Document created: 28 June 04
Air University Review, March-April 1970

Concepts, Objective, and Doctrine

Let’s face it—it’s hard to find much fun in planning. Saddled with the responsibility for making theory and practice compatible, more than one good man has gone down for the third time. While a quick look around can usually reassure us that things in general are running smoothly, daily experiences often seem to indicate that perfection is indeed unattainable. Sometimes things just won’t work out the way one would like them to. For the eager and capable junior officer, nearly every regulation may seem to say the same thing: “If you haven’t done it, you can’t do it.” One hoping to make it home on leave cannot understand why that C-141 is taking off nearly empty while the passenger-terminal types insist that no seats are available, pointing out some obscure subparagraph as justification. Finally, despite best management practices, things are costing too much—that one is certainly at the top of quite a few lists today!

If you have never been one of the planners, you have undoubtedly often cursed those upon whom you seem to be eternally dependent. Trapped in an endless web of seemingly inadequate regulations, procedures, restrictions ad infinitum, you become sure that everyone involved has reached what a recent best-seller refers to as his “level of incompetence.”¹ Obviously, something has happened between theory and reality—in a manner that has drastically compromised the feasibility of the former.

While the situation is seldom as hopeless as it may seem during moments like these, problems do exist. In fact, the difficulties of making things work are by no means peculiar to the simple regulation of daily activities. As the scope of one’s responsibility increases, so do the consequences of inadequate preparation and planning. The load is perhaps greatest on those who are responsible for shaping and effecting Air Force contributions to the broadest interests, national security policy.

Given some of the popular conceptions (or misconceptions) of the Air Force, the nature and scope of its contributions to national objectives might be easily misinterpreted. Even the seemingly simple, well-known “to fly and fight” mission statement belies, in a way, the true nature of the organization. Functional requirements and responsibilities in a variety of fields demand interests and efforts of diverse character. For example, behind the obvious operational capabilities of our forces lie scores of management and support activities which, when considered apart, often seem to bear little or no relation to the end product. Ensuring that efforts “across the board” and at every level maintain relevance to our basic purposes and goals is an essential task. Each agency and, indeed, each individual must have some common denominator to which goals can be related and efforts directed. Efforts to provide such a common basis for thought and action have resulted in concepts, objectives, and doctrine that constitute guidelines for Air Force-wide congruent efforts.

early efforts

In itself, the need for planning guidelines—for concepts, objectives, and doctrine—is not a revolutionary thought. In fact, it is widely recognized as an important function of good management. While various agencies within the Air Force have pursued such activity for some time, it has traditionally been in a rather disorganized manner without adequate interagency coordination. It was not until 1961 that an office within the Air Staff was established to look at planning in a truly corporate sense. Under the auspices of this group, the Air Force developed some thirty-three Objective Series (AFOS) papers, each concerned with a specific problem area, to be used as the basis for long-range planning. Although centrally directed and managed, these papers still represented fragmented, autonomous areas of interest from which the “big picture” was difficult to discern. Moreover, continuity within the series was soon lost, since initiation and revision of a given paper were carried out on an “as needed” basis. As a result, the AFOS papers failed to provide sufficient interrelationship and coordination between individual objectives; ad hoc interpretation and action characterized the undertakings themselves; and Air Force staff officers had no generally accredited source from which to develop long-term analyses or positions.

Fully recognizing the need for effective long-range planning, the Air Force carefully analyzed the shortcomings of the AFOS papers, as well as the rationale originally supporting the effort. The underlying problem was the “shotgun” approach to planning induced by lack of coordination. Although it seemed reasonable to break down the whole of long-range planning into independently manageable parts, the sum of such parts did not present an Air Force-wide “position.” Generally speaking, it had become obvious that overall conceptual views needed to be formulated and expressed within a framework of realistic trends and constraints, while at the same time achieving and retaining a consistency among objectives. As a result, on 18 November 1964 the Vice Chief of Staff announced: “The determination has been made to publish a single USAF objective planning document . . . to be known as The Air Force Plan . . .  to be published and revised annually. . .” This announcement constituted only the first of several actions aimed at giving the Air Force a centrally directed agency specifically and singularly responsible for the development of planning guidelines—an agency such as exists today.

current organization

Within the Air Staff and subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, is the Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives. This directorate has primary responsibility for the formulation and evaluation of the planning guidelines. In essence, this means that the directorate is the focal point for Air Force-wide efforts affecting concept, objective, and doctrine formulation.

