Document created: 29 June 2004
Air University Review, March-April 1970

The Challenge of Changing Warfare

As professional military officers, we are by occupational necessity students of warfare. One fundamental lesson in this study is that wars change: the next war will be different from the present one, just as the present war differs from the previous. Those of us still on active duty, if and when the next conflict comes, will be accused of having prepared for the wrong war: the previous one rather than the current one. While we ought to be philosophical about the certainty of being accused, we must ensure that the accusation is false.

To do this, we must know what determines the nature of war and why that nature changes.

Even the first wars were subject to many influences. A tribe possessing stones axes and clubs fought a war that differed greatly from that war waged by a group with no technology. Purpose also had an effect. A war fought to maintain a territorial imperative varied from one fought to capture slaves and goods. In the same way, a change in each tribe’s concept changed the war they fought: ethnocentric isolation which required trespassers to be driven across a boundary was one thing; tribal growth requiring the death of al adult males in a defeated group was quite another. Finally, a tribe’s capability also determined the kind of war it fought: a war waged by two nomadic hunting tribes with large male populations skillful in weaponry was quite different from that fought when one group had an agricultural economy. Even from the beginning, wars were as complex as the men and societies that conducted them.

Throughout man’s history, these same four elements—technology, purpose, concept, and capability—have been determining and changing the nature of all successive warfare. Each warrants a more detailed examination.

The impact of technology upon warfare is obvious. From the bow and arrow to the ICBM, each weapon improvement, whatever its level of sophistication, has brought changes in the fighting of war: in its size, in the type of battles, in the number of participants, and in the number of casualties. Unquestionably, the use of armor, fortification, gunpowder, the steam engine, the airplane, wireless communications, and, finally, nuclear power drastically altered the face of war. (It is significant to observe how much of the scientific alteration of war has occurred within this century.)

There are certain characteristics of the technological determinant that require definite action by a nation if it to survive. The accelerating rate of technological development places a premium on not only recognizing the importance of a change but on quickly adapting to it. Historically, there has been a significant time lag between technological developments and their exploitation in warfare. This gap has been decreases in more recent times, but it needs to be narrowed more, and by us rather than by our potential enemies. In addition, there is a danger in concentrating on weapons improvements to the exclusion of technological developments in other areas. The nature of war has been changed by developments in transportation and communication-electronics just as much as by more powerful bombs and more accurate guns.

The second major determinant is purpose. Purpose applies to a national objective as well as the objective of a specific war. While a nation’s purpose is often as intangible as its technology is tangible, different purposes have clearly resulted in different kinds of wars. Our own history illustrates this fact. Our major purpose of course, has always been national security, but within this framework we have more specific purposes.

In the Revolutionary War, our purpose was independence; the British purpose was to maintain control. To achieve these purposes, the colonists fought a war of harassment; the British sought to control key center and to catch and defeat the American Army in the field. One generation later in the War of 1812, we again fought the British in almost the same way. But while the British sought to control key centers along the seaboard, our purposes were somewhat unclear. Some people wanted to add new territory; for others, preserving our newly gained independence was enough. As a result, while we did attempt annexation of Canada, we fought primarily a defensive war, a war of harassment.

In the Mexican War our purposes changed and so did the nature of the war we fought. Territorial expansion and the desire to punish Mexico for attacking American troops resulted in two almost unrelated campaigns: General Zachary Taylor’s campaign along the border, where we eventually did annex territory, and General Winfield Scott’s amphibious landing and subsequent punitive march on Mexico City. In the Civil War, the different purposes of the North and South also made a difference in how each side fought. In general, the South fought as the colonists had during the Revolution while the North’s actions were similar to those of the British.

During the remainder of the nineteenth century, further shifts in purposes changed the nature of wars we were involved in. Our Indian Wars, motivated by the desire for territorial expansion, control, and protection, were conducted quite differently from our war with Spain. In the latter, our purpose was to stop the hostilities in Cuba and to gain freedom for that country. Our conduct of the war served the purpose, and we annexed Puerto Rico and the Philippines in the process.

