Document created: 8 September 04
Air University Review, November-December 1971

Public Affairs Aspects of the 1968

Reserve Mobilization

Two days after the North Koreans seized the intelligence ship U.S.S. Pueblo, President Lyndon Johnson’s press secretary, George Christian, began briefing a hastily assembled group of White House correspondents. It was 1125 hours 25 January 1968.

Christian had news of one facet of the American response to the seizure. He started by announcing that “the President has directed Secretary of Defense McNamara to recall to active duty certain air squadrons and support units of the Air Force and the Navy.”¹

After explaining that the Reservists and Guardsmen were being called under Congressional authority provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1967 and that the recallees could be activated for a period of up to 24 months, Christian opened the press conference to questions. He responded to several queries and then suggested: “You will have to have your people get details at the Pentagon.”

As soon as the reporters left George Christian’s press conference, most began deluging the Pentagon with requests for the promised “details.”

Representatives of the wire services, the networks, and the larger newspapers and news magazines relayed their inquiries through their Pentagon correspondents. (Some 35 newsmen maintain office space in the Pentagon and cover military affairs on a full-time basis.) Others called the Press Desk of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD/PA), and still others called direct to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information (SAFOI).

When the Press Desk officer receives an inquiry, he completes a brief “query form” to note the name and organization of the inquirer, the time the inquiry was received, and the specific question. This form is passed to the service involved. As soon as the answers are developed and approved for release by appropriate officials, the information is passed back to the Press Desk for release to the inquirer.

Quite often, when an inquiry relates to some nonvolatile issue or information already in the public domain—as, for instance, “What types of jet fighters do we have in Vietnam?”—the formality of a query form is dispensed with and the matter is handled by telephone.

But the mobilization of 372 fighter and transport aircraft and 14,187 Air National Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists was not a routine matter (there had been no major reserve force call-up since the Cuban crisis of 1962), and all information had to be carefully scrutinized for accuracy and security prior to release.²

Within three minutes after the Christian press conference, SAFOI had its first press query. The Press Desk called to request a breakdown of the number and types of aircraft and numbers of personnel assigned to each unit that had been called. Fred Hoffman, the Associated Press veteran Pentagon correspondent, asked if the Air Reserve Transport Units being mobilized were the same as those originally scheduled for deactivation. SAFOI field offices in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York had picked up wire reports of the mobilization and wanted to know what was releasable. Additionally, a score of callers from all over the nation asked the question, “Is our unit being activated?” These were easily and quickly answered because a releasable list of mobilized units had been distributed to all action officers in SAFOI’s Public Information Division.

Shortly before noon, the senior information officers of the National Guard Bureau and the Air Force Reserve, laden with fact sheets, strength figures, and assorted information, had moved into the Press Desk area to provide instant expertise and expedite query responses.

By 1300 hours, less than two hours after Christian’s announcement, the first barrage of inquiries had been handled. In addition, the SAFOI field offices and the major commands had been provided with press guidance and releasable information.³

Activity had been fast and furious, and of course all assigned personnel could not be spared to concentrate on this issue. The usual flow of inquiries about such topics as weapons research, procurement, and Vietnam operations continued unabated, and specialists in those areas had to ensure that this more routine business was attended to.

There were, inevitably, some minor foul-ups and communications breakdowns in those first hectic hours. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) called to report that the list published by OASD (PA) contained an error in the designation of one of the mobilized units. SAFOI checked the list, confirmed MAC’s observation, and arranged for the immediate release of a corrected list.

Yet another minor difficulty arose when OASD (PA), about midafternoon, reversed its position on releasing the individual personnel strength figures of the mobilized units. An Air Force colonel assigned to OASD (PA) had noted that several of the Navy recalled units were only 50 percent manned while most of the Air Force units were well above 90 percent manned. He felt that publication of the manning figures would reflect adversely on the Navy and wanted to hold up on this point until he could confer with Navy public affairs officials.

