Air University Review, January-February 1971
Where historians seek to make sense out of the past, political scientists study past events as a source of lessons for current or future applicability. A historian who becomes too steeped in the past runs the risk of assuming that the way things happened was ultimately correct. Working from a different vantage, a political scientist, given a proper understanding of the past, has a unique opportunity to probe and question ways in which past undertakings might have been managed differently.
From a case study of the methods and procedures employed by military planners while laying the groundwork for the United States Air Force in 1943–45, Major Perry McCoy Smith seeks to provide “lessons. . . of current as well as historical interest.* Major Smith, an Air Force fighter pilot and formerly an assistant professor of political science at the USAF Academy, concentrates on a specific group of Army Air Force planners—the Post War Division of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans—and makes an effort to “see precisely the kind of problems, pitfalls, and blindspots that were experienced by U.S. military planners in their first systematic attempt to anticipate the future.” (p. 1) As the U.S. military has had a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy since World War II, Smith suggests that it is necessary to know as much as possible about how the military operates.
In his research, Major Smith worked in a rich collection of Post War Plans Division source materials in the USAF Historical Archives Branch and interviewed a number of the Air Force planners of the generation in which he is interested. He was unable to gain access to the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His notes and bibliography indicate that he did not make any special use of War Department postwar planning files. In spite of these source limitations, Smith’s study has received professional acclaim from his fellow political scientists. An earlier draft of the book won an award from the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in international relations, law, and politics written in 1967. His prestigious university publisher adds an endorsement that Smith’s “always carefully documented” findings are most pertinent since they come at a time when many Americans are gravely concerned over the “enormous influence of the military establishment on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.”
Informed studies of the Air Force planning process have long been needed in order to increase understanding of a vitally important military function. Unhappily, however, Major Smith does not provide such an informed analysis, chiefly because he has not made himself thoroughly familiar with the period in which his work lies. Somewhat like the anachronistic Shakespeare, who has a clock strike in Julius Caesar’s time, Smith gives signs of judging the 1943–45 period in terms of the present, both in external details and in fundamental ideas. He is at his worst when he attempts to describe the “blindspots” of AAF planners. Displaying educational bias, he says, of air planners: “Political scientists were not recruited by the Air Force, and, lacking any in-house expertise, it went without such talent in its planning.” (p. 12) And, among key air decision-makers, he finds: “None had any graduate-level experience.” (p. 109)
Smith often accepts the exposés of latter-day revisionists who erroneously claim that the U.S. Air Force leaders of World War II were little more than blind adherents to a “dogma” of bomber supremacy and strategic bombing. He asks his readers to believe that the Air Force planners and decision-makers were “anti-intellectual,” “youthful,” “politically naïve,” and even “messianic.” Obviously a fighter enthusiast, Smith intimates that the combined bomber offensive against Germany and the strategic air offensive in the Pacific were “ill conceived.” (p. 17) He poses the need for additional study of the rationale for retention of “obsolescent weapons systems,” among which are included horse cavalry, the coast artillery, and the strategic bomber. (p. 23 n) With very few exceptions, he characterizes air planners and decision-makers as “parochial,” which he defines as a “narrow view whereby a military branch or service is intolerant of criticism from other services, is extremely protective of the missions its spokesmen feel are exclusively those of their service, and is unwilling to compromise with other services on roles and missions. . . .” (p. 8) Without any supporting documentation, Smith asserts: “The records show that despite tendencies of certain Army officers, the Army generals demonstrated less parochialism during the war than did the Air Force or Navy officers.” (p. 9)
In almost every sentence, Smith’s historical judgments are so fraught with a basic lack of understanding of air history (and with misinformation) as to defy individual rebuttal in a review of less length than the book itself. Above everything else, he is critical of what he conceives to be the inability of air leaders, including General Henry H. Arnold, to ask the key questions that could have provided proper evaluations of air power capabilities and requirements. (p. 32) But it is worth noting that Smith’s own use of leading questions contributes to his own summary evaluation of AAF planning in 1943-45: “The end sought was not national security through a properly balanced military defensive and deterrent force but rather an autonomous, powerful United States Air Force which would be the first line of defense, the largest of the three military services, and the recipient of the largest share of the defense budget” (p. 116)
In final assessment, Smith conceives that the AAF planners proceeded in an “inverse fashion” by initially deciding what the outcome of their planning would be and making all their assumptions in terms of this desired end. By way of a lesson for the future, the author points out that his study shows “the difficulties of objective planning when the outputs of the planning process are determined by the policy makers before the planning begins.” (p. 116)
Overall, it is impossible not to wonder whether the author was not guilty of the same thing that he attributes to AAF planners: selecting the desired outcome and then relating real and imagined facts to that outcome. Certainly a full understanding of air history on the author’s part would have revealed that as a group American air leaders of the World War II generation were pragmatic rather than dogmatic men, a conclusion that is supportable both by events and by the record of sprightly arguments among airmen concerning the development and employment of air power. There was far less agreement in the prewar Air Corps than Major Smith would have one believe. While the theory of transcendent strategic bombardment was prevalent for a time during the 1930s at the Air Corps Tactical School, it was kept under challenge by fighter officers, including such influential men as Lieutenant Colonels Millard F. Harmon and A. H. Gilkeson, as well as Major Claire L. Chennault, whom Smith erroneously describes (p. 33) as the “only articulate, albeit polemical, voice for fighter aviation.” At the Tactical School, moreover, both faculty and students were given utmost freedom of discussion and encouraged to challenge any idea advanced.
Whereas Smith characterizes prewar air thinking as dominated by technical and economic ideas, Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., has made the salient point that one of the defects at the Air Corps Tactical School was actually a lack of technical expertise, with the result that information about important scientific possibilities—including radar, which was being developed in heavy secrecy by the U.S. Army Signal Corps rather than by the Army Air Corps as Smith implies on page 30—was blacked out. Retarded development of a long-range escort fighter, moreover, was attributable not to lack of a stated operational requirement but rather to an incorrect technical estimate that such a plane was technologically impossible. Incidentally, the British arranged to purchase the P–51 Mustang not for use as a long-range escort fighter as Smith states (p. 33) but for ground support work in their Army Cooperation Command.
In his description of General Arnold as a man solely concerned with getting advice from “physical scientists and economists” (p. 12 and elsewhere), the author plainly lacks understanding of the way in which the wartime AAF commander liked to operate. Arnold saw nothing wrong in having an operating staff with 31 individuals reporting directly to him, thus, as he said, preventing “termites” on his staff from eating up good ideas before they could get through to the top. Smith also apparently lacks information about the contributions of the distinguished diplomatic and military historian Edward Mead Earle as a member of Arnold’s Committee of Operations Analysts and about the committee of distinguished American historians who made an in-depth background study of Germany for General Arnold in the winter of 1943-44.
At the same time that Major Smith trots out many of the old wives’ tales about the hidebound mind of the prewar Air Corps, his writing suggests that he did not understand the air doctrine of World War II—doctrine that he freely characterizes as “dogma.” He would have his readers believe that the landmark air plan, AWPD–1, “Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces,” issued on 12 August 1941, represented a “doctrinal dedication to strategic bombardment at the expense of close air support and interdiction. . . .” (p. 28) If he had studied AWPD-1 (instead of merely citing it), he would have found that it recommended priority development of unitary air forces for sustained strategic air offensives against Germany and Japan prior to the beginning of surface campaigns. If the requirement for the surface campaigns still existed after the strategic air offensives, the planners conceived that all air power would be employed in support of friendly surface forces.
The Air Corps also had a far better record during the 1930s in developing support for the Army mission than Smith indicates in his incomplete little narration about liaison aviation. (pp. 98–99) It is also difficult to reconcile the author’s portrayal of Major General Laurence S. Kuter’s overpowering commitment to strategic bombardment (pp. 7–8) with his later passing acknowledgment (p. 21) that in 1943 Kuter, more than anyone else, fathered the tactical air forces for cooperative employment with the Army.
When Major Smith finally gets to his assigned task and addresses planning for the postwar Air Force in 1943–45, he appears to forget the superior relationship of the War Department General Staff to Headquarters Army Air Forces, reflecting his lack of research in War Department files. Basic policies affecting planning for the postwar air arm originated in the War Department Operations Division (OPD) and were handed down to the AAF staff level. Thus on 28 October 1943 the initial OPD guidance for the postwar permanent military establishment stated: “The primary function of the armed forces is, when called upon to do so, to support and, within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the national policy of the nation.” This basic paper further provided that a force-in-being was required “for prompt attack in any part of the world in order to crush the very beginnings of lawless aggression, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations.” As Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall endorsed this paper with a marginal notation: “I think maintenance of sizeable ground expeditionary force probably impracticable except on the basis of allotment of fillers after six months. Having air power will be the quickest remedy.”l
In Headquarters Army Air Forces, postwar planning assumptions issued on 11 December 1943 included three basic propositions: (1) that the Air Force would be autonomous; (2) that it would be “an ‘M’ day force, instantly ready to repel attack or to quash any incipient threat to world peace”; and (3) that it would consist of a general headquarters, six air forces, and appropriate commands.2 With this general guidance, the AAF Post War Division under Air Staff, Plans, was immediately responsible for drawing up future projections; but when the division’s plan was circulated throughout the Air Staff and to major Air Force commanders, a lively dialogue of diverse judgments ensued. Among other things, this dialogue riddled the OPD assumption that the air striking force would be parceled out among six air forces and dispersed at bases throughout the world. An analysis of the varying comments on postwar air plans (available in the archival files used by the author) should have convinced Major Smith that senior air officers were anything but monolithic in their thinking.
Even with the most modern scientific planning techniques, AAF planners in
1943–45 would doubtless have found their postwar planning chores very
difficult. In short retrospect, in October 1945, Lieutenant General Hoyt S.
Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, noted that the planning
problem had been “approached from the wrong angle.” Vandenberg urged that a
firm decision be made as to the mission and responsibilities of the Air Force,
to which force requirements could be intelligently related.3 It was
difficult, however, to get definitive political guidance. As Major Smith says
(pp. 5–6), postwar military planning was instituted in 1943, in part because of
queries from the State Department as to future worldwide airfield requirements.
Nor was it as easy to identify the Soviet Union as a future adversary as Major
Smith rationalizes that it should have been. For example, a memorandum
concerning fighter and bomber projections, prepared on 25 November 1944 and
extensively used by Smith (pp. 23–24), included the estimate: “It would appear
that, since no real basis for conflict now exists between ourselves and the
Soviets other than in the ideological field, it should be possible even with
bad statesmanship to avoid a clash for more than one generation.4
In the absence of a clear definition of foreign policy requirements for military support, General Marshall’s often personal views on the future mood of the American people provided the framework for future air plans. He would not approve the concept of a large standing army in peacetime because he believed that its cost would be prohibitive, needed manpower could not be obtained by recruitment, and it would be repugnant to the American people.5 The initial War Department postwar force requirement, including the initial postwar Air Force (IPWAF) plan for a million-man, l05-group regular air force, paid little heed to costs, and Marshall turned it down in November 1944 with a directive for a more realistic appreciation of available resources, including an annual program of universal military training (UMT).
At this juncture, AAF planners saw usefulness in UMT for a mobilization
emergency but stressed that the standing Air Force could not depend on the UMT
increment to meet an M-day mission. The second AAF plan, PWAF-2, was generally
similar to the IPWAF plan, but it was much less expensive. The objective was
the same, but this plan assumed that political measures, including an
international collective security organization, would appreciably ease the task
of armed forces. PWAF-2 envisioned 75 air groups and was slated to go into
effect three years after victory over Japan. In the spring of 1945 the AAF
recommended a third plan, the Interim Air Force plan, calling for the
maintenance of 78 groups in the three years following VJ-Day.6
During 1945 AAF postwar planning moved gradually to a final firm position that 70 groups would be the “bedrock minimum” size of the postwar Air Force. On 13 March, General Marshall approved a basic War Department assumption that a future war would begin without declaration and with an attack against the United States but that the United States would have advance cognizance of the possibility of such a war “for at least one year” and would inaugurate preparatory measures in that year.7 At a meeting on 22 August, Major General Lauris Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, directed immediate preparation of a new plan for an interim and postwar Air Force in terms of the impact of nuclear weapons. A few days later, on 29 August, the Air Force set 70 air groups and 54 separate squadrons as the objective for the postwar regular air force. Major Smith records that this 70-group figure was selected on “an arbitrary basis” as a sort of planning ploy (p. 115), but in another part of his narrative (pp. 71-73) he had presented the logical rationale for the 70-group structure. It was the smallest-sized force that would provide a combat-ready M-day air striking force as well as expansion capability to meet the War Department’s one-year mobilization objective. It was the smallest-sized force that would keep U.S. aircraft production in a sufficiently ready state to meet mobilization requirements. And the number of groups and squadrons would be marginally sufficient to man the bases that would be required in the western hemisphere and Pacific to meet emerging U.S. treaty responsibilities. Air Force planners were confident that the 400,000 men required could be obtained by recruitment. Once again, it is only fair to conclude that air planners were seeking pragmatic solutions to the requirements of a future that was not at all clear.
On at least three other matters, Major Smith interprets partial facts to support foregone conclusions. The charge that air planners stated requirements for a great number of worldwide bases in order to justify a large air force and that they were oriented to a flat “Mercator” view of the world (pp. 75–83) is fanciful. Here Smith ignores his own information that the l05-group IPWAF strength figure originated in OPD rather than in the Air Staff. In asserting that postwar air bases should have been concentrated in the northern hemisphere facing across the arctic toward the Soviet Union, he overlooks military requirements elsewhere in the world. For example, the U.S. treaty with the Republic of the Philippines and the Act of Chapultepec had begun to dictate base requirements in areas quite remote from the Soviet Union. Moreover, these base matters were validated and handed down by higher authority to the Air Staff.
It is also hard to see how the air leaders “bargained away” the control of
Army liaison aviation and Army antiaircraft artillery (two missions that were
not under AAF control) in order to safeguard autonomy and strategic
bombardment. (pp. 100–102) In regard to Smith’s discussion of organic Army
liaison aviation (pp. 98–99), the Air Force policy asked no more than that such
organic lightplanes should be put to sustained use, that the separation of such
aircraft from the mass of air power would not seriously reduce the potential of
unitary air power, that the Army function would not duplicate existing
capabilities of Air Force units and equipment, and that no concomitant
necessity would arise for separate and extensive Army airdrome, depot,
maintenance, and training facilities.8 The Air Force did not “give
away” control of antiaircraft artillery in order, as Smith believes, to avoid
incorporating nonflying officers into its personnel structure. (pp. 100–101) On
the contrary, General Arnold and his staff made sustained and repeated efforts
to secure the transfer of antiaircraft artillery into the new Air Force,
thereby providing an integrated air defense capability. These efforts foundered
in December 1945 when the influential War Department reorganization board headed
by Lieutenant General W. H. Simpson recommended against the transfer of
antiaircraft artillery to the Air Force on the ground that it would constitute
an admission that each of the armed services should be completely
self-contained. Efforts of the Air Staff officers to reopen the transfer proved
unsuccessful.9
Major Smith’s study of postwar air planning is gravely deficient in proper historical understanding of the events and persons surveyed. This lack of perspective jeopardizes the validity of lessons drawn from the narration. These faults are regrettable, since Major Smith is obviously a highly motivated officer and scholar who has advanced thoughts that are worthy of fuller and fairer development. An Air Force decision-maker does need to know how to ask the right questions—questions so framed as to provide full evaluation of the matter at hand. Instead of belaboring the dubious assertion that the AAF planners and decision-makers did not ask the right questions, Major Smith could have provided some more positive advice on this technique of evaluation. And, of course, technology does have a unique impact on Air Force future planning—an impact that still lacks a complete rationale. These and similar subjects could profitably be addressed—with full evaluation—by Major Smith in future studies.
* Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, $5.95), xii and 132 pp.
Notes
1. Memo for the Chief of Staff from Major General Thomas T. Handy, Assistant CofS, Operations Division, War Department, subj: Outline of Post-War Permanent Military Establishment, 28 October 1943, with marginal comments of Gen George C. Marshall.
2. Ltr, Maj Gen Barney M. Giles, CofAS, AAF, to Distribution, subj: Post War Air Force, 11 December 1943.
3. Memo for Assistant CofAS-5 from Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant CofAS–3, subj: Revision of the Seventy (70) Group Program, 6 November 1945.
4. Memo for Major General Donald Wilson from Colonel S. F. Giffin, Executive Requirements Division, Assistant CofAS Operations, Commitments, and Requirements, AAF, subj: Future Trends in Air Fighting, 25 November 1944.
5. WD News Release, Statement by General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, on Universal Military Training, 16 June 1945; 79th Cong, 1st Sess, Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate (Washington: GPO, 1945), p. 49; 81st Cong, 1st Sess, The National Defense Program¾Unification and Strategy, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington: GPO, 1949), p. 601.
6. Memo for Arnold from Major General L. S. Kuter, Assistant CofAS Plans, subj: Status of Plans for the Post-War Air Force, 17 January 1945; Routing and Record Sheet, Lieutenant General I. C. Eaker, Deputy Commander, AAF, to Special Planning Division, WDSS, subj: The Interim Air Force, 31 May 1945.
7. WD Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment, Sections I-IV and VII, approved by Chief of Staff, 13 March 1945, Section II, par 2: Nature of the Next War.
8. R&R, Brigadier General W. F. McKee, Acting Assistant CofAS, OC&R, to AAF Management Control, subj: AAF Policy Book, 26 February 1945, citing AAF Summary Sheet to G–3 WDGS and CofS, subj: Organic Assignment of Aircraft Other than to the Air Forces, 10 October 1944.
9. Report of Board of Officers on Organization of the War Department (Simpson Board), 28 December 1945, p. 14; R&R, Major General E. E. Partridge, Assistant CofAS-3 to Assistant CofAS-5, subj: Air Force Policy as to the Organization of the Antiaircraft Artillery if Integrated into the Air Forces, 1 February 1946; Daily Activity Report, Assistant CofAS-3, 12 February 1946.
Dr. Robert F. Futrell (Ph.D., Vanderbilt University), Professor of Military History, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, is author of The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 and co-author of The Army Air Forces in World War II and A History of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957; his monograph “Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964” awaits publication. As adviser to Project CORONA HARVEST, he is writing a history of the USAF in Southeast Asia to February 1965.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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