Document created: 1 June 04
Air University Review, November-December 1972

Communist Lessons Learned

In the current debate within the United States concerning the advisability of continuing the American participation in Southeast Asia, a fairly detailed investigation of U.S. decisions and methodology in waging that conflict has resulted. In the armed services, numerous groups and agencies have studied and are studying closely the successes and failures of the tactics, strategies, organizations, and equipment utilized in Vietnam for the purpose of improving them and garnering as many lessons as possible from our decade-long military involvement. Still, the findings of these studies and debates cannot be complete, cannot be truly meaningful, without some understanding of the effect the struggle has had on the enemy. To borrow a phrase from the late Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, we need “the view from the other side of the hill.”

Unfortunately, detailed enemy accounts of the scope and depth of the Communist involvement are not readily available to us, and they likely will never become so. No Moscow, Peking, or Hanoi studies have been exposed to open publication to rival the “Pentagon Papers.” To help bridge this gap in our knowledge, we have devoted some effort to the study and determination of various goals the enemy has pursued in the conflict. Without doubt this examination has been worthwhile in that it has helped in a general way to evaluate whether our responses have been appropriate or wide of the mark in coping with enemy intentions and thrusts. However, this approach has yielded only a part of the information we really need in order to gain the proper perspective and lessons that we seek from our Southeast Asia involvement. A slightly different viewpoint is required to interpret the experience more fully. In short, we must attempt to define the lessons the Communists have learned from the struggle.

Lessons learned by the other side have not been pressing issues in most U.S. struggles in the past, primarily because our successes have brought military victory in the usual sense and the enemy threat has been largely dispelled. But who would argue today that, if the current conflict were satisfactorily concluded in the near future, the Communist threat to us and the free world would vanish? Therefore, we must assume that, just as we learn lessons from our experience and attempt to apply them to our organizations and methodology, the enemy will do the same. If we fail to grasp this thought, we may prepare ourselves for a reinstitution of the last war—but not for the next one. What is more, the lack of understanding of the impact of the Southeast Asia war on future Communist goals and courses of action may lead to an unnecessary continuation of the harmful exercise of excessive self-flagellation coming from some quarters concerning our participation in the struggle.

In the interest of carrying forward this proposal for an examination of the impact of the Southeast Asia war on the enemy, an example of the understanding and perspective that might be achieved is offered in subsequent pages. Obviously, an in-depth study of a topic as broad and complex as the full range of enemy lessons learned would be an impossibility in the few pages of this article. Nevertheless, if properly narrowed and kept within strict bounds, some contribution can be made—at least a beginning.

The most significant subject that might be addressed, of course, would deal with the effects of the Vietnamese struggle on Communist goals. However, considerable difficulty is encountered at once in trying to define completely the intentions of the parties involved. For example, there existed no common, all-inclusive set of desires equally attributable to each of the primary powers involved, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam. A basic reason for this divergence is clear if one reflects on the possible effects or ramifications of success or failure in the Southeast Asia struggle. The Soviets were patently less vitally concerned than the Chinese, whose interests were less crucial than those of the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the Southeast Asia conflict was begun and carried out during the time of open confrontation between the Communist giants, Russia and China; and the desires of each of these powers in Vietnam were manipulated according to their beliefs as to what was best for themselves and the Communist bloc. In the middle of the squabble, Hanoi was forced to jockey first to one side and then the other to avoid a split, garner support from both factions, and yet gain advantages in its own right.

Nevertheless, while the degree of interest in certain objectives may have varied within the Communist camp, other objectives were accorded considerable attention by each of the major “cooperating” nations. One of these concerned the principle of support for wars of national liberation.

Background

Serious thought about the possibility of marshaling and utilizing the energies of restive people as a vehicle to help the spread of Communism was identifiable in the time of Lenin. The relatively recent re-emphasis of this expansionist ploy was attributable primarily to the Communist Chinese and apparently began to receive concentrated attention from them in the latter half of the 1950s. The reasons for the resurrection of the principle of wars of national liberation in Communist theory were manifold, a function of the cold war conditions existing at the time.

To begin with, the Chinese had grown dissatisfied with developments within the Communist bloc and the relatively secondary role accorded them. In the years following World War II the grouping together of Communist nations was essentially a monolithic thing, almost wholly responsive to the wishes of the Soviet Union. But by the late 1950s the Chinese had cause to resent the pre-eminent position of the Soviets. Among the irritating points, the emphasis on de-Stalinization by Moscow had fostered considerable personal resentment within the Chinese Communist leadership, who believed that this policy had created insecurity and disruption within the bloc and had robbed Communism of much of its dynamism. Foot-dragging by the Soviets in assisting China’s entry into the nuclear “club” was another issue. Furthermore, the evolving Russian policy of “peaceful coexistence” in the face of mounting U.S. nuclear might, while appealing to a relatively satiated and secure Soviet Union, was not attractive to the Chinese.

