Document created: 29 December 03
Air University Review, May-June 1973

The Soviet Air Force 
High Command

Alexander O. Ghebhardt
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.

The organizational structure of the Soviet Air Force is a useful vehicle for an understanding of the fundamental military concepts and doctrine that support the raison d’être of the military organization. This is especially true of Soviet armed forces because of their acute general awareness of the necessity that organizational form follow doctrinal underpinnings. The Soviet armed forces in general and Air Force in particular have departed radically from the Western form of military organization to meet their specific and unique requirements.

All branches of the Soviet armed forces are subordinate to a single Minister of Defense, a key element of the post-Stalin reorganization of the Soviet armed forces in 1953. The Defense Ministry itself is one of several ministries within the governmental apparatus known as the Council of Ministries. There is an elaborate parallel structure for the political control of the armed forces through the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This control extends throughout the armed forces through the political directorates for each of the respective branches. This aspect of Soviet Air Force organization will not be discussed here, to facilitate a sharper focus on the purely military aspects of the Soviet Air Force High Command.

Directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense are three First Deputy Ministers, one of whom is the Chief of the General Staff, while another is Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Warsaw Pact forces. In addition there are ten Deputy Ministers of Defense, who are the CINC’S of their respective branches.¹ The group of Deputy Ministers forms the Military Council, a parallel advisory body to the Defense Minister, along with the General Staff. The High Command of the Soviet armed forces is currently in a process of revitalization. More youthful officers are being placed in senior positions to replace aging incumbents, with at least a limited expansion of the Military Council. (Average age within the Soviet High Command until recently exceeded that of U.S. counterparts by nearly ten years.) In addition to the creation of a Deputy Minister for Civil Defense, it appears likely that the Soviets will reinstate the position of Deputy Minister for Combat Training, which was abolished in 1968.

The Soviet Union is divided into sixteen Military Districts, four Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe, four fleet Commands analogous to Military Districts, and two autonomous Naval Flotillas.² The most important districts are Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and the Northern Fleet is the most important naval element.

As is already apparent, the mission, and consequently the organizational structure, differ substantially from their American counterparts. The Soviet Air Force CINC has largely administrative rather than operational control over the most important elements of the Air Force, reflecting broader Soviet organizational framework and preferences predating World War II. There are eleven Deputy Air Force CINC’S, five of whom are in charge of semiautonomous commands that are under the operational control of other branches. These five are the Long Range Aviation (the strategic bombing component of Soviet forces), which is subordinate to the Minister of Defense; the Aviation (manned interceptor) branch of the Soviet Air Defense forces (PVO), which is operationally subordinate to the Air Defense Forces CINC; Naval Aviation, which is subordinate to the Navy CINC; and the Tactical Air Force (or “Frontal Aviation” in Soviet parlance) and Airborne forces, which are operationally controlled by the Ground Forces CINC.

The remaining Deputies perform key administrative and support functions, including Rear Services, Engineering, The Chief Inspector, Training, Finance, and the inevitable Chief of the Political Directorate.³

leading personalities

At each turn in the history of the Soviet Air Force, changes in organization and doctrine have been accompanied by changes in personnel in senior positions. Thus, in 1949, just before the start of the Korean War, Stalin replaced Chief Aviation Marshal Konstantin Vershinin with Chief Aviation Marshal Pavel F. Zhigarev. In 1957 the reverse move took place when Vershinin replaced Zhigarev, this time for a period lasting until 1969. At that time Aviation Marshal Pavel Stepanovich Kutakhov, the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force, 49 years of age, became the youngest CINC of a service in the Soviet High Command.

Kutakhov’s career up to that point had been marked by rapid promotions as a result of his combat experience in World War II, when he was credited with having destroyed 13 German military aircraft. After the war Kutakhov held various staff positions in several Soviet military districts, including Odessa, to which he was appointed Air Force Commander in 1965. In 1967 he was transferred to the Air Force Headquarters in Moscow. His involvement in politics paid off when he was elected a delegate to the 23d and 24th Congresses of the CPSU, where he was selected as a member of the Central Committee by virtue of heading a branch of the armed forces. His replacement of 65-year-old Marshal Sergey Rudenko as Vershinin’s First Deputy in March 1968 was apparently in preparation for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Kutakhov’s promotion was almost completely overshadowed by the events in Czechoslovakia and the replacement of Army General Kazakov by Sergey Shtemenko as Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. Kutakhov’s appointment therefore should be interpreted as having resulted from a combination of political acceptability, relative youth, and favorable circumstances within the High Command brought about by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

On 7 November 1972 Kutakhov was promoted to Chief Marshal of Aviation, the highest rank achieved by an Air Force officer and equivalent to Marshal of the Soviet Union. Thus he attained the same rank as his predecessors Novikov, Zhigarev, and Vershinin. His promotion may indicate satisfaction with his performance, length of tenure as the Air Force CINC, or an attempt to appease the Air Force officers for a series of advantages given to the Navy.

