Document created: 24 August 04
Air University Review, September-October 1970

SEATO’s Capabilities
for Countersubversion

Major Joel J. Snyder

The fifteenth anniversary of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in September 1969 was a crucial one. Critics of the alliance have continued to assail its usefulness. Manila newspapers have predicted that SEATO’s breakup was imminent, or at least that its prospects were questionable.¹ Even in Thailand, the host country for SEATO headquarters, some have expressed doubt about its value. A few United States observers have also raised their own objections to SEATO. The United Kingdom and the United States policies of withdrawal from Southeast Asia have fed the pessimism about SEATO. The SEATO Secretary General, Lieutenant General Jesus M. Vargas, remarked to an American Chamber of Commerce meeting in Bangkok that the greatest immediate concern to free Asians was the tendency in the Western world to turn homeward. He noted that “one-time strong and determined allies . . . were gradually pulling out of the Asian scene.”²

Despite SEATO’S well-known weaknesses and asserted diminishing potential as a defensive alliance, nearly all of the eight member nations―Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, France, United Kingdom, United States―continue to solidly endorse the organization. At the May 1969 Council of Ministers meeting in Bangkok and again in the fifteenth anniversary ceremonies member nations’ representatives spoke strongly in terms of SEATO’s continuing role in collective security and economic and cultural endeavors.

The question that remains about SEATO is simply why it continues to survive despite its limitations. The Manila Fact, the basis for the organization, does not provide for specific actions by member nations to meet the common danger, nor does it explicitly recognize that an attack on one is an attack against them all, as does the North Atlantic Treaty. There is general recognition that an armed attack would endanger peace and security and that each member in that event will “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Besides a relatively weak treaty basis for SEATO’S mutual defense structure, differences in national policies among SEATO participants are another limitation. Over the years the mutual interests and attitudes of some of the members have become increasingly divergent. The military participation of France and Pakistan has been marked by a reduction of commitments, though both still pay their annual civil and military dues. After 1963 member nations found it necessary to modify the principle of unanimity. A more flexible arrangement now provides that a majority vote of five may adopt a proposal of the Council, provided there is no negative vote. Those who abstain are not bound by the decision.³ Consequently, while France and Pakistan do not fully participate, neither have they cast negating votes against the decisions of the other members. After the Laotian crisis, the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of March 1962 allowed bilateral and national defensive measures of the U.S. and Thailand without the prior agreement of all other parties to SEATO. This individual application of the treaty obligations has been generally accepted by other members.⁴

The sum total of the general language of the pact and charter, and of subsequent working-level and international interpretations, has been to reduce the treaty constraints or commitments to a matter of national self-interest, enlightened though it may be. A lack of supranational commitments was reflected in the internal structure established by the treaty. In the beginning there was no decision-making authority within the organization to deal with SEATO matters, and there was a minimum of formal coordinating machinery. The position of the Secretary General and the Military Planning Office were not established until 1957.⁵ The Council is structured to provide for consultation, and it meets monthly. Representatives are the member nations’ ambassadors to Thailand and an official from the Thai Foreign Office. In SEATO each represents his own country, obviously, and not exclusively a multilateral agency. A routine decision authority has evolved in the Permanent Working Group (PWG), which meets weekly to consider SEATO business. While PWG members negotiate and coordinate their national interests in relation to SEATO, any matter of significance is referred through the Council of Ministers to the national capitals for resolution.

The military aspect of SEATO continues to exist because it serves the national security interests of its members. It is a multilateral defensive organization in consonance with other bilateral and trilateral security agreements. Through SEATO the Asian and southwest Pacific partners have an assurance of the Western members’ interest in their strategic defense. From another viewpoint, the Western nations have the assurance that their strategic resolves are reasonably acceptable to the Asian and southwest Pacific partners. In short, it is a mutually beneficial treaty relationship that reflects the international realities which exist between Asian and Western-oriented nations. The key to understanding SEATO is, therefore, to understand the relationships between its members--the great powers, Southeast Asian nations, and the southwest Pacific members.

