Air University Review, January-February 1969

The Air Force Should
 Replace The OER

Major Albert H. Thelander

The system by which the Air Force evaluates its officers for promotion, special assignments, and other personnel actions is based mainly on the Officer Effectiveness Report (OER). Few officers, however, appear to have much confidence in the validity and reliability of the OER system. It is charged by many with being a dishonest, unfair system that has injured many and ruined the careers of others. To some extent these complaints may be dismissed as defensive maneuvers by individuals who have failed at promotion or in some other way. However, not all of the complaints can be so dismissed.

the flaws

What are the shortcomings of the present OER system? They can be considered under four headings:

(1) Subjectivity. The reports as presently written are highly subjective. They probably reflect as much about the author of each report as they do about the officer being rated—or perhaps even more. The personal likes or dislikes, the prejudices, even the writing abilities of the authors determine to a large extent how effectively an OER prepared. What the rating officer considers most important, even though it may be incidental to the assigned job, is what he will base his rating on.

For example: An officer is assigned primary duty as an AFROTC instructor, additional duty as commandant of cadets, plus other minor administrative duties. The rating officer never visits his classroom and never observes his performance as commandant. He does, however, criticize him on a few minor administrative and social matters. Because of these observed lapses in areas that the supervisor personally takes more interest in, the officer does not receive the high rating needed to compete with his contemporaries.

Most officers quickly realize that the way to succeed is to impress the boss by doing a good job on those matters he is interested in. If this means giving little time to subordinates or cadets, that is unfortunately the way the game is played.

This system also tends to stifle initiative and independent thinking on the part of junior officers. Most officers soon learn that it pays to agree with the chief, even though he may be wrong. The officer who speaks frankly on a matter is too rare. This climate of conformity tends to reduce our efficiency and also our professionalism. One of the qualities of a true professional is that he can be trusted to apply his knowledge and judgment to a problem without fear or distortion.

(2) Varied interpretations of ratings. Theoretically the Air Force desires a distribution of ratings approximating that of the normal or “bell” curve. Adjectives are applied to the various boxes on the rating scale in such a way that only paragons of military performance should receive the higher ratings. Yet these official distinctions are ignored by almost all rating officers. The entire distribution of ratings is skewed considerably to the right. All rating officers are somewhat aware of this skewing. Most (but unfortunately not all) know that to describe an officer as ‘“Effective and Competent” is really to say that he is marginal and should probably be let go. To get across the idea that he is a very fine officer and is doing an excellent job, the rater must label him as “Outstanding” or even “Absolutely Superior” (which in our inflated system is the step above outstanding). This leads to an unfortunate degree of dishonesty in official reports and personnel records.

More damaging, however, is the fact that different rating officers vary greatly in their interpretations of the ratings. Some officers conscientiously try to stay as close as they can to the officially defined ratings. They tend to rate most of their subordinates only one or two blocks above the middle and feel that they are giving honest ratings. On the other hand, many officers take the position that any rating less than the highest block or two is a downgrading and should be resorted to only in special cases.

For example, one officer has reported the following rather contradictory and disturbing experiences:

—sitting in an Officers Call at the Air Force Academy among a select group of officers and hearing the Superintendent state that rigid controls would be used to limit the number of top OER’S;

—sitting in Officers Call at a tactic wing among average officers and hearing the commander exhort his supervisors to “be generous” on OER’S;

—being told by one lieutenant colonel that he, as a matter of principle, rates all of his subordinates “Outstanding” in order to give them a fair chance for promotion;

—hearing another lieutenant colonel tell a hard-working officer that it is doubtful that he can truthfully give him a “Very Fine” rating.

(3) Unfairness to individual officers. As a result of the subjectivity of the ratings and the varied standards of different rating officers, many officers have been hurt badly—promotions missed, relieved from active duty as a result of passovers, special assignments denied, and so forth. The old saying that “one or two low OER’S won’t hurt anybody” obviously does not apply during times of limited promotion quotas or when some headquarters is looking for the best qualified officer for a special position.

It becomes largely a matter of luck whether an officer receives an assignment under a high-rating supervisor or under a lower-rating one. In some eases the command of assignment or the indorsing official may exert a predominant influence. An officer may find himself for years in assignments where he is able to garner a series of outstanding reports. As a result he will win early promotions, special schooling, and choice positions and be on the road to success in the Air Force.

Another officer, equally qualified and as hard-working, may find himself in an organization where OER’S are kept conservative or under a supervisor who has certain prejudices or very strict standards of performance. This officer may find that after a year of long hours, sweat, and suffering he receives a “Very Fine” or lower rating. He may find himself in this predicament for two or three years in a row.

The OER’S from those years will remain in his record unless he can document a case to have them removed—an extremely difficult procedure. It will take him years of further endeavor to build up a file of better reports. Probably the lower reports will bar his way to positions where he could best demonstrate his ability. In either case, during the first year or two after receiving the comparatively low reports, he may be subject to passover, selection out, or other damaging action. He may be as good an officer, as hard-working, and as full of initiative as the officer who has the string of outstanding reports. Nevertheless, he is branded as a failure and is going to be embittered. He may bounce back or he may not.

(4) Failure to meet Air Force objectives. The most serious charge against the OER system is that it is not meeting the objectives of the Air Force. What are the objectives on which an officer evaluation system should be focused? Air Force Manual 36-10 says only that OER’S are “to be used with other information as a basis for personnel actions such as promotion, elimination, school selection, and Regular appointment.” How well is this objective being met? Obviously it cannot be met unless the Air Force has sound, fair, consistent information on the officers it must select for these various personnel actions. With the built-in subjectivity and varied interpretations of ratings, the OER system cannot provide reliable data for such actions. Each officer can probably name from his own experience at least one truly excellent officer who failed to be selected and one other who should have failed but didn’t.

Another objective of a good rating system is that the majority of officers should consider it a fair and honest system. Unless officers believe the Air Force is being fair with them and their careers, they are not going to be motivated to give long years of their lives to the Air Force. From such indications as personal conversations and letters to the editor of Air Force Times, it appears that very few have a good word to say for the present  OER setup, and many have some rather bitter comments on it.

In the last analysis, the real objective of an officer evaluation program is to enable the Air Force to operate more effectively by having well-motivated, well-qualified officers in the jobs where they are needed. The system should encourage officers to perform their duties at a high level of professionalism.

Motivation is a complex thing; it is tied to human needs, which are many and varied. At a fairly low level there is the need for security. An officer who feels insecure is going to devote his efforts toward gaining security and will have little energy for moving higher. He will conform and fawn upon others and be incapable of coming up with a new idea. Unfortunately much of the motivation of the OER system is based on this need for security. An officer works to avoid an unfavorable OER because it would jeopardize his career.

At a higher level is the need for recognition. A man will perform better if he expects that his work and his abilities will be given proper recognition. Unfortunately, under the OER system the correlation between work done and recognition received is very imperfect. Consequently this motivation is weak.

The highest level of need is termed by some psychologists as the need for self-actualization. A man, once he has satisfied his lower needs, wants to go further. He wants to see what he can do, how high he can go. He feels a need to develop his skills to the fullest. This need for self-actualization calls forth the best in a man and leads to the highest achievements. In a military situation this drive can produce new ideas and a vigorous approach to problems. It can produce true professionalism.

Unfortunately, there is a priority system in our satisfying of needs. A man cannot work at self-actualization until his lower needs for security and recognition have been met. As long as the OER system threatens an officer’s career by the subjectivity and unfairness of its ratings and does not consistently give recognition where it is due, few officers will be able to rise to the level of fulfilling their higher potentialities. The loss to the Air Force from this failure to motivate officers to achieve their best cannot be calculated.

The present officer evaluation system based on the OER is not, therefore, achieving Air Force objectives. Whether these objectives can be met by revising the OER is doubtful. A number of revisions have been made since 1947, and the improvements achieved have been minor and temporary in nature. Perhaps the time has now arrived to consider seriously some drastic changes in the officer evaluation system.

The root of the problem lies in the rating of each officer by another very fallible person, his immediate supervisor. It is these supervisors who inject the subjectivity and varied interpretations of ratings into the situation. They are human beings who often develop feelings and emotional reactions toward their subordinates. A system standing on such subjective and shifting foundations can never provide valid, objective evaluations of officers.

The system of rating by supervisors is so deeply engrained in our military structure that it appears idiotic to question it. Yet we know that the OER as a formal report dates back only to World War I. Although we have fragments of commanders’ reports dating far back in history, they appear to be highly impressionistic in tone. It is doubtful that they could have been used as the principal means for selecting and promoting officers.

the alternatives

Let us face the question then: Do we need ratings by supervisors of officer personnel? The present system is not effective in meeting Air Force objectives. Could these objectives be met without some kind of ratings by supervisors? Are there other means for evaluating officers that might be more effective?