On the whole, since he was appointed, Kutakhov has maintained a low level of visibility. He is believed to lean toward an offensive strategy in contrast to the defensive orientation of most Soviet generals. One of his first moves was to reshape the Air Force High Command by replacing the aging Marshal Agaltsov with the then Lieutenant-General Vasilii Reshetnikov as Commander of the Long Range Aviation.

Also in 1969 Kutakhov appointed a new First Deputy, Colonel-General A. N. Efimov. Efimov is a World War II bomber pilot credited with flying 200 missions against German positions. After the war he attended the Soviet Air Force Academy and subsequently held various command posts in military districts. In 1970 the Air Force CINC replaced the Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Braiko, who had held the post since 1963, with Colonel-General A. P. Silantyev. Silantyev appears to share his Chiefs predilection for offensive operations. His selection of a young Deputy, Ivan F. Modiavev, a one-star major general, is further confirmation that the new generation of Russian airmen is likely to differ substantially from those who were in command during World War II or even during the Korean War. Another influential position was filled in 1967, following the death of Colonel-General A. G. Rytov, when Colonel-General I. M. Moroz became Chief of the Political Directorate.

The shake-up of the Air Force High Command was apparently carried out for two different reasons: first, because of the advanced age of the incumbents, the average age of the top four officers before 1969 being 66. Second, in advance of an apparent shift from a defensive to an offensive strategy, possibly caused by the realization that the growth prospects of the Moscow (Galosh) ABM system were not such as to give the Soviet High Command the confidence necessary to deploy a nationwide active defense system against ballistic missiles comparable to the existing system against aerodynamic threats, as well as decisions to move heavily into new areas of weapons development including SLBM’S, surface Naval combatants, and ICBM’S.⁴

One interesting aspect of the command change is to understand to what extent this has influenced the positions of the Air Force CINC within the Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Air Force as a whole in comparison to the other branches of the armed forces. As is well known, Soviet military strategy has been dominated by officers whose experience was in the tank and artillery forces. The present composition of the Soviet High Command reflects this fact. Today it continues to be dominated by Army officers, as demonstrated by the fact that despite his title of Deputy Minister of Defense Kutakhov ranks tenth in the overall High Command. The following list provides a better idea of the rank-ordering of the specialized services within the Soviet military hierarchy:
Marshal Andrei A. Grechko 
    Minister of Defense, Army
Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovskii 
    First Deputy Minister of Defense, 
    CINC Warsaw Pact, Army
Army General Viktor G. Kulikov 
    First Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of 
    the General Staff, Army
Army General A. A. Epishev 
    Chief, Main Political Directorate of the 
    Soviet Army and Navy, Army. 
    (He is not listed as a First Deputy but obviously 
    ranks as one.)
Army General S. L. Sokolov 
    First Deputy Minister of Defense without 
    specified duties but presumably in charge 
    of coordination and administration, Army.

The service chiefs are then listed in the order of importance of their respective services regardless of their actual rank. They all hold the position of Deputy Minister of Defense, which is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Assistant Secretaries.
Army General Vladimir F. Tolubko 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC Strategic 
    Rocket Troops, Army
Army General Ivan G. Pavlovskii 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC Ground 
    Forces, Army
Marshal Pavel F. Batitskii 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC Air Defense 
    Troops, Army (Artillery). (Previously 
    he was First Deputy Chief of the General Staff.)
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union 
    Sergey G. Gorshkov 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC Navy 
Chief Aviation Marshal Pavel S. Kutakhov⁵ 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC 
    Air Force
Army General Semyon K. Kurkotkin⁵ 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC Rear Services 
    (Logistics), Army
Colonel-General Aleksandr T. Altunin
    Deputy Minister of Defense, Head Civil 
    Defense, Army
Marshal Kiril S. Moskalenko 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief Inspectorate, 
    Army
Engineer-Army-General Aleksandr N. Komsrovskii⁵
    Deputy Minister of Defense, CINC Construction 
    and Billeting of Troops, Army
Engineer-Colonel-General N. N. Alekseyev 
    Deputy Minister of Defense, Head Weapons 
    Development (R&D), Army

The same is true about the position of Air Force officers within the General Staff. Neither the Chief nor any of his Deputies is an Air Force officer. The Navy was in the same position as the Air Force until recently, when General Kulikov, as part of his program of restructuring the General Staff, decided to appoint an Assistant Chief of Staff for Naval Operations—a move long overdue in view of the growing role of the Soviet Navy. The appointment went to Admiral of the fleet S. M. Lobov, until recently Commander of the Northern Fleet.⁶ It is interesting to note that in 1960 when Khrushchev split the aerodynamic and missile forces by creating a separate Strategic Rocket Troops service no similar move was undertaken in respect to the General Staff. If the Air Force is given the same importance as the Navy, the effect will be that in the near future an Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Operations will also be appointed. This in turn may lead to a fragmentation of the centralized Soviet High Command, with corresponding effects for Soviet strategy, tactics, and organization. Technology seems, however, to make such appointments desirable in view of the increasing complexity of operations and management. Currently the Air Force has a three-star general representing it on the General Staff in the person of Colonel-General N. P. Dagayev and a two-star general in Lieutenant-General V. Minakov. Since the appointment of Admiral of the Fleet S. M. Lobov as Kulikov’s Assistant Chief, the General Staff has the following structure:
Army-General Viktor G. Kulikov 
    Chief, Army 
Colonel-General Nikolai V. Ogarkov 
    First Deputy Chief, Army
Colonel-General Mikhail M. Kozlov 
    Deputy Chief for Operations, Army

Army General P. I. Ivashutin 
    Deputy Chief for Intelligence, Army 
    (KGB background)
Colonel-General V. V. Druzhinin 
    Deputy Chief, unspecified duties. (Former 
    Chief Radio Engineering Forces Air 
    Defense Command 1961-1967.)
Admiral of the Fleet S. M. Lobov 
    Assistant Chief for Naval Operations, Navy

The Air Force officers’ inability to become Chiefs, or at least Deputy or Assistant Chiefs, of the General Staff is probably one reason for unhappiness among their ranks. Traditional Soviet military doctrine has relegated Air Force and Naval officers to “specialists” in a particular field and as lacking general knowledge and expertise to assume the duties of the Chief of the General Staff of what was and continues to be mainly a continental military force. The interservice rivalry, up to this point, has not been comparable to that in the U.S., and although it should not be completely ignored, it is not as sharp or as important as among our services. As a result the Soviet High Command is among the best integrated in the world, a fact illustrated not only by the position and role of different services in the overall strategy, or the concept that all services and branches will play an equal role in a future war, but also by operational characteristics. The flying of Air Force medium and long-range bombers with the Soviet Navy in naval exercises is one example. The subordination of the Fighter Forces Command-Air Defense Command (IA-PVO) both to the Air Defense CINC and the Air Force CINC enables the Front Commander in time of war to shift fighter units from defensive to offensive operations. They may also be transferred to support a different army or front as battle conditions may require.

The impossibility of a Kutakhov or Vershinin to achieve the high position that General Twining achieved in the U.S. as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is quite clear at the present time. Technological developments and the growing complexity of operations and coordination will, however, probably persuade the Soviets to appoint a Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Operations and one for Naval Operations. The enhanced role of both the Soviet Navy and the Air Force, highly visible in recent Soviet maneuvers, makes it a future likelihood.

Air Defense Command

Since positions on the General Staff are hard to attain, Soviet Air Force generals appear to direct their ambitions in other directions. The Air Defense Forces or PVO Stranny (for Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona) are a separate command staffed by both Air Force and artillery officers, the latter holding all four top positions at the present time. In 1966 the present Commander in Chief, Marshal Batitskii, replaced Aviation Marshal Sudets, and another artillery officer, Army General A. F. Shcheglov, took over as PVO First Deputy from Colonel-General of the Air Force G. V. Zimin. This left Colonel-General Alexei I. Pokryshkin, the famous World War II Red flying ace credited with the destruction of 59 Nazi planes, as the most senior Air Force officer in the PVO. In 1972 Pokryshkin was appointed Chairman of the paramilitary Volunteer Organization for the Support of Army, Navy, and Air Force (DOSAAF), replacing Army General Getman. Pokryshkin has recently been promoted to aviation marshal, as has also Colonel-General I. Borzov, Commander of Naval Aviation.

Pokryshkin’s departure left two other Air Force officers in contention for Batitskii’s and Shcheglov’s jobs when one or both of them are retired. The Commander of the Fighter Forces, Colonel-General A. Borovykh, may be helped by both his command ability and political connections should one or both jobs be given to the Air Force. A more probable candidate for a command position (barring some unforeseen circumstances) appears to be Colonel-General A. I. Koldunov, whose military career in the past few years has been surprisingly successful. In 1968 Koldunov was Deputy Commander of the Baku Air Defense District. One year later he was moved to the Ministry of Defense for a brief tour of duty, and in 1970 he succeeded Colonel-General Vasilii V. Okunev as CINC of the important Moscow Air Defense District. Okunev was made Chief of the Soviet SAM Expeditionary Corps in Egypt, where he stayed until the Russian units were expelled in June 1972. Koldunov’s rapid promotion, current position, and age (49) make him an obvious contender for one of the two senior positions in the PVO Command. Politically he is also well placed, as demonstrated by his election as a Candidate Member of the Central Committee at the 24th CPSU Congress held in 1971.

The appointment of an Air Force officer would increase both the prestige and power of the service and may have wider doctrinal implications, especially on whether the role of the air defense artillery against low-flying targets will increase when the B-1 bomber enters service. An Air Force officer in charge of air defense is also bound to play an important part in the reshaping of strategy and procurement policy for the next generation of interceptors and tactical aircraft, which will probably be heavily influenced by advanced technology.

other channels of promotion

Another important current avenue of promotion for both Air Force and Navy officers is through political channels. In 1970 a Colonel Larionov of the Army headed a subsection of the Ministry of Defense responsible for relations with foreign military attachés assigned to Moscow. This subsection has subsequently been upgraded into a section similar to the Foreign Ministry Protocol Service and an Air Force Major-General, S. N. Sokolov, put in charge. Sokolov’s appointment appears to be a plum for the Air Force, although only the future will tell whether this position will be filled in rotation of the three major services.

Other young Air Force generals have achieved status via the Political Directorate. Major-General F. Ishchenko, who has recently become Head of the Political Directorate and Member of the Military Council of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, began his career as a Komsomol organizer and rose rapidly until 1970, when he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate in the Far Eastern Military District. In Hungary he replaced an Army officer, Lieutenant-General P. Petrenko. Currently Ishchenko is the only Air Force officer heading the Political Directorate in a Military District. However, the former exclusive Army domination is changing rapidly as young one-star Air Force generals are now holding the positions of First Deputy or Deputy Head of the Political Directorate in a number of services and districts and are probably earmarked to take over when the present incumbents are transferred or retired. The Air Force major-generals in such positions include the following: Major-General N. Kozlov, Deputy Head of the Political Directorate, Air Defense Forces; Major-General V. Semenov, Chief, Political Directorate, Air Force Staff and Administration; Major-General F. Kletskin, First Deputy Head in the Belorussia Military District; Major-General N. Tsymbal, Head of the Air Force Political unit, Far Eastern Military District. Kozlov and Kletskin are in the best positions to be made head of a Political Directorate in a Military District when a vacancy occurs. Nevertheless, despite all these steps forward, the Air Force is still behind the Army in the number and importance of political appointments held. Technological development combined with the process of rejuvenation of the entire Soviet High Command will undoubtedly help the careers of a number of Air Force officers. Both politically and professionally they are likely to play a greater role in the future.

Despite the fact that only one man is in a position to become CINC of the Air Force at any one time and that, once appointed, that person is usually kept on the job for a long period (as the careers of Novikov, Zhigarev, or Vershinin attest), the rejuvenation process begun by Kutakhov brought to the forefront a number of offense-oriented young generals who fit better into the overall changes in the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the General Staff that are now taking place under the personal supervision of the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Viktor G. Kulikov. By Soviet standards, Kutakhov at 52 could be in charge for the next 15 years. Konstantin Vershinin held the job for a longer period, and during his time the progress in development has barely been noticed in the West because the Missile Forces and the Navy caught the public eye. Kutakhov took over at a time when technological developments were beginning to exert a considerable influence on the shape of numerous changes in Soviet Air Force strategy, tactics, weapons development, and rapid growth.

