Air University Review, September-October 1968
In late 1965, Air Training Command was confronted with the urgent requirement to develop and implement a special program to provide aircraft maintenance training for a large number of airmen to be sent to Southeast Asia (SEA). Some of these airmen were needed as quickly as they could be trained, to make up manning shortages in units that Tactical Air Command (TAC) had transferred to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) when the force buildup in SEA began. The manning shortages were created by several factors: some TAC units had deployed understrength; all deployed units were flying more aircraft hours per month, which ConUS manning levels could not support; and, finally, the SEA operational environment was primitive, and facilities were limited.
Concurrently with the development of a program to fill the urgent augmentation requirement, ATC worked jointly with TAC and the USAF Military Personnel Center (MPC) to resolve the greater but longer-term problem of providing fully trained and weapon-system-qualified maintenance personnel replacements for the airmen then in SEA. Because of the nature of its mission, TAC would be the most logical source to provide mission-oriented replacements to sustain and replenish SEA combat units.
That command had tried to meet the requirement from within its own resources, but by the end of September 1965 it was apparent that these efforts would not be enough. Virtually all of its remaining mission units were being tapped for personnel to be fed into the replacement cycle.
TAC was also faced with the growing program to provide qualified combat-ready replacement aircrews. These aircrews had to be put through the appropriate weapon-system operational readiness training. To meet the aircrew training needs, almost all of its remaining fighter units were converted to combat crew training schools or replacement training units (RTU).
TAC’s actual trained manpower requirement grew apace with the increased flying mission.
This, then, was the situation in late 1965 when ATC entered the SEA support arena. It was readily evident that TAC was going to need assistance, and rapidly. It was also apparent that large numbers of augmentees were going to be required in SEA, and quickly. Qualified replacements would have to be supplied soon.
The exact nature and extent of ATC support was not readily discernible in September 1965. It was evident, however, that ATC’s field training capability—probably the most flexible of its several training mediums—would have to be expanded.
One of the solutions considered at PACAF’s request
was the placing of Field Training Detachments (FTD), with their training
equipment, at the main operating SEA bases. However, ATC’s
experience in
The delivery of a fully qualified weapon system technician is a complex task—there just isn’t any way to provide instant work-area experience and job knowledge to a maintenance technician, particularly in light of the complexity of the modern jet fighter. Nor was there time or the resources in TAC to allow qualification routinely by lengthy (6 to 12 months) exposure to the flight-line environment.
Hq USAF, recognizing these factors, directed ATC to develop and implement jointly with TAC a special program to provide the fully qualified replacements needed.
ATC, normally the provider of individual training, which this requirement surely was, could not accomplish such a task alone. This was an added mission, requiring facilities and equipment not available in ATC within the needed time frame. TAC, the center of tactical warfare and by far the major supplier of units, equipment, and personnel for the SEA buildup, did possess the facilities, equipment, and essential qualification environment. So in November 1965 the ATC/TAC/SEA training program was born. Operating under the charter given by Hq USAF, ATC and TAC joined in a coordinated training effort that has since produced the best-qualified replacements ever provided operational units.
The essentials of the training program were the following: (1) ATC would conduct classroom training at TAC RTU sites with FTD’s, preferably with mobile training equipment. (2) TAC would provide practical, on-the-job training (OJT) in conjunction with the FTD formal training. The goal was to provide a fully oriented individual, and our formal FTD training was redesigned and tailored to this end. TAC absorbed the SEA replacements directly into the work center and let them get their hands dirty in the real-world situation while undergoing enroute training.
Since TAC could no longer provide the numbers of replacement personnel needed, the question then was where to find the people to train. The solution was provided in a joint conference of ATC/TAC and MPC. The formula developed would utilize TAC’s inherent potential for work-area qualifying of maintenance personnel yet preserve TAC’s reservoir of the trained and qualified maintenance personnel essential to sustain the aircrew replacement training program. The formula called for training en route 50 percent of PACAF’s replacement requirements. These personnel would be withdrawn from other commands, such as ADC, MAC, and SAC. They would get full ATC/FTD and TAC/OJT training en route to their SEA assignment. Since only 5 or 7 levels were selected, they would already be skilled maintenance personnel, requiring only transition training to another weapon system. TAC would provide another 25 percent; these would also be 5- and 7-level personnel already qualified on the appropriate weapon system. The remaining 25 percent would be developed from 3-level graduates of ATC’s airman resident maintenance courses, who would be assigned to TAC as an intentional overmanning in order to gain work-area experience before being sent to SEA. The 3-level replacement would undergo the FTD/OJT cycle in a PCS status and be programmed to remain on base six months.
The scope and nature of the program was slowly developing, and by late November the immensity of the requirement began to take shape. Some measure of the scope could be obtained from the size and composition of the force that needed support: 10 F-4C, 5 F-100, and 5 F-105 squadrons, plus an unspecified number of RF-4C, RB-66, RF-101, and C-130 aircraft. PACAF had estimated that at least 6000 augmentation personnel might be required. The replacement trained personnel requirements (TPR) were estimated to be even greater—the estimates for the three fighter systems alone for 1966 totaled 7000, the preponderance of whom would need training.
