Air University Review, November-December 1969

Heritage of the Great Depression:
World War II

Dr. George W. Collins

In the beginning was the Great Depression —and from thence all evils flow. It is the economic crisis of 1929-33 that Pierre Renouvin uses as the point of departure for his study of “the origins, the development, and the immediate consequences” of the Second World War. † M. Renouvin, born in Paris in 1893, has been a prominent scholar in the field of diplomacy and international relations for many years. A long-time teacher at the Sorbonne, he also has had intimate experience with warfare dating back to 1914-18, when as an infantryman he was twice wounded.

This book, originally published in 1958 as Les Crises du XXe Siécle de 1929-1945, was the final volume of Histoire Des Relations Internationales, an eight-volume series dealing with international relations from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to 1945. Although the book is now over eight years old, its translation into English will be a boon to students of the period. Renouvin has not written a detailed account of the decade and a half but instead has attempted “to highlight the most important of the diplomatic negotiations and to give a critical interpretation of them.” Although the bibliography for this later edition is dated, containing only works published by 1959, its breadth is commendable. The author has used the published documents of the major European powers and the United States, as well as a broad international range of the printed memoirs and secondary works. The text is divided into two sections: the first deals with the origins of the war and the second with international relations during the war and the immediate outcome. The book is of particular value to those who may be familiar only with American writings on the diplomacy of this period.

Renouvin recognizes the intimate connection between the First and Second World Wars; nevertheless, he does not simplify it to a mere cause-effect relationship. Although the first war struck the intercontinental dominance of the European powers a severe blow—and much of the nationalist-independence movement of Asia and Africa stem from that development—he observes that by 1928 the tensions and problems of the postwar world had been largely resolved and that in political and economic relations the world seemingly was entering an era of conciliation. He cites the favorable economic conditions as well as the signing of the Kellogg-Briand pact as indices of comparative well-being and acceptance of the status quo—surely the grand illusion!

Disaster soon struck, however, and the lamps began going out in Europe with the economic crisis of 1929-33. There is nothing new in his account here; the relationship between the initial crisis in the United States and the subsequent spread of the depression across the Atlantic is well known. It is the significance of the depression, rather than the causes, which interests Renouvin, and that, he maintains, was profound. The shock waves from that crisis struck at the very heart of Western civilization, and what emerged was a new and more frightening nationalism which established the basis for the overthrow of the status quo and led directly to the Second World War. The depression was more than merely an economic calamity: the basic values of liberal and parliamentary government were questioned, and, as the states turned to national solutions of their problems, tariffs and other trade barriers were erected. Furthermore, the quest for economic independence led to a reawakened interest in national expansion. Eventually a new Europe emerged, dividing into blocs of “have” and “have not” powers.

In his discussion of the major powers’ reaction to the depression, Renouvin establishes the procedure which he follows throughout the book. After sketching a given international situation, he proceeds to analyze the various national policies, then interprets their causes and significance. His keen insights are the most rewarding elements of the book. Renouvin writes with a convincing candor and impartiality of the relations between states rather than between statesmen; there are no heroes and only one villain. His understanding of international situations is impressive. Not only are the policies of the major powers studied, but, when the issues are more local, he demonstrates equal familiarity with the situation in Austria, Poland, or elsewhere. He closely follows the shifts in national policy, e.g., the Soviet support of the principle of collective security after 1930 when the threat of German and Japanese ambitions began to jeopardize the Soviet position.

While recognizing the adverse effect of the Manchurian episode of 1931 and the Italo-Ethiopian war upon the status quo and collective security (developments made possible by the inability of Britain and France to maintain a common front), Renouvin believes that the real turning point came in 1935. The formation then of the “Stresa Front” between Britain, France, and Italy and a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance agreement apparently implied serious attention by the British and French governments to the problems of European unrest, particularly that of Hitler’s Germany. Unfortunately those agreements soon proved to be ephemeral. The Stresa Front broke down with the Italo-Ethiopian war, while the failure to accompany the Franco-Soviet pact with a military convention left it ineffectual. After that it was all downhill--German rearmament and the occupation of the Rhineland, wars in China and Spain, and, eventually, the final moves of Hitler in Central Europe in 1938-39.

Who was to blame? Renouvin unequivocally attributes the war to Hitler.

