Personnel Management

General Russell was Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq USAF, when he wrote this article. On 1 August 1970 he became Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and was replaced at DCS/P by Lieutenant General Robert J. Dixon.

The goal of personnel management can be easily described, for it is identical with the goals of the entire Air Force management team; that is, to obtain the maximum mission effectiveness from the resources available. There is an extra dimension in personnel management, however, for it must attempt to insure that human resources are utilized in a way that is optimum both to the mission and to the individual. What appears to be the logical course of action is not necessarily the best when dealing with human beings. We must consider the needs, hopes, and aspirations of our people. In the final analysis, the reaction of thousands of individuals to current personnel management decisions is a significant determinant of Air Force human resource effectiveness not only today but also in future years.

Like other Air Force managers, personnel managers do not operate in a vacuum. Personnel policies are, in varying degrees, the result of and responsive to external factors such as executive decisions, fiscal guidance and budgets, legislative directives, Congressional interests, public interests, and international tensions.

For the past few years major personnel programs have centered around the requirements generated by the war in Southeast Asia. Relatively short-term policies were established and programs devised to meet mission needs, retain experienced personnel, distribute assignments equitably, and resolve the many large and small personnel problems that arise in a wartime situation. Although management emphasis will continue in this area, the more difficult and demanding policies and programs necessitated by the wartime situation have been established and are generally understood by Air Force people. Barring further international crisis, the predominant external factor influencing personnel management currently and for the foreseeable future is funding.

The belief of many that a larger share of the nation’s gross national product should be allocated to solving domestic problems, coupled with the desire of the administration to hold federal spending to an absolute minimum in an effort to curb inflation, is resulting in drastically lowered funding for defense purposes. This lowered funding will inevitably result in fewer people on active duty in the Air Force, for the cost of people is our greatest single expense. One-third of the Air Force budget, over $8 billion, has been spent in each of the past few years in recruiting, training, and maintaining our military and civilian personnel. Obviously, substantial savings are possible when personnel strengths are reduced.

Although the Air Force did not experience a large influx of military personnel during the buildup for the Vietnam War, our strength total did climb by 48,000, from 857,000 in fiscal year 1964 to a peak of 905,000 in FY 1968. Beginning with 1969, however, there has been a series of personnel reductions as the Air Force has met the requirements of a steadily decreasing personnel budget and year-end strength ceilings.

By the end of FY 1969 the strength was down 43,000, to 862,000. By the end of FY 1970 it will have dropped approximately 53,000 more. In the proposed budget for FY 1971, which at the time of this writing is being considered by Congress, Air Force strength will be reduced to a force total of 783,000. The force is now well below the strength level at the start of the Vietnam War, and the end of reductions is not yet in sight. Undoubtedly, there will be more.

When reducing the force, personnel managers have available several alternative actions. Seldom does one action satisfy the requirement. Reductions must be made with full consideration of impacts on a balanced force, the future force, possible additional near-future force reductions (which have been realized in each of the last three fiscal years), the morale of the force, and the individuals affected.

To date, reductions have had a relatively minor impact on the career force. Cuts and dollar savings in the airman force have been achieved through reduced procurement, early releases, and rollbacks in release dates. Several alternative actions were employed to reach the reduced officer strength levels. Procurement cutbacks and early releases accounted for the bulk of losses. Other actions related primarily to a discontinuation of programs instituted during the Vietnam buildup to retain experienced personnel. The selective retention of regular officers twelve months past their desired date of separation or retirement was discontinued in 1969. Also in 1969 the program to retain Reserve officers who failed a second time for promotion to major was discontinued, and the “up or out” feature for promotion to major was reinstated. In 1970 the Air Force released “continued captains” those with 14 to 17 years’ service who had twice failed selection for promotion and had accepted the opportunity to continue on active duty in an indefinite status. Additionally, most Reserve officers who completed twenty or more years of service during FY 70 were separated and retired.

The Air Force was reluctant to release any of its career Reserve officers, both because of their substantial contribution to the mission and because of personal inconvenience or hardship they might suffer. Since cutbacks made reductions necessary, however, the release actions were determined to be most equitable when all officers in the force were considered. Reservists in the career force were given six months’ notice prior to retirement or separation from active duty. The six months’ notice is a policy requirement,not a legal one, since statutory authority provides for Secretarial release of a Reservist at almost any time.

In FY 1971 the 26,000 strength reduction will be achieved through normal attrition and reduced procurement of officers and airmen. Should additional reductions become necessary, as occurred with Project 703 in FY1970, it may be necessary to exercise other reduction actions, since there are limits to how drastically procurement can be cut in any one year. The Air Force Academy strength is fixed by law and not subject to management strength reductions. Also the AFROTC is a long lead-time procurement source, not susceptible to a sudden reduction. There also are limitations to reduction possibilities in Officer Training School, since a large portion of the OTS output is committed to stabilized programs, primarily flying training. Finally, one of the most critical considerations is that drastic reductions in procurement today may create serious imbalance in the force in future years.

Next to meeting mission requirements, the effects of reductions on individuals and career progression programs receive primary consideration in personnel policy decisions and actions. Certainly the Air Force has a moral obligation to treat its personnel as fairly as circumstances permit. Additionally, equitable treatment and viable career progression programs have a decided impact on the morale of the force and on career intentions of young people in the force.

The impact on career progression as a result of reductions is felt most keenly in promotion opportunity. In this regard, the critical factors are the length of time in which reductions are to be made and the grades held by individuals being lost to the force. Officer grade authorizations are based on fixed ratios of each grade to total commissioned officer strength. Airman authorizations are based on law and are additionally regulated by Department of Defense policy. When reductions are gradual over a period of years, management actions and the normal force attrition rate make it possible to maintain a viable yearly promotion program. Large-scale reductions in a short period of time, however, have substantial impact on promotion programs and may require exceptional management actions, such as legislative relief. This is an area which requires exacting management with an eye to maintaining reasonable promotion opportunities over the next several years.

Compounding the problem of lowered manpower funds is the move toward an all-volunteer force. Estimates of the cost of such a force vary from as low as $2 billion to as high as $3.5 billion a year, depending on the size of the force and timing. The all-volunteer force as a national goal is supported by the Air Force. The Air Force, however, maintains the position that programs designed to attract new personnel into the services must not be instituted at the expense of the career force. A major inconsistency of purpose would result if the effort to adopt a small, voluntary force were to be accompanied by involuntary release, loss of promotion opportunity, and deterioration of the service life of volunteers currently serving.

It is evident that, even in this era of austere budgets and reduced force levels, the Air Force will continue to have adequate numbers of well-trained personnel to accomplish the mission, along with career progression and related programs that support and benefit its people. The responsibility of personnel managers at Headquarters USAF is to recommend plans, policies, and programs to Air Force leaders, Department of Defense, and the Congress that will accomplish these aims.

The responsibility of leaders and managers in the field is to appreciate and understand the inevitable turbulence in the personnel system when reductions occur, to communicate to all personnel the Air Force’s determination to care for its people, and to insure that priorities are properly assigned and resources effectively managed so that no unreasonable demands of time and effort are placed upon the individuals in our smaller force. We must all effectively manage and protect our human resources to insure that we will meet Air Force needs today and in future years.

Lieutenant General Austin J. Russell (USMA) was Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq USAF, until 1 August 1970, when he was appointed Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. During World War II he commanded the 1st Bombardment Group, 14AF, China-Burma-India Theater, and during the Korean War the 307^th Bomb Wing, Okinawa. In the Strategic Air Command he has served in various capacities, most notably as Deputy Commander of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and Commander, Second Air Force. General Russell is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and National War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.