Since its inception in 1966, a primary responsibility of the directorate has been the annual preparation and publication of USAF Planning Concepts. Evolved from the aforementioned Air Force Plan concept, this document provides much of the broad guidance upon which planning for the next fifteen years should be based. By recording conceptual philosophy and expressing basic beliefs against an outline of environmental limitations, it provides an authoritative view of what the Air Force stands for, as well as a basis for understanding the context within which we operate. Attention is focused on issues and attitudes given high priority within the Air Force. It allows the Air Force for the first time to actively present its views in an integrated form—an obvious improvement over local reactive response to inquiries and challenge.

The development of USAF Planning Concepts reflects the decreasing scope of responsibility as one moves from the general terms of national interests to the more specific nature of Air Force contributions to those interests. Inasmuch as the only legitimate purpose of military forces is to support national objectives and policies, Air Force concepts and objectives must of necessity be derived from an understanding of national policy considerations. By clearly understanding such broad objectives, commanders and planners at lower levels can avoid much of the inflexibility that comes from being overly specific or having a narrow view of situations. This pitfall has special significance for the Air Force, since we often perceive things in terms directly related to operational capabilities. For example, strategies and postures have at times been shaped by hardware characteristics, in spite of management efforts aimed at making technological progress responsive to policy and strategy. The best-known illustration is the atomic bomb—a reality long before the development of a strategy for its peacetime employment.

USAF Planning Concepts reflects most major expressions of national policy in order to provide responsible Air Force personnel with a uniform and adequate assessment of the situation, a clear understanding of the Air Force position, and a close familiarity with desired objectives. It then relates both current and envisioned Air Force roles, missions, and capabilities to national policy.

The first step in this process is the formulation of a strategic appraisal. If a reasoned assessment of the future environment is applied to strategic concepts, then our strengths, weaknesses, and needed changes become more apparent. Building upon such a revelation—and objective analysis can indeed yield that kind of result—the capabilities required for continued effectiveness can be better ascertained, enabling a desired or objective force to be given the character needed to guide planners. Besides contributing to congruence of thought and effort within the Air Force itself, such a logical statement of principles and requirements can provide direction for R&D efforts relating to current and envisioned mission fields. Moreover—and of particular consequence today—the Secretary of Defense and Congress can be provided a sound rationale in support of requested budgetary allocations.

USAF Planning Concepts represents, then, an important first step in the planning process which determines the USAF contribution to national security objectives. This in no way implies, however, that it applies solely at the highest levels of staff effort. On the contrary, it represents some of the most basic thoughts and principles governing our efforts—thoughts and principles that must, in order to retain their relevance, relate to and affect every level of Air Force activity.

Another important function of the directorate is the authoritative delineation of aerospace doctrine. Perhaps most often defined in layman’s terms as “that which we believe,” doctrine is in essence the principles and proven concepts which govern the structure and employment of our combat and peacekeeping capabilities. Generally, doctrine is derived from the accumulation of knowledge gained through study, research, and, above all, military experience. In the more specific terms of day-to-day activities, doctrine is embodied in the definitions, characteristics, requirements, procedures, and clearly depicted considerations which determine the nature of Air Force activities.

Doctrine can be classified according to either its orientation or the scope of its applicability. In the most general sense, and at the most fundamental level, it is expressed in the form of broad, general principles and is referred to as basic doctrine. In such form, it clearly relates the existence of aerospace forces to overall national security objectives and describes the ways in which such forces can best be employed in support of these objectives. Of a more specific nature is operational doctrine, which covers the principles and procedures for accomplishing the various functions assigned to the Air Force. Directly influenced by both technological advance and operational capabilities, operational doctrine serves to determine the nature and direction of subsequent developmental and operational endeavor. Finally, unified doctrine relates to the employment of military forces in support of joint operations; it is promulgated through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It pertains to much more than just aerospace forces, being applicable to all participating services and guiding the operations of the unified and specified commands.²

