication techniques. It has become common for groups of business managers, foremen, and sales staffs to enlist the aid of communications specialists in providing training and practice in improved expression, listening, and understanding.

a pilot program

The above trends found common expression in a trial program established at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, in July 1970. Because of the large proportion of untrained first sergeants and the realization that getting many of them to an NCO academy would take considerable time, an attempt was initiated to provide a short-term, non-TDY, intensive training program.

A two-phase workshop was planned by the sergeant majors. It included (1) an information segment, reviewing knowledge of facts and procedures necessary for first sergeants to function well, and (2) a communication segment, imparting skills needed in relating to subordinates, particularly to first-term enlistees. The first phase was taught by specialists, primarily military, who were especially knowledgeable in areas such as military justice, payroll, commissary operation, narcotics and dangerous drugs, base exchange operation, CHAMPUS, and educational opportunities.

The second phase required instruction by a person qualified and experienced in teaching human communications. A college professor was selected, and he helped formulate the pattern of activities for that phase. As a result, the workshop was organized as a college class, for which the participants would receive college credit.

Three objectives were established for the second phase. Participants should (1) become better aware of themselves as they interact with others, (2) become more sensitive to the needs and motives of those with whom they interact, and (3) learn specific interviewing techniques appropriate for working with people under their supervision.

Accordingly, the participants were given some experiences and short lectures focusing on self-awareness, several group interaction exercises for studying communication processes and participant reactions, and an intensive treatment of dyadic interview dynamics. All participants were given the opportunity to practice, under supervision, the new interview skills with Air Force and civilian volunteers.

Several factors led to the specific formula for the workshop. The above-stated objectives—difficult to accomplish at best and particularly so in only a 30-hour format—formed the basic structure. The participants themselves imposed considerable restraints on the formula. They were career noncommissioned officers, ranging in age from 32 to 55 years. Having progressed through the military system, they could be described as generally capable, accustomed to rigid adherence to rules and regulations, somewhat stereotyped in their approach to people and problems, quite dependent upon past procedures, and therefore threatened by variations in perception, communication, and action. In some respects, they could be seen as having learned to play the military game so well that they had become inflexible in relating personally and limited even in playing the same game under modified rules. Change seemed especially threatening to this group of people.

In almost direct contrast to the nature of the participants was the nature of the training procedure. Being supervised, receiving feedback, demonstrating skills, and making mistakes in the company of peers—all require a fair degree of flexibility, and all entail a certain amount of threat. The need to communicate person-to-person rather than role-to-role works at odds with game playing. The wide range of potential group training experiences presented problems of selection—how to choose those which would insure maximum movement without producing damaging resistance on the part of the participants.

With these factors in mind, the workshop was organized in two divisions. The first week included activities geared to (1) reduce threat, (2) focus on the peopleness of the participants, (3) encourage self-disclosure, and (4) accept and use productive feedback.

The second week was devoted to role playing and interviewing with consistent focus on (1) seeing supervisees as people and (2) listening to communication; i.e., ferreting out the message from the verbiage.

The overall pattern of rationale went from reducing threat through focusing on self-awareness, sensitivity to other people, specific interview training to practice of skills with volunteer clients.

results

Somewhat standard participant rating forms were administered at the end of the second phase. Responses were very high: on a scale from -2 through 0 to +2 they averaged 0.76 for Phase I and 1.84 for Phase II. Subjective comments recommended extension of the experience to officers and other enlisted supervisors. A special endorsement was indicated for the usefulness of the workshop in dealing with problems across the “generation gap,” between career supervisors and first-term airmen.

As a result of the positive feedback from participants in the initial workshop, personnel from Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters (SAC) carefully reviewed the program through three successive trials and then initiated similar training programs at all bases and tenant wings in the Fifteenth Air Force.

As with the initial workshop, ratings were obtained from participants at other bases. The rating questionnaire was as follows for the second phase:

Human Relations Program Questionnaire

Circle one of the five negative, neutral, or positive numbers listed above. Then answer the following, please.

1. Does the course have value to you as an Air Force supervisor?
2. Do you recommend any changes to the course, such as additions or deletions? Specify.
3. Do you recommend another method of presentation?
4. If you disagree with any portion of the course, please specify.
5. Other comments.

