Japan’s Search For Security

Before attempting to assess Japan and its position in the world today, it would be advantageous to review briefly some of the highlights in Japan’s history since it emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century from a long period of self-imposed seclusion.

More than a hundred years ago, on March 24, 1860, Lord Ii Kamon-no-Kami, who was what today would be the Prime Minister of Japan and the then Regent of the twelve-year-old Shogun, was about to cross the bridge over the moat surrounding the Shogun’s palace in Edo, as Tokyo was then called. Carried in a palanquin, he was surrounded by his officers and guards. On the bridge were a number of idlers, wearing oil-paper cloaks as protection against the snow and rain. Suddenly one of these men flung himself across the line of march of Lord Ii’s group, causing the escort to rush at the intruder. The escort in turn was attacked by some eighteen armed men, who seemed to spring from nowhere. When the melee ended, the survivors looked to their Lord in the palanquin. There they found the headless trunk of their master.

It was this Lord Ii who had signed the first formal commercial treaty with the United States in 1858, following the advent of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry and the Treaty of Kanagawa some four years earlier, whereby Japan was opened to trade and the foreigner. Moreover, Lord Ii had dealt strongly with opponents of these treaties among the palace patty in Kyoto, where the Emperor resided, as well as with similar elements in other parts of Japan that were demanding the expulsion of the foreign barbarians as a threat to Japan’s security. He was, therefore, a marked man.

The fifteen years following Commodore Perry’s arrival in 1853 saw much unrest, discontent and struggle throughout Japan. Harassment of foreigners in Japan was one method of embarrassing the Shogunate, and many foreigners were attacked and a number killed, especially by unemployed samurai known as ronin. These attacks resulted in reprisal bombardments by British, French, Dutch, and American warships. Finally the Shogunate, for centuries the real government of Japan, toppled, and in early 1868 the whole country submitted to the Emperor.

Not until 1877 did it become illegal for samurai to carry swords. In the words of a contemporary observer, “The curio shops displayed heaps of swords which a few months before the owners would less willingly have parted with than life itself.”

In 1910, fifty years after the death of Lord Ii a ceremony under very distinguished patronage was held in Tokyo at the Yasukuni Shrine, to honor the spirits of the men who had assassinated Lord Ii. This was in keeping with the sacred purpose of the shrine, to honor those who died in the cause of their Emperor, whether in the war with China (1894-95) or the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) or, later, in World War I, in the incursions into China and Manchuria during the 1920s and 1930s, or in the Pacific war of 1941 to 1945.

I mention these events as a backdrop for Japan’s modernization and Westernization and some of the consequences flowing therefrom, with which I shall deal. This year 1968 marks the centennial of the restoration of the Emperor polity in the person of the Emperor Meiji, ending nearly 700 years of power exercised by successive Shoguns. It is a century which witnessed the rise of Japan to the status of a great power, its fall to the depths of total defeat, and its subsequent renascence to new heights of prosperity, responsibility, and self- reliance. Its people have a background different from ours; they are a proud, sensitive, and highly disciplined people with a long history and indigenous culture that must be studied and understood if their contemporary conduct is to be explicable and if we are to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of this our most important ally in the western Pacific.

The second series of General Thomas D. White Lectures at Air University continued on 25 September 1968, the subject for this series being Asia. Ambassador William J. Sebald has adapted his address for the wider reading audience of Air University Review.

The Editor

In 1868 Japan was a feudal state, seemingly unprepared to take its place within the comity of nations. But the new leaders who displaced the Shogunate were men of great prescience and courage who had the foresight to begin at the beginning and do what had to be done over the years to recast Japan and its people into the mold of a modern state.

The Emperor became the symbol of Japan’s unity. It was in his name that reforms were undertaken. Western experts and teachers were brought to Japan in great numbers, and Japanese were sent abroad to acquaint themselves with Western ways and the mechanics of Western civilization, for adaptation to Japan’s needs. There was also the recognition that only by being strong in a military sense could Japan survive the predatory policies of Western powers so evident at that time in Asia, particularly in China. To this end and to insure Japan’s security, a modern army and navy were established, based upon conscription and taught by German, French, and British officers and instructors.