It is too early to conclude on the basis of existing evidence that a major shift in Soviet strategy is clearly on the horizon. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for a hypothesis which holds that the coincidence of a number of evolutionary changes, including shifts in the High Command of the Soviet Forces, a shifting strategic balance move in the Soviet’s favor, and an apparent Soviet decision to develop Naval forces capable of projecting Soviet power beyond her borders—all these might be the result of a change in strategy. Developments over the next few years will likely repay careful attention.

The Soviet Air Force (vvs) High Command  (year of appointment in parentheses)
Commander in Chief Aviation	First Deputy CINC Col.-Gen.
Marshal P. S. Kutakhov (1969)	A. Efimov (1970)
Head Political Directorate Col.-	Chief of Staff Col.-Gen.
Gen. I. M. Moroz (1967)	A. P. Silantyev (1970)
Deputy Commander, Combat	Commander, Long Range
Training Col.-Gen. I. Pstygo	Aviation (Dalnaia Aviatsya)
Deputy Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen.	Col.-Gen. Vasilii
I. F. Modiaev (1972)	Reshetnikov (1969)
Chief Rear Services Col.-Gen.	Chief Engineer Maj.-Gen.
F. Polynin	V. Z. Skubilin

Air Force Officers attached to the General Staff
Col.-Gen. N. P. Dagayev
Col.-Gen. Ivan Kozhedub, also Chairman of the Aero-Sports Federation
Col.-Gen. V. Davidkov, specialist in combat training
Lt.-Gen. V. Minakov

The Soviet Air Defense (PVO Stranny) High Command

 

 

Air Force Commanders in Military Districts

 

Air Defense Districts

New York- Washington

Notes

1. The functional distribution of the Soviet service branches is a major departure from traditional Western practice. The branches are Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Construction, Air Defense, Inspectorate, Ground Forces, Rear Services, Air Force, Weapons Development, and a recently upgraded branch, Civil Defense.

2. Military Districts                                                            

3. The Soviet Tactical Air Force consists of 12 Frontal Air Armies composed of approximately 4000 fighters, light bomber, and reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Long Range Aviation consists of 140 heavy Bison and Bear bombers and 700 medium Badger and Blinder bombers. The PVO aviation component consists of some 3200 interceptors aircraft. The Military Transport element consists of some 500 regular military aircraft and an additional 2000 aircraft normally in civilian service. Approximately 1000 aircraft of light, medium, and heavy types are assigned to Naval Aviation.

4. As indications of a possible shift, see Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, Nastuplenye (“The Offensive”), Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1970; Lt-General I. G. Zavyalov. “Weapons and Military Art,” Soviet Military Review, nr 8, August 1971, p. 2; also Marshal Grechko’s Red Army Day article “Born in Battles,” Red Star, 23 February 1970, in which he lavishly praised the performance of the Galosh ABM system. However, not a single word on this subject was said by the Soviet Defense Chief in 1971 and 1972.

5. Besides Kutakhov, Kurkotkin, and Komarovskii, two others were promoted from colonel-generals to Army generals on 7 November 1972: Evgeny F. Ivanovskii, CINC GSFG, and Aleksandr I. Radzievskii, Chief, Frunze Military Academy; see Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 November 1972, p. 1. For each of them promotion will, however, mean a different thing. Kurkotkin and Ivanovskii at 55 and 54, respectively, are part of the rejuvenated High Command and as such can look forward to a long period of tenure or in the latter’s case to a higher position in the Ministry of Defense in Moscow. For Komarovskii at 66 and Radzievskii the promotion appears to be the signal that they are on their way out and will soon be retired and replaced by younger generals. It is also possible that the posts of Deputy Ministers of Defense and service heads will from now on be given to Army generals either by direct appointment or through subsequent promotion. In this case Alekseyev and Altunin, the only colonel-generals holding these positions, will probably be soon promoted.

6. Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 November 1972, p. 1.

Contributors

Alexander O. Ghebhardt is a consultant on Soviet military affairs for the Hudson Institute and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In 1971 he was an instructor in political science at the University of Maine. After earning a degree in government from the University of Manchester (England), Mr. Ghebhardt continued his graduate studies at Columbia University.

Dr. William Schneider, Jr., (Ph.D., New York University) is an economist with a background in national security policy issues. He is coauthor of Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (Pergamon, 1969). He is currently a consultant to the Hudson Institute and a U.S. Senate staff member.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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