Document created: 24 March 04
Air University Review, September-October 1972

The State/DOD 
Exchange Program

Dr. Raymond J. Barrett

My recent two-year tour as Deputy Chief of the Global Plans Division in Headquarters United States Air Force was unusual in that I am not an Air Force officer. I am an officer of the American diplomatic service, a U.S. Foreign Service officer.

My service in the Air Force was part of the officer exchange program between the Department of State and Department of Defense. The program is a recognition of the close relationship between diplomatic and military considerations in maintaining national security. I found the experience highly valuable in a variety of ways, many of them unexpected. This article is a distinctly personal and informal account of my experiences. I hope it will offer useful insights into the value of the State/DOD exchange program.

The exchange involves about fifteen officers from each department, almost all of whom are career Foreign Service officers (FSO's) or military officers. Several FSO's are in the headquarters of each of the military services, while others are in such offices as the Joint Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Normally three FSO's serve on the Air Staff, all assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations. One acts as an adviser to the Deputy Director for Plans and Policy; another serves in the Concepts Development Branch of the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives; the third position is the one that I occupied with the Global Plans Division. The grades of these officers are equivalent to lieutenant colonel or colonel.

The military exchange officers occupy a variety of positions in the Department of State. Several are in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; one is currently Deputy Director of that bureau's Office of International Security Operations. Others serve as political-military advisers in the department's geographic bureaus, e.g., East Asian and Pacific Affairs or Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Some officers are assigned in other appropriate sections of the department to take advantage of their expertise; one, for instance, is serving in the Bureau of Scientific and Technological Affairs. Of the military officers on duty in the Department of State, three or four are from the Air Force.

The basic purpose of the exchange program is to expose the military and diplomatic services to each other's concerns and expertise. In today's complex world, foreign policy and military activity can no longer be clearly separated. Effective national security policies require large admixtures of both diplomatic and military considerations.

The exchange program, while modest in scope, has a forceful impact by placing most of the exchange officers into operational responsibilities in the other service. It may seem risky to place high-level responsibilities on an "outsider" who has not grown up in the host organization. But my experiences and what I saw of other officers on both sides of the exchange program convinced me that any risks are manageable and the benefits great.

Bearing operational responsibilities in the Air Force was a salutary experience for me. I felt I came to the exchange program with a sound political-military background. But strong new dimensions were added daily. Having to work with the Air Force's burdens, constraints, and goals made military considerations real and immediate.

Furthermore, many things came to my attention that I might otherwise never have appreciated. I remember vividly being startled when I read a study outlining the practical consequences to the Air Force of a proposed reduction in F-4 squadrons as we withdrew from Southeast Asia. I'm sure I would have been generally aware of some of the physical dislocations involved, but I would scarcely have thought of the manifold difficulties. Personnel, school facilities, and money were all committed to an in-being pilot training program. A change in midstream was bound to be wasteful and upsetting to the personnel concerned. Explaining such seeming "waste" of resources to Congressional or other queries would also be awkward.

Representing the Air Force in interservice or intragovernmental discussions made me thoroughly aware of the Air Force's point of view. I once represented the Air Force in a discussion at which the Department of State was represented by an exchange officer from the U.S. Army. This was not only a fascinating experience but also a vivid demonstration of the validity of the exchange program. Meeting the host service's responsibilities is an impressive learning experience for the exchange officer.

I do not contend that it is easy. I am sure that my Air Force colleagues were often nervous about my being able to do full justice to the Air Force's requirements. And I know it was sometimes disconcerting for an Air Force officer seeking our division's coordination to find himself dealing with me instead of a blue-suiter. But I, of course, was keenly aware of how many things about the Air Force I did not know. So I was always careful, if I had any doubt at all, to check matters with a knowledgeable Air Force officer in our division. In other words, I do not suggest that an FSO is so smart that he can simply step in and run Air Force matters. My experience convinces me, however, that he can handle far more than is immediately apparent and that with reasonable prudence he can assume direct responsibilities without making serious mistakes. The same, I am equally convinced, is true of military officers in Department of State operational positions.

