Air University Review, January-February 1969
In a world beset by conflict and the threat of conflict, the phrase “crisis diplomacy” has acquired a new significance in the organization and operation of U.S. national security. At first obscure and unique, the characteristics of crisis diplomacy have appeared with increasing regularity since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, making possible today the identification and description of a new and critical dimension of the foreign policy process. The theme of this new development is the rising importance of the operational roles played by the national command authorities and the general decline of the policy-making functions. The more apparent manifestations include the growth of “crisis centers” in Washington, from which the President and his advisers manage emergencies at home and abroad; the centralization of decision-making in the nation’s capital; the trend toward shorter and shorter decision times; and a mounting volume of conflict situations requiring Presidential action.
Concern over the impact of these developments on the institution and operation of U.S. public policy has frequently been voiced both in and out of government. However, the documentation and evaluation of these changes have been somewhat slow to emerge, mainly because the key policy-makers—the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense—have been preoccupied with fighting diplomatic fires and thus have had little time to act on the long-term implications.
The first major effort to study in detail the nature and extent of recent changes in foreign relations was initiated in July 1959 by the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations under the chairmanship of Senator Henry M. Jackson.1 Now in its tenth year, the Jackson subcommittee has set a high standard for scholarly yet practical research into a complex subject over a wide range of topics. The literature it has developed now runs into the thousands of pages and is a prime source for data on national security policy, organization, and operations.
The basic charter of the committee was to investigate how well the government was organized to plan and implement national security policies in the nuclear age. Drawing upon the knowledge and experience of present and former government officials and students of foreign policy, the Jackson subcommittee explored at length such topics as policy-making at the Presidential level; the roles played in foreign policy by the Secretary of State and American ambassadors, the National Security Council, and the Bureau of the Budget; and the interdependence of foreign policy, nuclear strategy, and military technology. Changes wrought in the structure and procedure of foreign policy decision-making, in part the result of the findings and recommendations of this subcommittee, include initiation of the exchange program for State Department and Defense Department officers (1960), establishment of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs and the State Department crisis operation center (1961), and formation of the National Communications System (1963). The central purpose of such changes was to improve the quality and effectiveness of decision-making, particularly at times when the United States had to respond swiftly to crisis situations.
A second source of literature and insight on crisis diplomacy developed as
the President’s role as the nation’s chief crisis manager began to make more
and more headlines. The Cuban missile crisis, the Tonkin Gulf incident, the
Vietnam war, domestic disturbances, the Kennedy assassination, and the Alaskan
earthquake all underscored the prominence of the White House as the nation’s
command and control center for domestic as well as diplomatic emergencies. One
result of this movement of power to the center was the publication of a number
of “inside” accounts on Presidential crisis management, written by journalists
and former government officials, who presented move-by-move descriptions of how
decisions were made by the national command authorities in the midst of
fast-moving and often confusing circumstances. Among the more successful
studies in this category are the Schlesinger, Sorensen, and White books on the
Kennedy years and the Hilsman volume on both the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations.2
Under this category of “history as it happened” is a book by Weintal and Bartlett experienced Washington observers, who bring to their study a high level of knowledge and interest in the machinery of government. *Their goal, as stated in the Foreword, is to give the reader “an intimate glimpse of history in the making.” Their approach is to present case studies of a number of crises, including Cyprus, Yemen, Cuba, and Vietnam, and to analyze in detail the manner, quality, and effectiveness of the foreign policy decision-making associated with each. The result is a valuable, well-informed study which highlights some of the more significant developments in the conduct of foreign policy during the 1960s. Much new information is included, particularly on Cyprus and Vietnam and the roles played by the negotiators and decision-makers both within and without the United States during these emergencies. A brisk, sophisticated style keeps the story moving at a rapid pace.
*Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink: An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scriber’s Sons, 1967, $5.95), vii and 248 pp.
The authors rely on interviews with key members of the foreign affairs community for much of the insight and information they present. The focus is on the key participants in each drama and on the decision-making machinery of the United States government. Throughout, the authors compare the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations in terms of style and results. Eisenhower is depicted as a President who wanted each major foreign policy problem fully staffed. Thus he was attracted to the formalized use of the National Security Council (NSC) machinery to study and debate such issues as Quemoy and Matsu and the Nasser question. Toward the end of his term of office, as the pace of events accelerated, Eisenhower was obliged at times to set aside this procedure, one instance being the Lebanon crisis of 1958, which, according to Weintal and Bartlett, “was not even discussed in the NSC.”
