Air University Review, May-June 1969
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice objected.
“When
I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.”
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass
Gradualism, for good or ill, has been established as a military concept in the minds of some. But not everyone. There are those who deny that the concept even exists. Listen to General Earle G. Wheeler, current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
. . . gradualism is not a valid military concept but rather a catchword that has been coined in certain circles. If used at all, the word means merely the speed of application and the power with which force is applied in a given response. . . .1
There are those who defend the policy on the basis of political necessity. And then there are the critics. Critics of the U.S. policy of graduated application of force in Vietnam have used the word “gradualism” with great vigor and frequency.2,3 In describing the policy as gradualism they have given the word a negative connotation, since “-ism” words, such as Communism, Nazism, fascism, and pacifism, generally are used as opprobriums.4
In view of this diversity, it is worthwhile to ask: Does the concept exist? Is it a valid one? What are its implications?
Based on the two premises that there are identifiable elements in our graduated application of power and that the policy has existed for an appreciable period, this article will treat gradualism as a concept and discuss it in terms of both its genesis and its recent applications.
As a starter, I define gradualism as a term referring to the application of military power on an incremental, controlled-response basis. After each carefully restrained application of force, there is a pause. From this pause, the enemy receives a signal and reconsiders his position before going on with the conflict.
Let us, then, examine the elements of gradualism: graduated applications on a responsive basis, pauses, and signals.
Gradualism as a response was exemplified in President Lyndon B. Johnson’s statements at news conferences in regard to Vietnam: “ . . . we have used our power not willingly and recklessly but reluctantly and with restraint . . . the application of military force when it becomes necessary must be for limited purposes and tightly controlled . . . .”5 And, in referring to the effectiveness of bombing North Vietnam: “ . . . we have our policy of responding appropriately, fittingly . . . .”6
The political nature of the concept was clearly expressed in a statement by General Wheeler, speaking of Vietnam in an interview in June 1968: “Within a limited war, it is well within the rules for the political authority to establish the geographical limits and such other guidelines that are in keeping with those objectives.”7
One of the first statements in regard to pause appears in 1957. General Lauris Norstad, , in a speech, “NATO: Deterrent and Shield,” reiterated the two functions of the NATO ground forces: providing a tripwire to signal massive Soviet aggression and halting the Soviet advance temporarily while the Strategic Air Command was doing its job.8 In 1963, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara referred to this same NATO pause, but with an important change: he said the function of the pause is to give Soviet leadership time to reconsider the course of the military action they are undertaking.9 This statement of pause as a political/military strategy was evidence of a revision in Pentagon thinking and was the apparent forerunner of the pause element of the gradualism concept. The pause was first implemented in Vietnam in May 196510 with announcement of our first bombing halt.
As early as July 1964, the Department of Defense had adopted the concepts of “telegraphing” warnings to Hanoi and “signaling” our intentions. The military manifestations of these concepts were the restrictions on bombing targets and the “retaliatory-strikes-only” strategy of that period.11 Published exposition of the signals concept appeared in 1965 when Dr. Thomas C. Schelling, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, discussed signals and feedback in international relationships in an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.12
At about the same time, the literature on U.S. military strategy contained notations of a limited application of force with “strategic persuasion and coercion” as main features. A RAND Corporation paper, “Some Thoughts on Graduated Escalation,” is an excellent example of this general line of thought.13
Coercion is implicit in the gradualism concept, as indeed it is implicit in all military actions; but its application is different in an important way. In a gradualist approach, the coercion supposedly arises from enemy recognition of the pause as a signal, not from his evaluation of his military actions as defeats.
Terms like “gradualism,” even when carefully defined (which gradualism is not), change with time and usage. For example, the term “flexible response” was very clearly delineated at the outset but has apparently changed its connotation since its inception in 1955. In this connection it is worthwhile to review briefly the evolution of “flexible response” because of (1) its closeness to gradualism as a concept and (2) the importance of its author’s positions in the armed forces and as a high-level government adviser at the time the gradualist approach was developed.
General Maxwell D. Taylor is credited with the concept of a flexible response. In his 1955 paper entitled “A National Military Program,” General Taylor outlined a strategy in which U.S. military forces would be developed so that the most appropriate elements could be applied to a particular strategic or tactical situation. At that time it meant simply that we would have available sufficient force, conventional or nuclear, to deter or win quickly a war at any level from insurgency to general war.14
In speeches in 1957, General Taylor said the purpose of the armed forces is “deterring or winning quickly any local aggression . . . .”15 and, “ . . . if we allow a limited aggression to go unchallenged—if we attempt to suppress it with insufficient means or insufficient speed we run the risk of allowing a small war to grow into that great atomic war which it is our purpose to avoid . . . .”16 In 1959, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Committee, General Taylor stated that “we must be willing to make up our minds that we will use all the force necessary to secure the lives and safety. . . we must be willing to go all the way down the road.” The latter statement was in answer to questions by then Senator Lyndon Johnson on what we should do in the event of denial of free access to Berlin.17 And so, until the mid-sixties, the flexible response concept remained constant—a spectrum of available military force capable of meeting a threat at any level. But by 1964 the connotations of flexible response as our national military policy and as it was applied in Vietnam had been broadened to include the elements attributed to gradualism-graduated applications, pauses, and signals.
