Document created: 29 December 03
Air University Review, July-August 1973

The Lead-Time Problem

Theory and Applications

Lieutenant Kenneth C. Stoehrmann

 After years of hard work, a man decides to build his dream house. It is to be the most modern house imaginable, with all the latest innovations. After the design is approved, the contract is let, and ten months later his home is ready. Then a peculiar situation develops. All the innovations incorporated in the house have been either upgraded or superseded by newer, technologically superior innovations that have been developed during the ten-month building period. In short, the house is outdated because it took time to build it. The man vows that next time he will plan ahead to anticipate innovations not yet on the market. But how can anyone plan for innovations or inventions that do not exist at the time of planning? How can anyone build something “modern” if it is planned for months or years in advance? This is the lead-time problem.

Be it a new house, a modern submarine, or a new generation of aircraft, the lead-time problem is always present. In the defense sector, the lead-time problem is essentially one of how to plan a weapon system today to be built tomorrow and to be effective against enemy threats, present and anticipated, the day after tomorrow. For example, the new Air Force B-1 bomber can handle most air defense missions to counter threats present today, but can it handle as yet undiscovered future threats? The new TRIDENT can be a well-nigh invulnerable launch platform today, but what about in the future if new antisubmarine warfare (ASW) techniques are developed by our enemies? And finally, can ICBM’s be further hardened to withstand future overpressures from as yet unknown-sized hydrogen bombs?

The problem focuses around planning, both present and future, yet it is much more than that. The problem can be broken down into distinct parts, each of which is fraught with assumptions, probabilities, and possibilities. This is not to say that the problem is unsolvable if handled with care but rather to suggest that it is similar to trying to erect a building on a sand base; a shaky foundation does not give one much to start with. Nevertheless, the parts of the problem can be isolated into 1) planning, 2) speculation, 3) time constraints, and 4) research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E). Of the four, speculation is by far the most crucial and least scientific, while time constraints are sometimes determined by RDT&E, and planning sets the stage for the entire process. Analysis of each of these parts clearly shows the complexity and difficulty of the overall lead-time problem.

Speculation, or assessment of the future vis-à-vis the system under consideration, is the “sand foundation.” Without going too deeply into the discipline of futurology (Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute, the Club of Rome, etc.), suffice it to say that this aspect of the problem is coming under increasing scientific rigor. Probabilities are traded for certainties as trends are analyzed to predict future postures. As pertaining to the lead-time problem, though, assessment of the future presents a curious paradox, mainly because such assessment involves predicting the future of a potential enemy. The uncertainties involved are not hard to handle since

. . . there are simple techniques for dealing with uncertainties which make it possible to point out the major ones for the decision maker and indicate their significance. In fact, rather than conceal uncertainties, a good analysis will bring them out and clarify them. A best guess, of course, is not the same as certain knowledge. It is desirable to examine the available evidence and determine the bounds of uncertainty.1

The area of concern is with the enemy. Assume the United States is developing a new aircraft to counter Soviet air defenses. Obviously, American scientists and planners do not have access to the Soviet files on air defense R&D, future deployments or developments. Therefore, the United States can only predict what the Soviets will have as a defense against a new aircraft by analyzing the only air defense R&D files available: its own. This means that U.S. assessment of future Soviet air defense is done by making an assessment of the future American air defense system. This line of reasoning is based on one crucial assumption: that Soviet R&D and American R&D are proceeding at approximately the same rate. This assumption is quite defensible as it concerns the two superpowers.2 It would come into question, however, if a nation such as China, with inferior technology, assessed a potential enemy, say the Soviet Union, in this manner.

This instance aside, the paradox is still present. With the United States making its assessment of Soviet air defenses based on America’s air defense future, the paradox emerges. An American counterpart to the aircraft planner in air defense is trying to analyze the future of the Soviet aircraft in the same manner, i.e., based on American R&D in aircraft survivability. In other words, as the aircraft planner assesses American air defense of the future, he designs an aircraft to counter these defenses. The air defense counterpart sees this new American aircraft and tries to design a new air defense to counter it (a counter to a counter, if you will). The chain grows ad infinitum. Thus, in assessing a potential enemy, one must consider the possibility that the new system will be outdated before it is even built. Proof of this is evident in the appropriations by DOD where an increase in spending on offensive weapon systems is often coupled with an increase in spending on the specific defensive system concerned with negating the offensive system.

The problem is further compounded by the same paradox on the Soviet side, so the task of ever designing an aircraft to penetrate future Soviet defenses is even harder. Yet somewhere in this circular maze a decision must be made to go ahead with RDT&E on a system that the planners and analyst feel is worthwhile. From here on, the die is cast and a commitment has been made.3 In actuality, the problem now becomes one of cost-effectiveness. When is it cost-effective? When is it cost-effective to proceed with RDT&E instead of holding out and trying to speculate on future threats? This is the hardest decision that must be made. The effects of these decisions are numerous and bear directly on the overall arms race spiral.4

With speculation proving to be a very tricky area of concern, the time constraint factor is another that requires assessment, namely, how far into the future a planner could try to assess the threats to the new system. This becomes a function of, among other things, the time needed from the drawing board to operational readiness (the RDT&E split into R&D time and T&E time) and the life expectancy of the new system. Using the new aircraft example once again, a planner must decide the limits of these two factors and add their sum to the date at which the decision to begin RDT&E is made. In other words, if the RDT&E time of the system is 8 years5 and its life expectancy is 20 years, the assessment period should be for at least 28 years. A problem arises with this in that the time between the beginning and end of the assessment period is lost. Obviously, since this lost time must be taken from either the RDT&E or life-expectancy portions of the system’s life, the shorter the assessment period, the better chance the new aircraft has of countering future air defense threats. The problem can be overcome somewhat by adding the assessment period to the RDT&E period, but this now requires another assumption concerning the length of the assessment period. The whole lead-time problem is now compounded further by another speculation factor.

The time constraint part of the problem is not one that cannot be overcome, and it is crucial to the entire lead-time problem. How long is RDT&E? That could easily be a function of how different (both quantitatively and qualitatively) the new system is from the previous one. Existing technology as well as new advancements also plays a major role. How long should life expectancy be set at? Again, it is a function of many things, not least of which is the state of the technology being used to build the new system and the assumptions (again!) made about future technology (e.g., whether the new system can be modified in the future as was the F-1046 for West Germany). So now, besides making assumptions about future Soviet technology (and hence its potential as a threat) based on American technology, the planner must question American technology itself as it applies to the RDT&E and life-expectancy aspects of the new system.

The time constraint contains the seeds of a paradox in the circular nature of the assumptions concerning technology. In using technology to assess both Soviet threats and American capabilities, the temptation is to use a double standard in trying to measure this technology. Here the problem arises. A planner might want to be more liberal in his assessment of technology vis-à-vis the threat (i.e., it is probably better to assess a threat that does not materialize than fail to assess one that does). Such liberal tendencies should be avoided when assessing American technology in building and maintaining the new system (i.e., if technology cannot produce the new system, the planner has wasted time, money, and security). Here is the paradox: to be liberal in one area while being conservative in another in assessing the same thing (in this case technology) is logically impossible while maintaining a single standard.6

The third part of the lead-time problem is that of RDT&E. Even though an estimate can be made on the time allowed for RDT&E, this estimate is subject to numerous pressures that can force its alteration. If alteration does occur, the extra time needed for RDT&E would have to come out of the only phase of the system’s time constraints not yet utilized, the life expectancy of the system, possibly causing the entire project to be non-cost-effective. A classic example of this is the F-111 (or TFX as it was originally designated). After being designed as a Navy fighter, it was modified numerous times to fit a variety of needs against an expanded number of threats. The aircraft was built along the accepted line of thinking in the early 1960s that

projects were approved on the basis of a given technology. Then new technologies evolved. These were swiftly perceived as new opportunities for greater “performance” and as making the preexisting techniques obsolete. Changes were approved, and with them higher costs, delays and unforeseen technical problems as the new techniques were merged with the rest of the system.7

The result was a simple case of trying to make one system do too much (hence the Navy’s cancellation), which resulted in the increased costs and delays. Even though the FB-111 is now operational, its life expectancy has been shortened to the extent that it will become technologically obsolete in the near future. It is not that the FB-111 is a bad aircraft. Rather, by trying to make it suit too many tasks, RDT&E was stretched out to such an extent that that period almost coincided with the life expectancy of the aircraft.8

The RDT&E aspect is further complicated by the paradox discussed under time constraints. The use of technology for two purposes (to build a system and evaluate the future enemy threat) means that RDT&E in one area feeds on the RDT&E (mostly R&D) of the “opposing” section.9 Breaking out of it to build a system requires more RDT&E (now mainly T&E), the lessons learned here supposedly being applied to the next-generation system in that particular category under RDT&E as well as to the opposing system. Thus, if a new aircraft is T&E’d and something new is found to counter it, air defense planners will immediately begin their own RDT&E to exploit this new weakness in the aircraft, hoping that the Soviet counterpart aircraft has this weakness too. Only careful planning, the final area under analysis in this study, can prevent planners from becoming trapped in this circle to such an extent that a new system is justified solely on “technological response” grounds. As one opponent of the B-1 has stated in stressing this point,

The United States is now almost committed to a new strategic B-1 bomber, justified in large part in response to projected Soviet air defense improvements it is now very plausible to expect will never arise—and which makes little difference in any case.10

Thus planning, the final area of consideration, is a somewhat catch-all phase that requires a special characteristic absent in many present-day decision-making apparatuses, common sense. In planning, the overall lead-time problem is most apparent. The time periods of all other facets of the program are summed up to produce the overall “time line” of the new system. The immense space between the beginning of the idea and the operational readiness date is the lead time even though the assessments made must take into account the life expectancy of the new system. If a planner can’t see the forest for the trees in this overall planning facet, it is easy for him to jeopardize the entire system by centering on one particular facet, hardening parochial views and dooming the system to failure. Each facet must be viewed in the context of the entire lead-time problem. The planners who can do this are probably the most worthwhile assets to the entire system.

Even though common sense overshadows the entire problem, there are specific aspects of planning that must be coordinated and applied to the overall political/economic/military situation that the nation finds itself in. Furthermore, planning must be closely in tune with that most crucial area, financing. Simply stated, it is hard to convince anyone, much less a Congress skeptical regarding defense matters, that X is needed to counter future threats C, and D when A, B, C, and D do not exist. This of course involves the nomic/military aspects of those systems as well as their effects on future political/economic/military situations. Arguing that a new aircraft is needed against as yet undiscovered and possibly nonexistent threats is easily countered with the argument that these future threats will not be developed by the enemy if we do not develop an aircraft that can counter present threats. Leaving aside for the moment the idealistic and moralistic assumptions implicit in that counterargument, one can easily see that neither side has a solid case. Ultimately the problem rests on the issue of trust: if “we” do not build something to counter present threats, “they” will not build new threats. This means that our force is vulnerable to present threats, i.e., we are at a strategic disadvantage. To be at an advantage, we must build the systems needed, thus putting them at the disadvantage. Without delving into philosophy (Why do we need the advantage anyway?), suffice it to say that the entire idea of a “zero-sum” game is extremely complex and crucial to the entire planning facet of the problem. Most officials in both the military and the government are not willing to accept being on the “short end” of the advantage-disadvantage spectrum. Much can be said, however, for the cooling effect if both sides should adopt the idea of “strategic sufficiency.”

If a planner can convince the Congressional powers who control DOD appropriations for defense projects to allocate money for a particular system, a new question arises: How do the planners disburse it? In the overall plan for a new system, the factors of speculation, time constraints, and RDT&E have been integrated to produce a linear scale of time. The money given to each factor can greatly affect the pace at which the system moves along this scale. For instance, small amounts of money allotted for R&D would slow the process of developing the system from the drawing boards to the metal-cutting phase, thus forcing other parts of the time scale to be shifted downwards along the line. Since the final point on the scale (the end of the system’s life expectancy) is fixed during the initial assessment period, the lengthening of the R&D time necessarily shortens other areas, usually the life expectancy of the system, unless growth considerations are a part of the planning and design. As mentioned previously, the entire system might now not even be cost-effective. A similar argument can be made for each section of the time spectrum. As will be seen in the following analysis of two weapon systems, even the best planning cannot make up for fluctuations in funding and shifts along the time line.

This analysis of the theoretical issues involved with the lead-time problem does not attempt to offer solutions to the problems raised. Rather, it is to serve as a basis for the following study of two current advanced strategic systems, the B-1 bomber and the TRIDENT, and the attempts to cope with the problems. Because of their ongoing nature, the 20/20 hindsight analysis often found in assessing such systems is not currently available. What can be analyzed is the daily complexity of these problems and the steps taken so far to combat the many issues mentioned in this theoretical overview.

Practical
Applications

The four areas previously discussed as comprising the lead-time problem are all present in the specific instances of TRIDENT and the B-l. While different methods have been used to treat these problems, it is obvious at this time in their respective development stages that the handling of these systems is radically different from the handling of previous defense contracts.11 Consequently, optimistic predictions concerning costs and performance are being proliferated throughout the defense establishment. The reasons for such statements lie in the treatment given to the lead-time problem.

In the area of speculation, planners of both TRIDENT and the B-1 have been careful to stress general enemy defense characteristics rather than specific threats. Therefore the development of each of these systems is geared towards a variety of improvements over its predecessor, the Polaris and B-52 bomber respectively,12 to incorporate technological advances that have also been used to increase the enemy’s ability to counter the older systems. These assessments of technology are being made on the assumption of equality in technological advances between the United States and the Soviet Union. This seems to be a safe assumption, as Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., realized when he remarked, “The United States can no longer feel assured that it has unquestioned technological superiority over the Soviet Union.”13 Finally, the paradox mentioned previously concerning the use of American technology to assess Soviet threats is indeed present, but, as explained, it offers the only basis for study. Uncertainty still exists, but careful analysis has reduced it as much as possible.

The second area of concern is time constraints. In the B-1 and TRIDENT examples, these restraints are already present although no prototypes have yet been built or tested. The double-standard problem is present (as one writer has maintained, the entire lead-time problem is a problem of using two sets of assumptions about one’s technology in order to make different cases14) although, as already mentioned, the use of general threat analysis rather than specifics has decreased use of the double standard. What is somewhat disturbing is the contention that American technology can build these new systems without any trouble.15 This, of course, means that specific time tables for RDT&E have been set up, such as the following one put forward by Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., for the B-1:

We propose to continue with that activity, a developmental activity; more wind tunnel testing, much more structural testing, and much more engine testing leading to the construction of three prototype aircraft. We anticipate the first flight in April 1974, following which we plan to flight test these aircraft for a year’s time, before making a production decision, if one is made.16

Such schedules are not inherently bad, but they do add a sense of rigidity to the overall time spectrum and could force Congressional appropriations to waver if the schedules are not adhered to. While no statements have been made as to the life expectancy of either system, it still remains a truism that increased RDT&E times will necessarily cut into life expectancy of each system. Undoubtedly, former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard’s “fly-before-buy” idea is indeed an improvement in system acquisition, but careful planning is needed to assure that T&E is not stretched out to such an extent that the new system is effectively outdated when the decision concerning procurement is finally made.

This, of course, cuts into the third area of the lead-time problem, that of RDT&E. Unfortunately, neither system is in the T&E stage of development yet, and R&D is continuing under a great deal of secrecy. Thus, not much concrete specific evidence can be added to the overall Packard dictum.17 One facet has emerged in the B-1 program that might serve to set the pace for future endeavors in RDT&E. Contrary to the RDT&E of the F-111, the B-1 is attempting to use proven equipment as part of the total system, thus cutting down RDT&E quite significantly.18 This means that dependence on new technology to produce the new systems as well as test and evaluate them is not as strong as in previous systems. This is occurring without sacrificing the needed improvements that the systems will incorporate. Finally, RDT&E continues to feed the “counter” forces in the defense of such systems as discussed previously.19 In sum, it would seem that TRIDENT and B-1 development is taking a new approach to RDT&E, one that cannot be objectively evaluated until the systems become operational.

The final area in the lead-time problem is planning. In both TRIDENT and the B-1, planning has been very thorough and detailed as not to incur the wrath of Congress through cost overruns, delays in procurement, and legal battles.20 It is in this stage that the greatest improvements in combating the lead-time problem can be seen. Planners with common sense seem to be in control, as both systems now reflect concerned and deliberate planning in order to ensure continued Congressional support and introduction of these systems into service on schedule.

Figure 1. Funding of TRIDENT strategic system in millions of dollars

At present, the overriding problem in the planning of both systems is Congressional funding. The political/economic/military issues are being hotly debated in Congressional committees every day as the Defense Department asks for increased monies to spend on TRIDENT and the B-l. The issue of trust has become central to the entire discussion, as many Congressmen feel that “the concept of strategic mix, like so many other doctrines, seemed to evolve after the technology was developed rather than before.”21 Conflicts arise between military leaders and Congressmen as to whether the United States needs to have the advantage in the “zero-sum” game. These debates continue even though money is appropriated by Congress for the systems.