The staff activities associated with the promulgation of aerospace doctrine can be both complex and difficult. To become effective, doctrine must be implemented as well as formulated. Within the context of current Department of Defense organization implementation of doctrine is often directly related to the definition and justification of our roles and omissions as a military service. This in itself can become an activity of major proportion which must be continually supported and sustained by relevant, credible concepts, objectives, and doctrine. These basic tenets—our guidelines for thought and action—must reflect a continuing effort to acknowledge and respond effectively to a changing situation and changing needs. Doctrine characterized by relevance, responsiveness, and sensitivity is our best insurance against dogma parochially protected through reaction and pride. If the Air Force is going to sustain its important contributions to national objectives, the doctrine for which it stands—the principles on which it bases its very existence—must always remain valid.

associated activities

In support of these primary functions, the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives is responsible for maintaining an active liaison with various agencies not directly involved in the Air Force planning process.³ Through various programs, a continuous dialogue is effected with civilian and military scientific communities, prominent “lay strategists,” and industrial elements directly related to the field of national security policy. By maintaining such an interchange of conceptual ideas, Air Force principles and policies are actively presented in an attempt to promote correlation between military and related civilian activities. At the same time these tenets are themselves subjected to scrutiny, often from a fresh viewpoint. The result is an improvement in the quality and scope of our planning guidelines.

A Policy Planning Studies Program was established in 1962 to provide Air Force planners with contractual, interdisciplinary studies concerned with defense policy and military strategy, future strategic problems, and operational capabilities. National and international developments bearing direct relation to U.S. Air Force interests are analyzed. The probable nature of future political, economic, and military environments is investigated to provide a firm foundation for our expected requirements. Conducted by civilian research organizations employing political-military analysts of varied backgrounds, these studies are aimed at helping planners think more systematically about reasonably anticipated situations that will directly influence Air Force activities. More specifically, the studies aid in the development of new ideas, concepts, and insights concerning national security problems, in foreseeing the character of future environments, and in the composition and employment of future force structures.

While the scope of subjects for possible study is enormous, considerable effort is expended to ensure that the subjects chosen for study adequately correspond to known gaps in the knowledge required for formulation of our planning guidelines. Filling such gaps is essential to ensure that military strategy does not lag behind environmental change or technological progress. First, a screening process rejects those proposed studies that are not relevant to Air Force needs. Subsequently, and throughout the period of actual research, a program monitor is responsible for providing guidance and indirect supervision to the principal investigator and for reporting periodically on the progress being made. At the termination of the research, an evaluation of the study is made by pertinent Air Staff agencies to determine its exact utility and applicability. Finally, the study is disseminated to appropriate agencies in accordance with recommendations made by the evaluators and becomes another input for policy guidance. While the “rightness” —the absolute validity—of a given study or thesis simply cannot be assured, the program as a whole has provided a valuable basis for more informed judgments in critical areas.

Another more personalized channel of productive dialogue between military and civilian strategists is afforded by the Air Force Research Associates Program. Through this program eight to ten field-grade officers serve one-year tours at prominent civilian study centers concerned with strategic policy formulation.⁴ Working in close professional association with well-known scholars of international affairs, foreign policy, and national strategy, the research associates actively participate in a real give-and-take environment. Besides presenting Air Force policies, principles, and ways of thinking to nonmilitary elements, they are exposed to and participate in the formulation of new approaches to strategic problem-solving, thus greatly enhancing their own personal experience and insight. A number of former participants in the Research Associates Program are now serving at general officer and senior colonel levels within the Air Staff and other policy planning agencies.⁵

Planners have traditionally faced the problem of maintaining adequate responsiveness to the needs, problems, and questions of personnel in the field. Apparent disinterest or insensitivity on the part of higher headquarters has at times brought on pointed references to “ivory tower” types who are responsible for making (or failing to make) things work. With this in mind, it should be emphasized that the concepts, objectives, and doctrine which exist to help us orient our activities are not dictates decreed as law from above. On the contrary, they are guidelines, formed and sustained by dialogue. USAF Planning Concepts, for example, is in no way a plan, in no way a directive. It provides, instead, a basis for the dialogue which sustains experience as the prime mover behind our reasoned changes.

To maximize the scope and productivity of this dialogue, the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives makes a sustained and concerted effort to interact with field personnel. Briefings and discussions are held with classes of the Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, Squadron Officer School, and other service schools. Officers of the directorate participate in many of the activities of various agencies involved in shaping the Air Force contribution to national defense. For example, mission analyses conducted at the major air command level receive particular attention to ensure coordination with overall principles and capabilities. The “face-to-face” environments of the annual USAF Worldwide Plans and Operations Conference and Inter-Service Long Range Planners’ Conference provide an informal atmosphere in which the philosophy and rationale supporting plans, policies, and postures can perhaps best be discussed. Although discussion at this level may seem still far removed from the individual in the field, such efforts to bring theory and practice closer together can and do have great impact upon the way each person contributes to the Air Force, as well as the way the Air Force contributes to the nation.

Perhaps the most effective way that the viewpoints and requirements of the major air commands can find expression in our overall principles is through their contributions to the continuous process of concept, objective, and doctrine formulation. Building upon existing ideas and principles as expressed in USAF Planning Concepts and other sources, each command annually formalizes its own objectives, which become important inputs for the subsequent revision of overall guidelines. While nearly everyone is familiar with the popular depictions of intercommand battles for responsibility and emphasis, such contention is in fact minimized by the broad scope of the formulation process itself. Although the capabilities and contributions of the major operational components are reviewed in detail, the general thrust of the end product relates each of those components to the overall Air Force commitment to national objectives.

Through such programs and activities as these, the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives maintains a continuous effort to be both responsive and responsible to Air Force needs for planning guidelines. Although the ultimate responsibility for formulation of concept, objective, and doctrine rests with this single agency, emphasis on dialogue—as opposed to monologue—never ceases. Every effort is aimed at minimizing our uncertainties, since policy guidelines must be drawn from experience and reasoned assessment, never dictated from uncertainty.

the need for relevance

Successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.⁶

Whether one refers to broad concepts, more specific objectives, or well-defined doctrinal principles, the measure of effectiveness is always the adequacy and appropriateness with which they support the United States’ basic national goals. To ensure adequacy and appropriateness, ideas and principles alike must prove relevant; that is, they must reflect an accurate estimate and analysis of the environment within which they are to be applied.

As nearly every American is made plainly (and at times painfully) aware, today’s environment is one characterized by change. Strategic relationships established during the early years of the cold war are being rapidly and radically modified by Soviet technological advances and the emergence of Third World nations—generally underdeveloped and often nonaligned. Youth, life styles, and increasing social awareness are combining to shift popular attitudes on a variety of issues with a rapidity which often makes tradition itself suspect.

Within this context one doesn’t have to be an intellectual to be aware that traditional views on the role of the Air Force, as one segment of the Defense Establishment, are being challenged. In many eyes, some of our current military policies, programs, and philosophies are seen as irrelevant in light of perceived political and strategic realities. For example, a significant segment of the American populace, influenced by popular views relating to “mutual deterrence” and “détente,” sees the strategic threat to this country as a declining one. At the same time, reaction to the social and economic exigencies of the emerging nations and frustrations stemming from the conflict in Vietnam combine to give increased popular support to a re-evaluation of our commitments abroad. Finally, changing social attitudes, bolstered by these sentiments, are challenging the traditional priority of many activities relating to national security interests. Increased emphasis on domestic problems is becoming a popular demand. Critics warn of the grave dangers implied by an entrenched and politically powerful “military-industrial complex,” preoccupied more with its own sustenance than with environmental realities. Far more than simply the ravings of misinformed radicals, such criticisms have today attained a degree of popular acceptance that makes them a serious and legitimate challenge to traditional views on military roles and priorities.

Changes such as these are prescribing as never before a requirement for innovative and sensitive response. The character of current inadequacies has been expressed in many ways:

The time has come to stop mourning over formulas that served so well in the past, over blueprints for the future that have been made obsolete by changing events. What was reasonable in 1949 is often unreasonable today; what was visionary in the mid-1950s is reactionary in the late 1960s.⁷

While the tone of such statements may be a bit too absolute, their general thrust illuminates clearly the current need for re-examination of our programs, strategies, and postures. Necessarily, the guidelines for such reassessment must themselves reflect a high degree of relevance, for otherwise the resulting changes and responses to change will be inadequate. While ensuring such adequacy and relevance is the principal task of the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives, the Air Force answer to the challenges of the future will require efforts of much greater scope. This is a challenge which we all face; moreover, it is a challenge we face today.

involvement—the best response to challenge

Individual, personal involvement is a major key to organizational success. Correctly managed, it becomes the driving force behind productive effort and responsive change. Unfortunately, however, the achievement of such motivation on a large scale can be a very difficult task. The inherent character of any sizable organization tends to inhibit a visible relationship between effort and result. For example, there are few members of any large bureaucracy who at one time or another have not felt insignificant when contemplating the nature of organizational activity as a whole. The lack of any visible means of personal contribution is today a widespread personnel management problem. Energetic, dynamic people—the ultimate resource—must be involved. To deny them this interest—indeed, this right—serves no purpose. The organization that fails to offer involvement is being, to that extent, counterproductive. Faced with today’s and tomorrow’s challenges, the Air Force can in no way afford to become counterproductive. Our human resources require management equal to, if not greater than, that required by our material resources. Every man’s effort is required in the form of thought as well as action.

Toward this end, the Air Force must continually strive to become less of an “it” and more of a “we.” While the material advantages of fringe benefits, travel, and exotic duty may serve to make service life initially attractive, the challenges for continued involvement require a more complex, psychologically oriented response to individual need.

A high degree of personal involvement among Air Force personnel is an absolute prerequisite to meeting the challenges of today’s changing environment. Maintaining a relevant contribution to national security while improving organizational character is going to require our best efforts. Again, this challenge for involvement is not an aggregate one, posed to a faceless bureaucracy. On the contrary, it is an individual challenge, to be weighed very seriously by every officer and airman who timidly passes on the “All’s well” to his superiors, who avoids constructive conflict, and who opts for the security of meaningless unanimity in place of productive dissent. For the commander, these challenges imply many things. They imply the continuing effort to relate activity and energy to objectives. They also imply the delegation of authority within an atmosphere of confidence, even while recognizing that the lines of responsibility preclude “passing the buck” when things go wrong. For the planner, the challenges imply above all else the conscious effort to relate to others’ problems. For the individual it means an active interest in the  “why” of things, as opposed to simply filling the squares.

Within the Air Force, our concepts, objectives, and doctrine can serve as guidelines for response to these challenges—for the commander, the planner, and the individual alike. The dialogue through which these ideas and principles are formulated and disseminated can be greatly enhanced by the participation of personally involved individuals. Personal experience, the major source of our guidelines for effort, takes on greater meaning when the individual is able to identify with the purposes and goals of the organization. In turn, these guidelines can themselves and in that process of identification. Dialogue, then, refers to much more than intraorganizational consensus. It refers to communication between the organization and its members. If we are going to meet our challenges today, we must become involved in that dialogue. Understanding the principles and purposes of  “the” Air Force is the first step toward making it more of  “our” Air Force, and a better one at that.

Hq United States Air Force

Notes

1. Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull, The Peter Principle (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1969).

2. See Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 14 August 1964.

3. For a more detailed functional breakdown in associated areas, see Department of the Air Force, Organization and Functions (HP 21-1) 31 October 1967, pp. 122-25.

4. Participating centers to date have included the Center for International Affairs, Harvard; Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stanford Research Institute; Council on Foreign Relations; Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania; Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

5. Among others, Lieutenant General John W. Vogt, Jr., Major General Glenn A. Kent, and Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh.

6. General George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (1947).

7. Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 69. 

Contributor

Captain Henry Viccellio, Jr.,  (USAFA; M.A., American University) is a staff action officer, Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives, Hq USAF. After flying training, 1963, he served with the 309th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Homestead AFB, Florida, and during 1965-66 flew A-1Es with the 602d Fighter Squadron (C) in Southeast Asia. Captain Viccellio attended the National Autonomous University of Mexico under the Olmsted Scholarship Program, 1966-68.