Peaceful coexistence had real applicability in the primary sphere of Russian interest, Europe, with its tenuous but relatively stable East/West balance between Warsaw Pact and NATO nations; it had much less pertinence to the situation confronting the Chinese in Asia. In that area in the late fifties, the opposing elements were anything but stable. In particular, the most important free world nation, the United States, was especially active in forging certain defensive arrangements and developments to which Peking was extremely sensitive. For example, the continuing development of South Korea, the rapid resurrection of Japan with a small but increasingly capable Self Defense Force, the growing U.S. association with Taiwan, the creation of SEATO, and the apparently deepening American moral commitment to South Vietnam were interpreted by the Chinese as very important to their present and future interests.

However, the principle of wars of national liberation as the proper course for Communists to follow had greater appeal to the Chinese than would a simple alternative to an inapplicable Russian path in Asia. The policy offered Communist China special advantages; it accorded China more apparent prestige and influence than its capabilities warranted. By fostering, supporting, and hopefully dominating the leadership in certain revolutionary movements throughout the world, the Chinese could enhance their power through relatively minor contributions of equipment, personnel, and training. Equally important, this mode of activity promised success at small risk of significant retaliation by the free world against the Chinese.

Furthermore, the Chinese believed that a bold move in support of wars of national liberation, while low in risk and cost, would also offer the Communists renewed capabilities and opportunities at lower levels in the spectrum of violence—in situations less than general or limited war. And with U.S. military efforts organized and concentrated at upper levels almost exclusively in the late fifties, the anticipated inability of the U.S. to respond adequately and rapidly to the “new” principle was an appealing vision.

The concept of support for wars of national liberation expounded by the Chinese was enthusiastically endorsed by North Vietnam’s leaders. The acceptance was more than the normal reaction one might expect of a relatively minor Communist state nestled in the shadow of a giant Communist neighbor; it offered very definite advantages to Hanoi in its own ambitions in Southeast Asia.

The North Vietnamese had expected that South Vietnam would naturally fall under their domination as a result of the tenets of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, which ended the French Indochina War. Beyond that, it could be surmised that dominion over the entire Southeast Asian peninsula was a distinct possibility. However, the expectation concerning South Vietnam had not materialized. On the contrary, U.S. influence and determination to maintain a free and independent South Vietnam were growing, and the North Vietnamese had been unable to muster meaningful support within the Communist bloc for their desires. As a result, Hanoi had been forced to put aside expansionist dreams in the mid-1950s and turn inward to work on internal developments. The Chinese proposition served to rekindle North Vietnamese hopes and promised a low-risk alternate road to domination over the South—with added incentive of significant bloc support. 

In retrospect, the Soviet reaction to excited emphasis placed on the concept by its Asian allies appears rather subdued. The Russian leadership was aware of the possibilities and potentialities of the idea; however, subtle and selective support offered in the past had not convinced Moscow that the principle offered the Communists the panacea envisioned by the Chinese. A very important consideration to the Soviets was the difficulty of maintaining effective control over revolutionary movements after they were successful. Recent Soviet experiences in Africa had indicated that successful revolutions, even when substantially aided by the U.S.S.R., did not guarantee expanded Russian influence—and might generate just the opposite effect. Nevertheless, while the Chinese proposal constituted insufficient reason for the Soviets to abandon their policy of peaceful coexistence, a measure of Soviet support was accorded the principle.

The Soviet combination of the policy of peaceful coexistence with support for the principle of wars of national liberation was clearly indicated to the United States at the Kennedy/Khrushchev meetings in Vienna in the spring of 1961. Among the topics discussed were Laos and Vietnam. In the Laotian crisis, the Soviets and Americans were directly involved, and an open confrontation between the two was a distinct possibility in 1961. To avoid such a clash, the Russians seemed willing to cooperate in finding a solution to the situation, and finally in 1962 one was worked out. In the Vietnamese problem, however, the Russians were not directly engaged, and support for the principle of wars of national liberation seemed applicable in a successful effort. Therefore, Moscow declined to work with the U.S. in the search for peace, preferring to allow that “civil war” to run its course.

The Vietnamese Case

The pre-1961 background of the insurgency in Vietnam offered the Communists an almost ideal model in which to test their concept of support for wars of national liberation. In that nation, a diverse mixture of scattered groups (of which the Communists had been only one) who opposed the Diem government since its inception in 1955 had been coalesced about the better-equipped and-organized Communist core into the formidable Viet Cong fighting units and political organization that began to threaten seriously the survival of the Diem regime. Furthermore, although for all intents and purposes Communists directed the opposition movement, the facade of broader support and participation had not been stripped away. In particular, the ever tightening web of control emanating from North Vietnam was not readily discernible to the unsuspecting observer.

The belief of U.S. policy-makers that the Communists conceived of the Vietnamese situation as a test case for their “new” concept, with worldwide ramifications, was amply demonstrated by certain American measures taken in 1961. With a revived interest in Special Operations Forces and conventional capabilities and in the face of continued erosion of the situation of the Diem government, the United States agreed to sharply increased assistance to South Vietnam and sent additional advisers to assist that nation. A new U.S./South Vietnamese plan was developed to combat the insurgency, and significant strides were made in this endeavor through most of 1962 until a combination of South Vietnamese inflexibility and ineptness, along with enemy adaptations, once more turned the tide in favor of the Viet Cong.

Nevertheless, by 1962 the United States had come to the realization that the primary source of support and leadership of the extensive Viet Cong operations was North Vietnam. Thereafter, despite difficulties with the Diem and successor governments and a continuing lack of significant battlefield victories, the U.S. refused to abandon the South Vietnamese to the externally directed and supplied insurgency. Not even the sharp escalation begun by the enemy in 1964 and the twin strategies of attacks on U.S. personnel and equipment, along with the input of North Vietnamese fighting units into South Vietnam, were sufficient to cause the Americans to withdraw.

Importantly, these enemy actions apparently constituted a miscalculation by Hanoi of U.S. resolve and may have been taken over the counsel of the Chinese. In retrospect, it seems clear that the Chinese saw little to be gained from provoking U.S. participation in an escalated struggle almost at China’s doorstep. In addition, the principle they urged called for support on a wide-ranging basis to insurgent, not conventional, warfare in order to dissipate free world strength—not provide a focal point for it. The result has been a serious impairment of their bright vision of support for wars of national liberation that had been prevalent at the beginning of the last decade.

Some Possible Communist 
Lessons Learned

    1. The United States will honor its written and moral commitments to assist friendly nations in developing and in resisting even cloaked Communist efforts at expansion. This has been amply demonstrated by the Vietnamese experience. This stand has not been modified by current planning under the new Nixon Doctrine, although, over the long range, efforts by the nation directly concerned will, of necessity, be substantially greater.

    2. Through improved mobility and flexibility, greatly enhanced by the Southeast Asia experience, U. S. political leadership and military forces can effectively respond to Communist efforts even at lower levels of the spectrum of violence. New developments in U.S. command and control arrangements, tactics, weapons, and organizational structures have permitted better and faster responses to Communist incursions in the future.

    3. The Communist concept of support for wars of national liberation has been exposed as less an interest in the legitimate aspirations of indigenous people for freedom than as a means to extend Communist control over people and territory and gain leverage in the free world/Communist bloc struggle. It is not likely that the methodology the Communists practiced in taking over and manipulating the dissident movement in South Vietnam will be lost to non-Communist revolutionaries throughout the world. It may be expected to have serious repercussions in any similar attempts the Communists may try in the future.

    4. Without detailed control of wars of national liberation, their course, if left in the hands of indigenous Communists (who aspire to nationalism), can be erratic and even dangerous. In the Vietnamese case, certain rash moves by North Vietnam provoked determined U.S. responses that could have been extremely serious for the survival of the bloc, had it not been for the stringent and continual efforts of the United States to keep the war within the confines of Southeast Asia. It might be an error to expect similar U.S. restraint in the future.

    5. A policy of support of wars of national liberation is not an inexpensive proposition. In comparison with the large losses in men and wealth incurred by the U.S. in a decade of involvement, materiel and manpower costs to the Communists, especially for the North Vietnamese, have also been high. Although too little is yet known about the disruptions caused by the war effort and the bombing, North Vietnam’s progress in industrial, agricultural, and technological development has been impaired. To rebuild and restore that nation will be an expensive operation (and the limitations on future North Vietnamese courses of action, in order to secure the needed external aid in the restoration, are still unknown).

    6. Serious external support for wars of national liberation is not a riskless course. As a result of the destructive bombing campaign against North Vietnam, the U.S. has served notice that an instigator or propagator of wars of national liberation may not be accorded immunity from retaliation in future conflicts.

As the study of our activities in Southeast Asia is pressed forward, a complementary effort should be expended to try to determine the effects of the war on the Communists. It is hoped that the foregoing brief discussion of one of the many aspects of the free world/Communist bloc confrontation in Southeast Asia will help illuminate the possibilities of this course. Without more attention to the “other side,” we may run the risk of learning only a portion of the lessons available—and without broader and deeper study, many of those may be distorted by one-sidedness.

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Contributor

Major Edward Vallentiny (USMA; M.A., University of California, Davis) is Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, University of Wyoming. Following pilot training, he served in SAC on a tanker crew, then attended UCD under AFIT. While serving in Southeast Asia with Project CHECO, 7AF, he studied and wrote on the conflict, and he continued to do so during a tour with Project Corona Harvest at Air University. His last assignment was as Associate Editor, Air University Review.