In its newly found integrity as a state—well governed, stable, and economically capable of supporting its military forces—Japan was not long in taking advantage of favorable opportunities to annex neighboring territories that could pose serious threats to Japan if occupied by foreign powers. Thus, in 1875 a treaty with Russia resulted in the Kurile Islands becoming Japanese territory, and in the following year the Bonin Islands were annexed. In 1879 Japan formally annexed the Ryukyu Islands, despite China’s protests of prior claim. Formosa and Korea were gained through long diplomatic and political processes, sealed by the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, respectively. These wars also resulted in Japan’s preferred positions in China and Manchuria and in the cession of southern Sakhalim Island to Japan. The German Pacific islands north of the Equator were given to Japan under a League of Nations mandate as a result of World War I.

Manchuria, North China, Inner Mongolia, and vast portions of China proper were progressively occupied by Japanese military forces, beginning with the seizure of Manchuria by the Kwantung army in 1931.

Japan’s entry into World War II in the Pacific began with a succession of victories. Her power reached its zenith when she conquered all of East Asia, from the borders of Siberia to those of India, and Japanese forces roamed at will over vast stretches of the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Yet, with the growing power and determination of the United States, eventual defeat of Japan was inevitable. Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which had been announced on July 26, 1945, and for all practical purposes its surrender was unconditional, the only alternative being “prompt and utter destruction.”

For a Japan which had prided itself in the knowledge that throughout its long history it had never known defeat, this finale was the ultimate in bitterness and humiliation. But it was not a total or permanent eclipse, as I have noted previously:

On balance, the Occupation of Japan under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, later under General Matthew B. Ridgway, was benevolent, constructive, and humane. Its success, however, was in large degree the consequence of the Japanese peoples adaptability, discipline, and sense of responsibility in the difficult situation of a defeated people. Some of the policies carried out by the occupation forces were harsh. Of these, the most far-reaching was the provision of the Potsdam Declaration that Japanese sovereignty was to be limited to the four main islands of Japan and such minor islands as would be determined by the Allies, later given effect by the San Francisco peace treaty. The United States occupied the Ryukyu Islands, though Japan’s residual sovereignty over them was recognized. Territorially, with the recent return of the Bonin and Volcano island groups, this is the Japan of today.

Early in the Occupation, Japan was completely disarmed and demilitarized, and once again, as in 1877, “the curio shops displayed heaps of swords,” which had been prized possessions of their owners but the possession of which had become illegal.

Democracy was not unknown in Japan prior to World War II—a constitution had been adopted in 1889. It was a friendly, democratic Japan in which I lived when I first came to that country as a naval language officer in 1925. But this democratic interlude lasted only until the early thirties, when extreme rightists and the military managed between them to strangle the political parties and established a single national party, which was nothing more than a rubber stamp for the Japanese General Staff.

The Occupation therefore launched a vast democratization program, which included widespread purges from office of many thousands from the upper levels and leadership of Japanese society. Ironically, Communists who had been imprisoned by the Japanese were released and allowed to form their own political party, the Japan Communist Party, under the leadership of Moscow-trained Communists. This was one of the consequences of the hasty implantation of American democracy in an Oriental country that was to cause untold troubles for the future.

One important adjunct of the democratization program was the promulgation of a new constitution along Western lines, initially formulated in the General Headquarters, Allied Powers. It came into force on May 3, 1947, after having been publicized, discussed, and passed by the Diet. Article 9 of the new constitution renounced war “as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” It also denied Japan the right to maintain land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential. This was an important departure in the constitutional process, and I will refer to it again. However, despite this self-denying article, no provision was made for Japan’s security, and seemingly it was assumed by the General Headquarters and Washington as well that the question of security for Japan was moot and would not arise.

But an undertaking of such magnitude and political potential as the Occupation of Japan could not be carried on in isolation and without response to the impact of world events. This was the period of the cold war, which also impinged in full force upon Japan and the Japanese people. General MacArthur, while technically inhibited by the Allied trappings of the occupation terms of reference, was able to exercise sufficient flexibility to change the thrust of policy from that of a conqueror towards a defeated enemy to a paternalistic approach towards a valued ally of the United States. The realities of the Korean War, which began in June 1950, with its need for a firm base from which United Nations forces could operate and obtain needed support, greatly assisted in crystallizing this significant change of direction in American policy.

Another important consequence of the outbreak of the Korean War and removal of occupation forces from Japan was the formation under General MacArthur’s instructions, of a so-called police reserve to deal with possible serious internal subversion or other difficulties. The formation of this reserve was the first step in an effort to remedy the previous failure to provide for Japan’s security. It later became the Japan Self-Defense Force, now comprising a Ground Self-Defense Force of about 160,000 men; an Air Self-Defense Force of about 1200 planes; and a Maritime Self-Defense Force of some 500 vessels, aggregating about 150,000 tons. These forces were developed despite the provisions of Article 9 of the constitution, on the theory that self-defense, recognized in 1959 by the Supreme Court of Japan, is a fundamental right of the state and that the constitutional prohibition should not be interpreted as conflicting with that right.

Among the Japanese people there is considerable discussion concerning Article 9. One view asserts that world events have overtaken the great principle espoused in that article, which should therefore be amended to allow rearmament. The opposite view maintains that the self-defense forces are illegal and that Article 9 should be construed literally and the forces abolished.

It is argued by those favoring rearmament that Japan should not be caught unarmed in the event that the Vietnam war should be further escalated. The nuclear explosions in Communist China and continuing progress in the nuclear field by that country also give serious concern to the Japanese government and people, causing some elements to opt for nuclear armaments in keeping with Japan’s capabilities. Others insist that Japan’s prosperity, in contrast with the increased burdens and presence of the United States in Asia, is a good reason why Japan should at this time carry a greater share of responsibility in maintaining Asia’s security.

Under present conditions in Japan, however, as I shall point out later, it seems clear that any use of Japanese forces—assuming that they might at some future time be used in support of Japan’s foreign policy, either alone or in combination with others--must have the support of the “home front” to which General Maxwell Taylor so cogently referred in his lecture given here last February. No Japanese government, either now or in the foreseeable future, would dare commit Japanese forces for use abroad without firm support of the people.

To the surprise of the world, and perhaps even to the Japanese themselves, it was a new Japan that emerged from the Occupation when the peace treaty became effective on April 28, 1952. Japan was remembered as an aggressive and warlike country, given to a philosophy that envisaged world leadership through integrated national mobilization, superb development in the arts of war, and the strength of the Japanese spirit. But with the advent of peace following upon a disastrous war and a lengthy occupation, Japan seemed to have all the attributes of a democratic country, given to the peaceful expansion of its economy, to which it was devoting its strength and attention. Its pacifism and opposition to war were attested to by the prohibition of war and armaments written into its constitution, as I have noted.

The new posture of Japan, however, was not entirely appreciated or understood elsewhere, particularly among the east Asian and western Pacific countries that had felt the sting of Japanese military action and occupation. It therefore became an important objective of successive postwar Japanese governments to overcome the bitterness and skepticism that remained in these countries and to establish friendly relations by demonstrating Japan’s acceptability as a helpful, peaceful, and democratic nation. In these efforts they were highly successful.

Paradoxically, the security treaty between Japan and the United States, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, raised some doubts in Asian countries as to Japan’s peaceful intentions. And in Japan, as we shall see, the Opposition maintains that the security treaty violates the spirit if not the letter of the constitution. The treaty, however, corrected the oversight regarding Japan’s security, and it made Japan a partner of the United States, which shared with it the ultimate security of nuclear power. At the request of the Japanese a revised treaty was negotiated and ratified by the Diet in 1960, despite serious riots and massive demonstrations sponsored by opposition Communists and left-wing Socialists. Under the revised treaty, a one-year notice of termination may be given by either party when the treaty has been in force for ten years. The year 1970 will therefore be a highly important year insofar as United States—Japan relations are concerned.