In this century we entered World War I to help the Allies make the world safe for democracy. Failing to do this in postwar diplomatic and political negotiations, we tried again in World War II on the basis of demanding unconditional surrender. In each of these cases, the United States fought a different kind of war partly because our purposes were different.

Differences in concept, the third major determinant, have also made a difference in the wars fought by the United States. In addition, our own history reveals the interrelation of all the determinants and demonstrates the need for concept to relate to technology and purpose.

In the Revolutionary War we employed the concepts of the minuteman and the citizen soldier to demonstrate to the British that it simply was not worth their effort to continue trying to control the colonies effectively.

After the war of Revolution, our strategic concept was based on the avoidance of long-term, entangling alliances. We felt that if we avoided involvement in European affairs, maybe Europe would leave us alone. Hence our program for national security was based on the concept of a very small standing army which would be expanded, if needed, by volunteer citizen soldiers. Our concepts for the actual waging of war depended on our purpose, which varied at times from harassment on land and sea, to blockade, to invasion, to defeat on the battlefield of opposing forces, and occupation of territory.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century we began to shift to a strategic concept of ad hoc interventionism, a concept which lasted pretty much through the end of World War II. During this period we placed primary reliance on the Navy as our first line of defense, as urged by the father of naval power, Mahan. Behind this first line of defense and based on a favorable geographical situation, our concept was to mobilize both our manpower and our industry as needed either for defense or for projection of our forces overseas when we chose to intervene on an ad hoc basis.

Capability is the fourth, and probably most immediately obvious, determinant of warfare. A war in which only one adversary has nuclear weapons, a global navy, a large standing army, intercontinental missiles and aircraft would be quite different from a war in which both adversaries possessed similar capabilities. Obviously, a nation’s capability depends not only on technology and other power but on the will and ability of that nation to exercise its capability in accordance with concepts. Moreover, a nation’s security depends on its potential and actual capability being consistent with its technology, purpose, and concept.

Maintaining this consistency is a major responsibility of the professional military man. It is a difficult task at best because of the constant transformation of each determinant. Just since 1945, changes in these four determinants have substantially altered the nature of modem warfare.

At the end of the Second World War our purpose was simply to turn our attention to peace as quickly as possible and in the process to avoid a postwar depression. Our concept was that peace would be enforced by the Big Five, partly acting in concert through the United Nations. It was based on the technology evolving from World War II, including atomic weapons. In terms of capability our concept assumed that the member states of the United Nations would contribute forces necessary to enforce the decisions of the U.N. Security Council.

Within a matter of months this concept proved illusory. First of all, a series of Soviet actions made it obvious that their purposes were different from ours. The establishment of a ring of Communist satellites in Eastern Europe and in North Korea, Soviet intransigence in the administration of occupied Germany, and Communist threats to the security of Iran, Greece, Turkey, and Republic of China revealed the true Soviet purpose.

By 1947, as a result of the conflict between U.S. and Soviet purposes, we had evolved a new purpose, the containment of Communism. Later, with the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, we adopted another purpose, the avoidance of nuclear war. These basic purposes have remained unchanged for the last 22 years. However, there have been changes in concept, technology, and capability during this period which have significantly affected the nature of war.

Initially, we relied on a twofold concept to avoid nuclear war and to contain Communism. Primary reliance was placed on economic and military aid to our friends—first to Greece and Turkey, subsequently to Western Europe, and then progressively to other parts of the globe. We conceived that economically healthy nations were less subject to political overthrow by Communist parties.

Our concept also included the deterrence of the U.S.S.R. by primary reliance on our air-atomic power. The doctrine of retaliation was born then, in the late forties, rather than when Secretary John Foster Dulles made his famous “massive retaliation” speech in the fifties. Of course, our retaliatory ability then was not really massive in present terms, because atomic bombs were still relatively scarce. But it was sufficient to give us confidence in our deterrent capability so long as we enjoyed an atomic monopoly.

