Document created: 29 June 04
Air University Review,
March-April 1970
The National Security Council is set up to do one thing—advise the President. I make the decisions, and there is no use trying to put any responsibility on the National Security Council—it’s mine.
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
The
need to develop forward-looking policies to ensure our security dictates the
establishment of a national security organization that is responsive to
the needs of our time and can withstand the test of circumstance and
personality. President Nixon has attempted to create such an organization, by
“revitalizing” the National Security Council system of the United States
government.
Never
before in our history have the security of our nation and the peace of the world
depended so much upon policy decisions made by the President of the United
States. Policies developed for our security have a far-reaching impact on other
nations throughout the world. These policies cannot be solely
within geographical limitations or solely on political, economic, or military
terms. In one sense, perhaps there is no such thing as “domestic,”
“foreign,” “military,” or even “farm” policy. There is a national
security policy, and in developing it the entire Government plays a part. No
longer can there be an “overlord” of our national security policy other than
the President himself.
National
security is not the special prerogative of any department or agency; it involves
manifold domestic, foreign, and military considerations. Inescapably, the
President must provide the direction. The only purpose of the National Security
Council or any other machinery to deal with these problems is to assist and
advise the President in arriving at decisions with respect to these matters.
While it is the President who will make the decisions and determine the manner
in which he will seek advice, his supporting organization can be of inestimable
value in aiding him to meet the demands of executive leadership. Regardless of
the organizational structure, a major problem will continue to be the
interweaving of different points of view into a national course of action that
will strengthen the fabric of our national security. The task is onerous.
Whereas
some sixty-three years ago Secretary of State Elihu Root could disregard reports
of crisis in the Middle East by cabling the American envoy, “Continue quarrels
with missionaries as usual,” a similar crisis today generates terse
instructions to diplomats all over the world, brings world opinion to bear in
the United Nations, compels military commanders to bring their forces to the
ready, causes anxious decisions in Washington, and triggers emergency sessions
of the National Security Council.1 In today’s complex
world, the President needs a good deal of assistance in earring out the terrible
responsibility for developing national security policy and directing its
execution. The President must per-form the functions of Head of State, Chief
Executive, Commander in Chief, and leader of his political party at the same
time; however, he cannot plan, formulate, coordinate, and supervise the
execution of policy at the same time. In addition to the normal operational
delegation of responsibilities, there is always a need for proper assistance in
the planning of the nation’s long-range security program. No one questions the
need for this assistance. However, there are sharp differences of opinion as to
whether the requirement is best satisfied by interdepartmental planning
procedures or by delegating responsibility for national planning to a
specialized instrument of government. In any event, it is the President who
makes the final decision on the major questions.
On
2 December 1968, then President-elect Nixon announced the appointment of Dr.
Henry Kissinger as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This
appointment set the stage for what the President-elect called a
“revitalization” of the National Security Council as well as White House
long-range security planning. The planning function of the national security
machinery was to be “strengthened” while the operations function was to be
relegated to the. appropriate departments of government. The President-elect
further stated that Dr. Kissinger was selected in order to bring new ideas and
new men into the Administration “to do some creative thinking.”
Specifically, he declared that the White House planning function and the
national security machinery would be directed toward more long-range thinking
and planning. “Men in positions of responsibility and men who really have the
ability to do creative thinking too often get bogged down in reading the
interminable telegrams, most of which are not really relevant to the problems
they are concerned with.” He stated that it was “vitally important” to
have a capability for creative thinking as well as formal “planning
procedures” so that the United States does not just “react to events.” In
effect, “crisis diplomacy” had to be replaced with established machinery and
channels in order to develop well-thought-out contingency plans to apply when a
crisis occurred.2
The
President-elect emphasized that “leadership in foreign affairs flows today
from the President—or it does not flow at all . . . Certainly the Secretary of
State has the most backbreaking job within the Cabinet. I think it takes two
men. And I intend to have a strong Secretary of State.” At the same time, Mr. Nixon served notice that the Secretary of State would not be the sole overlord
of policy, as conflict would be built into the new national security machinery.