There is also the difficult problem of the return of Okinawa by the United States to Japanese administration. Both governments have taken a number of steps to minimize the impact of this situation, but the United States apparently has been unable to go beyond its position of maintaining that it is impractical under present conditions in the Far East to turn over administrative control of the island to Japan. And even though many Japanese understand that the American occupation of Okinawa contributes to their own security, the question is one on which all political parties are unanimous in desiring a speedy return of the island to Japan.

The problem is complex, and feelings are exacerbated by political and emotional considerations both in Japan and among the Okinawans. As one who in the past has struggled with this problem, it is my view that the difficulties are not insoluble and the wit of man should be able to devise a satisfactory and workable arrangement without too much delay. Certainly there is danger of serious friction arising unless this issue is solved.

Close to home, Soviet Russia presents a difficult security problem for Japan. Aside from the Free World--Communist World relationship, the issue of territorial adjustment arising out of Soviet Russia’s occupation of several adjacent islands, which Japan claims are not part of the Kurile chain, has made the normalization of relations between the two countries difficult. This situation continues despite the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in 1956.

The question of China has serious and continuing domestic overtones in Japan. Although Japan is clearly aligned with the West, in part out of deference to the United States’ desires it chose the Republic of China on Taiwan as the China with which to establish formal diplomatic relations in 1952. Yet it was soon felt in Japan that the problem of China was outside the framework of Japan’s foreign policy position with the West and could therefore be treated as an exception. In due course and as an ad hoc measure, private trade relations, separated from politics, were established with mainland China. This worked well for a time, aided by Communist China’s wooing of the Japanese people while simultaneously lambasting the Japanese government’s policies. But notwithstanding a growing trade relationship, China’s intransigence, its nuclear tests, unfriendly posture, and the shock waves of the Great Cultural Revolution have raised the question in Japan whether, perhaps, the real security threat does not in fact arise from this gigantic and seemingly irresponsible neighbor.

Despite these considerations, it does not make much sense to many Japanese to consider the exiled Chinese government on the former Japanese colony of Taiwan as the government of China. This arises out of a number of factors. Mainland China has for centuries had great fascination for the Japanese people, and Chinese culture is deeply embedded in Japan. The pull of China upon the Japanese persists--a relationship always “characterized by a strange mixture of affinity and antagonism.”²Their long and close association with China, in peace and war, has convinced them that they, more than any other people, can be the bridge between China and the West.

On the other hand, the United States, with which Japan is allied by its only security treaty, has little meaningful contact with Communist China. This, together with the dangerous situations brought on by the Korean and Vietnamese wars, has placed the Japanese government in a position of being pressured by its own people to establish closer relations with mainland China, while at the same time desiring to coordinate its policies with those of the United States. The Japanese government, however, has somehow managed to follow a sensible China policy, and its dilemma is also tempered by close trading relations with Taiwan, with which Japan’s favorable trade balance amounted to almost $200 million in 1967.

The phenomenal rise of Japan’s economy since 1952 has rightly been called the “economic miracle” of Asia. At the end of World War II, Japan’s economy had collapsed, and, as General MacArthur once told me, output at the time of the surrender was approaching zero. All principal cities (except Kyoto) had been burned out by our B-29 raids; the people were on the verge of starvation; raw materials, including oil and gasoline, were almost nonexistent. Six million Japanese were repatriated from overseas, and the millions of men who were hastily demobilized from the armed forces within a matter of months added to the confusion. Japan was stripped of all overseas territory and assets. Total defeat had brought the economy to a standstill.

From this chaotic state of affairs in late 1945, Japan has now become the second economic power in the Free World, with a gross national product of $115 billion in 1967, a figure expected to increase considerably in 1968. This rapid progress is a continuation of the advances made during the past century and has its roots in the feudal Tokugawa period. The miracle is also the result of many other factors, among which I would suggest: native industry and frugality; the peculiarly Japanese paternalism that exists between employer and employee; the wise and effective guidance of business by governmental agencies concerned with trade, commerce, and industry; a restructuring of the economy by the formation of larger units on an industry-wide basis, to eliminate the wasteful processes of intense competition; and finally; freedom from the need to incur the heavy defense expenditures with which other major powers, particularly the United States, have been saddled. In this connection, Japan chose butter without the guns. Much-needed capital thus became available for economic growth and social security programs that resulted in the creation of a huge and expanding domestic market in consequence of higher living standards and rising expectations on the part of the Japanese people.