Despite our lip service to primary reliance on our air-atomic power, we did not really begin to create the appropriate capability until 1949. Thus the situation in the late forties was an exception to the statement that military concepts often lag technology. At that time our concepts and technology for strategic deterrence were together. It was our in-being capability that lagged. In part, however, this lag in capability resulted from conflicting concepts on the roles of land and surface forces and on the role of industrial mobilization in a general war situation.

Almost from the beginning it became obvious that our concept for containment required something more than just economic stability and strategic deterrence. The Soviets still retained massive forces under arms, forces which represented a significant threat to Western Europe. The only question was whether it would take the Soviets three weeks to get to the English Channel or eight weeks. Thus, even those who were confident in the ability of U.S. air-atomic power td defeat the Soviets by strategic bombing recognized the likelihood that a successful strategic campaign could not in itself prevent the Soviets from quickly overrunning Western Europe. To cope with this possibility, we added a third element to our concept: territorial defense through regional alliances.

The formula for regional alliances, dating back to the Rio Treaty of 1947, became the concept for the North Atlantic Pact. But it took the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the military aid program to make the pact more than just a statement of intentions. This basic concept for collective regional defense has since expanded throughout the world and involves overlapping, multi-lateral, and bilateral defense arrangements with more than forty separate nations.

These three elements—economic and military aid, strategic nuclear deterrence, and collective regional defense—remain the basic elements of our concept today. Changes in our view of the nature of war in the last 20 years have resulted from dramatic changes in the other two determinants—technology and military capability.

Since 1949, five major technological developments have significantly affected the nature of war:

· The Soviet development of an atomic bomb by 1949.

· U.S. and then Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons.

· The development of ballistic missiles of intercontinental range and especially missiles with solid propellants.

· Air mobility.

· And finally, tremendous advances in communications-electronics technology which both support and control our various weapon systems.

These developments represent an extremely rapid rate of technological change unparalleled in any similar period in history. As a result, they have posed an unparalleled challenge to military establishments to keep pace.

Although these changes were not generally anticipated very far ahead of time, our concepts for exploiting them have generally kept pace. In fact, our concepts have at times been ahead rather than behind the force capabilities derived from technology. For example, our concepts were adjusted to a situation of strategic parity at least several years before the U.S.S.R. actually achieved such a military capability.

The intense competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has compelled both nations to convert these technological developments into military capability in the shortest possible time. This rapid military exploitation of technology is unparalleled historically. Significantly, neither the United States nor Soviet Russia has yet been able to obtain a marked technological edge over the other.

In broad terms, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have become military superpowers. Although it has become fashionable lately to speak of the diffusion of power, the fact remains that while the United States and the Soviet Union are competitive with each other, they have far outdistanced all other nations in terms of military power.

As a result, emphasis has been placed on forces in-being. This requirement for significant forces in-being represents the most drastic change in the traditional U.S. military posture. Americans are not entirely comfortable with the new situation. In part, at least, the current questioning of U.S. military posture results from the reassertion of the traditional American reliance on relatively small standing armies.

In general, the collective influence of the five technological developments has been substantial. Specifically, each development made its distinctive change in the nature of war. 

The Soviet development of the atomic bomb had three significant effects on warfare. First, it stimulated and speeded up the development of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. With our monopoly in atomic weapons gone, we saw the development of the concept of nuclear superiority and the re-emergence of the concept of counterforce. Second, Soviet possession of the atomic bomb led to a new U.S. emphasis on air defense. Third, the Soviet A-bomb was probably one of the reasons for applying the limited warfare concept in the Korean War. Of course, technical, moral, and psychological factors and the fear of a possible Soviet response in Europe also caused us to limit our military effort in Korea.

(It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened if, before June 1950, the United States had applied to Korea the concept of regional defense for a containment of Communism which we applied in Europe. Such a concept might well have deterred the North Koreans. In reality, our public statements probably contributed to the Communists’ thinking that they could take over South Korea without interference by the United States.)

