Air University Review, September-October 1969
Major General Gilbert L. Curtis
A new and revolutionary era has arrived for the Military Airlift Command gained Reserve forces. Old concepts have given way to new outlooks which promise to bring a more vital and direct involvement of Air Force Reserve forces in the mission of the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Inasmuch as these forces are an integral part of the total MAC force available to meet any level of increased activity, the concepts and structure which shape them must be compatible with the active force. We in the Military Airlift Command feel that the benefits gained from bringing this compatibility to the MAC active and Reserve forces constitute the most significant development to affect AFR forces in many years.
impact of the revolution in airlift
The 1966 name change of the Military Air Transport Service to Military Airlift Command has often been related to the current ongoing revolution in airlift. This revolution also relates to the evolution of the modern jet airlift aircraft, the C-141 and the C-5. This change in the basic character of the airlift force, started in the latter years of the Eisenhower administration, was greatly accelerated by President Kennedy’s 1961 decision to alter the national strategy that had been oriented to nuclear-war deterrence. The change to a strategy of flexible response to meet a greater number of contingency situations had a profound effect on MAC and its Reserve components, the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The term “Reserve” in this discussion refers to both components.
When measured against the characteristics of an airlift force demanded by the flexible response strategy, the aircraft then possessed by MATS were not adequate. The airlift force of the late 1950s and early ‘60s was essentially limited to an island-hopping, terminal-to-terminal, airline-type operation. To provide the flexiblity required for the new strategy, the MAC airlift force was programmed to become, by the early ‘70s, a mixed force of C-141 and C-5 aircraft. The long range, relatively high speed, high capacity, and advanced military operating characteristics of this force will permit operation into forward combat areas. Instead of being a relatively inflexible and limited logistics agency, the airlift force today is evolving to the point of sustaining large-scale deployments and resupplying these forces so as to create an effective on-scene military reaction force that could, in fact, deter large-scale land warfare.
In contrast, the relatively new MAC Reserve airlift units, first activated in 1959, were equipped with aircraft that were being replaced in the active force by new generation of jet airlifters, the C-141. The new jets, including the C-5, will be 4 to 16 times as productive as the aircraft assigned to the Reserves. Ironically, this gap in the relative capabilities of the Reserve and active airlift forces occurred before the Reserves were fully equipped with the obsolescent C-124s.
The conversion of MAC to a jet airlift force meant that the worldwide airlift support system would also be converted, with maintenance and materials-handling equipment necessary to support jet aircraft. In essence, if the reciprocating-engine reserve airlift was to be effectively utilized, it would require either the existence of a costly support system, including island bases that would not be properly utilized in peacetime or the necessary lead time to deploy a full support system in time of contingency. The conversion process to maintain jet aircraft is fully under way.
Traditionally, Reserve capability has been increased by assigning Reserve forces more capable aircraft released from the active force. In the case of strategic airlift, this procedure is not feasible. The change of MAC to an all-jet force is occurring over a relatively short time span. Accordingly, equipment is not available for assignment To the Reserves.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that new aircraft are so expensive that the alternative of purchasing them for the Reserves is not likely to be acceptable to the decision-makers in Washington.
This apparent incompatibility in active and Reserve resources was not lost on the Department of Defense. In fact, by the mid-sixties rob had already ordered a complete phase-out of MAC-gained airlift units.
As the MAC force changes to an all-jet force of C-141s and C-5s, the number of air-craft will be reduced by almost one-third, but at the same time the ton-mile capability will more than double; under certain operational conditions, it may actually quadruple. The capability to realize the full potential inherent in the new jet aircraft is, however, limited by the manning that can be expected in future peacetime budgets. These aircraft can and should be operated at considerably higher rates than we can expect from our peacetime manning. Therefore, the phase-out of the MAC-gained Reserve airlift units and the subsequent loss of the experienced Reserve airlift personnel were not in MAC’S interest.
