Document created: 31 December 03
Air University Review, May-June 1972

Preparing for a Generation of Peace

A Strategic Concept Responsive to a Presidential Mandate

Colonel Alonzo J. Walter, Jr.

A generation of peace is one of the goals established by President Nixon. This goal is attainable, but it will require the deterrence of war in the face of a variety of formidable challenges and crises. As long ago as 1790, President George Washington said, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” It follows that if we are to attain our goal of peace, we must exercise a great deal of prudence to insure that we are properly prepared for whatever kind of war might eventuate.

a realistic view of modern war

The impact of modern technology on warfare has created a situation in which international conflicts between major powers possessing the ability to destroy each other’s society can never be resolved to the satisfaction of either by unrestrained use of weapons of mass destruction. The frequently stated but seldom adequately defined goal, to “seek to emerge from conflict in a position of relative advantage” in the event of general war, demands that we examine the validity of the term “relative advantage.” While it is entirely likely that all-out nuclear war between today’s superpowers would terminate with one or the other in a dominant postwar posture vis-à-vis the other, the damage received by each might well be far out of proportion to the issues causing the war. Moreover, they both might become second-rate powers relative to major uninvolved nations. In today’s world, the minimization of the amount of military force used and the avoidance of escalation to high levels of violence should be a major objective, even in conflicts involving the use of strategic forces. This objective is recognized in the President’s Foreign Policy Report of 25 February 1971:

We must insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with the alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command-and-control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.

In retrospect it is clear that World War I and World War II, the most horrendous examples of mass destruction in recent times, should have been resolved by other means; but there were only two generally recognized alternatives: mobilization (for major war-fighting) or acquiescence. Additionally, by today’s standards, there were comparatively few incentives to seek resolution by other means. The protagonists in each case could reasonably expect that, win or lose, their societal structure would emerge intact and that, given sufficient time, mobilization and war-fighting on a grand scale might produce victory.

The development of modern strategic weaponry, with its associated command, control, and communications equipment, has provided much of the imperative and the means to avoid uncontrolled escalation. In other times, the Korean and Vietnamese Wars might have triggered World War III; but they did not. The United States and the Soviet Union possessed strong incentives and the sophisticated communications needed to signal their resolve to accommodate their respective national interests in these conflicts, involving nonnuclear allied powers, without resort to all-out war.

Regrettably, the fact that these wars were not terminated with greater dispatch (and a commensurate reduction in human suffering), indeed, that they were not entirely deterred, speaks ill of our capability to deter war at all levels. Much can be done and is being done to improve this capability on the level of purely conventional warfare, involving improvements to conventional military capabilities; but there has long been a widespread aversion to serious discussion of the problems of controlling conflict at the strategic nuclear level. It involves “thinking the unthinkable” for many who postulate that any employment of nuclear weapons guarantees escalation to general war. Given rational national leaders on both sides, such escalation is not at all certain. Nuclear warfare cannot be considered an “on-off” or “all-or-nothing” proposition any more than conventional warfare.

deterrence and war-fighting

Frequently, within the strategic community, there is undue emphasis on deterrence, which tends to obscure the requirement for controlling conflicts if deterrence fails. Likewise, there is a view sometimes expressed that acquisition of strategic capabilities to engage in controlled conflict is an invitation to employ those capabilities and reflects a clearly jingoistic attitude. The deficiency in these views is that they recognize only the two factors, peace and full-scale general war, ignoring the possibility that deterrence may fail, at least partially, and strategic conflict may occur. Our strategic posture should be designed with this possibility in mind and configured so that any such failure does not lead inevitably to large-scale strategic warfare. It would appear that, should deterrence fail, to be unable to cope successfully (in political as well as military terms) with provocations at any given level would mean a choice between escalation to full-scale general war and acceptance of failure.

For a nation committed to peace, such as the United States, to threaten extreme retaliation as a panacea deterrent is neither consistent nor credible. To be credible, a deterrent must be usable and consistent with the objective sought and the threat to be countered.

Thus, there is a direct relation between effective deterrent force and an effective fighting force. The task outlined by the President demands the attention and understanding not only of the military but of the political leadership as well. Political and military leaders instrumental in the national decision making process must join together in a new era of shared strategic responsibility.

the new political-military strategic team

It has become clear that the potential effects of the use of force are too important for a political leader to define his goal purely military terms, or allow his military leaders thus to define them for him, and then direct his military establishment to achieve these goals as best they can. They need to avoid uncontrolled escalation to all-out nuclear war carries with it a need to worry about the use of too much force as well as too little—about the collateral or undesired effects of the use of force as well as the primary or desired effects. This implies a need for types of military capabilities to give the national leader the force he needs, to do the job he needs done, at time he needs it.