The SEATO strategies of collective defense and mutual security were stimulated by the loss of China to Communist forces and the Korean and Vietnamese wars. In 1954, faced with continued adverse developments in Asia and especially Indochina, Thailand requested United Nations observers along its Mekong River borders with Laos. This proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union.⁶ Secretary of State Dulles proposed a “united action” to oppose the enemy on the ground.⁷ The British were reluctant to support joint military actions in face of the impending Geneva conference, so joint military actions were set aside for Indochina. Dulles’s plans for a security pact for Southeast Asia were stimulated by Thailand’s initiative in early 1954 during the Indochina crisis. The outcome of the Geneva Convention and apparent unwillingness of the Communists to abide by its terms probably increased United States concern over further Communist expansion into Southeast Asia.⁸

SEATO’S defensive purpose has been to deter further expansion of Communist powers. A corollary purpose has been to support greater Asian participation in regional and multilateral undertakings. Against these defensive objectives, critics have noted that SEATO failed to respond with resolute defensive measures against the threat to Laos in 1961 and to South Vietnam since 1964-65. These episodes are sometimes offered as evidence that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has failed its purposes.

Such criticism rests upon a restricted view of SEATO’S objectives. Concerted military action by standing forces under a unified command would be appropriate to NATO but not to SEATO. None of the requisite structure exists within SEATO to make such a response possible, nor was it intended in the design of SEATO. The United States itself was not in favor of a unified military command and standing force at the Manila conference.⁹ The defense commitment of the charter, to act in accordance with Constitutional processes, was a language formula consistent with all the other defensive treaties between the United States and Asian nations, including Australia and New Zealand. But there were no provisions requiring a member nation to take specific actions in the common defense of the members. SEATO’S purpose, like other U.S./Asian defense treaties, has been to help justify the Asian presence of Western strategic defense capabilities while not limiting unduly Asian and Western powers’ military responses to aggression. Thailand’s Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, bluntly recognized this situation when he stated that “. . . no treaty can bind any sovereign nation.” He considered that treaty partners would carry out their treaty obligations only if their national interests coincided. The provision for “constitutional processes” he labeled an escape clause.¹⁰

Despite the lack of compelling formal commitments, within the broader frame of their mutual self-interest SEATO members have taken common measures to provide for their defense. The troop deployment to Thailand in 1962 was characterized as a response to Communist offensives toward the Mekong River valleys in Laos. Members also have contributed to South Vietnam’s defense. Though the national forces have acted outside formal SEATO control, each participant has generally recognized that its contributions were in support of obligations to the SEATO treaty. The United States has claimed that SEATO provided the legal treaty basis for the massive aid given to South Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cited SEATO as the source of U.S. legal authority, in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearings in January-February 1966.¹¹ The SEATO response to South Vietnam was in compliance with the pact, since South Vietnam, as a treaty protocol nation, had requested assistance in meeting Communist aggression. One critic concluded that the United States was committed in Vietnam by the SEATO treaty because it chose to be, whereas Britain, France, and Pakistan did not so choose.¹² It is possible that France and Pakistan received no invitation to participate from the government of South Vietnam, the necessary prerequisite to a legal SEATO commitment. There were special reasons for the United Kingdom to take a neutralist position as co-chairman of the Geneva Accords. Nevertheless, the U.K. encouraged the commitment of the other members of SEATO.