It appears to be almost incontrovertible fact that the Second World War was brought on by the actions of the Hitler government, that these actions were the expression of a policy laid down well in advance in Mein Kampf, and that this war could have been averted up until the last moment if the German government had so wished. . . . In examining the origins of this war, one becomes aware that the will of a head of government and a group of men is the dominating factor. They were carried forward in their design by an outpouring of emotion that they themselves promoted and by an organization that stifled any manifestation of opposition.
(pp. 167-68)

Renouvin denies that there was any economic necessity for Germany to go to war; instead, he argues that its policy was motivated by the desire for power. He observes that other scholars reached similar conclusions and that there has been no “revisionist” debate as there was after the First World War. It should be noted, however, that since the original publication of this book, at least two important divergent views have been published. A. J. P. Taylor has stated that the irresolution of Britain and France in deciding upon policies of appeasement or resistance “helped to make the war more likely.”¹ He also suggests that Hitler’s insistence upon war with Poland late in August 1939 was to impress the German military staff and that the Führer counted, to the very end, upon the backing down of Britain and France and upon a negotiated settlement. The war finally came largely by accident, says Taylor. “Hitler may have projected a great war all along; yet it seems from the record that he became involved in war through launching on 29 August a diplomatic manoeuvre [a formal offer to negotiate directly with a Polish plenipotentiary] which he ought to have launched on 28 August.”² Another, who has studied the question of the origin of the war from an entirely different tack, is Denna F. Fleming, who views the war as merely a phase in the long crusade against Communism, a crusade which he believes has been largely mistaken. By the late 1930s, he states, all the efforts of the Western powers were intended to divert Hitler to the East. Fleming, however, fails to account for the entry of Britain and France into the war after what he terms their sacrifice of Poland.³ This delay in “revisionist” debate after World War II is more likely related to the critical level of international tension in the postwar years, a tension far more intense than that which followed World War I.

While Renouvin holds that the ultimate guilt was Hitler’s, he does not exonerate the other powers. In that assessment he implicitly argues for the “old diplomacy,” when the major powers accepted responsibility for leadership in the affairs of Europe and through a balance of power maintained the peace. Where such powers have important interests, Renouvin argues that they have the ability and obligation to control events. Thus, he believes that in the 1931 Manchurian episode Britain, as the most involved European power in the Far East, should have taken the lead. Similarly, despite lack of support from Britain, France could have acted to prevent the military occupation of the Rhineland, and the circumstances justified action. Again, in regard to the Anschluss, he holds Italy accountable for failing to support Austria. And finally, once Britain and France belatedly adopted a firm position in August 1939, had the U.S.S.R. supported them, Hitler probably would not have provoked war. What was the role of the United States? It “remained on the sidelines.” “At no time between 1933 and 1938 did the United States play the role in international relations that her economic primacy should have afforded her.”

This recognition of the failure of appeasement in the thirties is part of the nightmare of the sixties. With the bipolarity of power, the danger of nuclear holocaust, and apparently no limit to serious international crises, when and how is intervention required? What are the real threats to world peace, or to the best interests of the United States? The Truman Doctrine “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” cannot be universally applied, but the converse concept of “fortress America” is no more realistic. American postwar policy in general has been one of response and of a pragmatic nature. Policy is formulated as issues arise, while direct involvement has been limited to areas along the peripheries of the bipolar powers.

The second part of the book follows the diplomacy of the war through to the victory of the Allies. Once the war was widened in 1941 with the entry of the U.S.S. R. and the United States, Renouvin maintains that the defeat of Germany was inevitable because of the preponderant resources of the Allied powers. The only possibility of defeat lay in the disruption of the alliance, an opportunity which Germany never vigorously pursued. Nevertheless, the coalition between the Atlantic powers and the Soviets was always uneasy, as each feared that the other might negotiate a separate peace. That remained a distinct temptation for the U.S.S.R. until the second front was established in France in 1944.