General Taylor’s speeches, writings, and testimony subsequent to 1964 show a sharp variance from and additions to his original flexible response concept,18 “ . . . I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the leadership of Hanoi . . . . The third reason for the decision to use our airpower was to provide a sobering reminder to Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Viet Cong insurgency . . . . ”An example is his testimony before the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee in 1966, when he expressed the belief that the strategy then in force in Vietnam—measured application, pause, and signaling—was the correct one.19
The 1967 Taylor book, Responsibility and Response, reflects the revised thinking. Measured application of force that will coerce or convince the enemy that negotiations are desirable is a main theme, along with emphasis on the rightness of limited response policy. 20
In fairness, it must be pointed out that in 1968, at a Thomas D. White Lecture at Air University, General Taylor took special pains during the question period to distinguish between gradualism and flexible response and to disclaim any authorship of the former. The exchange went like this:
QUESTION: In this month’s Science and Mechanics magazine, a very high-ranking military man accuses you of developing our present strategy of minor escalation, gradualism and flexible response, . . . do you believe that gradualism or flexible response is a valid strategy?
ANSWER: I haven’t seen this article and I will probably read it with little enjoyment. First, I will plead guilty, in part at least, to being an exponent of the so-called doctrine of flexible response. I don’t think I can claim any direct responsibility for gradualism, although I must say I understand the reasons behind it and I can’t prove it’s wrong any more than I can prove its critics are necessarily right. But I would say that flexible response and gradualism aren’t synonymous in any sense of the word. Flexible response as I have used it and as I think that most people use it simply means a readiness to act across the whole spectrum of military challenge and to respond appropriately to what is required. Hence, this response can range from acts of propaganda to general nuclear war across that whole span of conflict. Hence, I would dismiss flexible response as not being really the issue in Vietnam. The question of whether gradualism is right or wrong or not, that is something the historians will have to sort out when this is all over . . . .21
Whether General Taylor is the author of gradualism or merely an exponent of a concept that has been changed by the manner in which it was implemented is not the important issue. Nor is it of vital importance to determine whether gradualism is of political or military origin. The significance of this discussion lies in whether the concept itself is a correct one. My contention is that it is basically unsound.
The theory may be sound when applied to economic methods, such as bargaining. Or it may be sound in the purely political realm where pressures and coercion are the sum and substance of the theory. But as depicted here, and applied in Vietnam, the concept is an amalgam of military and political strategy, and of military as well as political objectives. Its psychology is based on the American culture rather than that of our adversaries.
The military tradition that wars are fought to be won by a victory has not yet been countermanded by efforts in either very limited situations, such as insurrections in emerging nations, or in the larger limited wars, such as Korea. It is still a military victory, not military pressure, that gives rise to an armistice favorable to the victorious side.
The theory is unsound for psychological reasons also. It assumes that both parties in the struggle understand each other’s words in exactly the same manner. It assumes that the enemy will believe you when you say that this is a limited application of force, to be followed by a higher application. It assumes that the enemy will operate in accordance with the scenario you layout for him with your pauses. And it assumes that he will understand your signal. None of these assumptions is realistic. It does not take into account that the enemy has an entire strategy of his own, completely separate from yours and having no relationship to your objectives. It fails to account for the fact that the enemy can adjust to unfavorable conditions and keep adjusting so that what appears to you to be escalation of effort appears to him as a victory won. This is particularly true in the Vietnam situation, where a small country is literally successfully defying an obviously much larger and stronger nation.
To put it another way, if I apply limited military pressure and then pause as a signal, I have already stated my reluctance to apply more than the smallest amount of pressure. Hence, my actions are predictable to the enemy. At this point, the enemy can feel secure in the knowledge that whatever he does will meet with no more than the smallest increment of increased pressure. This makes my strategy essentially weak and his essentially strong. He always knows what I am going to do; I am always at a disadvantage because he is free to do whatever he pleases. Surprise, mass, flexibility—all the classic elements of military advantage—are his to use but are denied me.
One of the least desirable features of gradualism as a concept of war is that it confuses the issues of theory and implementation. In Vietnam a military strategy, flexible response, has been wed to a political/psychological theory, gradualism, with the result that neither the military nor political objectives have been achieved on terms favorable to us. To be explicit: A stated objective of the Vietnam war is that we wish the North Vietnamese to pull back their forces from South Vietnam and enable the South Vietnamese to run their own country. There is no quarrel with this limited objective, and as President Johnson has stated, “We seek no wider war.” But to arbitrarily draw a line at the 20th parallel for bombing does not necessarily support this objective. If we feel that bombing is necessary to gain our objective (pull-out by the North Vietnamese), we should be able to apply this particular portion of our national power to any degree we see fit. Then we will not have changed our objective; we will have more fully employed our capability for accomplishing it.
