Document created: 31 October 03
Air University Review,
January-February 1973
In 1957, when he was Commander of the Tactical Air Command, General Otto P. Weyland wrote: “I don’t think any unbiased Air Force officer visualizes B-52’s finding and dropping weapons on a small guerrilla troop concentration in the jungles of Indo-China—or some other area of concern in the local war problem. I not only think it illogical, but feel that it would be a pure mal-employment of such an expensive force when we can do the job better and more economically with tactical air forces.” Obviously the pattern of warfare and the use of strategic and tactical weapon systems in Southeast Asia have not developed as General Weyland would have predicted. Forces of both the Air Force and Navy that were designed for tactical operations have carried the burden of the “strategic air war in North Vietnam, while the B-52 Stratofortress has been used in a tactical role, primarily south of the 17th parallel.1 But the long-endured war not only affected concepts of military operations, it also intensified apprehension as to the pervasive weight of the totality of military affairs upon America and, in the General John D. Lavelle incident, led to an inquiry to determine whether the First Commandment of American military policy (the principle of civilian control) had been violated.
This review deals with two recent books which, while quite different in format and scope, are both concerned with the role of the military in modern America. The first, by Robert Frank Futrell, with a look from the inside of one of the nation’s military services, is a lengthy examination of basic Air Force conceptual thought. The other is a collection of readings appraising the impact of the military upon society and which, moreover, conveys a contemporary view of the military image.*
*Robert
Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the
United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (2 vols., Air University, Ala.:
Aerospace Studies Institute, 1971).
Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., editors, The Military and
American Society: Essays and Readings (New York: The Free Press, 1972,
$10.00), 322 pages.
For many years a faculty research scholar and historian at Air University, Dr. Futrell is well known for his history of the air war in Korea.2 For this present work he has mastered a prodigious amount of primary material and has included more than a hundred pages of documentation from the writings and speeches of major military and civilian air power leaders, as well as their testimony before Congressional committees and other forums. The book has been standing in the wings for more than a few years, apparently awaiting security clearance.
While Futrell has not established any organizational subdivisions, the contents inherently fit into three main sections: first, an account of the history of ideas and institutions within Army aviation from its beginnings in 1907 through the Second World War; then, discussion of the period from 1945 to 1957, when basic postwar policy was formulated and the Soviet nuclear missile threat emerged; and, finally, a review of the developments from the late fifties to 1964, when first the “New Look” and then “flexible response” became American military policy. The three terms, “ideas, concepts, doctrine,” Futrell defines as representing the evolutionary process from the original thought to its ultimate implementation as operational reality. About three-fourths of the material is concerned with developments since 1945. Among the old interservice rivalries discussed are the B-36 quarrel with the Navy, the arguments over a 70-group Air Force, as well as basic disagreements over missions, money, and unification. In addition, there is considerable material on the Air Force attitude regarding the “New Frontier” policy of nuclear stalemate and flexible response.
The role of Air University, along with various organizations under its command charged with the development of doctrine, looms large in these pages. Given the responsibility for formulating air doctrine in 1946, Air University found it to be a difficult task, and it was not until the mid-fifties that the first round of Air Force manuals codifying doctrine appeared. However, the concurrent joint efforts of the armed services to coordinate and frame an effective, unified doctrine failed. Even more unfortunate, Futrell maintains, was the fact that, in the development of Air Force thought, stagnation set in during the fifties—and at a time when new problems of missiles and aerospace warfare had to be faced. He quotes former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert to indicate how “parochial” Air Force thinking had become. One can conjecture that the need to counter the increasing criticism of the Eisenhower-Dulles “New Look” policy of massive deterrence may have contributed to the conservatism of Air Force thought. That criticism came from both within and outside military circles; from Army Generals Maxwell D. Taylor, Matthew B. Ridgway, and James M. Gavin, who argued for more balanced forces and were joined by influential intellectuals such as George F. Kennan and Bernard Brodie, who, dreading to risk the unleashing of thermonuclear holocaust, also supported a larger role for conventional military forces. The introduction of the Kennedy administration in 1961 made the formulation of air doctrine no easier, as the critics of massive deterrence received a sympathetic hearing. Rejecting the favored Air Force strategy of counterforce as “spasm war,” President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara instituted a policy of strategic stalemate and flexible response, stressing the capability of coping with both nuclear and conventional warfare. Meanwhile, Futrell observes, the Air Staff decided late in 1961 to hold back the revision of doctrine until the New Frontier military strategy had matured.
Ultimately, new vigor was found, and a second round of doctrinal study was undertaken in 1963-64. While Futrell notes that the Air Force never discovered a counterpart to the Navy’s Mahan (to formulate basic, lasting air doctrine), he has high praise for Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine. Drafted under the supervision of Major General Jerry D. Page, that 1964 manual is commended for its recognition that “basic doctrine evolves through the continuing analysis and testing of military operations in the light of national objectives and the changing military environment.” According to Futrell, that concept of continued evolution of doctrine, rather than static doctrine, provided the Air Force with an outlook suited not only to the needs of massive thermonuclear deterrence but also to lower levels of conflict.