The exchange officer's stepping into operational responsibility enables him to contribute his particular expertise. I frequently found that I brought an additional dimension to the Air Force's consideration of a problem. Generally I found the Air Force officers with whom I worked alive to the importance of the political-military aspects of issues. Quite often, however, from my diplomatic background I saw political-military implications that were not readily apparent to military eyes. Once I caught a serious flaw in one of the contingency plans dealing entirely with military arrangements. The plan was to reinforce a friendly country through facilities controlled by another country that cordially disliked the nation we wanted to aid. I pointed out the unlikelihood of our being able to use these facilities, and the plan was changed accordingly. On other occasions I was able to indicate the important foreign policy implications of weapon systems such as the B-l.

I could also add "something extra" in other directions—for instance, in helping to predict reactions to issues in the Department of State and elsewhere in the government. As many matters with important political-military implications are now handled in the National Security Council structure or other interdepartmental forums, there was a practical need to anticipate the views of other agencies. This was not simply a question of one-upmanship, of trying to pre-empt the opposition of others. Rather, it generally served a constructive purpose. Usually it helped the Air Force to seek and support arrangements that satisfied both its requirements and the likely positions of other concerned agencies. In short, it made for a better product from the beginning.

The fact that I, in effect, had two "hats" was also a distinct asset. I could readily go from the Pentagon to the State Department and, figuratively, put on my State "hat" and talk informally with my colleagues there. This arrangement was useful simply in getting information pertinent to matters being considered in the Air Force. It was also valuable as an insight into State Department thinking on topics of mutual concern. Furthermore, I could informally point out to my State Department colleagues military aspects of seemingly diplomatic questions that might not have been apparent. For instance, we noted that United Nations debates on protecting civilians were tending to define rules of war, and in ways prejudicial to U.S. interests. Similarly, the costs and complexities of arms control were noted as topics to be included in international assessments of the "arms race."

It is worth noting in passing that this dual role does not really frustrate official channels of contact. That it does so is sometimes suggested, and once or twice a management purist specifically objected. In fact, informal contact is generally beneficial. Obviously it must be kept carefully informal and not be overdone. But this sort of contact almost always improves the product from the start. In fact, it comes close to being a positive principle of effective organization. The more informal the contact at the working level, the mare likely it is that the product will adequately reflect all pertinent views and thus be the better product.

I was helpful in another way that may seem trivial but which was significant: I knew how to say things. I knew the style and language of the Department of State, the international arena, the National Security Council structure, and other interdepartmental groups. It is fashionable in same military circles to pooh-pooh the importance of language and especially to deride diplomats for vague and verbose language. But words do make a difference. As the subject is too complex to discuss adequately in this article, suffice it to say that ideas are more readily accepted if couched in the kind of language the recipient is accustomed to. Put plainly, the chances of Air Force ideas being accepted in the wider U.S. government arena were improved by being written in a style adapted to that purpose.

The net results of an exchange officer’s assuming the operational responsibilities of the host service are positive in other ways. The effects are salutary not only for the exchange officer but also for the officers of the host service, who see the exchange officer meet their type of responsibilities and add something extra to the job out of his background and expertise.

The personal relationship is similarly beneficial. The officers of the host service learn that the exchange officer is a normal human being just as they are. A State Department officer almost invariably has to demonstrate that he is not same sort of "striped-pants cookie-pusher." Initially same of my Air Farce colleagues seemed surprised at the strength of my concern for effective American military farces. On same occasions, in fact, I was more the hard-liner than they, and there were joking comments about "those hawks" from the State Department trying to lead Air Farce "doves" astray. In other words, each side learns that the other has a rational basis for its views.

Not all is positive about the exchange program, of course. Some officers are unhappy. Not all are as fortunate as I was in being put into a direct operating role. An exclusively advisory or sideline role can be frustrating, especially for a good officer.

Clearly, the program requires a somewhat special breed of officer that is not always readily available. He needs a broad background. Most particularly, he should have a proven ability as a "self-starter." He has to be able to identify ways in which he can be helpful and to diplomatically inject his expertise in constructive fashion.

Occasionally, to be candid, a poor officer gets into the program. A program such as this is always a temptation to personnel systems; they sometimes insert a poorer officer because they do not know what else to do with him. An occasional second-rate officer does not cripple the program, but he does not move it forward either. The recent affirmation of the exchange program’s importance by State and Defense should help in getting high-quality personnel.

