Document created: 29 December 03
Air University Review, July-August
1973
Contemporary headlines dramatize the military’s painful quest for internal social harmony. Millions ponder the national security implications of this or that incident. Congressional committees investigate and pundits speculate. Buffeted by these pressures, the service professional must contend simultaneously with angry minorities, an inveterate institutionalized resistance to change, and pious demands by “above-the-battle” superiors for the immediate resolution of those “embarrassing” confrontations.
Threatened, confused, and apprehensive, this normally pragmatic individual has chosen increasingly to abandon systematic problem-solving technique in favor of an emotion-dominated approach to social controversy. He often has drawn broad social conclusions from a few highly publicized but possibly unrelated events. Frequently his faulty inductions have obscured local issues, confusing fact, fancy, policy, and prejudice.
This pattern need not be accepted as preordained. Human relations questions are not unique. The inclusion of nonquantitative variables such as race, sex, age, guilt, fear, and anger does not place this class of problem outside the normal management spectrum. Often, in fact, leaders who have ignored basic managerial doctrine in favor of intuitive solutions have found that the heat generated in these incidents can stampede them into economically and psychologically disastrous courses of action.
If the supervisor is to avoid this unfortunate fate, he must consciously prepare himself and his organization for the tension that inevitably accompanies social unrest. He must culturally sensitize himself and his subordinates. Each must realize that he cannot be color-blind, sex-blind, or any other blind. People living and working in large groups must be capable of identifying and empathizing with different life styles and the value systems associated with them.
The modern manager, for example, learns to approach a black ghetto youth differently from a white middle-American. He does not mistake the former’s superficial preoccupation with the gratification of present needs as an indication of faulty motivation or lack of intelligence. Today’s sophisticated leader understands that the black’s attitude is as much future-directed as that of his white counterpart. If he has read, as he should, Elliot Liebow’s classic study Talley’s Corner, he realizes that
the difference between the two men lies not so much in their different orientations to time as in their different orientations to . . . their different futures. The future orientation of the middle class person presumes, among other things, a surplus of resources to be invested in the future and a belief that the future will be sufficiently stable both to justify the investment (money in the bank, time and effort in a job . . .) and to permit its consumption at a time, place and manner of his own choosing and to his greater satisfaction. But, the ghetto-dweller grows up and lives in a sea of want. He does not, as a rule, have a surplus of resources either economic or psychological. Gratification of hunger and the simple creature comforts cannot be long deferred. Neither can support for one’s flagging self-esteem. [Emphasis added.] Living on the edge of both economic and psychological subsistence, the poor man is obliged to expend all his resources on maintaining himself from moment to moment.1
Our supervisor understands that, despite the service’s vaunted “equal opportunity,” the habits developed by young men raised in extreme poverty can leave them incapable of capitalizing on any opportunity. Thus, the supervisor will employ a personalized management approach that recognizes inherent individual differences. The key word in this equation is individual. Our supervisor does not, for example, automatically equate the behavior patterns of the disadvantaged with all nonwhites. He thinks of people as individuals, not groups.
This sensitizing process is continuous. Military personnel often experience difficulty in objectively evaluating new ideas. This is a failure of command, for it is commanders who are responsible for providing the atmosphere, references, and group experiences that encourage the open exchange of information. People at all levels must be taught to winnow common goals from apparently contradictory points of view. Carefully planned “rap sessions,” films, and speakers with well-defined messages, controlled immersion in culturally alien situations, and role playing are but a few of the many tools available to the supervisor who is determined to create a change-oriented organization that profits from the different tastes and outlooks of its membership.
One cannot overestimate the importance of this basic step—the establishment of an environment that fosters a factual scientific approach to human relations—in the eventual resolution of social conflict within the organization. If this step is left incomplete, it will hamstring any further efforts, leaving the organization resembling a group of Americans told to play cricket without being instructed in the rules of the game.
If they are to succeed, supervisors must realize that cultural sensitivity represents a threatening concept for some individuals and certainly a change for many. Attempts to effect any change are difficult, but attitudinal and behavioral changes provide the most difficult challenge of all. Alfred Zander, in his article “Resistance to Change—Its Analysis and Prevention,” outlined several reasons why people are reluctant to alter either their schedule or their mental outlook:
1. Resistance can be expected if the nature of the change is not clear to the people who are going to be influenced by the change. . . . There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that those persons who dislike their jobs will mostly dislike ambiguity in a proposed change. They want to know exactly what they must do in order to be sure to avoid the unpleasant aspect of their job. . . .
2. Different people will see different meanings in the proposed change. . . . We tend to see in our world the things that we expect to see. Complete information can just as readily be distorted as incomplete information, especially so if the workers have found discomfort and threats in their past work situations.