Instead of providing a limited choice of military options designed to achieve well-defined and specified military objectives, forces and plans must be designed to permit appropriate options for strategic force use to be put together at the time the need for use develops. The capability for executing a massive last-ditch punitive war is still required as a means of insuring the unacceptability of general nuclear war. This will represent a minimum measure of U.S. capabilities (always safely exceeded) which guarantees that an aggressor faces a risk of massive societal damage over which he has no control other than self-restraint.

For deterrence of warfare below the all-out level, forces must also meet other standards:

While nothing has been said in this discussion to indicate that it is necessary to match Soviet strategic force improvements in numbers or types of systems, there is an obvious requirement that the capabilities inherent in our forces be clearly comparable in politically relevant terms. This will ensure that provocations at any level of nuclear war can be met by effective yet carefully controlled responses on our side. In this sense, but only in very broad terms, are our requirements influenced by Soviet decisions, for we may choose to emphasize quality and diversity to offset some Soviet numerical advantages.

In this regard, initial Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements are more likely to be quantitative than qualitative in nature, because quantitative limitations are apt to be easier to negotiate as well as to verify than are qualitative limitations.

when deterrence fails

An almost unlimited variety of circumstances can be postulated to describe hypothetical events that might lead to a first use of nuclear weapons on a limited scale. Some of these scenarios will seem more credible than others, and ultimately the credibility of each may depend upon absolutely unpredictable motivational forces and unforeseen personalities. For these reasons it seems pointless to dwell on detailed scenarios in this discussion. Instead, let us assume that at some time in the future—in response to circumstances which now may seem incredible but which at the time will appear perfectly rational*—either the U.S. or the Soviet Union elects to launch a clearly limited nuclear attack with limited goals. Perhaps the target is a naval task force on the high seas or in a foreign port, a ground force, or a remote military installation in the opponent’s homeland. The attack may be intended to display strong resolve or to achieve a local military objective that could not be accomplished with conventional weapons. In any event it would be clear to all that a major nuclear attack on the homeland was not imminent.

* Significantly, many major military events since 1941 were generally considered unlikely before they occurred:
-German invasion of Soviet Union, 1941
-Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941
-North Korean invasion of South Korea, 1950
-Bay of Pigs invasion, 1961
-Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
-U.S. operations in Cambodia, 1970.

Rational thought should provide leaders of both sides with at least three guidelines: (1) In no case does either side appear likely to gain by escalation to the all-out level. (2) An adversary unable to respond to the limited use of nuclear weapons in a clearly limited way must either do nothing or risk all-out war. (3) Once committed to the limited use of nuclear weapons, national aims will be served to the extent that the attacks are discriminate, carefully controlled, and appropriate to the circumstances.

For limited strategic use of nuclear weapons to be practical, enemy targets must be located precisely, successfully attacked with minimum collateral damage, and the results made known to the President in the shortest possible time. A known U.S. capability and intent to employ its forces in this manner, if necessary, is a powerful deterrent to encroachment. If deterrence should fail, the President has usable options clearly preferable to massive attack. In this regard, it might be legitimately asked, “Why could we not deter equally as well by relying upon retaliation in a relatively gross, unsophisticated manner but still well below the all-out level?” We might, of course, and it might be effective; but if deterrence should fail, the President would not possess the degree of control or the discriminative capabilities required to apply force in a manner that would achieve our goals while controlling the level of conflict.

today’s capabilities—the Triad

For the past decade, U.S. strategic policy has been to maintain significant retaliatory capability in each of three distinct forms: land-based missiles, strategic bombers, and sea-based missiles. The rationale supporting this policy is quite straightforward: In the face of manifold uncertainties—about the future capabilities and intentions of the enemy, about the ways in which war could come about and proceed, about the actual performance of our weapons in combat situations, about the tasks we may in the future assign to our forces—there is security in diversity. The Triad provides that diversity.

By their very nature, large weapon systems display certain weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The enemy will surely strive to discover and exploit these. He may be inhibited or even prevented from exploiting these weaknesses by the compensating strengths that other systems offer. This is generally well understood in the context of the massive, all-out exchange—the “assured destruction” view of strategic conflict.

It is important to appraise the Triad in the context of a more flexible and crisis-responsive U.S. strategy. Here we find the virtues of diversity even more dramatically highlighted.