The impact of thermonuclear weapons and the development of ICBM’s can be considered together in analyzing their impact on warfare. They have increased the emphasis on forces in-being, on instant readiness, and on political control of forces at the top levels of government. They have also caused a hardening of forces and motivated the research for an antiballistic missile. On the other hand, as ballistic missile forces have increased, progressively less emphasis has been placed on manned strategic aircraft and on air defense against them. Existence of these weapons has caused the Soviet Union to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States. Finally, they have caused the United States to exercise great restraint in waging war.

The technological developments mentioned thus far have not been used in actual warfare although their potential has profoundly influenced military planning. The development of military airlift, however, has allowed the United States greater freedom of movement within the constraints imposed by the previously mentioned developments. The most obvious example of this is the Berlin airlift of 1948—49, which saved the city without forcing a direct conflict between Russia and the United States—one in which we would have been at a distinct disadvantage. Since Berlin, airlift has proven itself in the Lebanon crisis and again during the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States rapidly mobilized its forces for action in Cuba. More recently, the use of airlift in Vietnam, in combination with the air interdiction 6am-paign and Army tactical air mobility, has at the very minimum prevented the enemy from achieving a military victory. This is at least one illustration that technology can be significant in guerrilla wars.

In the matter of the tremendous strides taken recently in the field of communications and electronics, only two points need to be made concerning their effect upon the nature of war. First, their development has made possible many of these other postwar accomplishments; and second, this sophistication has made it possible for the top levels of government to exercise close control over military forces.

It is best to summarize the impact of technology upon the nature of warfare since 1945 in the framework of the interaction between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Four points emerge from such an analysis. The first is that U.S. strategic power has thus far foreclosed most direct Soviet action which might have led to hostilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Second, with this avenue blocked, the Soviets have resorted to limited war waged by their proxies. Third, after the failure of the limited war in Korea to expand the Communist world, the Soviets reverted to the older tactic of revolution, which they chose to call “wars of national liberation.” Again, these wars were waged by proxy while being supplied and supported by the U.S.S.R. Finally, partly because of the danger of escalation, the United States chose to respond to each of these Communist overt actions essentially on their own ground. While the Communists have, in each case, exercised some degree of military restraint, our self-imposed restraints have significantly limited our technological superiority except in the field of air mobility.

What then can be said about the nature of warfare in the future? Conventional wisdom would have us expect that the future holds more wars of national liberation and insurgency. This is a logical projection, and it may turn out to be a correct one, but not necessarily. Planners most often go wrong when they attempt to project current situations into the future. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now possible to see clearly the inadequacies of the forward projections of 1959 and 1949. This does not mean that the planners of ten or twenty years ago did not do their jobs well. In many cases, it was the excellence of their projections that generated action programs which in turn changes the nature of the original predictions.

Rather than attempt hard and fast predictions on the future nature of warfare, which could, as we have seen, be outmoded by technology, it will be more profitable to analyze some of the ways in which the four changed the nature of the original predictions. Rather than attempt hard and fast predictions on the future nature of warfare, which could, as we have seen, be outmoded by technology, it will be more profitable to analyze some of the ways in which the four determinants of warfare might affect the future. In each case, there is such a wide range of possibilities that it is safe to say only that the future is indeterminate—that the nature of future warfare will depend upon decisions which have not yet been made by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other nations. Furthermore, decisions made by each of these nations will, in turn, generate new sets of decisions by the others.

In the realm of purpose, very little of the absolute is possible to predict. Soviet purposes at the moment are unclear. There are those who would have the United States believe that the Communists have abandoned their goal of territorial expansion and world domination. This is a situation much to be hoped for but one impossible to base upon any facts.