In terms of correctness of strategy, there is a barrier that separates political from military action, and different conditions obtain once the barrier is passed. Perfectly appropriate and practical rationales on the political side become improper and ineffective in the military realm. The barrier is best visualized as the point at which the decision is made to go to war—to shoot to kill—to destroy by military actions the adversary’s base that supports his effort, be it his people or his supplies. Once we have passed “through the looking glass,” the former psychologies and realities no longer apply. These “normal” conditions do not again exist until the war has ceased. It is as euphemistic and unrealistic to speak of limited wars as though they were somewhere short of the brutal facts of war as it is to describe a woman as being a little bit pregnant. There just “ain’t no such thing.”
None of the foregoing implies that it is impossible to limit wars. Nor does it imply that wars are fought, ultimately, for other than a political or material gain. What is implied is the essentiality of recognizing the different circumstances that exist—before and after hostilities—and the different strategies that must be employed when military force—war—is used to gain ends that cannot be obtained by other means.
From all this, what can we draw as conclusions in regard to gradualism?
· Unlike most military strategies, the conceptual elements of gradualism are based on political and psychological factors, rather than on military experience or tradition. That graduated, very limited response is the natural reaction of the politician to politico-military conflicts is posited by Harvard Professor Henry A. Kissinger and others. In his article “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy” he states: “. . . to the statesman gradualism is the essence of stability; he represents an era of average performance, of gradual change and slow construction. . . .”22 The special importance of the political factor in the Vietnam situation is detailed in periodicals as well as the public press.23
· Gradualism, as a concept, is an identifiable entity. Its elements are graduated application of force on a responsive basis, pauses, and signaling.
· Although generically related and chronologically contemporary, gradualism differs from the original flexible response concept in several important aspects.
· The concept, policy if you will, has not been successful in its only application to date, Vietnam.
· Gradualism is founded on an unsound psychology and an inadequate appreciation of the nature of our adversaries; it is indefensible from a purely military viewpoint.
· The primacy of political objectives and the legitimacy of the desire to keep wars at the lowest possible level are essential considerations. However, it is equally as important, or more so, to recognize that once we are committed to application of armed force we have passed a barrier beyond which political reasoning and political psychology cannot be effectively applied to military operations and objectives.
The rationale behind gradualism and use of the concept as a guide to future actions should be expunged from our political and military doctrines. To allow it to remain is to jeopardize the future security of the United States and those nations it supports.
Aerospace Studies Institute
Notes
1. Craig Powell, “Policy, Power Mesh in the Formula of Global Strategy,” Armed Forces Management, June 1968, p. 44.
2. Paul Finley, “Authorizing the Appointment of the Present Chairman of the JCS for an Additional Term of 1 Year,” Congressional Record—House (U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 May 1968), p. H3718.
3. Republican Coordination Committee, “Gradualism,” Congressional Record—Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 May 1968), p. S5472.
4. Mark E. Swenson, “The Vietnam Manipulators,” Air Force and Space Digest, October 1968, p. 12.
5. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 1 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 306.
6. The War in Vietnam, 1965, Project Checo, SEA Report, 25 January 1967.
7. Powell, p. 43.
8. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 337-53.
9. Robert S. McNamara, “Military Procurement Authorization Fiscal Year 1964,” Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services 86th Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 326.
10. Tom Wicker, “The Wrong Rubicon,” The Atlantic, Vol. 221, No.5 (May 1968), p. 83.
11. Ibid., pp. 81, 82.
12. T. C. Schelling, “Signals and Feedback in the Anns Dialogne,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1965, p. 5.
13. “Some Thoughts on Graduated Escalation” (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, December 1965), pp. 13-14.
14. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 6-7.
15. Maxwell D. Taylor, Address on 94th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, High School Auditorium, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 30 June 1957.
16. Maxwell D. Taylor, Address at 14th annual meeting luncheon of the National Security Industrial Association, New York, 25 September 1957.
17. Maxwell D. Taylor, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Part 1 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 March 1959), pp. 34-36.
18. Maxwell D. Taylor, “General Taylor Discusses the Vietnam War,” Journal of the Armed Forces, 26 February 1966, p.6.
19. J. William Fulbright, The Vietnam Hearings (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 177.
20. Maxwell D. Taylor, Responsibility and Response (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 27, 28, 32, 38, 40.
21. Maxwell D. Taylor, “Post-Vietnam Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” Speech in the Thomas D. White Lecture Series at Air University, 29 February 1968.
22. Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedalus, Spring 1966.
23. Wicker, p. 65, for instance.
Colonel Fredrick J. Adelman (M.Ed., University of Illinois) is a member of the Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University. During World War II he flew P-38s in the Pacific Theater. Subsequent assignments have been as weather officer at Hickam AFB, Hawaii and Johnston Island; Commander of the weather detachment, Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri; Chief, Forecasting and Special Projects, 7th Weather Group; Associate Professor of Aerospace Science, University of Illinois; in Inspector General’s Office and as Director of Safety, Air University; Chief, Safety Education Branch, Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton AFB, California; and as Executive Officer, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and Seventh Air Force Operations, Vietnam, flying EC-47s of the 360th TEWS.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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