“I want to have conflicts. The honest differences of opinion which we know do
exist between the Departments, or within a Department, I want laid before the
National Security Council, and particularly before the President, so that he
will know what the arguments are, so that he can make the determination as to
what the policy should be.” In this scheme of things, there is the intent that
more effort be directed to long-range thinking in the White House and a more
conscious emphasis be directed to long-range planning in the several
departments, with operating functions “pushed as far as possible into the
Departments.”3
Instead
of replacing one experiment with another, President Nixon is seeking to develop
an eclectic working model from the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson models. The key
elements of the Nixon national security organization are the National Security
Council staff under a Special Assistant, the Council composed of designated
department and agency heads, a Review Group composed of deputy and assistant
department heads, an Under Secretaries Committee, and a series of regionally
oriented organizations called Interdepartmental Groups. “Revitalization”
involves solving a problem that is partly one of mechanism and partly one of
substance. Any effective remodeling of the administrative machinery will reflect
the fact that political and economic considerations are entangled inextricably
with military strategy.
Two
factors which stood out in the President’s announced “revitalization” of
the National Security Council system made it imperative that a new approach in
organizing for policy planning in the 1970s be instituted throughout the
Government.
(1)
No one Department or Agency has the expertise or capability in depth to be the
sole “overlord” of U.S. national security policy.
(2)
Compartmented and ad hoc security policy must be replaced by long-range planning
which is predicated on “orderly conceptual thinking.”
The
Administration is striving for a system which will integrate long-range
conceptual thinking and departmental planning functions. The system allows
variant ideas and depart-mental views to mesh readily or be sharpened for final
presentation to the National Security Council as alternatives for final debate
prior to Presidential decision. Basic issues are not permitted to become so
concealed in compromise that the problems are not identifiable.
There
can be no denying that this nation's security position has suffered severe
damage in the past. Certainly, it would be unfair to blame the real or imagined
failings of American foreign policy on any element of the total governmental
organization. However, it is tempting td blame a national security system for
some of the decisions which have been termed mistakes in the last few years.
While the National Security Council and its supporting structure represent only
a small part of the whole, it is clearly the most important single element and,
to a considerable degree, sets the pattern for the whole. Without a formally
structured system reaching down to the expertise possessed throughout the
government departments, detailed plans which give effect to the basic security
decisions cannot be made.
Broad
planning requires the knowledge and experience of the expert and also the
resources and the environment of the department with the main responsibility for
the operations being planned. Only in the department concerned can one find
logically the extended creative planning which results in clear and purposeful
policy proposals. Planning that does not involve the constant participation of
those responsible for carrying out the plans is a formula with built-in hazards.
It takes on an academic tone, and the operators ignore the plans. Of course, as
the planning process takes place, there must be cross-feeding and
cross-stimulation between experts in the several departments at the level where
the planning is done. If this Administration is to put together a clearly
defined national security program of requirements and priorities, then planning
will have to be focused in the several departments where the experts have the
time for reflection and creative thinking.
Before
the executors of United States policy can decide what the nation ought to do,
they must learn from the political, economic, and military experts what the
nation is able to do. Objectives are measured along-side capabilities; in the
making of national security policy, ends are measured against means. Top-level
executives cannot be expected to participate actively in this initial planning
process. They do not have the time to explore single issues deeply and
systematically. They cannot argue—and should not have to argue—advantages
and disadvantages at length in the kind of give-and-take essential to boil the
matter down to specific issues. The top-level executives need to be confronted
with the specific issues which grow out of an effort to harmonize a new policy
with other policies. Key members of the National Security Council Review Group
concern themselves with identifying departmental conflicts, attempting to
resolve these conflicts, defining them sharply, and presenting the distilled
issues to the National Security Council for final discussion and ultimate
decision by the President. Good plans must be coherent; they must be
problem-solving oriented; and their various elements must be harmonious and
self-supporting. They must have the kind of logic that emanates from “orderly
conceptual thinking” and the imagination of a creative mind. The efforts of
the creative mind must remain uncompromised until after the planning process is
completed. At that time, an adjustment of conflicts between coherent plans
should take place.