The purpose of the Chinese Communists, on the other hand, seems much clearer. That teeming nation wants to expand both her power and her influence in Asia and perhaps beyond. The steadfastness of these purposes against those of the Soviet Union is questionable. Conventional wisdom would tend to predict a continuation of the Sino-Soviet split. However, the death of Mao and other elders in the Chinese hierarchy may lead to a quest for a healing of the ideological split.

The United States is in the midst of clarifying and redefining its purpose at this time. It is a logical assumption that nuclear deterrence will continue as one major U.S. purpose. How far we will go in the current policy of containment will in a large measure depend upon how much we are willing to pay in its pursuit. The decisions of these three nations and their respective allies will establish the parameters of war in the future.

There is a wide range of alternative future concepts which can and would affect future warfare if put into practice. Issues such as strategic arms control, if agreed upon by the major powers, could basically alter the type and ferocity of future wars. The parameters here could embrace anything from all-out nuclear conflict to the severely limited use of conventional arms. Any nation obtaining nuclear capability after the initial agreement could very well upset any past strategic parity. A second conceptual issue is the extent to which we will continue to rely upon regional collective defense throughout the world. Again, this doctrine can be applied with varying degrees of implementation ranging from full-scale assistance, such as in Vietnam, to the simple supplying of arms to a nation’s forces. Certainly, the following questions must be considered: How will we implement this concept in terms of (1) deployed U.S. forces versus a strategic reserve, (2) in terms of U.S. surface forces versus air forces, (3) in terms of nuclear forces versus nonnuclear forces, and (4) in terms of concepts for employment of nuclear weapons in the defense of our allies? If the United States retrenches, will the Soviets step into the resultant vacuum, or will the Chinese Communists decide to take upon themselves this function? Should either of these latter two countries act in this manner, then how would the United States respond to protect her interests and commitments?

A third major conceptual issue is United States policy toward internal subversion, wars of national liberation, and counterinsurgency. This concept will be decided only when Russia and China have sufficiently revealed their hands to allow the United States to decide how she will react to Communist insurgencies in areas far from its shores.

In the field of technology, antiballistic missiles, space research, lasers, sensors, improved guidance systems for missiles, air mobility, and very-low-yield nuclear weapons have created vast possibilities. How these developments affect warfare will depend largely upon our concepts for exploitation in pursuit of national purpose. It is possible, however, for technology not only to affect warfare planning but to be affected by such things as feasibility and the ever-present problem—cost.

These latter two considerations materially influence the fourth determinant, capability. Current indications are that United States financial considerations will loom especially large in the months ahead in influencing capability. It could go to the extreme of creating a gap between capability and concept, and it most certainly will cause the United States to adjust its purposes and concepts to the capabilities we are willing to pay for.

All this may well raise more questions than it answers. It should certainly afford a glimpse of the problems of second-guessing future wars. There are, however, four things which are of paramount importance in the consideration of the future. First, all military professionals must recognize the indeterminacy of the future of warfare and gear their thinking away from the stereotyped and into the flexible. Second, the professional must ask himself the right questions, based upon careful study of the situations, which will enable this country to react in timely fashion as the future is revealed. Third, the planners of the future must be prepared to cope with a wide range of alternatives, with subtle shades of grey instead of the conventional black or white. Finally, a truism should be ever present in the planner’s mind: those eventualities for which one is best prepared are the least likely to happen.

Aerospace Studies Institute

Contributor

Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh (USMA; Ph.D., Harvard University) is Commander, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University. His World War II services was in Field Artillery, ETO, and in GHQ Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, Japan. He transferred to the Air Force in 1949. His assignments have included Assistant Professor, USMA (1948-51); Legislative Liaison, OSAF; Plans Officer, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe; Deputy Director, Office of Public Services, OASD; Assistant Executive to the Chief of Staff, USAF; Air Force Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State; Air Force Member, Chairman’s Staff Group, JCS, and senior staff member, National Security Council Staff, and Armed Forces Aide to the President. General Ginsburgh is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Air War College, and National War College. His published writings include U. S. Military Strategy in the Sixties (1965) and articles in various military and professional journals.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor