Air University Review, January-February 1971
During the past forty years the American people have been concerned with armed conflicts from Formosa to the Suez, from Ethiopia to the Dominican Republic, and from Guadal canal and North Africa through Iwo Jima and the hedgerows of Normandy to Berlin and Tokyo. We have dictated surrender terms on the deck of the battleship Missouri. Our endless negotiations at Panmunjom, Korea, are like the proverbial twitching of the snake waiting for sundown. We are now fighting in South Vietnam while a major debate goes on in our country as to why.
We rushed to build a missile force to fill a gap which many authorities later said was not there. In Vietnam we have flown planes that were obsolete before some of their crew members were born. Our casualty lists have included names put there by Viet Gong spears and crossbows.
Despite the way war and military affairs surround us and often dominate our lives, we remain ignorant of the principles, techniques, and theories involved in these activities. We divide ourselves into emotionally and morally oriented groups and label each other with epithets such as dove or hawk, pacifist or imperialist, peacenik or militarist. Some who seek a middle ground have even been labeled chicken hawks.
A man who invests his life savings in the stock market on the basis of his emotional beliefs rather than on study and analysis is sure to lose. Why, then, do we as voters and taxpayers insist upon gambling with our votes, our taxes, and even our lives when the payoff—much more than money—is national survival?
Most histories of World War II will contain the names of Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, and King, who led our naval forces to victory in the Pacific. But how many Americans have read of their predecessor, Admiral Albert Thayer Mahan? Though he spoke from the grave, he was truly the author of the concepts of naval strategy that were the basis of the successful defense of the western hemisphere in World War II. His ideas are part of the basis of our defensive posture today and for the future.
The memoirs of Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur are a record of their military successes in Europe and in the Pacific. But how many Americans have ever read of Prussian General Karl von Clausewitz, who lived during the Napoleonic era? His “Principles of War” are ten timeless guideposts for all students of military strategy and tactics. They are as essential to the understanding of the use of military force today as they were when they were written.
General Curtis LeMay was the principal American proponent of strategic air power, both during and after World War II. But how many Americans ever heard of Giulio Douhet? This Italian air officer, writing between 1910 and 1930, formulated the concepts and theories that are still the basis for the employment of air power in this supersonic age.
Since 1959, we have spent over half of each year’s federal budget on national defense, not including veterans’ benefits or interest on the debt from past wars. Never have so few understood what so many must pay so high a price for.
Should we unilaterally withdraw from Southeast Asia? Do we build a manned strategic bomber to succeed the B–52? How will you vote for your senator up for re-election—the one who voted against funds for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier? Do you agree with a Secretary of Defense who plans for highly mobile forces in the United States rather than forces permanently in place in overseas areas? Civil defense gets less than one percent of our federal budget; How do you feel about that? Does possession of a nuclear capability make a nation more likely or less likely to be attacked or to initiate nuclear conflict?
The answers to these and a myriad of similar questions concern more than the several million Americans in uniform. They concern more than the 110 million American voters and taxpayers. They concern more than the 200 million U.S. population. They concern all humanity. The American voter is the most important decision-maker in the world, but he is poorly prepared for decisions regarding military affairs because his formal education in this area is conspicuously lacking.
This plea is not related to either pre-emptive war or unilateral disarmament. Nor is it a vote for universal military training and a nation of armed minutemen. It is a plea to remove the twin blinders of jingoism and pacifism; to excise the cataracts of emotional morality; to realize that decisions regarding national defense must be based on knowledge rather than wish, on fact rather than fable, on study rather than hope. This plea is not motivated solely by our problems in Southeast Asia. It is a timeless plea for a serious need in education now and in the foreseeable future.
In examining this subject, one begins to suspect a bias on the part of educators. Some professors act as if the only purpose of the military is destruction and the armed forces are dedicated to that end. Others have described the military as the height of institutional inefficiency. This latter view is contrary to the findings of the Hoover Commission on Government Economy and the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, both of which have cited the Department of the Air Force as one of the most efficiently administered departments of the entire federal government.
We must say to the educators, “What are you doing to teach the student about one of the most vital aspects of the world we live in? What do you, as educated people, know about national defense and military science? You profess to defer to the trained individual who possesses experience and knowledge in his field, yet the evidence is that when that individual is a military man on a military subject you become self-proclaimed experts, ridicule him, and deny what he represents. Worse still, you blindly reject the idea that this discipline has any place in general/liberal arts education. Thus, you perpetuate the ignorance of the citizen on a subject that concerns his survival.”
Within the realm of the social sciences is the place for the missing discipline, military science, or the study of national defense. Here is where we should learn of the roles played by industry, civil government, financial institutions, natural resources, manpower, etc., in the national defense. Here is where we should learn of such matters as the pros and cons of service unification. The interplay between the Defense and State Departments and between military and political forces should be examined and discussed here. The theories behind military discipline and the degree of individual freedom in military life should be explored. The role of the military in a democracy (as opposed to an autocracy) is another valid topic for discussion.
These are only a few of the ideas to be covered in this area of study. The end product will be a college graduate better able to view the military establishment objectively and wisely as he votes, pays his taxes, and, when necessary, serves his country.
It has been said that war is too important to be left to the generals. In our government, civilian control of the military is established on this basis. This control, by elected and appointed officials in the legislative and executive branches, ultimately resides in the people through the ballot. The degree to which they exercise this control intelligently is directly related to their education in the military subject. At present, that education is, for the most part, informal and largely based on propaganda, hearsay, old wives’ tales, and some usually parochial personal experiences. Very little of it is the result of serious study and analysis because this subject has not been made available in our colleges and universities except through programs such as ROTC.
There is a missing IBM card in the curriculum offerings in the typical college or university social science division today. That card ought properly to carry the title “Military Science” or “The Study of National Defense.”
As I see it, this omission is a fault of higher education in the decade of the seventies, which is blind to the empty chair at the academic table.
One of our social sciences is missing.
Santa Fe, New Mexico
Dr. John J. Marsh (Ph.D., University of Northern Colorado) is a faculty member at Eastern New Mexico University and Associate Director of Project New-Gate, an educational program at New Mexico State Penitentiary. He served in the Air Force from 1944 to 1965 in personnel and administrative assignments. A graduate of Squadron Officer School, 375th Aeromedical Transport Wing, when he retired. His articles have appeared in educational journals.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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