An important instance of SEATO’S broad purpose applies to Thailand―United States relations. The mutual defense aspects of American presence in Thailand have been consistently related to the SEATO treaty. The Rusk-Thanat communiqu6 of March 1962 placed the SEATO commitment alongside bilateral economic and military assistance agreements with Thailand as an important basis of United States actions to aid Thailand’s defense.¹³ In May 1969, at the SEATO Council of Ministers conference, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated that the Rusk-Thanat communiqué was a valid restatement of SEATO responsibilities. President Nixon’s press release from Bangkok during his summer 1969 Asian trip reiterated the American pledge to support Thailand. In discussions with SEATO Secretary-General Vargas, President Nixon was understood to have offered reassurances regarding future United States support for the organization and presumably its member nations.¹⁴

Fifteen years of existence is evidence of SEATO’S success. Internal subversion and insurgency have been opposed―effectively in the Philippine Republic and with increasing impact in Thailand. The credibility of SEATO’S deterrent influence is recognized even by its critics, and no doubt by Communist China itself.¹⁵

While it would be claiming too much to assert that SEATO’S is the best alliance that could be developed for Southeast Asia, it does possess two salient advantages. First, it provides a convenient vehicle for representing the regional defense interests of Asian members. Second, its consultative, nonauthoritative structure is acceptable to the domestic political interests of Asian nationalists. These features might be all that is either desirable or possible in the Asian multilateral defense arena.

A comparison of the regional groups that have paralleled SEATO in the 1960s reflects common limits in their compulsion to organize. Nearly all have occasional ministerial council meetings, embryonic working groups, and generalized objectives. None offers more than a forum for developing cooperation along lines of mutual national interests, and some have not lasted beyond their initial meetings.

The most recent organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), replaced the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and ASA’S stillborn predecessor, MALPHIND (short for Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia). ASEAN machinery includes annual meetings, a standing committee in the Foreign Ministry of the host country, and plans for other specialist groups that may be formed.

Another reasonably successful group is the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), formed in Seoul, Korea, in 1966. The original purpose of the Korean sponsors was an anti-Communist defense alliance. However, the ASPAC that emerged is only a political forum for social and economic objectives. There is a standing committee, but it lacks any permanent secretariat.¹⁶ Various specialized centers are also being established, including an Economic Cooperation Center in Bangkok and a Social-Cultural Center in Seoul. In a recent press interview the Thai Foreign Minister characterized ASPAC as “unlike SEATO . . . but a looser confederation of Asian nations seeking and learning the value of cooperation.”¹⁷

The several new organizations and conferences among the Asian countries demonstrate a growing cohesion and desire for regional programs. The struggle to shape the identity and form of the various groups closely imitates the early experience of SEATO as it established its permanent secretariat and military advisory mechanisms. It is pertinent to recall that SEATO also evolved from a small unit supported by Thailand’s Foreign Ministry. So far most of the new groups have begun to develop an associated structure much like the civilian side of SEATO, which suggests that the consultative approach is acceptable and suitable to Asian regional affairs.

The new groups have been reluctant to include military or defense matters. The proposed defensive purpose of ASPAC was softened because of resistance from Japan particularly, although Australia and New Zealand also originally opposed the ASPAC defense objectives out of deference to SEATO.¹⁸ No other recent Asian-founded association has even pretended to further multilateral defensive purposes beyond the language of general aims and principles. It is unlikely that the infant regional associations will develop effective military defensive institutions in the near future. This avoidance of military aspects leaves the current field to SEATO for regional mutual defense, limited though it is. It implies also that from an Asian and Western point of view SEATO provides a satisfactory arrangement on the issue of regional defense alliances.

In my opinion, a loose conference-type association of military allies without a formal structure might be started around the SEATO foundation. This overlapping group could expand SEATO’S consultative feature beyond the treaty members to other countries with mutual interests. Political and military coordination in defense planning and intelligence could involve other countries in a loose, semi-invisible association.

The regular SEATO Council meetings in recent years have provided an opportunity for a separate consultation among the principal nations contributing forces to South Vietnam. These meetings were established by the 1966 Manila conference among the seven troop-contributing countries. Until 1970 they were hosted by whichever SEATO member was hosting the Council session, and they followed that session but with South Korea and South Vietnam in addition to the five SEATO allies participating in South Vietnam. A recent meeting of troop-contributing countries followed the SEATO Council Ministers’ annual conference in Bangkok in May 1969. According to Bangkok press reports, the problems of ending the war in Vietnam and maintaining peace in Southeast Asia were topics on the agenda.¹⁹ Future development of this kind of political-military association will undoubtedly be gradual and unforced by its participants.