The advent of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, according to the authors, introduced a significant shift in the method of handling foreign affairs issues as the need for quicker response and Presidential involvement became more urgent. Instead of the more formalized structure, as symbolized by the NSC, the emphasis turned to a more pragmatic, informal mode of operation. “Kennedy . . . . distrusted large meetings as a forum for honest exchanges.” His creation of the Executive Committee during the Cuban missile crisis, which turned out to be a condensed version of the NSC, is an example of how Kennedy improvised and personalized the foreign policy organization to meet the exigencies of changed circumstances.
President Johnson is pictured as entering office with neither a penchant nor a background for foreign relations. Eventually his instinct for decision-making in domestic matters applied also to foreign relations, which meant he utilized key advisers and the advice of friends (such as Abe Fortas and Clark Clifford) to supply him with the information and judgments needed for making decisions. This attitude and mode of operation are seen by Weintal and Bartlett as accelerating the trend toward a “highly personal, informal and frequently secretive procedure” in which traditional foreign policy planning is minimized.
The conclusion by the authors that the 1960s witnessed a disintegration of the more institutionalized approach to the foreign relations process provided them with the thesis that the current U.S. foreign policy process needs urgent transfusions of precrisis planning to avoid future entanglements of high risk. “The crisis-ridden history of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations described in this book provides conclusive proof that impatience with a crisis situation coupled with the natural American tendency to ‘do it now’ has involved the United States in crises where, with some preplanning, involvement could have been avoided.” The pragmatic, ad hoc, hit-or-miss approach to decision-making during the last eight years has, according to the authors, led to an over-emphasis on the operational aspects of foreign affairs and a dangerous under-emphasis on long-range planning. The President, they say, needs to return to the use of some “formal machinery” that will restore a sense of balance to the foreign affairs process, in which national goals, policies, and priorities will receive as much attention, as day-to-day operations.
The argument by the authors for a return to some “formal machinery,” perhaps modeled after the National Security Council organization as it functioned during the Eisenhower Administration, is generally unconvincing, primarily because it is oversimplified. The political change during the last eight years, which Facing the Brink convincingly documents, has radically altered foreign policy planning and operations. Fundamental national security factors such as total war and the response time of foreign nations, factors which formerly had long lead times, must now be structured into the President’s operational role in addition to their inclusion in long-range forecasts. The decisions of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to scrap some of the national security machinery of their predecessors (e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board of the NSC) are more a reflection of changes in the world environment than of differing Presidential styles. The presence of instant global communications, 30-minute rockets, and fractional orbit bombardment systems with a five-minute warning time is transforming the Presidential decision-making process, necessitating new solutions, new emphases.
This is not to argue that basic policy planning is no longer a primary concern. Rather, the machinery and the agenda for foreign relations planning in the future must be redrawn, and the planners must tailor their tasks and their solutions to the demands of nuclear diplomacy, in which the President’s operational role will be a primary consideration.
In examining the manner and method of decision-making during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Weintal and Bartlett also allude to some of the technological forces that have contributed to the shift in emphasis from long-range planning to day-to-day operations. Although these factors—such as strategic nuclear weapons, jet travel, and modem communications—are not analyzed in depth in this study, it is quite apparent that they figure in a major way in the shaping of crisis diplomacy in the 1960s. The influence of technology on the organization and operation of national security has yet to be adequately documented and analyzed.
The flights and appointments of Under-secretary of State George Ball in Geneva, Athens, Ankara, Washington, and New York during the 1964 Cyprus crisis were dramatic examples of how jet travel has altered the format of classic diplomacy. In this episode one man negotiated a highly sensitive international crisis by moving between the major decision centers on a timely basis.
Perhaps the least heralded development of the technological revolution, however, has been the movement of modern communications to the center of the foreign policy process. George Ball’s 90-minute trans-Atlantic teleprinter conference with Secretary Rusk during a crucial point in the Cyprus affair and the extensive use of cables between the State Department and American embassies are examples which can be cited from this book.
