Document created: 3 June 04
Air University Review, September-October 1971

The Synergy of the Triad

General John C. Meyer

Strategic deterrence is the most important job of the armed forces. Without it, all other service missions could be meaningless. Yet, to be effective, strategic deterrence requires positive actions by the military services and the public support which makes those actions possible. It also requires some understanding between the potential adversaries, to ensure that neither miscalculates the capabilities or intentions of the other. Over the past twenty-five years the United States has been very successful in meeting those requirements.

But there is an irony in that success. The interest of many people in this vital peacekeeping role seems to have jaded. There are those who would falsely reason that because there has not been a world war for about a generation there is no need to do anything more to prevent such a war in the future. Or they may even argue that our present strategic forces can now be unilaterally reduced. That kind of logic, while pleasant to contemplate, just does not fit the real world.

With an issue as vital to the nation as strategic deterrence, I believe all Americans should understand just what the real world is—and what it is likely to be. They should know what the current strategic balance is and why we are concerned about it. They should know what the United States’ part of that balance is and the important role of the Air force. And finally, they should understand where we are going with our strategic forces and how we hope to get there.

I am sure I do not need to spend much time developing how the strategic balance of forces contributes to world stability and to our national security. We need only look back to 1962 for an excellent example of how that balance works.

It was nine o’clock at night on Monday the fifteenth of October. Couriers were delivering reconnaissance photography to the President’s most trusted executives. Twelve hours later, the U-2 photography of Cuba was laid out in front of President Kennedy. The evidence of missiles was absolute. By 11:45 that morning the President had ordered an increase in reconnaissance coverage: he had to know how fast the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployment was growing.

At that time we had almost 400 land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles that could strike the Soviet Union; they had 38 intercon­tinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s). They also had submarines that had to surface to launch short-range missiles. If all of them had been in launch position, they would have totaled fewer than a hundred missiles. In strategic bombers configured to strike the enemy in his homeland, we had 1600; the Soviets had just fewer than 200 long-range aircraft. Another factor was our general purpose forces—our air, ground, and sea forces.

By Monday the 22d of October the President had charted the nation’s course. We had a three-to-one advantage in missiles, counting all the Soviet submarines, and an eight-to-one advantage in bombers. The President announced the quarantine of Cuba.

By Sunday, Moscow radio was reporting that the Russians would dismantle and return their missiles to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been deterred, and the crisis had passed.

The Cuban crisis put our system and our purposes to the test; it is now also rich in lessons on how deterrence works. Here are two of them:

The first deals with reconnaissance and surveillance. Photography was absolutely essential, for without it we would have been hard pressed to know what was going on at our doorstep. And, more important from a political perspective, we would have had trouble substantiating the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba to our own government and to the United Nations. High-resolution photography turns out to be far more convincing than any number of verbal assertions.

The second lesson of Cuba had to do with leading from strength. By having the balance of strategic strength, we were able to dominate the play in terms that the Soviets could easily understand. There was no question about our having sufficient strategic strength, and they were deterred.

Now, if someone asks me today how much is “sufficient strategic strength,” I am going to have to admit that I am not sure. In my opinion it is a question that might best be answered in hindsight, and of course then it could be too late. In 1962 a superiority of ten to one in effective ballistic missiles and of almost that ratio in bombers on alert was at least sufficient. But that was 1962.

Today we have a different situation and a different game plan. The Soviets now have nearly 1500 operational land-based ICBM’s, with others under construction, including some new silos unlike any we have seen before. When current construction is completed, about 300 will be SS-9s or SS-9-type missiles, with their large payload and versatile applications. These are the missiles that can carry a single warhead yielding up to 25 megatons or three warheads yielding 5 megatons each. Just where the Soviets will stop in missile deployment is still an open question.

Recently we observed Soviet testing of multiple re-entry vehicles on an SS-11 variant. They have over 900 SS-11s operational today. The thought that each of those silos could accommodate an SS-11 with multiple re-entry vehicles is cause for serious concern.

The Soviets also have at least 17 Polaris-type submarines operational, each carrying 16 missiles. That adds up to 272 more ballistic missiles, not to mention about another 90 on older submarines. The total Soviet operational ballistic missile threat today, then, is 1857 missiles—and still growing. The estimate for 1973, when current construction is completed on silos and another 15 submarines, is a deployed force of about 2250 ballistic missile launchers on land or at sea.

In addition to those ballistic missiles, the Soviets maintain a force of bombers and aeri­al refueling tankers. Their strategic air forces consist of around 200 Bear and Bison long-range bombers and tankers and over 700 Badger and Blinder medium bombers. While this fleet has declined slightly in size in recent years, its use in strategic training exercises has actually increased.

And lest one think that the Soviets have lost interest in bombers, let me add that they are testing a new swing-wing strategic bomber prototype. It is considerably larger than our swing-wing FB-111 and could be operational in 1973.