Less obvious contributions to the miracle were such important factors as the land reform program enacted by the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP); free access to raw materials in world markets; the rebuilding of war-destroyed factories and the rise of spanking new plants of the latest design; improvement of internal communications—roads, railroads, airfields, and telephones; the establishment, with considerable selectivity, of joint undertakings with foreign companies bringing technological knowledge and processes; and the accumulation of capital through domestic savings (18.5 percent in 1966) and availability of needed funds in world money markets.

A very few illustrations in concrete terms will assist in demonstrating what an economic giant Japan has become and how it now stands out among the countries of Asia.

But enough of these statistics. I might sum up by noting that the production and export of high-quality goods have changed the image of Japan from the purveyor of shoddy merchandise before the war to the guarantee of quality which the label “Made in Japan” now connotes.

Japan’s trade patterns have changed considerably during the past twenty years. In 1967 the United States accounted for almost one-third of Japan’s total foreign trade (27.5 percent of imports, 28.8 percent of exports).

A new departure is Japan’s rapidly increasing trade with Australia, which bids fair to become highly significant, especially in much-needed imports. As an example, it is estimated that by 1971 almost 40 percent of all iron ore used in Japan will be imported from Australia as a result of long-term contracts involving several billion dollars.

In comparison with these figures, in 1967 imports from all Communist countries, including the Chinese mainland, amounted to only 7.6 percent of total imports into Japan, and exports to these countries aggregated only 5.1 percent of total exports (including Cuba in both categories).

In keeping with the enormous progress of her economy, Japan is among the most advanced nations in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Moreover, the Japanese have for many years been experimenting on a sophisticated scale in the use of long-range rockets. Hence Japan has the economic capability of converting to atomic weapons should the security situation be such as to warrant the huge costs involved.

One final word regarding Japan’s economy. Questions arise as to whether Japan will be able to maintain its fantastic growth rate. Some economists, including Japanese, think not and estimate that the average postwar rate of 10 percent growth will be reduced to about 6 percent by 1971 because of four fundamental factors which I will merely mention in passing: a gradually decreasing labor supply, accompanied by rising labor costs and greater unionization; a reduction in domestic savings; a growing technological gap in contrast with the West; and balance-of-payments difficulties.³

Let us now consider some of the facets of the American-Japanese relationship and the interaction upon Japan’s security which the alliance seems to bring forth.

Aside from Japan’s dependence upon the United States for its security under our nuclear umbrella, there is a considerable linkage to the United States in the financial field. Thus, from 1950 through March 1967, 64 percent of all foreign capital inducted into Japan, including loans, was American, amounting to about $2 billion. Seventy percent of all foreign money paid for the acquisition of Japanese stock in connection with management participation was American. And of all technical assistance agreements concluded during this period, 60 percent were with American partners.

Of the 500 largest American corporations, some 120 are already operating in Japan, and the weight of American capital is considerable. Moreover, as we have seen, one-third of all Japanese trade is dependent upon the United States. Of the remainder, roughly one-third is with Asia and one-third with the rest of the world.

To many Japanese, this apparent overwhelming dependence upon the United States—the Americanization of Japan—is a disquieting state of affairs. They feel that, as a minimum, greater efforts must be made further to diversify Japan’s trade and thus, in this sector, make the economy less dependent upon what might happen in or to the United States. The argument runs to the effect that the American economic tail wags the Japanese political dog; that only by diversification of trade into other areas—such as Europe with its 300 million people, mainland China with 700 million, and Soviet Siberia with its need for development—can some measure of political independence from, and equality with, the United States be achieved.