Assignment to a program such as this, outside the service mainstream, is worrisome to many officers. They are concerned that their promotion chances may inadvertently be compromised, not only by the lack of opportunity for personal recognition by their service superiors but also by there being distinct styles in writing effectiveness reports. Although there is probably no complete cure for these psychological problems characteristic of bureaucracies, they can be minimized by careful arrangements. For instance, Foreign Service inspectors annually interview and assess each of the exchange officers from the Department of State. On both sides, effectiveness reports are now reviewed and, if necessary, commented upon by knowledgeable officials in the parent service; only then do the reports actually go into the promotion process.

On the more substantive side, I met occasional frustrations, as when my Air Farce superiors seemingly did not want to admit the foreign policy implications of an issue. An important example was the revision of the Unified Command Plan designating the unified commands and their geographic areas of responsibility. This rearrangement of American military commands around the world obviously had fundamental international impact. But—again to speak candidly—it hit very close to the heart of the Air Force (and the other services); it had a fundamental impact on roles and missions which determined the size, composition, and future of each service. I am not faulting the Air Force's reaction—the State Department reacts similarly on its "gut" issues. I am simply noting realistically that in some areas an exchange officer is unlikely to have much impact even though he thinks his contribution valid.

In the opposite direction I also encountered problems. I found my Air Force colleagues often eager for authoritative foreign policy guidance. Repeatedly I was asked what U.S. policy was toward Country X or Issue Y. They sought such guidance so that they might accurately assess the military implications and thus have a solid foundation for constructing (or eliminating) military programs. Viewing the Department of State as the formulator of U.S. foreign policy, they were often puzzled by the lack of explicit guidance from the department. In part, as I was constrained to explain, the "fault" lay with the American constitutional system. Only from the President, not the Secretary of State, comes authoritative foreign policy. Fortunately, the NSC system was progressively developing and issuing relatively concrete guidance on many foreign policy matters. I think my presence facilitated our ability to obtain and interpret this guidance. My "two hats" also were useful in getting insights into appropriate policy. I was able to talk informally with pertinent desk officers in the Department of State. Each desk officer, to do his job adequately, has to have a good "feel" for U.S. policies toward the country of his responsibility. From such informal discussions I could obtain and convey to my Air Force colleagues some concept of pertinent U.S. policies. To be candid, however, I could not always satisfy them with the kind of explicit guidance that they felt the Department of State should supply.

Bureaucratically, I was somewhat disappointed in the Air Force. Somehow, I suppose, I expected a military organization to be less tied up in procedural detail. 

I thought the briefing papers were overly long and detailed. Maybe shifting to letter-sized paper, as State did some years ago, would be conducive to shorter and better Air Force briefing papers. Not only were the papers excessively detailed, but so was the backup material that accompanied them in the "package." The effort seemed designed to cover every possible question or point of fact. At the debriefings of senior Air Force officers I was often struck by how little of the elaborate material provided had actually been used. It would seem better to emphasize—clearly and concisely—the information likely to be most pertinent. Senior officers, after all, can think quite well.

The suspense system also struck me as arbitrary and sometimes counterproductive. Obviously some deadlines must be set and met, but in many other cases a system of spot checks to avoid excessive delays would be sufficient. I frankly think that the present rigid suspense system does more harm than good and that more flexibility needs to be introduced.

To list these bureaucratic flaws in the Air Force is not to deny that the Department of State has its own. I am sure the military officers serving in that department have their complaints; I suspect they feel the department is too relaxed in its procedures. However, I do feel that the department has come to take a somewhat more pragmatic view toward purpose rather than form in internal procedures. The basic situation, as I often kidded my Air Force colleagues, is simply that in State and the Air Force the "confusion" is differently organized.

The interchange of officers between the Departments of State and Defense has, I submit, been eminently successful. The advantages are profound and greatly outweigh the disadvantages. This interchange has an impact far beyond its modest size. The exchange officers enter thoroughly into the realities of the other service. They bring a real, substantive contribution, and they acquire a realistic appreciation of the techniques and problems of that service. They work with and learn a great deal about many other parts of the department in which they serve an exchange tour. And the personnel in that department work with and learn much about them. In addition, these officers informally pass on their experiences to colleagues in their own service. This exchange of responsibilities develops understanding and improves coordination that strengthens the national security of the United States. Some expansion of this exchange program might well be considered.