These minor snags notwithstanding, the first test—that of marshaling a tremendous amount of data on very short notice, clearing it for release, and expediting it to waiting newsmen—had been passed.

On the following day, 26 January, the “in depth” newsmen came in with their requests. John Mulliken, Time Magazine’s Pentagon reporter, requested strength figures on all Air Force units in the Pacific area. Life wanted to send Sam Angeloff (an Air Force Reservist) to do a feature on the recalled 184th Tactical Fighter Group in Wichita, Kansas. The American Broadcasting Company wanted a complete rundown on the history of reserve activations. These obviously involved a great deal of leg work and research, but they were the sorts of projects routinely handled by SAFOI.

Since the range of legitimate questions reporters might ask is almost limitless, obviously it would be impossible for OASD (PA) or SAFOI to garner all the answers before the questions were posed. Who could have predicted that George Wilson of the Washington Post would ask the number of pilots affected who were airline pilots or that Hugh Lucas of Aviation Daily would ask the amount of the monthly payroll of the mobilized units?

As press interest in the call-up announcement subsided, SAFOI personnel found time to evaluate press treatment of the event. SAFOI judged that most of the reportage seemed to be factual and that the reporters had drawn realistic inferences. The Associated Press observed: “The call-up is generally viewed as an administration effort to put some military bite behind the diplomatic bark directed at the North Koreans who captured the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo.”⁴ United Press thought that the call-up added “psychological pressure to these [diplomatic] efforts and was viewed as a diplomatic signal in itself, directed as much to Moscow as Pyongyang, that the United States means what it says in demanding the return of the Pueblo.”⁵

Both wire services included in their early releases that the mobilized Reservists and Guardsmen were to report to their respective units by midnight Friday 26 January. Widespread publication of the reporting times contributed to a very high percentage of men “present for duty” at the appointed hour.⁶

After the initial excitement and enthusiasm waned, however, complaints were not long in cropping up.

Some of the mobilized Guardsmen and Reservists charged that they had been rushed to active duty but now found themselves with little to do. News reports, letters to the editor, and letters to congressmen publicized the complaints.

Norman Sklarewitz of the Wall Street Journal fired the first major volley on 15 March with a front-page story headlined “Where Are They Now? Activated Reserves Just Waiting Around.”⁷ This report contained examples of most of the various types of gripes the men were making.

He had requested and received Air Force cooperation in preparing his story. Telephone interviews were arranged with recallees, specific questions he asked were processed, and answers in writing were provided. To a question on morale, the Tactical Air Command (which had gained most of the mobilized units as they came on active duty) responded in part: “TAC believes the morale of the Air Guard units assigned as part of this command is commendable.”

Sklarewitz’s story, however, did not reflect TAC’s optimism. In his lead he asked the question, “What ever happened to the 14,787 air reservists mobilized in January?” And in 800 or so searing words he answered his own questions. Most of the men, he said, were doing nothing except complaining. One airman reported that he spent his day emptying trash cans. Another remembered doing “not one productive task of any substance.” As for morale, most were “disgusted,” and others were “bugged by all this uncertainty.”

The reporter saved his most critical statements concerning the recallees for his last paragraph. “Some military officials also say it is a good thing the reserves haven’t been sent to Vietnam or Korea. They say the men just aren’t prepared to fight.”

Sklarewitz painted a dismal picture and in the process revealed that he, too, was displeased with the Pentagon. He charged that “the Pentagon does not have much to say about the activated reserves. Officials side stepped queries for days. . . . As for how long the men will be in, an officer repeated only that the authorization is for up to 24 months.”

Sklarewitz obviously felt he was being given the runaround. He was not accustomed to covering Pentagon news and was not as prepared for built-in delays involving staff work as a “Pentagon regular” would have been.

After completing his telephone interviews, he posed several additional questions to OASD (PA) on 14 March. SAFOI tracked the somewhat lengthy answers down and returned the information to the Press Desk for relay to Sklarewitz on 15 March.⁸ The story—without the answers—had appeared in that morning’s Wall Street Journal.

