Document created: 29 December 03
Air University Review, May-June
1973
Lieutenant Colonel Laun C. Smith, Jr., USAF (Ret)
To most United States citizens, Latin America is a Catholic land of mañana, where all people speak Spanish; where the military controls the governments; where poverty, graft, and corruption are a way of life; and where the United States has tried its best to “give” a suitable way of life to the people of the poor, unfortunate small republics.
Most people do not know that the “tiny” republic of Chile, if superimposed on a map of the United States, would stretch in a 100-mile-wide strip from New York to San Francisco. Nor are they aware that Argentina is as large as that portion of the United States east of the Mississippi River plus Kansas and Nebraska. And continental United States could fit into Brazil, where Portuguese has been spoken since the days of the conquest, and have room to spare. In fact, it is doubtful even that all U.S. statesmen understand the relative sizes of the Latin American countries.
Yet another popular misunderstanding concerns the degree of United States impact on Latin America. To most people Latin America is a convenient pool for exclusive United States political influence and economic investment. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Latin America and has had a relatively high degree of political influence there; but it is not true that Latin America is the exclusive domain of the United States. Other foreign governments have always been active in Latin American affairs, and their influence is increasing.
Herbert Goldhamer has written a book, The Foreign Powers in Latin America,* which contains a wealth of information. Originally a RAND Corporation Study, his book is the result of much research and analysis, and some would say that he has tried to pack too much information into its three hundred pages. The book is, in places, difficult reading, and to most Latin American specialists much of the data therein is well known. However, our military officers, when assigned to a post in Latin America, will find a study of Goldhamer’s book helpful in doing a good job there.
* Herbert Goldhamer, The Foreign Power’s in Latin America (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972, $10.00), 302 pages.
While the main focus of the book is on United States/Soviet competition in the area, the author contends that our preoccupation with the role of the United States in Latin American affairs has obscured the important part played there by other countries. Within the time frame of the Alliance for Progress, 1961-71, Goldhamer examines the activities of other foreign powers—the West European states, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, Japan, Canada, Israel—their Latin American objectives and the methods and resources used to attain them.
Goldhamer quotes President Giuseppe Saragat of Italy as saying that South America is the continent where Europe’s future lies and that South America’s destiny is the destiny not only of the Continent but of the world. This is probably an overstatement, but Saragat’s conclusions have been shared by Sir George Bolton of England, Paul Martin, former Canadian Secretary of State, the late General Charles de Gaulle of France, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Covey T. Oliver. This line of thinking has led to considerable inroads into the affairs of Latin America by other foreign powers.
Goldhamer notes that Great Britain, seemingly in a hurry to divest herself of most of her possessions in the western hemisphere, has been in conflict with several Latin American states over her territories. In spite of the fact that she is the second-largest investor in Latin America (after the United States) and despite substantial sales of military equipment to Latin American states, Great Britain has suffered losses in political prestige as well as in the economic market in Latin America.
France, on the other hand, has no intention of relinquishing control over her possessions in the Caribbean. Although she has had no increase in her own influence in Latin America, her broad interest in reducing Latin America’s dependence on the United States has been somewhat gratified. In spite of considerable military sales to Latin America in the form of the Mirage jet aircraft and tanks, France has had problems in Latin America, and the future does not promise anything better.
West Germany’s drive to re-establish her pre-World War II economic position in Latin America has not succeeded fully but has made a substantial progress. As the third-largest investor in Latin America, Germany is also the second-largest provisioner there, next to the United States. Since she does not depend upon Latin America for imports, her balance of trade with the region is favorable. So the future for Germany in Latin America looks bright, favored by the cultural and economic impact of the great number of Germans who have settled there since World War II.
Japanese emigrants have also flocked to Latin America since World War II, giving their homeland a nucleus of economic and cultural influence in the region. In great need of raw materials, Japan has taken the initiative in Latin America economically and has avoided political problems by “sticking to business.” No other industrial nation can show so much gain in Latin America at so little cost.