But wait, someone may say, doesn’t the OER system also serve some other purposes indirectly? Maybe we would be endangering something basic to eliminate it. Doesn’t the OER help the supervisor to maintain the loyalty and discipline of his subordinates? Doesn’t the ability to give a high on to a deserving officer give his chief a good means of promoting morale and job performance? These questions can be answered very simply by going back to some of the basic principles of leadership. A supervisor who needs the OER to maintain his authority and the loyalty of subordinates is an inadequate leader. He is using the OER as a crutch. Perhaps, if the OER were abolished, some of our supervisors could relearn the basic lessons on how to motivate their troops. This would be a tremendous gain, not only for morale but also for the operational effectiveness of the Air Force. And, of course, operational effectiveness is the ultimate goal of any officer rating system.

Suppose we were to eliminate the OER system. What alternative methods could be used for officer evaluation purposes? A complete answer to this question would require a research project designed to investigate the types of executive and professional evaluation systems used throughout a wide variety of organizations. It would also require some imaginative engineering to develop a new system designed especially for Air Force needs.

The following suggestions indicate some of the areas in which a solution may be found:

· The self-report, covering accomplishments, self-improvement efforts, and related items, could be a useful tool. This would be similar to the yearly report which a professor makes to his university president. An annual Achievement Report would provide each officer the opportunity for describing what he has accomplished on his job in terms of missions flown or other workload, important projects completed, improvements initiated, ratings given by inspectors, special accomplishments or recognition (speeches, articles, awards, and decorations), civic activities, educational achievements, and similar items. The report would be factual in tone, with no evaluative language allowed--except of course for quoting an inspection report or citation.

A benefit of the self-report would be an increased sense of professionalism on the part of individual officers. An OER type of report is simply not compatible with the dignity of a true professional man. In what other profession are such annual report cards required? When the officer realizes that the Air Force trusts him to report upon his own activities, he will feel the added dignity necessary to become a mature professional.

· Appraisal by committee is a method used by some corporations to overcome the inherent subjectivity of ratings by immediate superiors. A group of two to five officers at the management level just above the man being rated is formed to prepare an appraisal. They will look at his performance and prepare a balanced appraisal, which must be agreed upon unanimously. Companies which use this method of reporting executive performance claim that it provides a more valid appraisal and is worth the time and effort required.

· The Air Force presently uses a number of comparatively objective measures of performance. Outstanding base personnel offices are selected on the basis of error ratings in mechanized programs, OJT success rates, retention rates, reports of audits, and other inspection and staff visit reports. Outstanding base-level supply organizations and finance offices are selected on the basis of quantitative data reflecting the accuracy and effectiveness of their operations. Select aircrews are recognized on the basis of grades on standardization/evaluation and tactical evaluation checks, flying safety records, bombing or gunnery accuracy, and related factors. Tactical Air Command in TAC Manual 900-1 provides an award for outstanding accomplishment in almost every operational and support function.

· Specialty knowledge tests are used to upgrade airmen in almost all specialties. Test results are also looked at by selection boards. Why can’t tests be developed to measure the professional and technical knowledge of officers? Although it is true that knowledge is useless unless it is translated into effective duty performance, still the officer with the greater knowledge has a higher potential.

Carrying this idea of testing somewhat further, perhaps psychologists could devise special tests for officer evaluation and selection. Tests to measure problem-solving ability, creativity, initiative, imagination, understanding of human relations, and similar personal qualities would be very useful evaluative tools.

These recommendations are not put forth as final solutions  to the problem of officer evaluation. They are proposals for further research in this important area. Perhaps the answer will lie in a combination of two or three of these approaches. For example, self-reports, objective measures of performance, and test scores could be combined to give a more valid picture of each officer.

A more objective officer evaluation system is urgently needed, both to meet Air Force requirements and to provide fair treatment for all officers. A more mature approach to this problem could do much toward increasing professionalism in the Air Force.

Hq Tactical Air Command


Contributor

Major Albert H. Thelander (A.B., Harvard University; M.A., University of Colorado) is Assistant for Housing Policy, DCS/P, Hq Tactical Air Command. Previous assignments have been in the Air Material Command, 1952-53; with Far East Air Forces, Tokyo, 1953-56; as instructor in history and philosophy, United States Air Force Academy, 1956-60; Personnel Officer, Hahn AB, Germany, 1960-63; with AFROTC, University of Michigan, 1963-66; and as Training Officer, Shaw AFB, South Carolina, 1966-67.  Major Thelander is a graduate of the Personnel Officer Course and Academic Instructor Course (AC&SS) and has contributed an article to the USAF Instructors Journal.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor