Document created: 25 August 04
Air University Review,
July-August
1970
Certainly there could be no more appropriate book to appear at this time than Major Robert J. O’Neill’s General Giap—Politician and Strategist.† Although published four months prior to Ho Chi Minh’s death, it dealt with a man who was and will continue to be a key figure in any government that may rule North Vietnam. There can be little doubt that General Vo Nguyen Giap has tremendous power and prestige in the North, yet he lacks something that assures men of his stripe a solid hold on power: the ability to promulgate independent action and win acceptance of it by his rivals.
O’Neill alludes to this quality and makes it clear that Giap became what he is largely because of Ho Chi Minh and circumstances. However, the point is not sufficiently expanded by the author, for time and again he attributes action to Giap when actually the shots were called by Ho and the Politburo, including some of Giap’s rivals.
Giap has made many enemies in his quest for power, and several are key personnel in the government that will succeed Ho Chi Minh, the most powerful being Truong Chinh. O’Neill effectively documents the conflict between Giap and Chinh, pointing out that it is not only one of power and position but also one of basic Communist orientation. While Giap, because of his background and training, leans strongly toward the Russian sphere, Truong Chinh is very pro-Chinese in his thinking. This basic difference is sufficient to cause rumbling from Hanoi in the months ahead.
O’Neill's book is the second one to appear recently dealing with the heretofore little-known leadership of North Vietnam. In 1968 Jean Lacouture published his masterful Ho Chi Minh, A Political Biography, in which he saw Ho as the great Vietnamese nationalist who strove to unite a divided Vietnam after freeing it from the French. The O’Neill book is not of the same caliber as Lacouture’s, but then his subject is not of the same caliber.
In any evaluation of General Giap—Politician and Strategist, one must appreciate the difficulty involving both the man and research about him. On such subjects as battlefield leadership, it is almost impossible to separate fact from myth in any relatively closed country. Research on Giap is especially difficult because little has been written about him, and the North Vietnamese sources are so much influenced by propaganda and Communist platitudes that the real Giap fails to appear. Despite this handicap, O’Neill has written a fairly well-balanced and judicious account. He gives the reader a relatively clear grasp of Giap’s character and adequately portrays highlights of his later life. He also brings into his narrative the key men in the Giap’s life and identifies those important in his rise to power. Finally, he presents an astute analysis of war against the French, although actual coverage of the war is far from complete.
The aspect of the book that seems to have given the author most difficulty is the same that makes the Lacouture book on Ho so excellent: the effort to probe the man in terms of deep drives, motives, and desires. Of course this kind of information is always hardest to come by.
O’Neill also fails to deal in any depth with Giap prior to World War II, devoting all but 35 of his 204 pages to the post-World War II period. For this reason, it is difficult for the reader to grasp the early development of Giap’s character and the foundations that eventually made him the man he has become.
The most glaring weakness of O’Neill’s work is the lack of documentation. He leaves undocumented far too many points that are not commonly accepted and that can be realistically disputed, and he makes assumptions that cannot be proven and that are not necessarily valid. This fault is compounded by the secondary nature of his research. It must be realized that primary sources dealing with Giap are probably unavailable, but the lack of references to even accepted secondary sources furthers the weakness. On this point O’Neill is somewhat ahead of Lacouture, since the latter failed to include any footnotes or bibliography—a frustrating situation to say the least.
Despite the implications in the book’s title, the picture that O’Neill paints of Giap is neither of a great politician nor of a great strategist. Rather he portrays an opportunist who found the military sphere of the Vietminh regime vacant and who, because of an early interest in military history, decided that this was the place for him to cut his niche. He thus became a self-taught general, in the tradition of the guerrilla leader. It is little wonder that Giap adopted the tactics of Mao and possibly those of Sun Tzu, for the tactics of the guerrilla are basically those of common sense and of the untrained military leader. This point is further demonstrated by the continual trouble he had when facing his first sophisticated enemy, the French. His trial-and-error methods were not those of the great strategist but rather those of the amateur, unsure of how to deal with the situation. This holds true for the siege of Dien Bien Phu, where Giap demonstrated neither great strategy nor any great degree of resourcefulness. He had an ideal situation in almost all respects: he faced a hopelessly outnumbered enemy that lacked equipment, logistics, leadership, and the backing of its government. Yet what he won was a war of attrition. One may suggest that Giap is considered great not because of Dien Bien Phu—he should have won and any competent general would have—but rather because Dien Bien Phu was part of a political victory and was therefore great. His victory can be compared to Jackson’s at New Orleans: the war of 1812 ended in victory there, the Americans thought, even though the battle was fought a month after peace had been arranged, and thus Jackson became a hero. Dien Bien Phu ended the French adventure in Indochina with defeat, and thus it was a great victory, even though it was probably not a major element in the French decision to withdraw or in the peace treaty that was eventually drawn up at Geneva. Yet because of this battle, Giap is classed as a great military leader.
Neither does Giap emerge as a great politician. He may well be above average as one, but he did not rise to his position in the North Vietnamese government through his own prowess. Rather he was fortunate enough to tie himself to Ho Chi Minh’s coattails, at a time when the latter needed faithful lieutenants, and to move forward with him. Lacouture also seems to hold this view of Giap. There is no natural charisma in his being, no magnetic quality that draws men to him, but rather the characteristics of an opportunist who was able to do the appropriate thing at the appropriate time. This, I think, makes it highly improbable that Giap will emerge as the head of the new government in North Vietnam, unless he gains it through control of the military. If he should succeed Ho Chi Minh, it seems quite possible he would be easy prey for the men who have tended to emerge ahead of him on several occasions.
It is also important to consider Giap in light of the present conflict in Vietnam. O’Neill characterizes the war as basically Giap’s. The validity of this assumption is doubtful, since the entire course of North Vietnamese history since World War II has been basically Ho Chi Minh’s, including the military aspects short of actual battlefield tactics. If, however, O’Neill is correct, this could have a significant impact on the present situation. In a bid for leadership in the North, might not Giap try to stage another Dien Bien Phu? With the United States already committed to a course of withdrawal, might he not try making it appear that the withdrawal was one of great military defeat? This could serve his position well, but what about his rivals, Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh? Might they not try to discredit Giap’s war, to remove him from the potential power structure? A negotiated peace that was not accompanied by a crushing military victory might result in the opposite of Dien Bien Phu. The future will tell.
Another issue, and one which O’Neill discusses very well, is the problem of North Vietnamese individuals and the influence of the Russian-Chinese orbit. North Vietnam is fighting a war that aids both China and Russia, although the former gains more than the latter. To China, it is another war of national liberation from colonialists, a method of bleeding the United States, and, of great importance, a way of securing her border from a Western power, a situation which she cannot tolerate. To Russia, on the other hand, the war is an economic and manpower drain on the United States. It is also a drain on the Soviet Union, but not to nearly as great a degree. In addition it is a great unsettling force in the world.
It seems reasonable to assume that the new government of North Vietnam may be more susceptible to outside pressure than that of Communist/Nationalist Ho Chi Minh was, and also that any pressure to end the war will be creditable more to the Soviet Union than China. This puts another variable into the North Vietnamese governmental situation, since Giap is more likely to be influenced by the Russians, Truong Chinh by the Chinese. Because they both sit on the council that now rules North Vietnam, conflict over conduct of the war seemingly could erupt in Hanoi, with Ho’s strong hand now removed from the wheel.
General Giap—Politician and Strategist brings these several points to the reader’s mind and poses many more. In this way it is a provocative book. The author admits that he has not written the definitive biography of Giap, which of course would be impossible under present conditions, and he has not added anything to our knowledge of the man. He has also not made a sufficiently strong case to prove that Giap is, in fact, the one who will emerge as the head of state in North Vietnam, but he has presented his facts in such a way as to demonstrate that Giap will be an influential force. The book is at best a compilation of previously published material on Giap. Yet it is well worthwhile for anyone who would be as fully informed as possible on North Vietnam and the courses it may follow in the months ahead.
†Robert J. O'Neill, General Giap—Politician and Strategist (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1969, $6.95), 219 pp.
Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of
Vietnam
Major Philip D. Caine (Ph.D., Stanford University) is on duty with the Seventh Air Force, PACAF, after serving on the faculty of the History Department, USAFA, 1966-69. After pilot training, Major Caine served as instructor and instrument examiner, 3537th Navigator Training Squadron, Mather AFB, California, 1957-61, and studied at Stanford University under Air Force Institute of Technology, 1961-63 and 1964-66. He first joined the Academy staff as instructor, 1963, and was associate professor when assigned to Southeast Asia.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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