The effort to convert ideas and concepts into doctrine and organization necessarily required theoretical projection of advanced weapon systems. The Air Force here tended to follow the conservative view that “a bird in the hand, etc.,” and as a result intercontinental missiles were afforded a low priority; nor were nuclear weapons evaluated highly at first as they were few in number and not expected to be decisive. When Secretary McNamara threw his support behind an extensive missile program rather than the B-70, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas O. White warned that to rely primarily on missiles, instead of a balanced strategic force of missiles and manned bombers, would breed a disastrous Maginot Line psychology. But that was a losing battle, and the obsolescence of the B-52s increased while no replacement was programmed.
Among the more interesting doctrinal matters which Futrell presents is the question of the desirability of separate strategic tactical air forces. The issue had arisen during World War II when Brigadier Generals Orvil A. Anderson and Robert C. Candee both protested such arbitrary division of air power-which Candee condemned as mistakenly copied from the British. The same question emerged again in the 1950s when Major General John De F. Barker, Deputy Commander of Air University, spoke out against separate air arms, and former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter and General Curtis E. LeMay independently proposed the consolidation of SAC and TAC. The legitimacy of the question is evident, for in every major war in which America has engaged since and including World War I, strategic bombardment aircraft have been used in tactical roles. Futrell cites a 1951 Air Staff paper stating that the designations “strategic” and “tactical” air forces “were arbitrarily chosen” and were not intended to be rigidly construed.
In assessing this book, one is reminded of the comment of Michael Howard, the eminent British military historian, who said that the central problem for mankind in this century, and one which the military historian must study, is this: “Under what circumstances can armed force be used, in the only way in which it can be legitimate to use it, to ensure a lasting and stable peace?”3 For that is the problem that Futrell has addressed in narrating the history of air power thought within the United States Air Force. He has most clearly stated the convictions of many air leaders that without adequate American air power the probabilities of a lasting and stable peace are very limited. Moreover, the conceptual thinking within air power circles and the Air Force’s efforts to establish an organizational framework in which to foster such thinking are described here with a thoroughness that will mark this book as an invaluable research tool for every student of air power.
There are some disappointments, nonetheless. In his chapters dealing with the pre-World War II years, Futrell has not appreciably enlarged upon the work of Thomas H. Greer,4 and he therefore could have more briefly summarized that period. In addition, Futrell has failed to provide any insight into the character and background of the various air leaders. Admittedly this is a study of ideas; however, intellectual history cannot ignore the human elements. Snippets of those leaders’ ideas, with no insight as to how their professional assignments and ambitions may have nurtured them, are insufficient. One is repeatedly struck, for example, by how the arguments of LeMay, Cannon, Schriever, Weyland, and others so often appear to be merely expressive of their dedication to the particular arm of air power they happened to command. This is not a question of their sincerity, but it surely points to the need for more biographical and professional data on the individual leaders than Futrell has provided, including not only the relatively well-known commanders but also such conceptual thinkers as Jerry D. Page, Noel F. Parrish, and Richard P. Klocko.
Finally, it is regrettable that Aerospace Studies Institute could not have provided a better printing format. Earlier Air University publications, Greer’s for example, were not set in typescript and are easier to read. Furthermore, the Greer volume was indexed—a deplorable omission in Futrell’s work, in which so many individuals, organizations, and ideas are discussed that even to track down an individual’s full name or position is quite time consuming. And whoever decided to place all the footnotes at the back of the second volume made a serious blunder. Each volume is large and awkward to handle, and to cope with both at once in an attempt to follow the documentation is most annoying. One hopes that future reprinting will correct these as well as the many typographical errors.
The Book of readings edited by Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., differs considerably from Futrell’s. The essays deal primarily with post-1945 developments within the American military and, more generally, with how military demands and policies have affected American society.5 Both editors are established scholars of military affairs. In the last ten years Professor Ambrose has published a number of books on American military history, and Barber, now teaching at the Naval War College, has written for the Naval War College Review. In the book under consideration here, the editors, besides presenting essays of their own, have selected a well-chosen variety of material by governmental officers, journalists, and scholars on topics ranging from a critique of the military-industrial complex to the relationship of the military to foreign policy, race relations, domestic order, and even to ecology. It is surprising to learn that virtually half of the adult males in the United Stateshave had some military service. That statistic alone lends credence to the thesis of the extensive societal impact of the military. Except for the essays by the editors, almost all the readings have been published previously. Most of them are of recent date; only three predate 1964, the selection from President Dwight D. Eisenhower and those by Samuel P. Huntington and Jack Raymond.