Responses of 580 participants from the first year of operation were processed by averaging the numerical rating as well as counting “0” and negative (-1, -2) responses. The 580 forms were from 20 workshops. Forms from the other workshops were not submitted by the time of initial processing. Because of the large number and because some forms from each base and tenant wing were included, it was felt that the results would be representative of all participants.

Responses to the open-ended questions were sampled and the results generalized to the total return.

The average numerical evaluation was 1.78. There was a combined total of 15 neutral or negative ratings, constituting 2.8% of the total. Responses to the open-ended questions tended to reinforce the numerical average rating:

Question 1: “Value to supervisor.” All the responses in a random sample of 50 were affirmative.

Question 2: “Recommended changes.” Of the 50 sampled, 23 (46%) suggested making the program longer. A second popular suggestion, made by 15 of the 50 (30%), was to extend the workshop to all officers; a few thought it should be made available to all personnel. Several comments were made relative to deleting or expanding certain activities; however, no strong consistency was shown for any one treatment of any activity.

Question 3: “Method of presentation.” Of those sampled, all were satisfied, many pleased, with the methods they were subjected to.

Question 4: “Disagreements.” The most consistent response in the sample indicated that the size of the class was too large. A second concern frequently expressed was that regular duty requirements competed with class attendance. Although neither of these totaled over 10 % of the sample, they may be important factors to the ultimate success of the program.

Question 5: “Other comments.” Responses to this item tended to be repetitious of previous items and did not emphasize any one point. The following quotations are typical:

The most valuable course of instruction that I have ever attended in my life. It has profound effect in all my dealings with people on the job—off duty—business and family.

…. course should be added to the curriculum of the NCO Academy and the Leadership schools.

I believe this course is the most significant single step yet taken by the Air Force to open channels of communication. Please make every effort to continue the program. All personnel stand to benefit.

expansion in 1971-71 and 1972-7

The consistently positive response by participants and a feeling expressed by base commanders of a positive impact on their personnel resulted in an expansion to 74 workshops during 1971-72. Additionally, nine workshops were conducted in PACAF: four at Hickam Air Force Base and one each at Kadena, Clark, Yokota, Ching Chuan Kang, and Osan. One workshop was conducted at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, for a U.S. Navy unit on that base.

In a sample (463 participants) of the 1971-72 course, the following ratings were realized: Phase I = 0.99; Phase II = 1.81.

For the 1972-73 year, 74 workshops were scheduled for the Fifteenth Air Force and Eighth Air Force, both of the Strategic Air Command. PACAF officials, impressed by the results of their initial workshops the previous year, scheduled 50 workshops for the current year.

As of January 1973, 180 workshops had been conducted for approximately 4000 people, enlisted and officers. Response has been consistently high: 97.2% of the latest sample rated Phase II positive (82% rated it 2), which is identical to the data from the first-year ratings; i.e., 2.8% of the total ratings were neutral or negative.

An innovate training program, arising at a time of two supporting trends and tailored to the needs of the trainees, has been conducted over a two-and-a-half-year period at 22 Air Force bases, a total of 180 workshops for approximately 4000 people. It has received consistently high ratings from the participants and considerable support from base commanders, personnel officers, top-three NCO’s, and education officers.

With movement toward an all-volunteer military system, programs such as this may help the United States to maintain a highly efficient and highly effective military force.

Cheney, Washington

We Stand Corrected Department

Colonel William C. Ferguson, Chief of the Munitions Division at Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command, writes:

It was with a distinct feeling of frustration that I noted reference to M-117 (rather than M117) bombs and LAU-3A (rather than LAU-3/A) rocket launchers on page 6 of the November-December 1972 issue of the Air University Review

The same caption incorrectly describes the ordnance load of the F-4E illustrated on page 7. Three LAU-3/A rocket launchers are clearly visible on a six-station multiple ejector rack (MER) suspended from the outboard pylon. The inboard pylon is equipped with a triple ejector rack (TER) loaded with 3 M117 bombs. A MER cannot be used at this station because it would extend aft into the landing gear. Therefore, only 3 bombs can be carried on this station, not 4 as noted. It appears that a MER may be mounted on the centerline bomb rack, but it is impossible to be sure.