A
conscious emphasis on planning, with long-range thinking having a persuasive
bearing in the planning process, will go a long way toward preparing the nation
better to meet crises when they come and thus mitigate their effects. Delegating
the responsibility for basic planning to the several departments takes advantage
of the expertise of the men who generate new ideas daily in their attempts to
solve problems with the means available to them. Creative thought generally
springs from daily concern with real problems. The solution of the relationship
of planning to operations is to place these functions in the several departments
where expertise and creative effort can combine to produce clearly defined and
purposeful national security issues. Clearly, planning is a function of the
several departments, interdepartmental groups, and ad hoc White House groups
appointed by the President.
There is a tendency to mold organizations to fit the personality of a single leader or a handful of leaders. The stakes are too great, however, for this nation to depend on the all-pervasive wisdom of our top leadership. Organizationally, the national security system should provide a program which will strengthen the performance of our leaders, whatever their caliber, and make an excellent leader even more effective. In the last analysis, the National Security Council system can be no more effective than the President wishes it to be, but this should not deter seeking the best system for all time.
The
nation realizes that American security policy has outgrown the informal cabinet
or ad hoc committee concept, just as the atom and manned space flight have
outgrown the laboratory. The National Security Council (NSC)
is a device by
which the different departments concerned with national security can meet;
discuss their problems and differences on issues to reconcile unimportant
disagreements; and, on major disagreements, attempt to expose weaknesses in each
other’s arguments—all at the level of key Cabinet members in the presence
and for the benefit of the President. The objective of the Council is to relate
military, foreign, and domestic policies by providing a forum to our
policy-makers. It is the Council’s duty “to assess and appraise the
objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our
actual and potential military power. . . .”4 Its function is that
of a forum for debate and through debate a channel of information for all
concerned. In its deliberations the Council seeks to avoid interdepartmental
matters which, even though related to national security, can properly be
resolved at a lower echelon without reference to the President. The Council
formalizes a continuing relationship between those responsible for foreign and
military policies—of utmost importance in an age of unprecedented crises.
While
the purposes of the National Security Council are clear, its specific
functioning is a subject of concern. There seems to be real doubt as to whether
the Council is meant to resolve differences of opinion or simply to bring them
into the open. Members of the Council must assist in seeking the most
statesmanlike solution to a problem and strive to place themselves above
departmental interests so that they can judge the soundness of the issues
presented in terms of the national interest vis-à-vis their own operations. The
basic interdepartmental issues cannot be permitted to confuse the fundamental
issues of national security. Council members, understandably, will have
differences in outlook because national security issues are inherently complex.
However, interdepartmental differences should be examined and resolved in the
Review Group, or at a lower level if at all possible, and only significant
issues should be addressed in the Council. The members of the Council cannot
allow themselves to become negotiators representing their departments, whereby
they achieve a consensus in which the overall national viewpoint is lacking. In
the past, NSC papers have been broad and sweeping in content, so that difficulty
was encountered when one attempted to apply them to specific problems. The
charge that “there is rarely, if ever, a clear national security policy to
oppose clear-cut competing policies in other areas”5 is serious and
is being countered through “revitalization” of the intended role of the
Council.
The
law states that the Council’s function is “to advise the President.” This
being so, it should be clear that the Council itself does not determine policy.
It prepares advice for the President as his super-Cabinet-level committee on
national security. With complete freedom to accept, reject, or amend the
Council’s advice and to consult with other members of the executive branch,
the President exercises his prerogative to determine policy and enforce it.
Furthermore, the Council has no responsibility for implementing policies which
the President approves on the basis of its advice. The respective departments
traditionally have carried, and continue to carry, this operating
responsibility. Once a policy is determined, the departments establish the
necessary programs and. issue implementing orders to accomplish their share of
the national security policy.
The
primary contribution of the Council, then, is to attempt to reconcile some of
the divergencies (issues) through debate before the President makes a final
decision. To that end, the Council ensures that the President, in making policy
decisions for our national security, has the benefit of all the facts, views,
and opinions of the responsible officials in the executive branch and their
considered judgments as to the proper course to take.