Latin America has also been a haven for Italian immigrants since World War II. Ranking fifth as a trading partner with Latin America, Italy has remained free from tensions with the republics. She will probably continue to get her share of Latin American trade, but her present policy does not constitute a threat to other nations.
Unlike Italy, Spain has had almost insurmountable political problems, stemming from her old colonial ties with the Latin Americans and from the politics of her 1936 revolution. Both Mexico and Argentina have been highly critical of Spain, but Spain has nevertheless been able to increase its share of the Latin American market. Spain will always have cultural ties with Spanish America but will be hampered in its New World policy until some changes are made in the political picture in Madrid.
Other smaller countries are beginning to trade with and invest in Latin America, too.
Various nations’ foreign policies toward Latin America have been widely divergent. On the one hand there is the long-term policy of the United States that spawned the Alliance for Progress. On the other there is the “No policy is the best policy” approach that has been successful for such powers as Japan and more recently the Soviet Union. This approach is characterized for the most part by short-term or ad hoc actions. “The Soviet Union often operates in the West by individual offers at strategic moments and places. For instance, on the day that the United States ambassador visited Brazil’s President Arturo Costa e Silva to inform him officially that Washington was reducing its military aid program, the Soviet ambassador appeared and offered Brazil credits for a subway and bridge for Rio de Janeiro.” (pp. 183-84)
Sir George Bolton early had exceptionally accurate insight to the major weakness of the Alliance for Progress when he said, “. . . my personal view is that Washington has made a mistake in imposing on potential beneficiaries standards of behaviour both political and economic.” (p. 205) That the Alliance for Progress failed, there is no doubt. One must assume, of course, that the premise of the Alliance was wrong. But there are other reasons why it failed. Specialists in Latin American affairs we generally little content with the Latin American policies of their own governments. They find them to be unclear, vacillating, and indifferent to Latin America and executed by officials insufficiently trained and informed on Latin American affairs.” (p. 71, emphasis added) In this respect the United States is no different from the other powers.
Soviet policy in recent years, however, has been different from that of the other nations. There is no public debate about foreign policy in Russia, nor does the Soviet press publish distorted articles that divulge Soviet planning “in the interest of the people.” Soviet diplomats are well trained, and their instructions are specific. They know why they are sent to Latin America and what they are expected to do—and they do it.
In contrast, private groups in the United States “solicit and often receive special advantages from the United States government.” But this does not mean that “they shape the main lines of its policy in that region [Latin America]. The principal directions of that policy were, in the decade of the Alliance for Progress, affected more by the cold war, by the advent of Castro and sporadic guerrilla outbursts, by the political importance of the military in Latin American affairs, by strategic considerations, and not least by the almost inextinguishable faith that the United States responsibilities and capabilities extend to the moral and practical guidance of the Latin American states.” (p. 75)
This does not alter the fact that not only do private interests in the United States seek favors and criticize U.S. policy, but so do congressmen and other state officials, as well as that self-styled equalizer of all wrongs, the United States press. The Latin Americans realize—long before a measure is passed into law by the United States government—pretty nearly what they can expect to gain or lose by the law. Thus, they know what they can get, and they will not be satisfied with less.
Distance alone made Latin America the backyard of the United States politically, but many factors are changing this picture. Included is the more aggressive approach to Latin American affairs by France, Japan, Germany and Italy. The fact that the Latin Americans are no longer deeply concerned about the feeling and reaction of the United States to their relations with other powers certainly is a potent cause. Instead, many of the Latin American nations have made clear their interest in economic and diplomatic relations with Europe, Japan, and the Soviet bloc countries. Distance today seems to make the Soviets seem less dangerous in the eyes of the Latinos.