This uneasiness about American predominance in Japanese affairs is given voice principally by the Opposition, mainly the Japan Socialist Party, which has consistently over the years opposed alignment with the United States through the security treaty, American bases in Japan, rearmament, and any amendment of the constitution that would make rearmament possible. But even the foreign policy of Japan gives some indication of efforts to obtain greater flexibility through closer relationships with countries other than the United States. Thus, Japan has become an influential member of the nine-nation Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), which now seems to be developing after an uncertain beginning. There have also been various soundings and initiatives looking to the formation of organizations concerned with the area, with Southeast Asia, and with regional projects of a technical nature.

There are other influences and forces that cannot be ignored by any Japanese government that aims to strengthen, or even simply to maintain, security ties with the United States or, as an alternative, to increase Japan’s military strength and thus lessen the dependence upon the United States for security.

One of these forces is pacifism. In Japan today a surprisingly broad sector of the population totally rejects everything military. This pacifism largely derives from the Japanese people’s experience during World War II, when they were utterly helpless during air bombardments by fire bombs, and the fact that only Japan has ever been on the receiving end of atomic bombs. A Japanese writer summed up this type of pacifism by saying: “Indeed, one of the most conspicuous characteristics of postwar Japanese life and thought is the virtual nonexistence of military considerations.”⁴

Second, an important irritant and nuisance factor is the student unrest, usually led by the Zengakuren, a highly disciplined, leftist-controlled student organization. The Zengakuren can be counted on to bring out thousands of students for riots and demonstrations against the Japanese government and the United States. These demos, as they are called in Japan, are often aided and abetted by non-student left-wingers and Communists. They are, to say the least, unsettling, and their effect upon public opinion should not be minimized.

A third element, somewhat more subjective and elusive, is the emphasis which many Japanese now place upon the need to better their own personal security and situation. This is in contrast to the prewar group discipline that resulted in the support of the policies of aggression, aggrandizement, and force adopted by the military leaders as the proper precepts of Japanese nationalism. Perhaps this new attitude is best illustrated by the themes adopted for EXPO '70 to be held in Osaka in 1970, the first world exposition to be held in Asia. The principal theme is

In the Spartan atmosphere of Japan prior to World War II such themes would have been unthinkable.

Finally, with the steady rise in industrialism, there has been a rapid shift of population from farms and villages to the great cities. These trends—industrialization and urbanization—have brought the curse of industrial pollution of air and water, critical overcrowding of cities, vast traffic problems, and gross housing shortages. The problems in Japan’s cities are in many respects worse than ours, with inadequate sewerage facilities, water, public transportation, hospitals, schools, and, above all else, space. Moreover there is the problem of security for the aged, for no longer in many instances can the family live as a unit as it had in Japan for centuries.

The disparateness of Japanese thought on security problems, the polarized divisions that have developed between successive conservative governments and the Socialist and left-wing opposition, the enormous power of the politically oriented labor unions, the problems of the cities, and the not entirely new tactic of taking to the streets to indicate opposition, all tend to complicate governmental difficulties—political, economic, social, and military—and thus affect attitudes and capabilities towards the problem of national security.

The exercise of the option to continue the close political alignment with the United States, based upon the present or perhaps a revised security treaty, could well give rise to great difficulties. The paradox of the present arrangement—the partnership of two nations, one of which has overwhelming nuclear power, the other having nuclear capability through economic strength but no power—arises in part out of Article 9 of the constitution and certainly some of the other factors that I have mentioned. In any event, the amendment of Article 9 would be well-nigh impossible under present circumstances. And the ‘“big brother” relationship which has resulted is in itself a psychological handicap that has already taken some toll in goodwill and understanding.

Regardless of whether the security treaty is continued, revised, or abrogated, it seems to me that it is patently in the interests of both countries to maintain the economic interdependence that has developed during the past two decades. But in our own country, there are growing protectionist and isolationist tendencies which have arisen out of the enormous amount of highly competitive imports from exporting countries, such as Japan, and out of our Vietnam experience that suggest a need for reappraisal of our own security requirements. In my view, protectionism and isolationism would both be inimical to the best interests of the United States and could seriously undermine our friendly and, on the whole, satisfactory relations with Japan.