Reserve Associate Unit concept
In consideration of these facts the Commander of MAC, General Howell M. Estes, Jr., directed in January 1966 a complete reappraisal of the command’s future Reserve needs. While the main focus was to be on strategic airlift, the full range of MAC’S many mission areas was to be included. Four key points of guidance were followed: (1) that augmentation would be primarily by organized units, (2) these units would be complementary to and compatible with the force to be augmented, (3) the units’ organizational structure and concept of operation should permit flexible response at all levels of activity rather than only under general war mobilization, and (4) that the units’ operation must be cost effective.
The Reserve Associate Unit Program was developed from that review. These units are distinctly different from the typical Reserve flying unit. They do not possess their own organic aircraft but rather share the C-141s, and later the C-5s, of an active MAC wing. Further, their organizational structure and personnel strength are predicated on a total force (active and Reserve) Unit Detail List (UDL), which is designed to meet the wartime requirements of a MAC wing at a greatly accelerated activity rate.
In this regard, perhaps the most striking difference from the typical Reserve flying unit is the absence of large support functions used primarily to open new bases overseas. This is explained by the fact that MAC does not increase its base structure in wartime. Rather, MAC operates at an increased rate through its existing bases and through the CONUS and overseas bases of other major commands.
An associate group with 415 people assigned will be organized at each of the eight bases in the U.S. where MAC airlift units are to be located. Organizationally, the group will consist of a headquarters, a materiel squadron, a support squadron, an aerial port flight, and one airlift squadron for each airlift squadron in the active wings. The airlift squadron will initially have 16 aircrews, which represent a wartime capability of 2.5 hours per day for each of the active squadrons’ 16 C-141s or C-5s. The materiel squadron has enough personnel to support that sized flying-hour program. The aerial port flight has the number of personnel needed to meet the increased traffic load associated with the increased activity. And, finally, the support squadron contains the numbers and skills necessary to support the increased base population.
In essence, the associate group is a mission-oriented organization that is tailored to MAC’s specific requirements. Accordingly, the associate program is not recommended for general application to all MAC missions or to other commands.
The heart of the peacetime unit is an Air Reserve Technician (ART) force of 120 people, which provides the necessary management and support of peacetime training activities, primarily in the form of flying hours and instructor capability. The existence of this ART force is vital to the program, to insure that Reserve training is not conducted at the expense of active force productivity.
Reservists are trained to the same standards as active duty personnel. Pilots and flight engineers attend the MAC C-141 transition training unit (TTU), which is followed by additional training in their own unit, to complete requirements for worldwide qualifications. For pilots, this includes flying 60 hours per quarter to maintain currency. The navigators and loadmasters attend local flying training detachments (FTD), followed by flying training in their units. The satisfactory completion of “combat airlift training” signifies the end of the initial upgrade training program. Initially, the new group will lean heavily on the active wing for training assistance. However, the Reserves will eventually be fully capable of conducting their own training programs.
Peacetime training for the associate aircrews has distinct advantages over present training programs. The Reservist will have a greater opportunity to fly with the shorter elapsed round-trip times of the jets and the more frequent mission departures of the 32-64 aircraft of a wing than is possible with a Reserve unit with only eight aircraft.
For the Air Force, this training is also productive. After initial qualification, more than 70 percent of annual training will be on productive airlift missions. This productivity, if replaced by commercial airlift at current rates, would cost almost twice as much as the annual cost of the Reserve training program.
The Reserve unit’s dependence on the active force for equipment and facilities resulted in a unique approach to combat-readiness (C) ratings. While active and Reserve units report their C-status separately, there will also be a combined rating, and the periodic readiness inspections will be based on the combined active and Reserve units’ capability. Thus, the active wing commander shares the responsibility with the Reserve group commander for operational readiness.
The wartime capability of Reserve forces is the basic reason for their existence. In the associate program, participation during periods of increased tension short of general war is emphasized. Formerly, MAC-gained Reserve airlift forces have flown as much as 60 percent of their wartime rate in voluntary support of the Southeast Asia (SEA) logistics mission. This effort was difficult because of the personnel’s 12-15 days away from civilian employment, and it was also difficult to form all-Reserve crews. It is possible for this participation rate to be equaled or exceeded in the associate program because of the shorter round-trip times and the flexibility for a Reservist to fly with an active crew or for an active crew member to fly with a Reserve crew that is short a crew member. Obviously, in the event of mobilization, MAC will have an immediately available expanded wartime capability to meet increased Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements on a sustained basis.