Review Group
Although
every effort is made in the Review Group (RG) to find the best solution from the
departmental proposals in terms of our national security policy, there is no
overriding requirement to interpret the “best” solution as unanimity. If,
after due consideration, departmental differences remain which cannot be
reconciled short of dodging the issues of reaching a meaningless agreement, then
the divergent views are stated clearly as contentious issues and together with
the reasons behind them submitted to the Council for high-level debate and,
hopefully, Presidential decision. In this manner, the President avails himself
of the “honest differences of opinion which we know do exist between the
Departments,” and he is able to determine what the policy should be, based on
the “arguments” presented before him.6
The
purpose of the Review Group is to bring the total resources of the government to
bear upon the clarification of issues, upon the sharpening of alternative policy
proposals and their implications. The Group is composed of department
representatives who are lesser counterparts to their bosses on the Council.
These officials attempt to develop a concise and complete picture of the
situation and of the policies to cope with it. They strive to agree upon a
single policy to be recommended to the President, or else they submit to the
Council alternative recommendations from which the President chooses one, or
none.
President
Nixon has stated that he wants to build “conflict” into the new national
security machinery. He wants the “honest differences of opinion” laid before
the Council, “and particularly before the President.” He has implied that
the Review Group will be utilized with a clear recognition that its members
will, as they must, function primarily as instructed delegates and advocates of
their departments. There is no harm, and a great deal of benefit, if both the
President and the Council are faced with recommendations arising from a vested
interest in the long-run national interest, as well as those arising from the
specialized interests of the operating departments. The “lowest common
denominator” is not sought by the President. It is obvious that he wishes to
reach the “best” solution after he has heard the sharply defined
issues discussed by his advisers.
As
noted earlier, the responsibility for national security matters is not the
prerogative of a single department or agency of government. Although the
supporting machinery will necessarily and properly function in accordance with
the President’s desires, there are two steps which are to be satisfied prior
to the development of a policy paper for Presidential decision:
(1)The
process of identifying emerging problems and contriving the means to deal with
them.
(2)The
development of proposals and shaping them into sharpened issues.
To
satisfy these steps, the initial planning and staffing are accomplished by
experts within the several departments. The proposals of the several departments
then are examined, and an attempt is made to integrate them. Once the proposals
have been sharpened into key issues and cross-stimulation and coordination have
taken place, the results of the staff work are presented to the Review Group for
final evaluation prior to submission to the Council.
To provide for continuity and to reduce the “overlord” tendency of any single department’s establishing unprecedented control over the development of national security policy, the Review Group is chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As the Presidents representative, he brings to the deliberations of the Group the long-range point of view. He is free to inject the views of his long-range planning staff to be tested for feasibility within the Review Group. His role is that of a conductor who attempts to develop a concert on the problem pending and is expected to forward his view, if it differs, along with other alternatives to the Council. The Special Assistant is concerned primarily with the substance of the recommendations going to the Council. A small administrative staff supports him in the final preparation of the results of the Review Group deliberations. Thus the Special Assistant represents primarily the planning link joining the White House, the Review Group, and the several operating departments.
Under Secretaries Committee
The
Under Secretaries Committee (USC) is subordinate to the National Security
Council and is responsible for marshaling the total resources of the nation in
order to execute the policy established by Presidential decision, as it pertains
to interdepartmental activities overseas. It is responsible for assisting the
operating departments and agencies in carrying out these established policies
with maximum effectiveness. The Under Secretaries Committee is composed of
representatives of those departments and agencies that have operating functions
in the national security area. Its membership includes the Under Secretary of
State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central
intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A
primary concern in the “revitalization” of the national security
organization is the establishment of a realistic role for the Under Secretaries
Committee. First, it is necessary to establish the principal function of this
committee, i.e., to assist in the integrated and effective implementation of
national security policies assigned to it by the President for coordination. It
should be noted that the Under Secretaries Committee reports to the Secretary of
State and not to the National Security Council. Thus the Committee must strive
for interdepartmental orientation to be effective. The Chairman must be willing
to subordinate his departmental orientation to assure greater coordination of
policy and to give the Committee status with respect to the departments and
agencies. He must also be willing to subordinate personal views on
implementation of policy to his task of coordinating the programs and operations
of all departments and agencies so that a single national response is effected
to carry out the President’s decisions. The Under Secretaries Committee, then,
is composed of personnel who combine the knowledge, judgment, character, and
authority necessary to impose the President's will, through a chain of command
of officials individually responsible for their agencies, upon the government.