However, the Soviet Union does pose the greatest threat to United States leadership in Latin American trade and investment today. In varying degrees, the Western-oriented countries shared political objectives in Latin America associated both with the containment of Communism and the Soviet Union and with the pursuit of economic relations with the Latin republics. The author points out that the Soviet Union, in turn, has political interests in Latin America related to its conflict with the West generally and with the United States more particularly. Recent Soviet behavior in Latin America represents “some shift toward pursuing political influence . . . where political power largely resides, that is, in the government of the Latin American states.” (p. 53)
The author is particularly critical of two of the Alliance’s programs: the Peace Corps and Military Civic Action. Regarding the former, he contrasts what he considers (and I agree) the ineffectiveness of the exuberant young college recruits of the Peace Corps with the mature judgment and specialized skills of the people who compose the German Development Service (GDS). After a while the Latin American republics refused to request help from the Peace Corps. They would rather rely on the older and more skilled people of the GDS, who could offer them what they needed. By 1970 this led to about sixty percent of the new recruits of the U.S. Peace Corps being older, skilled people. (pp. 170-71)
Goldhamer’s treatment of the U.S. military presence in Latin America is generally good, but he tends to lump military civic action with aid programs administered by other agencies. As a consequence, the value of the programs does not, in his opinion, measure up to the costs. The armed forces can put up a convincing argument to the contrary. The author does acknowledge that “United States military observers had a more accurate appreciation [than members of Congress, the State Department, or the press] of the futility of the United States attempts to prevent South American military establishments from acquiring advanced weapons.” (p. 268)
However, in writing about relations between the U.S. military and that of the host countries, Goldhamer states, “. . . the training and advisory relations between the United States and several of the Latin militaries led to such a close identification of the Latin American military with the United States that it weakened the position of the military vis-à-vis their own people and often was a source of embarrassment to them.” * (p. 264)
* In my three years with the United States Southern Command I had many
opportunities to work with the host military and the people. I was never
involved in, nor did I ever hear of, an incident that was embarrassing to the
host military, the people, or me.
The Soviets, claims the author, have made mistakes that have led to repeated breaches of relations with Latin American governments. But they have some advantages over other powers. The Latin Americans expect them to resort to propaganda and subversion. It is part of their way of life. Thus, Soviet officials in Latin America are not expected to observe the same degree of discretion and restraint required of others.
Goldhamer does not credit the Soviets for the failures of the United States in Latin America. “Fortunately,” he writes, “failures of major programs are not always as disastrous as they well might be.” (p. 302) Failure forces a review of the means employed to implement a program. Goals should not have to change. Planners should beware of a multiplicity of special, long-term programs; they can be a hindrance. There should be a new emphasis on a “low profile” or policy of avoiding a tutelary, paternalistic, and interventional posture. Our leaders should also recognize that “the resistance, by no means total, of Latin American political institutions, attitudes, and practices to change is determined much more by characteristics of a social structure shaped over several centuries than by recent U.S. policy.” (p. 274)
Latin America is changing. The United States does not have an exclusive sphere of influence in Latin America. Other nations are making gains at our expense, some of them with our blessing. The ideological conflict, however, has just begun. Goldhamer opines that the United States, by inference, can probably offset Soviet gains by seeking more modest aims in Latin America. “Modest aims,” he writes, “and decisions taken with the fullest provision for withdrawal or radical modification, might provide modest successes that in the long run could add up to greater benefits than are provided by ‘enterprises of great pith and moment’ for which one is ill-prepared and ill-equipped.” (p. 302)
El Paso, Texas
Lieutenant Colonel Laun C. Smith, Jr. (UASF, Ret), (M.A., University of Pennsylvania), was Associate Editor, Air University Review, at the time of his retirement in 1972. He served as Information Officer in Morocco and at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri; Assistant Professor of History, USAFA; Deputy Assistant for Policy and Programs, SAF-OII; and Regional Desk Officer for Central America, Public Affairs Office, U. S. Southern Command. In retirement he is engaged in free-lance writing.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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