Bombers are able to attack hardened as well as soft military targets because of the great accuracy possible with modern aircraft-delivered weapons. Bombers are also able to provide a conventional option against strategic threat targets. Bomber crews are able to assess the damage inflicted by their strikes or strikes of other forces. They are able to communicate this assessment in near real time; given improved communications, they could transmit in real time. A continuous two-way communication capability will permit in-flight retargeting, thereby increasing their inherent flexibility. In time of crisis, bombers can be deployed in a variety of ways. Such deployment flexibility can be used to transmit strong political signals to an opponent without requiring the actual or overtly threatened use of force.

Bombers, of course, have a relatively long flight time, require refueling to reach distant targets, and must fight through heavy defenses. Therefore, if a time-urgent arrival were required or if the desired targets were at great distances, bombers might not be suitable. On the other hand, if the option included limited pre-emptive strikes against peripheral target, then bombers would probably be the preferred weapon system because of the surprise tactics possible. Since in limited operations targets are likely to be chosen for different reasons, good deal of flexibility in target selection: likely to exist.

Sea-based strategic forces provide a significant retaliatory capability against soft, time-urgent targets, but at present they have limited utility for limited operations. Accuracy limitations mean higher expectation that collateral damage would result. Military leaders have also noted communications difficulties with our sea-based missile force. Accuracies could be improved but at a high cost. Submarines, of course, are vulnerable when they are in port or can be destroyed at sea.

The current U.S. land-based missile force is usable against a wide range of military targets, from soft to those of limited hardness. It has particular utility because, if pretargeted, it can be used when a time-urgent response is needed. Communications to launch sites are reliable and continuous, provided, in part, by redundant systems. The long range of ICBM’s allows their use against remote targets with high assurance of penetration. If needed, ICBM’s can be targeted against strategic defenses. Accuracy is better than that of SLBM’s, being roughly comparable to bomber accuracy. ICBM’s provide less flexibility than bombers in yield selection, and collateral damage would probably be higher than with bombers. However, isolated targets with low adjacent population levels can be selected without regard to bomber defenses. Presently there is no real-time damage assessment capability for ICBM strikes. With their present kill probabilities, U.S. ICBM’s would probably not be used in limited strikes against very hard military targets such as nuclear storage sites, dams, or hardened missile launch control facilities. With the accuracies and yields now available, several missiles would be required to achieve the desired damage expectancy against a hard target, and several warheads impacting in the target area would have the potential of increasing collateral damage.

In summarizing present capabilities and limitations while viewing the possible forms of strategic war as broader than an all-out exchange, one becomes aware of subtle vulnerabilities that might otherwise be obscured. For example, a protracted strategic crisis might give the Soviets an opportunity to compromise our sea-based missile force through slow, covert attrition at sea or limited attacks on ports. Command and control centers could be degraded, and communications could be disrupted. Thus the reliability of the submerged forces could be subjected to sudden doubt in the midst of a crisis demanding the highest confidence in them. Attacks on missile submarines in port and on the port facilities, while having no immediate effect on the forces then at sea, could cause significant degradation in the capabilities of the system over time.

In strategic nuclear conflict short of all-out exchanges, the emphasis in operations would be on discrimination, flexibility, and control. For such operations, bombers are generally preferable to missiles because of precision delivery, reconnaissance, and communications capabilities, their ability to be recalled and redirected, and their recyclability. Land-based missiles are preferable to sea-based forces because of greater accuracy and more reliable command and control qualities.

As we have seen, the paramount objective of strategic reappraisal today is to make strategic power more responsive to the tasks of deterrence and war-fighting in a more challenging environment than in the past. Subject to the limitations of existing weapon systems and command, control, and communications capabilities, the Triad can provide some options for limited employment of nuclear weapons.

a force for tomorrow

It has been shown that today’s strategic forces, configured as they are for deterrence of all-out war, possess inherent characteristics which also provide a degree of flexibility for deterrence of limited provocations. It is not at all clear that these forces can remain effective indefinitely or that they can now be fully exploited in times of crisis to provide the most effective range of options.

There is an opportunity at this time for the U.S. to make all-out nuclear war an even more remote possibility, yet simultaneously provide capabilities for viable options across a broad range of crisis situations. The course of action herein proposed focuses on two significant requirements. The first involves improvements to U.S. strategic weapons to insure their continued survival and effectiveness at varying levels of conflict. The second requirement is to enhance dramatically the information-gathering, command, control, and communications available to our national decision-makers, to permit them to realize the full potential of the resources at their disposal. Not all the improvements of our strategic weapons will require new programs. Some are under way already and must be continued. 