Interdepartmental Groups
In
addition to the Under Secretaries Committee, there is a series of working groups
called Interdepartmental Groups. The latter are chaired by Assistant Secretaries
of State and are composed of personnel representing the operating departments
and agencies. These working groups conduct policy studies for the NSC.
They prepare
policy papers which set forth all significant options, evaluate the pros and
cons of each option, and include a statement of the p9litical and economic costs
of each recommendation. These papers are sent to the Review Group for
evaluation. The papers are studied and returned to the working groups if
additional work is required or submitted to the NSC for
consideration. Once the President makes a decision, the specific instructions
are incorporated in National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDM)
and forwarded to
the Under Secretaries Committee for implementation.
A concerted effort is needed to develop operational plans that cut across departmental lines. The Interdepartmental Groups develop plans which are applicable worldwide and can be implemented regionally without detracting from the overall national security objective. The Under Secretaries Committee has the potential to be a very effective device in the National Security Council system if the proper people/organization balance is achieved.
Mr.
Nixon has stated publicly that neither he nor Dr. Kissinger wanted to set up a
“wall” in the White House between the President and his Secretaries of State
and Defense: there was to be a “better staff” and a less freewheeling
attitude toward decision-making by White House assistants. He implied that
national security advisers in the White House would not be involved in
day-to-day operations. More specifically, the White House staff would be
involved in long-range thinking and planning, while operating functions would
rest with the departments and agencies.
In
the “revitalized” National Security Council system, the Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs (SANSA) directs a small group
consisting of some of the most experienced national security affairs experts in
the country as well as some of the most outstanding “thinkers” available.
This group was established in the White House to look at problems with a longer
range and broader view than could be taken by any of the departments of
government. The latter are of necessity focused on the present and the immediate
future; the task of developing policy to deal with these matters is in their
purview. But the very tasks of developing policy and carrying it out limit them,
in time and incentive, for looking ahead to discern new problems. The special
need, as implied by the President, is for this group to project goals within the
context of the future and to attempt to anticipate those problems that are
peculiar precisely because they cut across the areas of responsibility of the
several operating departments and agencies.
The
staff of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs provides long-range
planning guidance to the departments and agencies through the Review Group and
the Under Secretaries Committee. In turn, the departments and agencies detail
consultants to the White House, on request, in order to provide the Special
Assistant and his staff with professional advice as to the capabilities
possessed in the various operating agencies. The first-hand knowledge and
expertise of the operating departments are used to flesh out theoretical models
developed by the “think group” so that the result of long-range thinking can
lend itself readily to long-range planning and ease the implementation for
contingency plans responsive to the long-range policy objectives. For the sake
of reality, “orderly conceptual thinking” must take place within the
parameters imposed by the nation’s present capabilities or projected
capabilities.
Dr. Kissinger fills one other important role as Special Assistant to the President, that of chairman of the Review Group; as such he represents the planning link between the President and the operating departments and agencies. While the President has hinted that Dr. Kissinger is more of a staff assistant and less of a policy-maker, the important role he plays as chairman of the Review Group provides the President with a first-person evaluation of the manner in which long-range thinking and long-range planning guidance are influencing the flow of options from the operating agencies.
During
the past few years there seems to have been a tendency in the White House for
policy to leap from crisis to crisis, to deal with the immediate and urgent and
neglect the long-term and fundamental. As Mr. Nixon stated in an election
campaign speech on 24 October 1968: “I attribute most of our serious reverses
abroad since 1960 to the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower’s
successors to make effective use of this important Council [the NSC].”7 This
phenomenon, hopefully, will be corrected through “revitalization.”
Little,
if anything, has
been said about the administrative staff or secretariat of the National Security
Council, primarily because no significant changes in its functions have occurred
under this “revitalization.” Naturally, the Council staff has taken into
account the “revitalization” of the system and adjusted to the minor
changes. However, the adjustment has been one of orientation rather than
structure.
Another
subject not treated is the use of ad hoc study groups. The “revitalized”
structure makes allowance for the formation of these ad hoc study groups or task
forces which are used for consulting purposes and to focus on certain issues
which it is felt need extra-governmental appraisal. These groups are in addition
to the usual departmental consultants and come into being at the specific
request of the President. Their findings are referred to the President and the
Council and should be subject to study and comment by the operating agencies.
This provision preserves Presidential prerogatives and tends to retain
flexibility in the system, while providing, hopefully, fresh insights into the
problems of national security. These ad hoc study groups, however, should not be
used as a panacea for crisis situations.
In addition to the foregoing, a Program Analysis Staff functions to support the Special Assistant in three areas: planning, programming, and operations. This staff is composed of personnel from State, Defense, CIA, the Bureau of the Budget, the military, and colleges and universities. They monitor the performance of the “revitalized” system, make sure the President’s desires are carried out, assist in the planning and review of papers from the Interdepartmental Groups, and do preliminary work on new projects assigned by Dr. Kissinger. In effect this staff functions as Dr. Kissinger’s personal staff.
Our national security policy machinery is, at best, an imperfect organization working in an exceptionally difficult environment. Many critics have voiced their disapproval of the ways in which the last four Presidents have used the organization. Each President has attempted to mold the organization to his personality, and in some cases the system has not fared well. Regardless of the structure envisioned, the President makes if the system what he wishes.
The answer to effective national security policy is not simply “put the right people in the right job.” Nor is the answer, as some claim, the creation of even more elaborate machinery. The answer seems to be to establish an intricate balance of organization and people dictated by a need to develop forward-looking policies to protect our security. The most efficient organization and the most effective conduct of our national security affairs depend upon an interdepartmental arrangement which strives to achieve the same clearly defined and well-understood objectives. The activities of the several departments and agencies must be designed not simply to deal with situations as they develop but, rather, to shape the trend of events and anticipate further contingencies. The operating departments and agencies must be depended upon for advice on national security matters because the expertise and knowledge possessed by them can never be matched by the few officials at the executive level.
It
is essential, therefore, that the National Security Council system be responsive
to the needs of our time. These needs presuppose a balance of organization and
people necessary to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks
of our nation in this turbulent era. It is still too early to know, however,
whether President Nixon has succeeded in achieving such a balanced approach for
keeping the peace through his “revitalization” of the national security
machinery.
Hq United States Air Force
Notes
1.
Ernest R. May, “Development of Political/Military Consultation in the US,”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 70, June 1955, p. 161.
2.
Newspaper articles appeared daily on this subject. The most informative
report was written by George Sherman, a Washington Star staff write,
“Nixon Aim: More Long-Range Thinking,” Washington Star, 3 December
1968, p. 4.
3.
Ibid.
4.
National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
5.
A lengthy evaluation of the Eisenhower NSC is contained in “The National
Security Council,” an unpublished manuscript by Donald S. Bussey.
6.
Sherman, p. 4.
7. Radio address by Richard M. Nixon, broadcast over the CBS radio network, Thursday, 24 October 1968.
Contributor
Major John F. McMahon, Jr., (M.A., University of North Carolina) is assigned to the Special Operation Plans and Policy Branch, Global Plans and Policy Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans and Policy, Hq USAF. After flying training, 1956, he served as an instructor pilot at Greenville AFB, Mississippi, and Craig AFB, Mississippi, and Craig AFB, Alabama. Subsequent assignments have been as faculty member, Department of Political Science, USAF Academy; with the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing; as an F-4C commander, Vietnam; and with the Special Warfare Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans and Policy, Hq USAF. Major McMahon is a 1967 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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