Colonel Daniel H. Lufkin, Chief, Space Environment Branch, 12th Weather Squadron (MAC), Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, writes:

The article “Aerospace Systems and Weather” by Major John Manley in the November-December issue of the Air University Review suffers from a number of sins of both omission and commission which deserve to be aired if note rebutted.

Manley begins by demolishing the “all-weather” myth, although I deeply doubt that he could produce a single Air Force operator or planner who truly embraces such a starkly literal concept as Manley postulates. By and large, serious discussion of “all weather” operations takes place in a context sufficient to make clear to the average reader that “all” means “as much as possible” rather than “the whole of.” (See Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 23.

. . . After establishing “solar flares” as a prime hazard in space flight, he has captioned the frontispiece (p. 42) as an example of a “sun flare” invading the camera lens. Someone has confused ‘‘flare = a temporary outburst of energy from a small area of the sun’s surface” with “flare = light resulting from reflection (as between lens surfaces) or an effect of this light (as a fogged or dense area in a photographic negative).” (Webster, p. 317)

So much for semantics. A more serious error occurs in the discussion of the effects of flares (in the first sense of the word). It is not true that “During . . .  Apollo XII, solar flares created ‘weather’ that temporarily blacked out all communication with the astronaut crew on numerous occasions.” (Manley, p. 44) Since the greatest part of the Apollo flights takes place outside the ionosphere, and for other technical reasons, communication with the spacecraft is carried by radio frequencies much higher than those which are strongly affected by ionospheric disturbances. During the flight of Apollo XII, our Aerospace Environmental Support Center, the unit that actually performs the space weather function, issued alerts for 44 events connected with solar activity. Of these events, seven caused measurable ionospheric changes which could have interfered with conventional radio communications between elements of the military recovery force. Even in these cases, though, adequate backup communication is available, mostly through satellite relay.

Let me emphasize that the space weather services of our unit do play a useful role in many space-flight operations. Both we and the operators we support understand what that role is, and neither of us profits from having it misrepresented in the pages of the Review.

Manley is also mistaken in his assessment of the effects of changes in the density of the outer atmosphere on the orbital mechanics of satellites. Although it seems counter-intuitive to a layman, the effect of drag on an orbiting satellite is always to speed it up. Since the drag brings the satellite into a lower orbit, its velocity must increase to balance the loss of potential energy with an increase in kinetic’ energy. (A rigorous discussion of the so-called ‘‘satellite paradox” will be found in N. Ya. Kondrat’ev and V. A. Odintsov, eds., Handbook of Astronautics, NASA Technical Translation F-500, 1968.)

Although  few readers are likely to be misled by the caption page 45, that remarkable photograph should receive proper attribution. It is not a nimbus cloud-cover picture at all, but rather a photograph of a solar prominence taken in hydrogen-alpha light at 1636Z, 4 June 1946, by Dr. Walter Orr Roberts, then at Climax Observatory, Colorado. It is particularly interesting to us solar physicists because of its strong suggestion of helical structure. (See G. P. Kuiper, ed., The Sun, University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 413.)

Major Manley replies:

Unfortunately, Colonel Lufkin missed the main point of this philosophical (not technical) article. By defining the word “all” to mean “as much as possible,” he has admitted to being an advocate of the “all weather myth himself.

He has convinced me that my message needs repeating, i.e., that the current approach to designing aerospace systems to resist adverse environmental effects ‘‘as much as possible” is not cost effective. Military operators and planners most become more creative and explore the alternatives suggested on pages 49-50. Specifically, systems designers should place greater emphasis on threat, force-mix, and climatological considerations. They should try to avoid the syndrome of continually building systems that are more and more weather resistant but, at the same time, more and more expensive.

J. H. M.

Air University Review replies: The confusion regarding the captions is regrettable, and we are glad that Colonel Lufkin (and others) called it to our attention.

THE EDITOR

Contributor

Dr. Sterling Gerber (Ph.D., University of Utah) is Associate Professor of Psychology, Eastern Washington State College. For 2 ½ years he has directed the Human Communications Training Project, which required his involvement at all bases and tenant wings of Fifteenth Air Force (SAC) and seven PACAF bases. Dr. Gerber is a licensed psychologist in the State of Washington and holds the Diploma in Counseling Psychology of the American Board of Professional Psychology.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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