The present status of TRIDENT and B-1 financing continues the trend of increased funding over the years, but many less well-known facets of such financing are important. Both systems have incorporated inflation factors into their cost estimates.22 Both systems continually revise cost estimates (and in the case of the B-1, RDT&E estimates too) to keep unit costs as near to the original estimates as possible. Finally, both systems have already set out monetary allocations for each stage of the time spectrum so as to be able to keep each facet of the spectrum to its original length. These allocations are of a specific nature.23

One particular aspect of the TRIDENT program points out quite graphically the powerful effect that finances have on systems being developed. There has been talk of accelerating the TRIDENT program to put the first systems into operation in 1978 instead of 1981. This switch was approved by Secretary Laird and reflects a decision taken after careful overall planning.24 This accelerated program cuts off three years in the RDT&E and assessment stages and, at an average cost of $1 billion per year, puts the system into service.25 Obviously it is wrong to equate the time decrease to the money spent, but the relationship between the two does exist to some degree and should not be lightly disregarded.

Figure 2. Funding of B-1 strategic system in millions of dollars

From this analysis it is clear that 1) the lead-time problem is present in actuality, not just in theory, and 2) it is being handled by present planners and analysts in various ways, all designed to bring about a cost-effective weapon system. The two examples have shown how the problem is being handled, but one should not forget that

a decision by the Secretary of Defense to develop, procure, or operate a weapon system affects not only the current defense budget but future budgets as well, the latter far more than the former as a rule. When he decides to begin the engineering development of a new system, with procurement presumably to follow, he initiates a stream of expenditures which can eventually include development, procurement, and operating costs and maintenance costs of the completed system.26

With world and national resources becoming scarcer, the United States must order its priorities. This obviously will involve the defense establishment and its problems and policies. Successful understanding and coping with the lead-time problem, inherent in development and acquisition of every DOD system, can only serve to fortify DOD’s case and increase its strength in the over-all bureaucratic maze that American government has become.

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Notes

1. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 70.

2. See statement by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., concerning this issue in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, FY73, Department of the Navy, 92d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1972), pp. 693-94.

3. See Dr. Foster’s critique of the B-1 in this regard in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, FY73, Department of Defense, 92d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1972), p. 690.

4. See comments on this by General Otto Glasser, DCS/R&D, Hq USAF, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, FY73, Department of the Air Force, 92d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1972), p. 686.

5. See Andrew Pierre, “Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. XLIX, January 1971, p. 289.

6. Not all agree that assessment of an enemy should be liberal. “Overestimates do not necessarily lead to insurance and safety; they may lead to the pricing of important capabilities out of the market and to strategies of despair.” Enthoven and Smith, p. 70.

7. Ibid., p. 26.

8. F-111 costs have risen 280% from $2.8m to $8.0m per unit. Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, The Economics of Defense (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 79.

9. See Melvin R. Laird, Defense Program and Budget for FY73 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 68.

10. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, DOD, p. 1154.

11. See Charles Murphy, “The Pentagon Enters Its Era of Austerity,” Fortune, December 1972, pp. 144-50.

12. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, DOD, pp. 420-21.

13. Ibid., p. 688.

14. Enthoven and Smith, pp. 232-33.

15. Laird’s comment concerning TRIDENT: “We have not built one of these submarines, but I can assure you. . . that we have the technology and the capability to do it.” Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, DOD, p. 413.

16. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, Air Force, p. 69.

17. Murphy, “Era of Austerity,” p. 144.

18. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, Air Force, p. 75.

19. Funding for ULMS increased from $140m in FY72 to $942m in FY73 while ASW funds increased also. The B-1 funding went from $370m in FY72 to $445m in FY73 while air defense funding rose from $348m in FY72 to $695m in FY73. See Laird, Defense Budget and Program, FY73, p. 68.

20. Such a legal battle is developing over the Navy’s F-14 and Grumman. See “Grumman v. the Navy,” Time, December 25, 1972, p. 68.

21. Economics of Defense, p. 101.

22. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, Navy, p. 106, and DOD Appropriations, FY73, Air Force, p. 73.

23. See Admiral Zumwalt’s discussion of ULMS in Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, FY73, Navy, p. 106.

24. Ibid., p. 1439 gives the history of ULMS.

25. Charles Schultze et al., Setting National Priorities, The 1973 Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 98.

26. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough? p. 48.

This article has been adapted for Air University Review by Lieutenant Stoehrmann from a paper prepared as part of his academic work while assigned under the Air Force Institute of Technology program to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts.

Contributor

Lieutenant Kenneth C. Stoehrmann (USAFA; M.A., Tufts University) is a student at the USAF Intelligence School, Lowry AFB, Colorado. Under AFIT/CI, he recently completed his master’s degree at Tuft’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, concentrating in national security studies. Lieutenant Stoehrmann is a 1972 Distinguished Graduate of the Air Force Academy.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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