associate program activation and management
DOD approved the associate program in October 1967 and ordered the 944th Tactical Airlift Group to move from March AFB, California, to Norton AFB, California, and be reorganized as a Military Airlift Group (Associate), to be associated with the 63d Military Airlift Wing (MAC). This initial group was considered a pilot unit to test and further define the program concept developed at MAC headquarters. Emphasis was placed on converting an optimum number of Reserve C-119 aircrew members rather than recruiting former MAC C-141 personnel. Furthermore, members of the C-124-equipped parent wing were not allowed to transfer because of their involvement in SEA support missions.
A particularly tight schedule, for a Reserve unit, was decreed for attaining C-2 status: 24 February 1969, 11 months after the activation date of 25 March 1968. The 944th achieved this C-2 milestone on 20 February 1969—in fact, it had sufficient crews already transport-qualified and scheduled for combat airlift training so that C-1 could be attained in short order.
Approval of additional units was forthcoming even before the 944th began operation as an associate unit. To date, 12 C-141 associate airlift squadrons within seven groups have been approved for activation by the end of FY 70.
A great deal of thought was given to the inherent problems associated with such an unusual undertaking, primarily resulting from the concept of shared equipment and integrated wartime organizations. In peacetime, both units needed strong unit integrity, yet at all times they had to strive to develop a cohesive unit that could achieve rapid and productive consolidation should mobilization require. The regular force must have its integrity to respond immediately and effectively to any contingency, especially under political conditions that preclude Reserve participation. The Reserves must also have unit integrity to conduct a strong training program without degrading the active force capability. Unit integrity is a key to the ultimate success of the program.
Emphasis is placed on equality and common standards. Reserve ART’s in the maintenance area have been integrated into the functional areas, working daily in the position they will occupy upon mobilization. In this way the active and Reserve units gain respect for each other as well as an understanding of the mutual dependence which exists as they attain an effective capability.
The C-141s of the 63 MAWg fly both the wing and 944 MAGp insignias, indicative that they are sharing these aircraft. The same idea has been carried out on facilities that are shared and on signs along the base perimeter.
worldwide airlift support
Airlift operations depend heavily on a worldwide support system located on bases that are associated with the normal flow pattern to overseas locations. Obviously, contingencies will occur that require new support squadrons at locations previously nonexistent and related to the conflict. Reserve aerial port squadrons and mobile enroute support squadrons provide this kind of expansion.
The 1966 MAC analysis showed that while the twelve existing aerial port squadrons were adequate, two support squadrons were needed in addition to the existing six. DOD approved one of the two in 1967 for activation in March 1968 at Norton AFB, and MAC will continue to seek approval for the second squadron.
CONUS aeromedical evacuation
The new emphasis on the flexible response strategy had its effect on the other mission areas of MAC as well. The aeromedical airlift system within the United States has had to be increased significantly in recent years to handle the casualties returning from the Vietnam conflict. Augmentation in wartime was planned to use Reserve airlift aircraft from the strategic airlift force.
Two factors made this a less realistic concept: DOD had, in fact, programmed the phase-out of all MAC Reserve airlift units; and the increased emphasis on support of deploying United States Strike Command forces meant that the secondary aeromedical role might not be accomplished with the required degree of certainty.
MAC therefore proposed creating an associate aeromedical airlift group to augment the 375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing at Scott AFB, Illinois, which is presently converting to the twin-jet McDonnell Douglas C-9 aircraft. The 932 MAGp presently at Scott is converting from the C-124 to the C-9, having started in July 1969.
To meet the rest of the requirements for movement of general-war patients, MAC gained DOD approval to convert four Air National Guard C-121-equipped MAWgs to the aeromedical airlift mission, which they had previously performed in a secondary role.
aerospace rescue and recovery
Another MAC support mission is the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery, Service. Rescue, as it is more commonly known, has five Reserve squadrons equipped with HC-97 or HU-16 aircraft. These units are performing in an outstanding manner in the search and rescue missions, as well as in the precautionary orbit (duckbutt) missions that support fighter deployments.
