Air University Review, May-June 1969
Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S. Bounds
Most military personnel have heard of the term “civic action” by this time. A few articles and stories have appeared, but they usually present only a localized picture. The average person not associated with Military Civic Action (MCA) still has a very hazy image of what it is all about.
After queries to several people of various ranks in Vietnam in 1967 as to what they thought civic action meant, it seemed to me that MCA had not been sold at all. Most had the impression of leaping into a jeep, tearing off down the road, wheeling into the local orphanage, and passing out gum, old clothing, soap, etc. In Vietnam particularly, this procedure is more damaging than good as it undermines basic principles of the Vietnamese by ignoring the elders and catering to the children. Sometimes the children, as a result, learn to beg, which is even further degrading. Properly done through the village governing structure, civic action can be productive. By this time, however, the American public must think that we support at least one orphanage for every man we have in Vietnam, judging by the barrage of photos under the title of “Civic Action.”
What is civic action then? Simply stated it is nation-building. Take a look at the globe: the underdeveloped nations outnumber the rest. So as long as the United States assumes a leading position in world affairs, MCA will be with us. The emerging nations possible can eventually raise their standards; however technology is expanding at such a rate that the “have” nations tend to further outstrip the “have not” nations. Strong efforts in nation building assistance by the richer nations can materially reduce this economic gap.
Professor Walt W. Rostow has described the national development of the United States through five stages: (1) the traditional society with scattered agricultural communities; (2) the preconditions for economic takeoff in which the nation develops social overhead capital in the form of transportation, communication, and investment; (3) the economic takeoff—small industries spring up, internal trade increases, a middle class starts to form, etc.; (4) the drive to maturity—heavy industry develops, internal and external trade advances, development of stages 2 and 3 increases; and ( 5) the age of maturity and high mass consumption.
From the previous stages of national development, four prime requisites stand out in order for national development to proceed through the fifth stage: transportation; communications; investment—in the form of internal and external trade, real estate development, banking; and viability and political stability. Because of deficiencies in the last item, some older nations will not progress far into stage 5.
Why do we say “Military Civic Action” instead of merely “Civic Action”? In almost all underdeveloped countries, particularly those in stages 1 and 2, the elite of the country are the military. In the military are found those capabilities necessary to nurture national development: leadership, technical skills, administrative experience, mobility, and willingness to spend years away from home. If our national policy dictates assistance in development of a nation, we must work with the existing power structure to accomplish any positive results. And that power structure is usually military. When the U.S. has attempted otherwise, the result has usually been a dismal failure.
Much the same was true in the development of our own nation. Although its work was not called Military Civic Action at the time, our Corps of Engineers has been instrumental in building our nation over the past 160 years, particularly in developing the West. The military was practically the only source of engineers in the earlier stages. The military forts of the old West were graphic reminders to the settlers of U.S. government presence and backing.
The Air Force, thanks to its capability of speed, should be even more effective in Military Civic Action. Its history bears this out: the Army Air Corps encouraged civil aviation by development of airways, communications, landing fields, and the aviation industry. Aerial photography for flood control work materially shortened response time for the engineers. Spraying by aircraft for agriculture was developed by the Army Air Corps. In developing nations today, aviation offers the quickest means for opening internal communications and transportation. Short takeoff and landing airstrips are relatively easy to construct with local labor in remote areas. Surface transportation and communications can then be developed as resources permit.
Probably the most convincing argument for expending effort on Military Civic Action was furnished by the MCA Section of Seventh Air Force: “It cost $26,000 to kill each of 7,200,000 men in World War 1. It is presently costing over $55,000 to kill each Viet Cong. We have expended about $125 for each vc defector through psychological operations/ civic action.” By attempting to kill all the VC, we probably would first run out of money. The expenditure of more funds on psyops/MCA would not produce a rise of linear-scale proportions in the number of defectors, but it would certainly be more economical than killing on a greater scale than the present.
Several difficulties arise in training the U.S. military to perform MCA. First, it is difficult for Americans to recognize the attitudinal differences of people who have a different culture, particularly the oriental. According to Dr. Abraham Hirst, of U.S. Agency for International Development, most orientals are basically harmony-oriented, with little concern for time in the accomplishment of objectives. This is the opposite of Americans, who are action-oriented: Get it done now! The differences in mores, traditions, beliefs, and languages inhibit Americans from being more effective. The training of their allied counterparts also suffers from these differences. The American often becomes impatient with the indigenous personnel and does the task himself rather than wait. Also, the American designed programs tend to become too complex. They have to be kept simple and within the existing local technical capability, else they will be discontinued as soon as the Americans leave.