I do not mean to go through a complete description of the Communist military forces that weigh on the balance of power. I have not mentioned Soviet ballistic missile defenses, either deployed or in development. I have not talked about their operational Mach 3 interceptor, the Foxbat. I have skipped over their technologically advanced and growing antisubmarine forces. And I have not touched on Chinese nuclear capabilities. But I have described enough to give a feel for the other side of the balance. It is massive military power by any standard, and it is still growing.

My second point concerns our side of the strategic military balance and our strategy. The strategy is clearly one of deterrence, but the question of deterrence cannot really be separated from that of what happens if it fails. The questions are closely related, and the military forces that would be involved are the same.

The idea is to exhibit sufficient military strength to convince any would-be attacker that he will be worse off if he attacks us. Of course “sufficient” has to be interpreted through the eyes of the would-be attacker, and that is subject to considerable uncertainty. Still, our job is to make sure that no enemy miscalculates our ability to survive an attack and still have sufficient force to retaliate and do unacceptable damage to him. The means to this end are reconnaissance and surveillance combined with the Triad of strategic forces.

Our surveillance and warning program is the aggregate of many diverse inputs and indicators, but for the present purpose I will limit my discussion to those systems that would provide warning of actual missile attack.

The first of these is the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System—or BMEWS. It has been operational since 1964 and consists of three radar sites. The BMEWS would provide about a 15-minute warning of a mass ICBM attack. It also indicates launch areas and trajectory impact points.

Of course the BMEWS is not foolproof—and I would emphasize that no system is. The BMEWS has gaps in its coverage. It looks to the north and cannot “see” the “long way around” missiles that could come at us from the south. Its capability is also limited against depressed-trajectory missiles that could come in under the radar coverage.

But the utility of the BMEWS is supplemented by another network of radar coverage that blankets much of the Soviet Union and China. It is called over-the-horizon radar. It, too, gives warning of a mass missile attack and provides more warning time. We have been operating the over-the-horizon radar as a test system since early 1966. In more than three years of testing and operation, the system has detected and reported a large number of ICBM-type launches. It gives us great confidence that there would be only a very remote chance of missing a salvo of as few as five missiles.

Although this over-the-horizon radar does not provide the same detailed information as BMEWS, it makes a significant contribution to warning. It fills the gaps in the BMEWS and provides earlier warning. Of course we would even earlier warning, together with more detailed information. I will describe what we are doing about that later.

Now, let me turn to the Triad of strategic offensive forces. These forces have been described in detail in many sources, but I would like to re-emphasize the important contribution that the Triad makes. This three-pronged approach consists of Air Force land-based missiles and long-range bombers together with Navy missile-carrying submarines. The point I want to make is that this combination of forces significantly increases our confidence in continuing to deter attack.

The most obvious reason for greater confidence is the added reliability of multiple independent approaches. An unforeseen vulnerability in any one system would not put us out of business. For example, as the Soviets continue their high-priority programs in antisubmarine warfare, we can still deter an attack.

Then there are the advantages associated with each type of system. Well over 95 percent of the land-based ICBM’S are constantly on alert, 30 minutes from their targets. They are reliable and accurate. Today we have 1054 of these missiles: 54 Titans and 1000 of the Minuteman.

Last year we completed our development flight-test program on the Minuteman III, and these are just beginning to enter the inventory. The Minuteman III has such added advantages as a multiple independent re-entry vehicle capability. By 1975 we plan to have a Minuteman force that will be just about evenly divided between Minuteman IIs and IIIs.

The manned bomber is an entirely different kind of deterrent force. It can be launched and then recalled without ever penetrating enemy airspace. It can be rerouted en route. It can be on airborne alert outside our continental limits and out of range of enemy defen­ses. When ordered to attack, the manned bomber can strike a series of targets with a variety of weapons. It can also be reused.

Today, we have close to 450 operational bombers. Nearly all of them are B-52s, although a few FB-111s are entering the inventory. The B-52s have the versatility to carry free-fall bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and decoys; the FB-111s will only carry free-fall bombs until a new air-to-surface missile now in development becomes operational. The number of these bombers, and their supporting tankers, that are on alert can be varied in response to international tensions. In the absence of any abnormal tensions, something like one-third of the force would be on alert. 

The third part of the Triad consists of missile-carrying submarines. They offer yet a different type of targeting problem to the Soviets. The fleet includes 41 ballistic missile submarines, each of which carries 16 missiles. About half of those submarines are in firing position at any one time; the rest are en route, being serviced, or in overhaul.

These three systems, operating in concert, complicate an enemy’s defense problems and limit his offensive strategies. For one thing, they put a strain on his resources. He must divide those resources between offensive and defensive forces. Those that go to defense must then be further divided among antiballistic missile systems, antiaircraft systems, and antisubmarine warfare systems. He must also spread out his top-grade scientists, engineers, and managers. The resulting dilution in defenses is tantamount to increased capabilities for our strategic offensive forces. At the same time, resources used for defense are no longer available for offensive systems.

Then too, and perhaps most important of all, our combination of strategic forces presents an enemy strategist with an extremely severe problem in timing. A simultaneous surprise attack on all elements of the Triad is virtually impossible, and a strike on any one element gives warning to the others. Thus—and this is a point worth emphasizing—the advantage of a first-strike surprise attack is largely foreclosed by the Triad of strategic forces. To quote the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, “. . . each of these force categories is of . . .critical significance; for each strategic force has its own inherent strengths . . .”