In this instance the reporter, very likely under the pressure of a deadline, did not wait for the SAFOI responses for even one day before filing his story. The incident points up how one kind of “news management” charge can originate. Nonetheless, the story appeared in an influential newspaper and was highly critical.

Others in the same vein began to appear. The Newark News asked SAFOI to comment on an AP report that mobilized Reservists, particularly college-trained men, were complaining bitterly about being “treated like dirt.” SAFOI proposed that some of the rationale developed for the Sklarewitz queries be used to respond, but OASD (PA), remembering the short shrift given this material by Sklarewitz, rejected the proposal and went with a “no comment” response.

The fact was that some of the recallees were beginning to complain about inactivity. There were likely not nearly so many as Sklarewitz reported nor so few as the “through channels” complaints indicated to Air Force officials.

An additional mobilization of some 3500 Air Force Reservists, which was announced on 11 April, did little to still the rising chorus of “inactivity” complaints. However, SAFOI was afforded something of a breather in that all the units involved in this smaller mobilization were to be given 30 days’ notice prior to reporting in mid May.

Essentially the problem of “inactivity” arose because of a basic misunderstanding. The recallees assumed that, because they had been activated immediately following the Pueblo seizure by the North Koreans, they would be sent almost immediately to Korea to bolster American forces there. Air Force planners, on the other hand, were proceeding on a different set of assumptions.

Early in March, in response to their questioning why they were called up, SAFOI issued the following statement, clearly outlining the Air Force’s position:

Although the reserve units were mobilized because of the Pueblo incident, they were not necessarily called to active duty to serve only in Korea. . . . Now that they are on active duty, they comprise a portion of the total world-wide defense structure. With this in mind, the units, and the personnel assigned, will be handled in the same manner as the entire Air Force, which means taking normal tours in all theaters of the world under standard Air Force Policies.⁹

It soon became apparent that “standard Air Force policy” in this matter was to step up training of the mobilized units but to hold off on deploying them overseas. Pilots and personnel directly associated with the flying mission were extremely busy during the first 90 days of their active duty tours, but some support and administrative personnel had relatively little to do. Typically, this was because the mobilized units had deployed to Air Force bases that already had fully manned support facilities capable of providing most of the administrative support required.

Some of the pressure of “inactivity” charges was relieved in May and June as two recalled fighter squadrons were deployed to Korea and four were sent to Vietnam.

Even media reports of the deployments, however, contained hints of trouble to come. Announcing the arrival in Vietnam of the Colorado Air Guard squadron, the New York Times added: “Most of the service and administrative personnel would not be sent to Vietnam because there was already sufficient support there.”¹⁰

On 1 July, Sergeant Robert A. Levy of the recalled 113th Tactical Fighter Group (of Washington, D.C.) wrote an open letter to the President, the Congress, and the Department of Defense.¹¹ In 2000 well-chosen words Levy reviewed his unit’s experiences during the call-up and expressed his carefully thought-out opinions. Levy charged that the Air Force was an “unbelievably demeaning environment” and that all the men did was “participate in chess tournaments and take coffee breaks.” He concluded, “Never have I seen human resources so tragically wasted.” Prior to his call to active duty, Levy had earned the Ph.D. (at age 24), authored a book and a dozen articles, and organized his own computer firm. He wrote well and persuasively. His letter received wide publicity, and on 12 July it was included in the Congressional Record by Congressman Durward G. Hall of Missouri.

Air Force reaction to this sort of publicity was prompt. On 13 July a Department of Defense national news release stated that 10,800 of the 15,750 recallees had already been deployed overseas and in the United States with their units. The announcement added that the Air Force had ordered 2200 of the recalled men to replacement assignments overseas and would shortly order the remaining 2700 men to assignments within the United States. In response to a press query, the Air Force said that “all reassignment orders should be issued by the end of July.” These assignment actions effectively stilled the complaints of inactivity—almost everyone was now going somewhere to fulfill a specific role.

But reassigning personnel out of their Reserve units raised another hue and cry—the principle of “unit integrity” was being violated. Basically, unit integrity amounted to a policy of keeping recalled units intact. National Guard recruiting drives had stressed the theme, “Train with your buddies, serve with your buddies.”

The reassignments were followed by a rash of complaints to congressmen from the affected individuals and by critical media reports. The New York Times front-paged its story of the Air Force action and observed: “The announcement followed bitter complaints made publicly and privately by many airmen who have received orders within the past two weeks. These airmen contend it is contrary to Air Force policy for them to be reassigned as individuals.”¹²

The next day the Times reported that Senator Jacob Javits was “looking into” the matter after receiving hundreds of complaints from members of the mobilized 904th Military Airlift Group at Stewart AFB, New York. (The same story quoted the 904th commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Amdur, as follows: “Twenty to 25 men have protested. The rest of the men have served proudly and have not complained.”)¹³

Two days later, on 17 July, Senator Javits announced that he had wired Air Force Secretary Harold Brown asking for a “comprehensive senior policy review” of the reassignment policy.

From a public affairs point of view, the Air Force had jumped from an “inactivity” frying pan into a “unit integrity” skillet.

The “skillet,” however, was to prove a great deal cooler than the frying pan. The unit integrity problem had been anticipated as reassignment plans were being formulated. On 13 May, Alfred B. Fitt, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, had sent a memorandum to the military departments, spelling out unit integrity policy. He cited a 1959 Defense directive which clearly stated that, although personnel would be ordered to active duty only with their units, “this does not prohibit the reassignment of the personnel of such units after being ordered to active duty.” He added that it was not intended that such units be used primarily as a source of filler personnel for other units, either regular or reserve.¹⁴

Dr. Theodore Marrs, Air Force Deputy for Reserve Affairs, in an hour-long interview with Harold Gal of the New York Times on 18 July, said that any Reservist called should assume that he would be utilized—possibly outside his home unit—and that there was Air Force, Department of Defense, and Congressional authority and precedent for reassigning men out of their units. He declared that reassignments were reviewed by high authorities and were based on real need, not whim. He admitted that the Air Force had perhaps overstressed the “Train with your buddies, serve with your buddies” theme and said he regretted it. With these “regrets,” Dr. Marrs ended the Air Force’s public comment on the unit integrity issue.

Air Force Secretary Harold Brown assured Senator Javits that each individual complaint would be carefully examined. Paul H. Nitze, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, informed Secretary Brown that his personnel utilization policy was approved with the proviso that “reserve personnel will be released upon demobilization of the units with which they were mobilized, regardless of their assignment at the time of the demobilization order.”¹⁵

Later in August, a group of New York Reservists lost a bid in federal court to block their reassignment orders when the judge ruled that the President had the right to activate them and the Air Force had the right to reassign them.

Doubtless the number of the complaints and Congressional interest served to make the Air Force give more careful attention to its reassignment policies and perhaps did, in the end, serve to protect some Reservists from being malassigned. And as a direct consequence of the furor, the Air National Guard dropped or toned down its “Serve with your buddies” slogan.¹⁶

With completion of the reassignment actions and the overseas deployment of additional reserve combat units, the public affairs problems of the call-up virtually disappeared. In fact, for the remainder of the active duty tour the mobilized units were to attract a great deal of very favorable attention by the media.

The key to the improved public affairs climate was that, given meaningful jobs and a sense of mission accomplishment, the recallees performed superbly. Complaints were few. In the final analysis, operational performance of the mobilized units—especially those in combat—merited favorable press coverage.

SAFOI’s tasks relative to the mobilized units then became routine. Because many of the Guard and Reserve units were overseas, information officers in the overseas theaters assumed responsibility for issuing releases and responding to most inquiries relative to their combat performance.