Although SEATO membership is more limited than might be desired, it does include strategically essential countries. The ANZUS partners (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) are gaining importance as the remaining Western powers after the United Kingdom withdraws its Far Eastern forces by 1971. France has not participated in military activities for several years or attended SEATO Council meetings since 1967.

No Western power could operate effectively in Asia without the support of Asian countries, to provide logistical bases and supporting manpower. Thailand and the Philippine Republic are essential from this aspect. Thus the five key countries that would be crucial to a successful military defense of Southeast Asia―namely, Thailand, Philippine Republic, Australia, New Zealand, and United States―are already aligned in SEATO and are cooperating in South Vietnam. This strategic relationship is well understood in Asia. During the Fourteenth Council Meeting in Bangkok, 20-21 May 1969, the Ministers spoke directly to the issue, The Australian representative noted SEATO’S special role in the international cooperation of the region and stated, “. . . we in Australia place considerable reliance upon SEATO and on what it represents to our own security.”²⁰ Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, commented on SEATO’S inherent defects and restraints, but he also concluded that

the many instances of actual collaboration . . . .could not have been possible were it not for the singular commitment made by the United States, symbolized by SEATO to defend the region from any aggression . . . . SEATO has, therefore, provided the minimum framework within which the relatively defenseless nations of Southeast Asia could get on with their plans for development, and ultimately to become responsible for their own security.²¹

Speaking even more plainly, SEATO Secretary General Vargus told the Council meeting that “no security alliance can hope to succeed without the active participation of an established world power.” Asians, he said, should develop their defenses in collaboration with the powers of the free world. To put the strategic issue in simple terms, he said: “I have yet to see an American President who is prepared to take the view that American presence, power and influence are not necessary in containing communist aggression in Southeast Asia.”²²

The strong testimonials of the members indicate that SEATO will continue to influence the regional development of Asian countries. As a pattern of multilateral undertakings and as the “minimum necessary vehicle for great-power defense commitments, SEATO has served an essential purpose that will remain relevant in the foreseeable future.”

A central issue in the current debate over SEATO is its potential adaptability to future conditions. The present situation in Southeast Asia has changed significantly since 1954. A post-Vietnam environment will offer new possibilities for progress and change. There are new challenges for regional groups to consider and new alignments between participating countries. Moreover, in the wake of British withdrawal policies, the United States has begun the phasing back of its major military forces in the region. Under these new conditions SEATO will have to adjust to survive, especially if it is to offer essential mutual defense advantages to its members.

Foremost in affecting SEATO’S future is the changing nature of the threat. Several years ago a major danger was from conventional attack by Communist China, as in the Korean War. With the Vietnam War, subversion and insurgency have become a more real danger than overt invasion to the Asian countries.

The Communist threat has also employed a softer thrust of aggression using government-to-government relations. Communist organizations engaged in overt and covert revolutionary activity are active in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, where normal political relations and trade go along with subversion. Since 1965, when Lin Piao called for widespread “people’s wars,” Communist China’s policy has more openly supported subversion and insurgency in Southeast Asian countries. Secretary General Vargas remarked that “after the Vietnam War, insurgency will be the greatest danger facing all free countries in Southeast Asia,” and he said that he would ask the SEATO Council to invite other non-Communist Asian countries to participate with SEATO members in joint efforts to meet the problems of Communist-supported insurgency.²³

As Council Ministers considered the new challenges facing SEATO in 1969, they called for greater emphasis on countersubversion, along with political consultations and economic cooperation, to meet the new Communist tactics. Some, like the Australian Minister, expressed deep concern about Communist subversion and insurgency. Other delegates called for efforts to adapt the organization to the new nature of the threat. Secretary of State Rogers suggested that SEATO’S assets should be turned toward countering subversion.