In effect, then, there is synergy in the Triad which adds value beyond costs. And while the total value of the Triad cannot be measured in strictly quantitative terms, it has been sufficient in the aggregate to deter attack.

But there is no guarantee that what has been sufficient will continue to be. As a result, I am concerned about where we are going and how we will get there. And that is the third area I want to cover.

I would start with a sobering observation: the Soviets have built a strategic military force of about the same stature as our own. But parity does not seem to be their objective. The pace of their weapon development and deployment is sufficient to cause concern. To this can be added the growing importance of the Chinese Communist nuclear threat. They could have an ICBM capability early as 1973—two years from now.

Yet we see our own strategic forces remaining relatively constant numerically. That is a real cause for concern. It makes me very uneasy to consider the possibility of a preponderance of military force on their side of the balance. It could lead to the prospect of psychological blackmail.

One way of avoiding that kind of problem is to keep pace quantitatively and qualitatively. I am certainly encouraged by the President’s 20 May 1971 announcement that the quantitative pace may be slowed through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

With respect to quality—and here I mean technological quality—we cannot afford to wait for someone else’s technological breakthroughs and their associated surprises.

Of course, the Soviets recognize this situation as well as we do. This year they are expected to spend the equivalent of more than $16 billion on military and space research and development. The comparable U.S. figure is about $10 billion. In terms of people, the Soviets are adding 230,000 engineers every year while we add 35,000. Further, they are keeping all of theirs employed on priority research and development projects.

Since we cannot meet the Soviet technological challenge on a dollar-for-dollar basis, we have to be very selective in our R&D program. At the same time we have to be sure we cover all the important bets, both strategic and tactical. And that is what we are trying to do.

One very important development program for continued deterrence is the satellite early-warning system. With this system we expect to get greatly improved overall warning capability against enemy missile launches, and we will get it for both land-launched ICBM’s and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This kind of warning will benefit all the strategic forces in the Triad by providing more of that valuable commodity, time. And it will give us even more time to get the manned-bomber force into the air—even in the face of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

We are also working on the development of a new bomber, the B-1. This new aircraft is being designed to penetrate the more sophisticated air defenses being developed by the Soviets and still get its weapons on target. It will be significantly smaller than the B-52, both in actual size and, perhaps more important, in its radar reflectivity. This means it will be able to get to its targets with less chance of detection. The B-1 will be able to carry almost double the load of a B-52 while flying lower, faster, and farther. And, of course, it will continue to offer all of those advantages peculiar to the manned bomber: it can be launched, recalled, and reused; it can be rerouted en route; it can be on airborne alert; and each sortie can strike many widely dispersed targets with a variety of weapons.

We are also flight-testing a versatile short-range attack missile to add new nuclear capabilities to our present bombers, as well as the B-1. This new missile is called the short-range attack missile (SRAM).  It can get to its target on a high arching ballistic path, or it can hug the earth in an all-low-altitude attack. In either mode, the SRAM will substantially increase the enemy’s air and missile defense problems.

These new systems, as well as others in development, should keep the strategic balance from tilting against us, at least in a qualitative sense. They will do this by being able to penetrate the newer and more effective defenses that are evolving. And they will protect us against technological surprise.

In this business, though, we have to face the fact that no one is ever really sure. We know we could do more in system development, and we know we could move faster on some of the systems now in development. But we also know that either of those alternatives would cost more money—money we do not now have. At the same time, we see the Soviets doing more and moving faster. In that context, we have to be sure that we continue to have sufficient strategic forces, but it is a risky business at best.

In this articles I have focused on the primary element of our military power—nuclear deterrence. The role of the Air Force in our national strategy of nuclear deterrence is a very vital role and one that gets a good deal of attention. Even more important, I reiterate, is the strength of the Triad of strategic forces in the reinforcing effect provided by each of the different types of forces. That is, there is a synergistic relationship between bombers and land-based and sea-based missiles. It is the kind of relationship that assures real deterrence, since an attack on one gives warning to the others.

But deterrence, once achieved, does not continue indefinitely. It has to be maintained and modernized if it is to stay effective. For that we need new systems capable of deterring any enemy in the future. We think we have those new systems “on track,” but it is going to take a lot of work and support to keep them on track. One way to get that support is to make sure that all of us in the Air Force and in the other services—as well as the public at large—understand the inherent strength of the interlocking parts of the Triad and why that strength is in fact the real measure of strategic deterrence.

Contributor

General John C. Meyer (B.A., Dartmouth College) is Vice Chief of Staff, USAF. While serving as deputy commander, 352d Fighter Group, he became the leading U. S. ace in Europe in World War II. Other assignments have included USAF Liaison Officer, House of Representatives, later assistant House Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. General Meyer has held various positions in operations and has been commander of two air divisions and a numbered air force. He was Director of Operations. The Joint Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to his present assignment in 1969.