Of interest is Renouvin’s interpretation of the Big Three conferences. Whereas most scholars cite the Yalta decisions as the most important, particularly for the postwar world, Renouvin writes that the key decision was made at Teheran in November 1943, when a tentative agreement to move the Polish boundaries westward was reached. He questions the soundness of that accord, granted when the Soviets were not in a commanding military position and appeasement was unnecessary. Through it, he argues, Roosevelt and Churchill opened “the way to the penetration of Russian influence in Central Europe.” Here Renouvin’s judgment seems unduly blunt. Had the Western powers only postponed the decision, the military course of the war would have forced it at a later date. To have steadfastly rejected the Curzon line would have jeopardized the coalition. Moreover, the Soviets’ “interpretation” of the Yalta agreements in regard to Poland, as well as their occupation policies, shows that for purposes of their own self-interest they would never have condoned a central Europe unfavorable to their regime.

The concluding parts of this book do not measure up to the rest. Chapter 14, “The World in 1945,” endeavors in thirty pages not only to recount the situation in Europe and the Americas in that year but also to trace the emancipation movements from the thirties to 1945 for much of Asia and the Middle East. Even Renouvin’s skill at synthesis is unequal to such a feat. The final section of the book, “General Conclusions,” is also dissatisfying. Here his four-page sketch of the rise and decline of European influence from the Middle Ages to 1945 is so brief as to be almost useless. He then proceeds to discuss some of the fundamental elements for the study of change in society, elements also essential to the study of international relations. These are the “demographic and economic conditions, as well as currents of collective thinking.” Besides these, the author reminds us that since the sixteenth century, international relations revolve around the activities of the state; that “the state initiates the contacts between people and civilizations.”⁴ It would have been better to introduce these concepts at the beginning of the book, to enable one to better understand Renouvin’s approach to the study of international relations. Moreover, one could see more clearly how he emphasizes the role of the state and relegates other factors to lesser importance.

Earlier, his interpretation of the causes of the major depressions is questionable. In stating that the situation in 1929 was similar to the depressions of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 in that the origin of those crises was American, he attributes too much importance to the nineteenth century economic influence of the United States. During that century the circumstances of the 1920s were reversed: the United States was the debtor nation, and the flow of credits was westward across the Atlantic. Certainly British economic policy was a major factor in the depression of 1837. The raising of discount rates by the Bank of England in the summer of 1836 resulted in the curtailing of investments in the United States. Furthermore, it occurred at a time when cotton prices fell because the British demand declined. As Bray Hammond aptly wrote: “. . . . .the British had stopped buying, had stopped lending, and expected payment of what was due them.”⁶ Again, in the depression of 1873, the effect of the dumping of British goods in the European market must be evaluated.⁶ By the middle of the nineteenth century the interaction of European and American economic developments was quite complex: contraction or expansion of the European economy hardly can be attributed to one side of the Atlantic.

Although Renouvin’s interpretation of international relations of 1929-1945 is not new, it is a cogent reminder of how drastically the world has changed. Today the problems of pre-World War II Europe seem much less significant than they did then; indeed in this age of nuclear threat they can almost be viewed with nostalgia. The war unquestionably did drastically alter the world position of Europe, particularly western Europe, whose intercontinental empires crumbled forever. M. Renouvin has underestimated the phoenix, however, which, with its material and demographic resources, technical competence, and outside assistance, has again demonstrated its recuperative powers. The recent change in French leadership affords new opportunity for western European cooperation and for the creation of a “third force” in international relations, affording greater opportunity for diplomatic harmony.

Wichita, Kansas

†Pierre Renouvin, World War II and Its Origins: International Relations, 1929-1945, translated by Rémy Inglis Hall (New York: Harper & Row, 1969, $8.50), x and 402 pp.

Notes

1.  A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 1961), p. xi.

2.  Ibid., p.267.

3.  D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, Vol. I (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961), p.95.

4.  For elaboration of these views, see Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Doroselle, Introduction to the History of International Relations, trans. Mary Ilford (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

5.  Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 457-59.

6.  Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 287.

Contributor

 Dr. George W. Collins, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Ret), (Ph.D., University of Colorado) is Associate Professor of History, Wichita State University. After flying training, 1944, he served as a B-17 and B-29 navigator until 1945 and as a B-29 navigator with the 28th Bombardment Squadron in the Korean War.  He was assigned to Strategic Air Command as a navigator, later as a logistics officer, 1953-58; then taught navigation and history at the United States Air Force Academy until his retirement in 1968. Dr. Collins has published articles on navigations in Aircraft Observer and Navigator and on history in Colorado Magazine, Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal, and Air University Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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