Our present MCA capability in Vietnam consists of a staff section in Headquarters Seventh Air Force and one officer, one airman, and one Vietnamese national at each major base. Civic action councils meet at Seventh Air Force headquarters and at each base to decide courses of action and priorities. All civic action projects undertaken must be wanted by the people, must include participation by the people, must be capable of continuation without protracted U.S. assistance, and must support the Vietnam government’s Revolutionary Development Program. Projects are executed through and in concert with local officials at all levels, to insure identification of the government with the people. The USAF role emphasizes Vietnamese self-help and provides technical assistance and resources not available from other sources. The base civic action officer uses volunteer USAF personnel to further the local civic action programs. After these volunteers work a normal ten- to twelve-hour duty day, little time is left for civic action. The abundance of needs with civic action potential in areas contiguous to all Seventh Air Force bases, coupled with the positive results achieved from efforts to date, has led Seventh Air Force to support the requirement for a full-time eight-man civic action team.
The Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP) presently has eight Air Force teams working full time at Vietnamese hospitals to upgrade facilities and increase training. Since personnel working full time can always produce a more effective program than a part-time effort, the PACAF Civic Action Conference on 12-15 March 1968 strongly supported the formation of a nine-man Medical Capabilities Team at each of the major bases in Vietnam, to work full time in civic action. These teams will assume the MEDCAP activities presently being conducted by volunteer medical service personnel during their off-duty time. The composition of the teams will enhance professional capability in an already successful program. The full-time aspects are anticipated to increase the present monthly average services rendered as follows: medical patients treated-from 10,296 to 78,160; dental treatment procedures-from 1893 to 14,880; immunizations-from 4279 to 31,010. The teams can also present 2080 instructional hours each month. The included veterinary officers will enhance rabies-control programs and extend the teams’ scope to encompass agricultural improvement projects.
Air Force civic action has progressed from nothing two years ago to a very influential factor in Vietnam today. Not only is progress being made in national development around the air bases but many side benefits accrue that are not publicized. At least three planned attacks on air bases were reported through passive intelligence collection prior to the VC/NVA Tet offensive. At least three were reported during the offensive, and other lastminute warnings were received in time for U.S. personnel to take shelter, thereby saving many lives. These warnings were received through MEDCAP/Civic Action activities and were not actively solicited. To make intelligence collection a part of MCA would be self-defeating. Of the six attacks prevented, how much was saved? Who knows: Two F-4s? Three C-130s? Five A-1s?
No one knows; but judging from past experiences of attacks, we would have lost at least ten million and possibly as high as twenty-five million dollars’ worth in equipment-to say nothing of American and Allied lives. Until about January 1968, all this cost us was a few dollars to support the 26 fulltime personnel and other personnel as volunteers for extra duty. The MCA budget for the last half of FY 68 was only $339,000. Any way you look at it, the price is cheap. The FY 69 MCA budget for Vietnam and Thailand is less than the cost of one F-4. How many F-4s, C-130s, A-Is, etc., can we save through civic actions? But the money value of those saved aircraft is only an incidental benefit to the United States; the real value is that MCA, the National Development Program, and the Revolutionary Development Program could enable us to withdraw altogether.
Another of our prime objectives is to get the Vietnamese Air Force actively involved in MCA. Seventh Air Force works through the Air Force Advisory Group (part of the MAAG) to interest the VNAF. This has been somewhat less than productive at some bases, while at others it has moved along very well. There are adverse conditions in the VNAF that inhibit a full-scale MCA program: the VNAF numbers only 16,500 men and supports five combat wings; the lower-ranking VNAF airman is not as well off as the average villager around the air bases; and most Vietnamese are more family than nationally oriented, so it is difficult to motivate all of them.
In Thailand the Civic Action Section of the 606th Air Commando Squadron is doing the major portion of civic action. Composed of 84 U.S. personnel and 12 Thai interpreters, the section’s objective is to assist and train the Thais in civic action in the northeast provinces where the potential for insurgency is greatest. Personnel available cover a wide range of skills, including structural engineering, civil engineering, bioenvironmental engineering, medical, dental, metal processing, radiology, forestry, and veterinary. From this cross section of talent, considerable progress has been made. They man twenty-five first and second-class health centers, train sanitarians and midwives, teach dental hygiene, assist the Thai Health Ministry in organizing a dental school, and teach animal husbandry. Rabies control is another of the progressive programs. There are over 300 reported human deaths from rabies each year. Estimates on unreported deaths range as high as 1200. Animal control and inoculation programs have been started, to reduce or eliminate rabies.