Also on our part there has been a certain amount of taking Japan for granted, despite great differences between us in outlook, responsibilities, geographical considerations, history, culture, and national aspirations. As the world’s greatest power, we are on occasion somewhat prone to consider our own policies and actions as sacrosanct. A case in point, already touched upon, and concerning which I am fully aware of the depth of conviction and feeling with which it is held, is our policy towards Communist China. Large segments of opinion in Japan consider this unrealistic, despite the many provocations that may be laid at China’s door. And no single problem gives so many Japanese in all walks or life so much concern as the possibility that Japan, as an ally of the United States, might somehow be drawn into a war with mainland China.

Having said all this, it should be evident that the security needs of Japan go much beyond the political and military aspects of the security treaty with the United States. These needs additionally involve the security problems of the economic sphere so basic to Japan’s efforts to support its population with ever rising living standards and expectations and the security of a well-maintained and preserved environment. Some of these hopes and aspirations, as we have seen, are pithily expressed in the EXPO '70 themes about fuller enjoyment of life, more bountiful fruits of nature, and fuller engineering of living environment.

All this should, I suggest, be considered a part of the security picture of Japan—a synchronization of the political, military, economic, social, and environmental aspects of atomic-age security of mass populations, with their pressures of improving living standards, urbanization, and the host of new economic, societal, and environmental requirements. But in this context, Japan must face the dilemma of its military security problem: Can Japan develop and preserve a great new society and yet remain virtually defenseless—more defenseless should it cut its security tie with the United States?

No doubt there are many Japanese who will contend that this can and should be done and that the security relationship with the United States (or an independent rearmed Japan as an alternative) in fact makes the achievement of these goals impossible. I think that the reasoning of these Japanese is wrong and is based upon a false premise. The problem, however, is somewhat similar to our dilemma in choosing between the divisive issues of our own security requirements as exemplified by our commitments in Vietnam, Korea, and elsewhere, and the domestic needs of the Great Society with its overtones of racial difficulties.

I hope that I have not given the impression that all is not well in our relations with Japan. The strong showing made by the Liberal-Democratic Party in the July elections for the House of Councillors, and the declining popularity of the Japan Socialist Party, seem to indicate that Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s policies continue to have the backing of the majority of the electorate. Moreover, we may take heart in the similarity of outlook of Japan and our own country. What we both want, in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk at Kyoto in 1966, is “freedom, security, and peace.” I venture the thought that there are no problems or irritations between the two countries, serious though they may or could be, which would not be susceptible of solution through the give and take of the normal channels of diplomacy. There is, fortunately, a broad range of interchange between us. And in consequence, in my view, the increasing ferment of cultural, educational, technical, and informational exchange which is constantly taking place between Americans on all levels and their Japanese counterparts bodes well for the future.

1. William J. Sebald and C. Nelson Spinks, Japan: Prospects, Options, and Opportunities (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1967), p. 13.

2. Noriytiki Tokuda in Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, Tokyo, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1966, Introduction, p. 6.

3. Dick Wilson, “Fat, But Fighting Fit,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXI, No. 29, July 18, 1968, p. 151.

4. Makota Oda, “Meaning of ‘Meaningless Death',”Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, Tokyo, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1966, p. 82.

Ambassador William Joseph Sebald (USNA; LL.D., University of Maryland) served in the Navy 1922-30, including three years as Language Officer, American Embassy, Tokyo. After finishing law school in 1933, he practiced in Japan, 1933-39, and in Washington until Pearl Harbor, when he was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Reverting to inactive status is 1945 with rank of Captain, USNR, he was appointed Special Assistant, Auxiliary Foreign Service, on staff of Political Advisor to Supreme Commander, Allied Powers. His career in the Foreign Service, Department of State, began in 1947 and included assignments as Foreign Service Officer, Tokyo; Ambassador to Burma; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; and Ambassador to Australia from 1957 until his retirement in 1960. Ambassador Sebald’s writings about Japan include With MacArthur in Japan (1965) and, with C. Nelson Spinks, Japan: Prospects, Options, and Opportunities (1967).

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.