The most significant communication application, however, is the use made of the telephone and telegraphy in recent years by the President during emergencies. One example from Facing the Brink involving President Johnson during the Dominican crisis, provides some insight into the impact of communications on the foreign policy process:
Once, during the crisis in the Dominican Republic, the UPI reported that 12,000 rebels were poised to overwhelm the first contingent of American troops then being landed by helicopter on the island. Tearing the item from his ticker, Johnson placed an urgent call to McNamara, who happened to be testifying before a Congressional committee. McNamara had not heard of this menacing rebel force but he called General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of Wheeler’s subordinates, a colonel, was directed to call General Bruce Palmer, the commander on the scene, to learn what the report was all about. Not aware that the President had initiated the inquiry, the colonel balked, saying it was ridiculous to clutter up the communications channel with such garbage. By the time the query reached Palmer, the President had already telephoned him directly and been advised that the report was totally untrue.
The casual reference to President Johnson’s telephone call to General Palmer in the Dominican Republic in the heat of crisis gives some hint of the great strides made in Presidential communications since that day in May 1878 when the first telephone set was installed in the White House. For the first fifty years, the telephone was used mainly by the White House staff. Then in March 1929, reflecting a trend toward the increased use of the phone by Presidents Coolidge and Harding, President Hoover ordered a handset installed on his desk, putting him in arm’s reach of a communication network that provided immediate contact with the nerve centers of the nation.
Some eleven years later, in May 1940, President Roosevelt ordered a private line between the White House and Prime Minister Churchill’s official residence in London. This link enabled the two Allied leaders to discuss and decide critical wartime issues virtually in real time, bypassing the time-consuming diplomatic practices and procedures. After World War II, advances in telephony, such as submarine telephone cables, communication satellites, and electronic switching, came with amazing speed, and with them came a further projection of Presidential power both nationwide and overseas. Today, through worldwide communication networks, President Johnson can talk instantly with his military commanders at home and abroad, as well as with his diplomatic representatives and America’s allies. He has a direct line to the British Prime Minister. He can and does talk directly with the top U.S. commander in Vietnam. “If knowledge is power,” conclude Weintal and Bartlett, “up to the minute knowledge yields special power to a crisis operator like Johnson.” And key instruments in this power leadership are the telephone and the broad array of telecommunications now available to the President.
One feature of Facing the Brink that will be distracting to many is the overpursuit of personality analysis, in which the authors seek to penetrate the subtleties of leadership behavior. For example, the in-depth and critical comparisons of Presidential styles (Kennedy versus Johnson) in the chapter “Diplomat in Chief” do not contribute significantly to an understanding of the foreign affairs process but do add measurably to the partisan discord. Much the same can be said for the chapter on the Secretary of State, in which the authors trace the career of Dean Rusk under two Presidents, a career which they roundly criticize for its lack of imaginative leadership. In the instance of Rusk, Weintal and Bartlett overanalyze to the point of contradicting themselves. After a deep criticism of his career, the authors end by praising Rusk (along with Ball, McNamara, and Rostow) as a member of “a team which any government in the world would be proud to call its own.”
This journalistic prerogative, however, does not overshadow the intrinsic importance of this book as a valuable contribution to the anatomy of foreign policy decision-making in the nuclear age. Testifying before the Jackson subcommittee on the organization for national security, General Maxwell D. Taylor called for a system of “politico-military bookkeeping” by which the President and his advisers could keep close tabs on major and minor shifts in the world environment affecting national security. Facing the Brink is a welcome contribution to such a system of politico-military bookkeeping, in which changes in the foreign policy process precipitated by the crisis diplomacy of the 1960s are identified and evaluated.
Annandale, Virginia
Notes
1. Since 1959 the Jackson subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations has functioned under three names, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 1959-62; Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 1962-65; and Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 1965 to date.
2. The studies referred to include: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1964 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965); and Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967).
Dr. Richard T. Loomis (Ph.D., Stanford University) is a member of the technical staff of the MITRE Corporation at Tyson’s Corner, Virginia. He served as a historian for the U.S. Air Force, 1955-57, and was with Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 1957-62, performing foreign policy studies relating to the Polaris deterrent system. At Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1962-68, he was a senior politico-military historian, specializing in analysis of the crisis management process at the national level. Dr. Loomis has taught history at Carleton College and San Jose State College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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