In a health survey it was determined that 88 percent of the villagers had internal parasites such as liver flukes and hookworms, and this is common throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world. It is easy to see that these people have little energy for improvement beyond the efforts of bare sustenance. The parasites can be controlled, but it will do little good until basic good sanitation habits become standard. The medical river boat and STOL airstrips, promoted by the 6O6th, are examples of means used to overcome transportation and communications deficiencies in remote areas.
Area security is one of the prerequisites for a successful civic action program. Two years ago there was some trouble in the area south of Nakhon Phanom from Communist terrorists/bandits. The 606th started the village monitor program to thwart the insurgents. Each of 26 villages was given a series of flag panels to display on the roof of the schoolhouse. Each panel depicted a different message, e.g., all safe, village under attack, Communist terrorist in the area, need medical evacuation. Twice daily a lightplane flew over the villages, covering hundreds of square miles in one hour’s time, In the event of trouble indicated by the panels, the observation plane could radio the information back to base and have Thai paratroops dispatched in time to be effective, Prior to this time, it was usually two weeks before government authorities even heard of such incidents due to lack of road transportation and communications; then, of course, it was too late to do anything about it. This plan has since been discontinued because of a decrease in insurgency in this particular area, but here was an outstanding example of how air power can be used to develop national security in remote areas, The 606ACS has been predominantly responsible for assisting the Thai government in accomplishing this objective.
There has been less urgency for development of programs around our other bases in Thailand, but we recognize the need to assist the Thai government in nation-building as well as to improve our own image. Manpower spaces have been obtained for an MCA officer and airman to be assigned at each base. As in Vietnam, the objective will be to get an eight-man team assigned to each base to speed the progress.
The major part of the PACAF effort in Military Civic Action has been directed at Southeast Asia, but we are now beginning to direct more attention to the Philippines and Korea. Their problem has been less severe because of reduced internal threat to national security. The Philippines still have some problems with the Huks and still desire much national development. Korea has demonstrated astounding progressiveness; but in view of the North Korean aggressive agent infiltration program, much more can be done to solidify the South Koreans through MCA.
To Sort out the major conclusions or principles, there are five that could apply anywhere:
· Civic action programs cannot be motivated by humanitarian principles alone. This does not degrade such activities, but firm self-accomplishment is an absolute requisite for national development.
· The number of U.S. civic action personnel must be kept to a minimum at anyone location, for otherwise it would appear to be a program dictated by the U.S. The indigenous people must be in the foreground, with U.S. personnel quietly assisting in the background.
· We must maintain a positive frame of reference. To throw up our hands in despair only indicates that we do not understand other cultures and therefore our objectives will never be accomplished. As Dr. Hirsh says, we can charge in the typical American fashion, a la Don Quixote, and get nowhere; or we can do it their way and progress a little bit. Faced with these two alternatives, the latter would have to be chosen.
· Programs must be kept simple. Grandiose schemes that outstrip existing indigenous technology and capability are self-defeating. The local people must be able to carryon with the program after the Americans depart.
· No project should be started that cannot be completed, whatever the reason, whether it be despair, money, or security. To do so would completely disillusion the local people and make any subsequent effort fruitless.
Hq Pacific Air Forces
Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S. Bounds is assigned to 12th Tactical Fighter Wing. He was at Hq Pacific Air Forces, 1965-68, where he developed the PACAF Civic Action Program. During World War II he took flying training and served with 447th Bomb Group (B-17) in England until the war ended. Recalled in 1951, he served in fighter and fighter-bomber group operations in Korea, 1952-53. He was a proof test pilot, Special Weapons Center (ARDC), Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, until 1958, when forced to leave nuclear testing. He has since served as Commander, 501st Bomb Squadron, Langley AFB, Virginia, to 1960; exchange officer with Royal Australian Air Force, to 1962; and Director of Plans, 507th Fighter Wing, Kincheloe AFB, Michigan, to 1965. Colonel Bounds is enrolled in the Air War College Seminar Program.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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