The units are not able, however, to per-form adequately in the new and more publicized Rescue roles now being performed in Vietnam, principally combat aircrew recovery. MAC therefore has suggested re-equipping these squadrons with HC-130 aircraft and HH-3 helicopters, so that their mission capability will be more compatible with any contingency requirements of our combatant forces.
Another Rescue role is that of Local Base Rescue (LBR). When we were faced with new requirements in SEA, our only course was to transfer units from CONUS: there has never been an expansion capacity in either the active or Reserve air forces. The LBR role is similar in nature to the peacetime help given for many years by the Air National Guard to Air Defense Command interceptor units on alert duty. MAC felt that Rescue could use a number of Reserve LBR’S in the same way. The Reserve LBR’S would be located at the more stable USAF bases (those not subject to short-notice deployment), such as Air Training Command bases. The active units would continue to be at Tactical Air Command bases in the CONUS and at all overseas locations.
Obviously, care must be taken to have a proper balance of active and Reserve units, to insure that we maintain a proper personnel base for overseas rotation during peacetime and nonmobilized emergency conditions. A very favorable aspect of the Reserve LBR is the expansion capability with the larger Reserve personnel complement. With the stable alert commitment, there are more personnel in a Reserve unit, whose members participate on a part-time basis, than in a regular unit. Upon mobilization, a resource base will exist that permits at least one new LBR, assuming equipment is procured, which could be activated for each Reserve LBR in existence.
Aerospace Audio-Visual Service
The final area of MAC support missions, requiring a new Reserve approach, is the Aerospace Audio-Visual Service (AAVS). Unlike other organizations, this area has not had Reserve unit augmentation in the past. Like the other mission areas, the photo documentation mission has had its scope and focus significantly increased by the new national strategy.
AAVS tasks in documenting Air Force operations in SEA exceeded the existing capability so greatly that the 600th Photo Squadron had to be organized. A similar increase in contingency operations by mobilization of operational Reserve units would require still another photo squadron. Therefore, MAC feels that a Reserve combat photo documentation squadron is a realistic contingency resource.
The command’s experience in implementing this ambitious package of program changes has already validated this unique “total forces” approach to Reserve affairs. Thus, our units are flexible enough that they can be productive in peace as well as war. The cost-effectiveness aspect of the program significantly lessens the problem of program justification during periods of austere budgets.
The command’s approach to a Reserve force is best summed up in a statement by General Estes after the Department of Defense approved the initial associate unit:
The Air Force Reserve, over the years, has given to the regular Air Force tremendous backup in both flying and ground units. As far as the Military Airlift Command is concerned, the Air Force Reserve has provided support in terms of airlift units and air rescue units in addition to a number of different types of ground units. It is vitally important to the capability of the Military Airlift Command that this Reserve support continue into the future.
Furthermore, it is important as we achieve new and modern aircraft in the inventory of the Military Airlift Command, such as the C-141 and the C-5, that our Reserve forces be capable of operating these more modern types of aircraft rather than back up the regular force in outmoded older style aircraft.
This is the purpose of the Associate Program within the Air Force Reserve: To directly couple formed Reserve units, not individuals, with regular units flying these modern aircraft so that in times of emergency we are capable of achieving maximum capability which is inherent in these new modern aircraft. I am sure that this is going to be a fine program for the Reserves and the United States Air Force.
Hq Military Airlift Command
Major General Gilbert L. Curtis is Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Hq Military Airlift Command. He was commissioned in 1940 and spent the war years in B-17 and B-29 training and command assignments. Since then be has served in Hq Far East Air Forces as Chief, Cargo Traffic Control Section and Transportation Division, to 1949; student, Air Command and Staff School, continuing there as an instructor until 1953; in Hq USAF as Chief, Traffic Division, and of Requirements and Allocations Division, to 1956; as Deputy Commander and Commander, 1502d Air Transport Wing, Hawaii, to 1959; ADCS/O. Hq Military Air Transport Service, Scott AFB, to 1964; Commander, 63d Troop Carrier Wing, at Hunter AFB, Georgia, to 1966 and at Norton AFB, California, to August 1968, when he assumed his present position. General Curtis a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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