The words, perhaps more ardent than in previous Council meetings, were not a unique departure from SEATO objectives in the past. At SEATO’S inception, the treaty articles had paid some attention to the threat of subversion, although these references were vague and limited like the measures for dealing with overt aggression. Nevertheless, SEATO Council representatives had been directed, as one of their first tasks, to arrange an expert study group on combating subversion. The Council at its first meeting in Bangkok in February 1955 stated that “subversion and infiltration constitute a serious threat to the peace and security of the area.” Both the British and Philippine governments reported to the Council on measures they had taken against subversion within the treaty area.²⁴

At Karachi, Pakistan, in March 1956, the Second Council Meeting noted again that Communist tactics were placing increasing reliance on infiltration methods, and SEATO members were asked to place priority on regional cooperation and joint action in countering subversive activity.²⁵ The first seminar on countering Communist subversion took place in November 1957 in the Philippines. A second followed in February 1960 at Lahore, West Pakistan. Other efforts were also taken in the early sixties to make SEATO more effective in dealing with the subversive threat. An expert study group in 1961 recommended that a permanent office be established in SEATO to identify and assess specific problems of insurgency in the treaty area. Among other measures, SEATO staff organizational terms of reference were to be reviewed for adequate attention to the importance of countersubversion work. The military advisers also directed the Military Planning Office of SEATO to study what military plan assistance could be provided to support countersubversion objectives.

A Special Assistant to the Secretary General was set up in 1962, along with an expert staff and a Committee of Security Experts, composed of delegates from intelligence and police agencies, to assess and exchange information on the nature and extent of the threat of Communist subversion.²⁶ This group, now called the Intelligence Assessment Committee, holds semiannual meetings to assess the Communist subversive and insurgency threat in the treaty area.²⁷

SEATO’S Information Advisory Group conducts regular ad hoc meetings on regional information programs, including the nature and exposure of Communist propaganda. The group is chaired by the Public Information Office Director, who maintains liaison with the Special Assistant on exposure matters. The SEATO Public Information Office produces both written publications and radio programs aimed at offsetting Communist subversion. The Research Office collects materials and focuses on Communism in the treaty area.²⁸ In addition, SEATO has produced or is making several training films, including one on Malaysia made in 1963, one concerning Thailand entitled “Border Lands,” and three others intended eventually for a regional audience.

The Council meeting of 1966 was a bench mark of progress in SEATO’S countersubversion programs. Strongly endorsing the Secretary General’s efforts to assess and identify Communist insurgency threats, the meeting was followed by new attention and assistance for countersubversion by member nations. The present SEATO administrative budget for countersubversion and related economic, informational, and cultural programs has become about six times larger than the funds spent for military planning.²⁹ The main accomplishment of the expansion of SEATO into countersubversion has been to provide advice and arrange assistance among member governments for the countries with a subversion problem.³⁰

A third countersubversion seminar, this one on internal security in rural areas, was conducted in Quezon City, Philippine Republic, in June 1968. The meeting was significant because of the attendance of experts from South Vietnam, South Korea, and the International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, along with SEATO members (except France and Pakistan). It reflected a growing regional interest among neighboring countries faced with similar insurgency problems.

The Second Expert Study Group, which convened in early 1969, not only studied the subversive threat in the Philippines and Thailand but also reviewed once again SEATO’S effectiveness in countersubversion, in light of the need for an overall regional effort and SEATO’S role in developing a broader counter-subversion objective.

The SEATO-sponsored Community Development Program suggests a possible avenue for such a regional activity. A seminar on community development in 1965 recommended that a director for this specialized area be added to the Secretary General’s staff. In 1967 the director was appointed. A goal of international exchange of community development experts was realized when the Philippines and Thailand participated in the first such program in 1969. Besides the exchange visits and tours, overall study and training effort was carried on at the SEATO-Thailand Regional Center in northeast Thailand. Aimed at assisting community development committees mainly from Thailand, the center also provided a decentralized focus for the visiting experts to discuss new approaches and innovations in community and rural development.