As might be expected, several of the contributors are dismayed about the
concentration of military authority. Mr. Raymond, of the New York Times, questions
those legislative changes since 1947 that greatly augmented the authority of
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while
John Kenneth Galbraith’s apprehensions about the military-industrial complex
exceed those of Eisenhower. Nevertheless Ambrose, himself a challenging critic
of many aspects of militarism, concludes that, although the military is
gigantic, it has not swallowed the American society and “does not dominate our
lives, establish values, or dictate our foreign and domestic policies.”
Furthermore, as Lawrence B. Tatum observes in an article included in the book,
the number of military men appointed to key non-military positions within the
government has declined in the past twenty years. He maintains that the high
incidence of their employment immediately after the Second World War was
primarily due to the shortage of civilian talent available at that time.
Contrarily, today some people are fearful that the ascendancy of civilian
leadership in military’ affairs is dangerous,6 although, as Tatum
reminds us, that has been the American tradition.7
For those individuals interested in current sociological tensions in America, there are pertinent selections by Professors Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., and by both the editors, on socialization and race relations. The writers generally agree that the military has provided individuals of “lower class” backgrounds with a sense of belonging and with opportunities for better living, which they often lacked in civilian life. Ambrose, differing with Harry S. Truman’s interpretation of how, as President, he had introduced integration in the military services, credits black leaders with having pressured the administration to take action.8 Each of these readings is incisive and very helpful to an understanding of the broader interrelations between the military and other aspects of American society.
Ambrose and Barber have included only a few selections dealing with military planning and operations. In one of these, I. F. Stone, a respected radical journalist, chastizes both President Nixon and the military services for their continued support for strategic bombers, a policy that Stone denounces as an “expensive luxury,” since he doubts the bombers’ penetration ability. Nevertheless, this argument continues. Time and again USAF has reiterated its need for a supersonic heavy bomber and last year was supported vigorously by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, who testified in the Senate hearings regarding the SALT agreement that he would not recommend acceptance of that arms limitation unless further funds were provided for the B-1 bomber and Trident submarine development. Yet, although such development funds were in included in the fiscal 1973 DOD budget, little bomber production is yet seen.
The variety of the selections in this book is such that most readers will find some articles more noteworthy than others. Jack Raymond’s comments on former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s interest in exercising operational control will appeal to those who are attracted to questions of the command of American military forces. Another thoughtful article is Martin Blumenson’s “On the Function of the Military in Civil Disorders,” which presents another nuance in the long controversy regarding the respective merits of regular and militia forces. Using the 1967 Detroit riots as an example, Blumenson argues that regular soldiers have demonstrated a far greater ability to act successfully and with restraint than has the National Guard.
In general, while the editors are to be complimented on assembling these selections, they would have assisted their readers more had they included a preface or introduction that stated their intentions; in that respect the title is not a sufficient guide. And parallel to the typographical shoddiness of Futrell’s book is the editorial laxity of Ambrose and Barber. The citations regarding previous publication of the selections included are incomplete and inconsistent, sometimes lacking the volume number, date, and pagination from the journal where the articles were originally published. Stylistic changes were made unnecessarily and not indicated in the articles by Raymond and Tatum, and in the latter the changes misrepresent the author’s intended meaning.
While the readings included in Ambrose-Barber are provocative and merit attention, the stature of this work obviously is not on the same plane with Futrell’s original study. Dr. Futrell’s book is a major contribution to the history of military thought, and no one dealing with the intellectual context of air power development, or even more generally with the problems of war and peace in the twentieth century, can afford to overlook it. Within the USAF, it should be studied at the highest levels in what one hopes is a continuous effort to provide individual and organizational priority for the formulation of ideas, concepts, and doctrine.
Wichita State University
Notes
1. For an account of the tactical use of the B-52, see William H. Greenhalgh, Jr., “AOK Airpower over Khe Sanh,” Aerospace Historian, 19 (March 1972), 2-9.
2. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961).
3. Michael Howard, “Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare,” The Harmon Lectures in Military History, no. 9 (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1967), p. 12.
4. Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Air University, Ala.; USAF Historical Division, 1955).
5. These topic currently are receiving much and proper attention. The theme at the USAF Academy Fifth Military History Symposium held on 5-6 October 1972 was “The Military and Society.” As Professor Louis Morton mused in the wrap-up session of that conference, there is an inconsistency in treating the military as something apart from society.
6. See Herman S. Wolk, “Antimilitarism in America, ” Air University Review, XXIII 4 (May-June 1972), 23.
7. An excellent article refuting the likelihood of dominant militarism in America is Colonel Richard F. Rosser, USAF, “Civil-Military Relations in the 1980s,” Military Review, LII (March 1972), 18-31.
8. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), 182-83.
Dr. George W. Collins (Ph.D., University of Colorado) is Associate Professor of history, Wichita State University. He served as a bomber navigator during World War II and Korea and later in Strategic Air Command. He then taught navigation and history at the United Stated Air Force Academy until his retirement in 1968. Dr. Collins has published articles on history and navigation.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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