Our land-based ICBM force can remain effective if we harden and defend existing ICBM silos, strive continuously for missile warhead accuracy improvements, and attain the ability to retarget rapidly in response to changing strategic requirements.

The B-52 bomber force is approaching the end of its cost-effective life span. A new manned bomber is needed if the great flexibility of the manned bomber is to be available in the future (the B-1 is under development, of course). Survivability of the bomber can be improved by incorporation of improved penetration aids and dispersal basing.

More subtle, but no less important, are capabilities for information gathering and processing, command, control, and communications of unprecedented utility. Indeed, they are so broad in scope that the term “Posture Management” seems more appropriate to describe the iterative process needed for the discriminate use of forces. Posture Management will provide the capability for national leadership to direct and employ U.S. strategic forces in a variety of world situations, from precrisis through crisis and hostilities (if any) to termination. This will be realized through the ability to collect and respond to situational information, to perform real-time or near real-time evaluation and decision-making, and to exercise rapid, precise application of strategic forces. The essentials of this concept involve: (1) the rapid collection of heretofore unavailable situational data; (2) the processing of these data into useful information; (3) the display of this information and other processed data so as to permit decision-makers to assess and select an appropriate option or options; (4) the reliable communications needed to convey their decisions; (5) forces with improved capabilities needed to carry out the decisions promptly and effectively; and (6) a realistic assessment of mission, results, which is then fed back into the process at point (1). The concept is thus a “closed loop” process: each succeeding decision made possible by a constantly updated and appropriately presented résumé of the situation as it unfolds.

Implementation of a total concept such as this can be accomplished by use of a building, block approach, producing incremental improvements in total strategic force effectiveness. First emphasis should be place upon qualitative improvements in existing capabilities, with subsequent development of entirely new ones in order to keep pace with the threat as it intensifies. Specific areas requiring attention include: Tactical warning, which must be provided to enhance survivability of forces and to provide the earliest possible decision-making opportunity. Advanced satellite and improved ground based detection systems can provide rapid warning of incoming attacks, whether by ICBM, FOBS, SLBM, or manned bomber.

Decision-making and flexible force execution are enhanced if decision-makers can determine rapidly the scope and destination of incoming attacks and the effectiveness of our own retaliatory attacks. Attack assessment techniques employ many of the same sensor systems used to provide tactical warning and incorporate the precision assessments provided by the manned bomber.

Those systems used to detect and evaluate incoming and outgoing attacks must employ positive, continuous, and survivable communications to report to surviving and effective command and control centers. Key elements are dedicated satellite communications systems and improved mobile command and control facilities capable of processing and retransmitting detection, force status, retargeting, and force execution data. Crosstalk between command and control systems serving the President and the major commands concerned with strategic force operations will contribute to survivability through redundancy.

Our force for tomorrow must contain a mix of land-based ICBM’s, strategic aircraft, and sea-based missiles, all improved for and tied together by a comprehensive and survivable “Posture Management” system. This force can provide our national leadership with the means of responding to nuclear crisis situations in a reasonable and controlled manner.

an alternative to “all or nothing”

U.S. capabilities for limited strategic conflict cannot guarantee a favorable outcome to serious confrontations. They can increase confidence that, when a peaceful resolution cannot be achieved and when U.S. resolve remains high, a mechanism other than the threat of massive nuclear exchange is available to induce further mutual bargaining. Realization of the full potential of these capabilities requires a high degree of political and military cooperation.

Acquisition of such capabilities will not be cheap, either in terms of monetary costs or institutional readjustments necessary to completely exploit the capabilities. The alternative may be all-out nuclear war. The goal is a generation of peace.

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida

The author desires to express appreciation to Ralph E. Strauch and Fritz Ermarth of the Rand Corporation and Colonels Harold L. Hitchens and Robert G. Brotherton of Hq USAF for their suggestions and critical review during the preparation of this article.

Contributor

Colonel Alonzo J. Walter, Jr. (M.S., USAF Institute of Technology) is Vice Commander, 31st Tactical Fighter Wing (TAC), Homestead AFB, Florida. After serving as F-86 pilot in Korea, he was a test pilot at AF Armament Center and Air Proving Ground, Eglin Air Force Base. Subsequent assignments have been with Space Systems Division, AFSC; USAF Academy; Project Corona Harvest; XXIV Corps, Vietnam; and Concepts and Objectives Division, Hq USAF. Colonel Walter is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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