3. Resistance can be expected when those influenced are caught in a jam between strong forces pushing them to make the change and strong forces deterring them against making the change. . . .
4. Resistance can be expected to the degree that the persons influenced by the change have pressure put upon them to make it, and will be decreased to the degree that these same persons are able to have some “say” in the nature or direction of the change. . . .
5. Resistance may be expected if the change is made on personal grounds rather than impersonal requirements or sanctions. . . . Many administrators can expect trouble in establishing a change if it is requested in terms of what “I think is necessary” rather than making the request in light of “our objective.” . . .
6. Resistance may be expected if change ignores the already established institutions in the group. Every work situation develops certain customs in doing the work or in the relations among the workers. The administrator who ignores institutionalized patterns of work and abruptly attempts to create a new state of affairs which demands that these customs be abolished without further consideration will surely run into resistance.2
Management’s task will be infinitely more difficult if these observations are ignored. Once the commander is satisfied that he and his subordinates are involved in a meaningful sensitivity program, he can expect that a systematic problem-solving mechanism will function. All members of the organization will have confidence in the system’s objectivity and will expect justice as its natural product. These two assumptions are vital if this scientific approach is to compete with the emotions aroused when social controversy is present.
The problem resolution system itself is simply designed.
First, rules must be established and observed. The supervisor must be certain that equal opportunity and fair treatment programs flourish in his department. His subordinates must have clear human relations guidelines to follow, and the manager must insure that these directives are strictly observed. Paper programs are more destructive than no program at all; they involve the organization in a revolution of rising expectations. Unfulfilled promises and dashed hopes are the parents of group disintegration.
Next, when problems do arise, the manager must gather all the facts available. He might begin by taking official statements from the people involved and then initiate an inquiry just as he would for an accident or other unusual event. At this stage, it is essential that value judgments be totally suppressed. No one is lying, at fault, or a troublemaker. Everyone is a source of information.
Third, the facts must be tested for validity and relevance. The supervisor wants the answers to two basic questions: What really happened? What do people believe happened? He must deal with both. Mere discovery of the facts is not sufficient. What the participants think and feel must also play an important role in deciding what course of action to pursue.
Fourth, the supervisor should list and explore all possible alternative solutions. The strengths and weaknesses of each must be carefully examined. The circumstances under which each possibility would operate most effectively should be outlined.
Fifth, the commander must determine which alternative will best resolve the problem. He must also select a method of communicating his decision that will not alienate any faction. If corrective action is required, it should be couched, as far as possible, in positive terms. Public recrimination must be limited. Unless disciplinary action is a pivotal point in resolution of the conflict, it should be handled privately. The operative principle in this area coincides with Zander’s observations concerning the greater effectiveness of change predicated on “impersonal requirements or sanctions” than change based on personalities.
Sixth, individuals at every level should be assigned personal responsibility for actions in support of the commander’s decision. They must translate the directive into terms applicable to their operation. For example, if a base were ascertained to have been remiss in the employment and training of Mexican-Americans and a decision made to correct the situation, its commander would set certain goals. An example might be “the hiring, training, and placement of 75 Mexican-Americans by 1 July, 10 percent of whom are to be placed in supervisory positions.” Each subordinate manager would then be responsible for identifying a given number of positions to be made available, developing a training program, and selecting the people needed to fill these jobs.
Finally, the manager must follow up his directives to determine the efficiency of the corrective action taken. It is vitally important that he use measurements that accurately reflect the real situation. If, for example, he merely counts supervisory positions filled by the Mexican-Americans hired during the stated time, he might fail to note that these individuals had been assigned to supervise only Mexican-Americans. While the numbers might be correct, the spirit of his equal opportunity directive would have been subverted.
The following factual case—not a theoretical exercise—demonstrates perceptive human-relations management in the daily job environment.
A squadron training NCO asked his commander to nominate Sergeant Jones, a white, for the Airman’s Medal. Jones was credited by this NCO with pushing A1C Smith, a black, to safety when a weapon malfunctioned and exploded. Jones received superficial injuries in the incident. Smith was unhurt. Smith then went to the commander and alleged that the accident did not happen as the NCO said it had. “The weapon jammed, I called Jones, he took it, and while he was examining it, it exploded. He didn’t save me, I don’t need any man taking care of me, and I don’t like being made a fool of by him saying so.” The commander asked the training NCO about the incident and he said, “It’s just those blacks, Sir. They don’t want a white to get credit for anything. If Jones were black, they’d want him nominated for the Medal of Honor.” In the past, individuals in the squadron had received the Airman’s Medal for incidents as questionable as this one. The three witnesses to the event are black and support Smith.
For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that equal opportunity programs were alive and well in the unit and that the problem represented a momentary failure. Again, if this is a false assumption, any problem-solving method employed will do little in relieving the tension aroused by incidents such as the one described.
The first task facing the commander was to gather the available facts. Step one in this process was the taking of official statements. Such a course had no negative implications, as statements were required for the ground accident report that had to be submitted regardless of whether a nomination for a decoration was made. During this phase of his inquiry the commander discovered these “facts”:
1. The witnesses had been unaware of the incident until they heard a muffled explosion. Up to that point they were looking down range and firing at their own targets. When their attention was drawn to Jones and Smith, they observed Jones on the ground, hands covering his face, the weapon lying a few feet away, and Smith standing slightly to the rear of Jones and reaching toward the injured NCO.
2. The training NCO had not witnessed the event but had interviewed all the participants. Based upon that and his knowledge of weapons and range procedures in use the day of the incident, he had reconstructed the event. Jones, he pointed out, had an excellent record and no reason to lie. Smith and the other blacks were mediocre airmen and known to be close friends. “They all stick together you know!”
3. Jones could remember little of the event. “It all happened so fast.” He had seen Smith raise his hand, indicating a weapon malfunction. He had moved down the firing line and was told by Smith that the weapon had misfired. He took the weapon to examine it. “Here things are a bit fuzzy,” he said. “I realized the problem and the danger, shielded Smith with my body, and pointed the weapon down range. The next thing I knew I was on the ground covered with blood.”
4. The medical report showed Jones’s injuries to be concentrated in the facial and upper chest areas.
5. The armaments section indicated that the accident was caused by a “cook-off” (a round fired by the heat of the weapon rather than by operating the trigger). This report further stated that at the time of the cook-off the breach was open.
6. At the time, proper procedure in misfire incidents involving the M-16 rifle required the instructor to remove the magazine and point the weapon down range for at least 10 seconds before opening the breach to clear the weapon. Cook-offs during normal firing rarely occurred.
7. The squadron policy on decorations was unclear. Supervisors interpreted the manuals in their own way, and generally the commander had approved their recommendations without comment.
8. To earn the Airman’s Medal, one must consciously risk his life to save that of another.
The commander’s next step was to evaluate these “facts.”
It was obvious that while the three witnesses could accurately describe events just after the explosion, they had no real knowledge of what happened prior to that time. The fact that they were black and also friends of Smith was irrelevant. The commander did note the implications of the training NCO’s statements about blacks. As soon as this inquiry was completed, he examined the possibility of prejudice being introduced into the squadron’s training programs consciously or unconsciously by this NCO. In view of real evidence provided by the armory and the medical reports, the training NCO’s reconstruction of the event was discounted.
The injuries sustained by Jones and the armory report seemed to confirm that the breach of the weapon had been opened and an exploding round had blown back powder and shell fragments into the instructor’s face.
Jones was interviewed again and asked if he had complied with proper range procedure, specifically, waiting ten seconds or more before clearing the weapon. He was also asked if he expected a cook-off. He answered that he could not remember opening the breach, and while he wasn’t expecting a cook-off, he did realize something was wrong. “Knowing that, did you push Smith to safety?”
“Maybe not push,” he replied, “I stepped in front of him, though.”
Smith was then called in and asked about the open breach and the “push to safety.” He could not remember whether the breach was open because Jones was between him and the weapon. Had Jones stepped in front of him?
“I can’t remember, but I know I wasn’t pushed.”
Based on this investigation, the commander produced his own reconstruction. Smith’s weapon had malfunctioned, he raised his hand, and Jones came over to determine what was wrong. Realizing something was amiss, Jones took routine precautions. He took the weapon and pointed it down range. After a time, he opened the breach. The round inside cooked off. The blowback injured Jones. Whether he waited 10 seconds or not was irrelevant; cook-offs under this circumstance are rare and can occur after the ten-second waiting period. In the mind of the instructor, he honestly thought he had pushed or shielded the student. Confused by the rapid chain of events, Smith did not realize that this was Jones’s intention when he took the weapon.
The commander now had to consider his alternatives.
1. He could follow the previous awards policy and nominate Jones for the Airman’s Medal. If forwarded in the same form it was originally reported, the nomination would probably be approved. This alternative would improve the career potential of Sergeant Jones, an excellent young prospect, and reassure the squadron’s career NCO’s about their commander’s faith in their judgment. Without further clarification, however, it would alienate all or some of the squadron’s minority members, who would probably see it as the word of one white man taken over that of four blacks. This impression possibly could be mitigated by explaining that while he realized the real circumstances, he was taking this action because in the past people had received this medal for like incidents. This policy would continue in the future and would benefit both black and white careers.
2. He could reject the nomination. The hard feelings engendered by alternative number one would be reversed: this time it would be the white faction that would feel their word was worth less than that of a minority airman. “The old man won’t stand up to a black” would probably be a popular refrain. He could help his cause by calling in his NCO’s and explaining his findings and the bad psychological impact the nomination would have had on Smith, hoping they were knowledgeable enough to accept the situation.
3. He could take no action on the award but reassign the training NCO because of his conscious or unconscious prejudice. While in the long term this NCO might have to be removed, to do so at this time would complicate the present matter. It might also be interpreted incorrectly by other supervisors as a warning not to oppose minority airmen on any issue. This course, however, would solve the immediate problem, leaving the commander time to deal with the unpleasant aftereffects.
4. He could take no action at all presently. This is a judgment call based on the premise that the incident is a minor one of little interest outside the immediate circle of those involved. In time, when tensions had eased, he could approve or disapprove as he saw fit.
The commander discarded alternatives three and four immediately. Firing the training NCO in the middle of a controversy would completely obscure the questions posed by the original problem. The commander would also lose the opportunity to show that his equal opportunity program was capable of objectively resolving problems. Doing nothing at all risked adding a misunderstanding to what might become multiple misunderstandings such as had previously provided the fuel that ignited major confrontations.
After some thought concerning the realities of promotion competition in the Air Force, he also rejected the hypocrisy of alternative number one.
He now had to determine what was the best method of communicating his decision to reject the nomination. He felt he had to center his message around clarification of the original misunderstanding that led Smith to protest the nomination. The theme would be “no villains, just people with part of the picture.” He also felt that reformation of the squadron awards program was an imperative and that this act had to be linked to the problem solution. After all, simply stated, Jones had not earned the medal for which he had been nominated.
The commander prepared a written report of his findings, which he discussed with his airmen at the monthly commander’s call. Here he again emphasized his theme. He also called a special meeting with all supervisory personnel, at which he explored in depth all the human relations ramifications of the incident. At both these meetings the actual incident was used only as a starting point for a discussion of communication problems. The commander also announced that the operations officer had been tasked with the responsibility of preparing clear guidelines on the new awards and decorations program.
After initiation of the new program, the commander made spot checks to insure that nominees had fulfilled the requirements for the decoration for which they had been nominated. He also charged the superintendent (the senior NCO in the squadron) with the responsibility of insuring that deserving airmen were being nominated. He revised the squadron’s human relations training curriculum, introducing additional hours devoted to interpersonal communications. After about a month, he interviewed the training NCO in depth and discovered the man had been unable to shed the prejudices he had learned early in life. He was reassigned to a nonsupervisory position. The commander then directed the operations officer to review carefully all training records to determine where this prejudice might have restricted the progress of any squadron member. In all cases, the benefit of the doubt was given to the airman involved, and remedial programs were developed to enable him to catch up with his peers.
Obviously, one cannot present all the details in this illustrative example. Hopefully, however, the reader can follow the problem-solving technique as the commander systematically worked through the case. Most important, it should be noted that at no point did he allow himself to be swayed by unwarranted emotion. Initially he branded no one a liar. He refused to be influenced by remarks about “those blacks” or the anger displayed by Smith. He looked for the facts and then made a decision based upon his findings. This subjective decision was made only after he had factually reconstructed the incident.
When dealing with social problems, one may not always have enough time to make a full investigation before making a decision. But one can always ask, “How do you know that’s true?” One should always strive to distinguish fact from opinion. Finally, one should engrave on his mind the words of Lieutenant General William McBride, Commander of Air Training Command: “Equal treatment is not always fair treatment.”
Anyone who is a supervisor must work with people. He must view them as individuals and develop management systems that respect their differences. When conflicts occur, he cannot abandon these systems. If he does, only the most powerful or the most raucous voices will prevail. In such circumstances, justice will seldom be satisfied.
Lackland AFB,
Notes
1. Elliot Liebow, Talley’s Corner (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).
2. Alfred Zander, “Resistance to Change—Its Analysis and Prevention,” quoted in George Henderson, To Live in Freedom (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972).
Recommended
Blake, Robert R., and Jane S. Monton.
Corporation Excellence through Grid Organization Development: A Systems
Approach.
Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles
V. Hamilton. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation.
Kerner,
Otto. Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders.
Toffler, Alvin. Future Shock.
Captain Jon M. Samuels (M.A.,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of