Although the center cannot be characterized as an Asia-wide organization for community development training, it has already functioned satisfactorily as an outpost for integrating community development at the regional level and as an institution to provide technical services, such as research and evaluation, field training, and exchange among its participants.³¹ It has the potential for a broader role in this key countersubversion activity. Such a SEATO expansion will depend, of course, on Thailand’s willingness as well, but to date the Community Development Center has had a profound impact on Thailand’s training plans and on the betterment of the local villagers in its vicinity. The visiting experts strongly urged that SEATO’S community development exchange program be developed and expanded in the future. With SEATO assistance, an international seminar on village development and security was held in Bangkok in March 1970, under the auspices of the government of Thailand. Participants from ten countries, including four non-SEATO members (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and South Vietnam), met for six days to discuss various aspects of countersubversion.

Although SEATO’S countersubversion study and information activities have grown, a less impressive record has been achieved in providing material assistance to countersubversion projects. Only a modest start has been achieved. Since 1965 the United States, Australia, and other donors have provided project assistance through SEATO to the Asian members for countersubversion purposes or to directly related rural development activities. The Hill Tribe Research Center in Chiang Mai, north Thailand, has become a key element in developing essential knowledge about the hill tribes that are being subjected to Communist infiltration. Australia has supported the establishment of three technical training schools for the Royal Thai Armed Forces, the latest one a Motor Mechanics School that began in March 1969. Other assistance has included radio and broadcasting transmitters for northeast Thailand, civic action projects in the Philippines, donation of vehicles and audiovisual equipment to Thailand’s Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, and the Secretary General’s provision of $18,650 to aid in Thailand’s hill tribe evacuation and resettlement programs. While these activities are neither large nor relatively expensive, they establish SEATO as a channel for material help to the countries having insurgency problems. Along with the study programs under way, this aspect of SEATO’S countersubversion role could get bigger and more significant.

Will SEATO ever be sufficient to deter effectively the subversive threat to Southeast Asia? SEATO’S critics have suggested that its role to date in combating insurgency has been limited and less successful than it has been in deterring overt war.³² The issue of SEATO’S future effectiveness requires an understanding of what could be done in the counter-subversion area, compared to SEATO’S potential.

An essential premise about countersubversion is that the responsibility to deal with it belongs to the affected nation. The security threat is small, even though aimed at the weakest and most vulnerable parts of the target society. Multilateral military deployments are not an appropriate remedy. Rather, a flexible mix of economic, social, and security programs is required, and these must suit the conditions peculiar to each circumstance of subversion. These situations need thorough analysis and study, including consultation between donor and recipient countries, to develop the best countersubversion program, one carefully designed to support the indigenous capabilities. Large-scale aid―as in South Vietnam--is now being recognized as less appropriate to the early stages of insurgency, when SEATO might be called upon for informational help, expert study, or limited, specialized kinds of material assistance. Other domestic or international restrictions will probably prevent future large increases of direct assistance beyond those measures that are now in existence or that can be introduced multilaterally through the SEATO Council.

Because the threat of insurgency is against the internal structure of a country, neither bilateral nor multilateral assistance can provide a quick or inexpensive remedy. Countersubversion programs require nationally and regionally based social and economic development programs as well as village-level security forces. Against this complicated need, the kinds of response that major powers could make in the future will be more restricted than at present. Military aid and advisory assistance are expected to be reduced along with large-scale economic grants. The result will probably be a threat demanding more resources for solution than could be generated in the troubled nation or than major allies would be willing to provide. On the other hand, there is increasing support for regional and international associations as avenues for providing technical assistance or limited aid to specific programs. SEATO could develop its ability to channel multilateral help to a member nation in need, and SEATO’S experience in Thailand proves that it is possible. SEATO may also develop informal mutual interests with other regional groups such as ASPAC or ASEAN, thus enhancing its flexibility to provide a broadly based response. Such a possibility was implied in May 1969 by the Thai Foreign Minister, when he called for “political consultations” among the various associations’ members.³³

