Document created: 24 August 04
Air University Review, September-October
1970
Lieutenant Colonel Oakah L. Jones, Jr.
Many historians, social scientists, journalists, and governmental officials have turned their attention to the study of Cuba during the past ten years. They have produced a staggering list of publications since Fidel Castro Ruz seized power in the “Pearl of the Antilles” on 1 January 1959. Of the hundred or so books that have appeared, only a few will be definitely meaningful in the long-range analysis of revolutionary Cuba and its leaders. Most of these recent works have been of a polemical nature and were either highly biased, inadequately researched, or largely influenced by the immediacy of events in Cuba. Balanced views and documentary studies have been all too rare.
The present book by Jay Mallin* is one of the best to appear in recent years. It is neither an emotional study nor an attempt to vindicate or denigrate its principal subject, Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna, or Cuba. The author’s purpose is to present the essence of Guevara’s thinking on the topics of revolution and guerrilla warfare. He achieves his goal admirably by presenting a selection of Guevara’s major speeches and writings without attempting to publish everything he said or wrote. In addition, Chapter 10 presents photostatic copies of the pages in Guevara’s Bolivian diary, with the author’s translations paralleling them. Finally, there is an excellent heretofore unpublished account by Ciro Roberto Bustos of his experiences with Guevara’s rebel band in the Bolivian Oriente during 1967. Bustos, an Argentine insurrectionary from the unsuccessful uprising in Salta and now a Bolivian prisoner, provides insights into the nature of the guerrilla activity in Bolivia, observations on Guevara’s leadership (or lack of it), and an account of the daily activities of these guerrilla bands before their suppression.
Mallin has made an exhaustive study of the “Number 3” and sometimes “Number 2” man of the Cuban revolution. Formerly a journalist with various periodicals, the author is now a research scientist at the University of Miami’s Center for Advanced International Studies. His three trips to Bolivia (the last shortly before Guevara’s death), excellent command of the Spanish language, and familiarity with a wide range of source materials enhance the overall value of this book. His scholarly approach and exhaustive study of Guevara’s own words contribute to the final balance of the product.
The work is exactly what the title suggests. It consists of three basic parts. First, the author provides a thoughtful, objective introduction placing Guevara in perspective. He reviews the major known phases of his subject’s life, but emphasizes the unique aspects of his thoughts, particularly the insistence that guerrilla warfare, when applied “correctly,” could be pursued to ultimate victory. This concept was in opposition to that advanced by Lenin, China’s Mao Tse-tung, and Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap. Mallin makes comparisons of revolutionary thought among these figures and further provides a general analysis of the major concepts advanced by Guevara. He concludes with a perceptive analysis of the man and the myth, comparing realities with fictional observations about Guevara. Here he notes the revolutionary’s inadequate command of history and economics as well as his inability to think creatively or profoundly. Mallin notes that the reality of “Che” Guevara is one thing and the growing fiction about him quite another. Finally, he points out the irony in the fact that Guevara’s image seems to appeal to people who profess hatred of war, violence, industrialization, collectivism, and bureaucracy, all of which he advocated.
The second and third parts of the book―Guevara’s own speeches and writings and the concluding account of Bustos―comprise nearly eighty percent of it. Here the reader finds Guevara’s speech to the United Nations on 11 December 1964, his Prologue to General Giap’s People’s War, People’s Army, his farewell letter to Castro and to his Cuban involvement, and other principal letters and published works. These documents reveal Guevara’s views on guerrilla campaigns, the need for diversification and immediate industrialization in Cuba, the social responsibilities of rebel armies, socialism itself, his anti-imperialistic preoccupation, and his attitude toward the deteriorating insurrection in Bolivia. For the professional military man these chapters also depict the inadequacy of air power when employed in a conventional manner to root out guerrilla bands. Most important, however, military personnel can gain insights into the philosophy, nature, and tactics of the guerrilla concept in warfare, including the belief that popular forces can succeed against regular armies. Since Latin Americans have long employed guerrilla warfare against both invading and domestic armies, this study is a particularly meaningful one if examined carefully.
There are only a few minor weaknesses noted in the book. Maps of Cuba and Bolivia would have been very helpful to the reader, allowing him to follow the course of the revolutionary movements described in the text. There are a few typographical errors. The notes for the Introduction should have been placed at the bottom of each page instead of collecting them awkwardly at the end of the work. But these are not major detracting features, for the reasoning is generally sound and the documents well selected to illustrate Guevara’s ideas.
“Che” Guevara’s historical inaccuracies and contradictory thoughts are obvious throughout. His stated objection to foreign intervention and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, expressed in his speech to the United Nations, is in conflict with his promotion of Cuban interference in the affairs of other Latin American countries. In fact, his final involvement in Bolivia is one illustration of this contradiction.
Perhaps the greatest irony may be observed in Guevara’s not practicing what he preached whereas his enemies did. Bolivia was a poor choice as a location in which to launch a revolution. Guevara proved he knew nothing of Bolivian history by trying to promote an insurrection in a country that had already experienced a major upheaval in 1952 and subsequently had undertaken a program of land reform, economic diversification, and social integration. Furthermore, he repeatedly demonstrated that he knew nothing of the terrain where his forces operated, failed to show positive qualities of leadership, caused internal dissension within his bands, and failed to gain the support of the local populace. He and his followers were extranjeros, foreigners, distrusted by the Bolivians. These fatal mistakes on his part were at variance with his earlier teachings. He even tried to regularize guerrilla warfare, which he had stated earlier depends upon its flexibility. Bolivian armed forces demonstrated that they had learned the lessons of guerrilla warfare either through formal training, advisory assistance, or practical application of guerrilla tactics in pursuit of the ever dwindling opposition movement. Thus, Guevara’s original ideas may have been used by his enemies to defeat him.
*Jay Mallin, ed., “Che” Guevara on Revolution: A Documentary Overview, with Foreword by Mose L. Harvey (Coral Gables, Florida University of Miami Press, 1969, $7.95) 255 pp.
United States Air Force Academy
Lieutenant Colonel Oakah L. Jones, Jr., (USNA; Ph.D., University of Oklahoma) is Tenure Associate Professor of History and Chairman of Latin American History, Air Force Academy, where he has served at various levels of instruction in recent years. Colonel Jones is author of Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest (1966) and Santa Anna (1968), in addition to articles and book reviews on Latin American history and Western United States.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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