On the morning of 3 October, the Legislative Liaison office notified the Congress of the dates of release from active duty of each of the units. Later the same day SAFOI made the information available to the press through the DOD Press Desk. Most of the units were scheduled to return to reserve status by 30 June 1969, which meant an active duty tour of from 15 to 17 months for most—considerably less than the maximum 24 months.

SAFOI’s Community Relations Division began to work on plans for “Welcome Home” and deactivation ceremonies. High-ranking civilian and military speakers were invited, and parades, bands, and aerial demonstrations were planned.

There were still occasional letters to congressmen (as often as not from Reservists who had been sent to Korea and were irate because they were not being sent to Vietnam) which had to be answered. But with all the policy decisions now ironed out, drafting responses was made easy.

Senior Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve officials accepted invitations to address various organizations across the country. They usually informed their audiences that the recalled units were serving well on active duty and presented such statistics as numbers of combat sorties flown, targets destroyed, tons of cargo airlifted, etc.

In the fall of 1968, Brigadier General Winant Sidle, USA, Chief of Information in Saigon, invited the Air National Guard to send over a special Information team to make in-depth reports on combat accomplishments of the Guard units. This program was carried out with considerable success.

As the active duty tours approached an end, theater commanders sent congratulatory and appreciative messages to the governors of the various states to which the units were returning. These messages, which were widely reprinted in the various state newspapers, and the fanfare of deactivation ceremonies provided an auspicious ending to an operation that at times had been subjected to harsh judgments by both the press and the public.

Austin, Texas

Notes

1. White House News Conference 1108-A transcript, 1125 hours EST 25 January 1968, p. 1.

2. The “cleared” version of Defense Secretary McNamara’s testimony before a Senate subcommittee on 7 June 1968 was to become a primary source of releasable data on the Pueblo incident. The following excerpt is quoted to illustrate the degree to which security censoring can limit information: “The force structure of the 5th Air Force within South Korea at the time of the “Pueblo” seizure consisted of [deleted] F-4C’s, of which [deleted] were physically located at Kunsan [deleted] and [deleted] at Osan [deleted]. Therefore, with the exception of [deleted] the [deleted] available aircraft within South Korea were [deleted].”

3. Interview with Mr. James Newton, action officer, SAF0I-P, 26 March 1970.

4. Associated Press wire story No. 83, 26 January 1968.

5. United Press wire story No. 203, 25 January 1968.

6. SAFOI-P Answer to Query form dated 29 January 1968. The United Press asked SAFOI what percentage of recalled personnel had reported for duty. The National Guard reported that over 88 percent of their men had reported within three-hours after the official announcement. The Air Force Reserves had no “three hour” figures but said that over 98 percent of assigned personnel had reported by the Friday midnight deadline. Both figures reflected favorably on reserve force readiness and organization and the United Press release on this matter was regarded by SAFOI as a “plus.”

7. Wall Street Journal, 15 March 1968, p. 1.

8. SAFOI-P Answer to Query form dated 14 March 1968.

9. Ibid.

10. New York Times, 3 May 1968, p. 8.

11. Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, 12 July 1968, pp. E6494-95.

12. New York Times, 14 July 1968, p. 1.

13. New York Times, 15 July 1968, p. 2.

14. Memorandum from Alfred B. Fitt to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments, subject: “Integrity of Mobilized Units,” dated 13 May 1968.

15. Memorandum from Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Air Force, subject: Utilization of Mobilized ANG/Reserve Personnel, dated 2 August 1968.

16. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel James Elliot, Public Affairs Officer, National Guard Bureau, 26 March 1970.

 Acknowledgment

Major John Duncan Williams (M.S., Boston University) is a Ph.D. candidate in Communication at the University of Texas, working under the AFIT Program. He has served as director of information at base, wing, and air division levels and a tour in the Office of Information Secretary of the Air Force (SAFOI). In 1967 and 1968 he received the George Washington Honor Medal (Essay Category) from the Freedoms Foundation.