A modification to the organizational structure of SEATO may be required to better realize its potential for countersubversion activities. Whether a new working-level staff will evolve from existing Secretary General or Military Planning offices cannot be predicted. Nevertheless a moderate strengthening of SEATO in this vital area is generally recognized as desirable. The Council Ministers indicated their nations’ support for such a development. The resulting structure will undoubtedly remain consultative and designed to allow maximum national initiatives. In the Asian environment of embryo regional groups faced with a diffuse and concealed threat of insurgency, SEATO could well develop another forerunner feature in multilateral activities. Its achievement of the countersubversion measures that are possible and successful could indicate the new shape of Asian regional security measures in the decade ahead.

Hq Pacific Air Command

Notes

1. For example, Manila Chronicle, 6 February 1969, and Manila Bulletin, 8 February 1969.

2. Bangkok Post, 20 February 1969.

3. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Manila Pact and Pacific Charter, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand, 1968.

4. Ibid.

5. George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, Ltd., 1962), XXXVII.

6. Melvin J. Taylor, Deputy Director, Public Information Office, SEATO, “SEATO Briefing Paper,” mimeograph, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, 14 November 1969.

7. New York Times, 30 March 1954.

8. Chatham House Study Group, Collective Defence in Southeast Asia, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1956, p. 5.

9. Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York: Praeger, 1963, for Council on Foreign Relations), p. 131.

10. Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, in a speech before the Foreign Correspondents Club, Bangkok, Thailand, 19 August 1969.

11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam Hearings (New York: Random Rouse, Inc., 1966), pp. 11-12.

12. Theodore Draper, Abuse of Power (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), p. 158.

13. Department of State Bulletin, XLVI, 1187 (26 March 1962), 498-99.

14. “Around and About with Nixon,” SEATO Record, VIII, 4 (August 1969), 10.

15. Roger J. Miller, Commander, USN, “Is SEATO Obsolete?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 94, No. 11 (November 1968), p. 60.

16. “ASA and ASPAC,” Far Eastern Economic Review:1967 Yearbook, Hong Kong, 1968, pp. 67-68.

17. Bangkok Post, 8 June 1969.

18. Far Eastern Economic Review: 1967 Yearbook, p. 67.

19. Bangkok World, 13 May 1969.

20. Gordon Freeth, Minister for External Affairs, “What They Said: Extracts from Opening Statements,” SEATO Record, VIII, 3 (June 1969), 9.

21. Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, “What They Said: Extracts from Opening Statements,” SEATO Record, VIII, 3 (June 1969), 12-13.

22. Lieutenant General Jesus M. Vargas, Secretary-General, SEATO, “Two Top Men Spell Out SEATO’S Vital Role on the Chessboard of Asia,” SEATO Record, VIII, 3 (June 1969), 24.

23. Bangkok Post, 23 April 1969.

24. Chatham House Study Group, p. 19.

25. Ibid., pp. 124-25.

26. Fifield, p. 135.

27. Jesus M. Vargas, SEATO Report:  1966-1967, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, p. 15.

28. Fifield, p. 135.

29. Interview with Paul Eckel, Special Assistant to the Secretary General, SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, 21 February 1969.

30. Vargas, SEATO Report: 1967-1968, p. l5.

31. Ibid., p. 31.

32. Miller, pp. 60-61.

33. Bangkok Post, 22 May 1969.

Contributor

Major Joel J. Snyder (M.S., George Washington University) is an intelligence officer at Hq CINCPAC, Camp Smith, Hawaii. Previously he has been an intelligence officer in England, served with a tactical reconnaissance wing, and was a student at Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. Major Snyder was an adviser to the Vietnam Air Force Intelligence Branch and an instructor in counterinsurgency at the USAF Special Air Warfare School.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.