Because of the size and urgency of the augmentation requirement, the decision was made by ATC/TAC and MPC to provide only FTD training, with limited practical experience, in as expeditious a manner as possible. The augmentees trained from 31 January through 18 May 1966 numbered 1813.
ATC designated FTD’s, supplemented in some
instances by travel teams, at 16 bases: for F-4 training, MacDill,
Davis-Monthan, George, and Eglin were selected; F-105
training sites were Seymour Johnson, Nellis, and
McConnell; F-100 sites were
By July 1966, the machinery designed jointly by ATC and TAC to sustain the units in SEA with system-qualified personnel was established and operating. The program had begun 6 months earlier to provide some 1800 additional personnel to reconcile the differences between ZI operation and overseas combat operation. This task had been completed in May 1966. Originally we had planned to train 3600 replacements for PACAF between July and December 1966, based on the formula devised to train en route 50 percent of the total PACAF requirement, which was 7000. However, in April 1966 PACAF furnished a more definitive TPR calling for 4813 personnel to be trained en route by May 1967. This TPR included replacements for some of the augmentees just trained. Adjusting the plan was eased by the fact that the program was in-being and that TPR’s could be projected with some assurance.
Although it appeared that the rough spots were being ironed out in the
replacement training program, there were certain inherent factors that had to
be considered because they complicated the effort that was being expended. It
was recognized that the already emplaced FTD’s at the
TAC bases were the most logical means for providing the replacement training;
however, these units were initially there to support TAC basic needs, not the
SEA requirement. The concurrent buildup of TAC units could not be overlooked by
those doing the programming for SEA support, since the need for replacement
aircrews in SEA was as critical as the need for maintenance replacements.
Limited troop housing at Shaw, TAC’s
By late 1966 evidence began to appear that a situation was developing which would render the training program less effective and would depress the skill level of the people being sent to SEA. The basis of the situation stemmed from the formula established for providing the personnel, specifically that part which levied on TAC one-half of the total SEA replacement requirements, of which 50 percent were to be 5 or 7 skill level. TAC no longer was capable of providing this caliber of personnel, and initial implications were that ATC would be required to train larger numbers of 5 and 7 personnel in the en route training program. The situation was eased, though, when PACAF agreed to accept 34 percent of the total replacement requirements as 3-level weapon-system qualified. This eased the strain on TAC’s resources by reducing its requirement for qualified 5- and 7-level personnel from 25 percent to 16 percent of the total SEA requirement. Despite PACAF’s revising the requirements downward, the cold fact remained that ConUS resources had been depleted severely. The situation was so critical that one base had to resort to the temporary hiring of civilian contract maintenance personnel to support local maintenance requirements. Further, the input of 3-level technical school graduates into the ConUS maintenance complexes was steadily increasing, with no end in sight. ATC would need at least 68 more instructors for the FTD’s supporting TAC to handle training loads just through the remainder of FY 1967.
Stability of the ATC instructor force was also a concern, for ATC FTD
instructors formed a pool of weapon-system-qualified maintenance personnel to
be drawn upon to satisfy the needs of SEA. The computers in the
As always, ATC was not satisfied merely to deliver gross numbers of
personnel to meet requirements; the quality of the individual was a concern
also. Evaluations of the training made afterward by the students themselves
indicated that a satisfying level of success was being attained, but this
assurance was not sufficient to satisfy ATC’s concern
completely. Accordingly, a plan was instituted to evaluate the student after he
began serving at his overseas assignment. The means for accomplishing this were
to be a mailed questionnaire/critique form, on-the-spot evaluations by ATC
traveling team instructors, spot checks by the ATC Liaison Officer to Seventh
Air Force in
The end-of-course critiques by the students almost universally showed satisfaction with course content, although a fairly common complaint was that some courses were longer than necessary. Fairly common, too, were complaints about lack of trainers, training and test equipment, and training materials. A shortage of technical data drew some criticism but subsided as soon as additional technical orders became available. Student facilities also received a fair share of criticism, mainly of housing, transportation, and overcrowded classrooms. But in spite of these conditions, overall ratings of “good” and “very good” predominated. This, then, indicated the measure of success being achieved in what could be classified as a rapid response to an add-on, unprogrammed requirement.
The success of the program must be attributed in part to the instructors’ thorough understanding of their role in the training task and to their achievement in motivating the students.
In summation, ATC’s support of the buildup in SEA tactical units was at first the providing of individual training to personnel required to augment those units. This was accomplished from January through May 1966. Replacement training began immediately thereafter and continues to date. The total trained so far in this unique TAC/ATC program exceeds 12,000. For the future, ATC foresees expansion of the training concept and scope to encompass all aircraft support personnel in SEA. Aircraft such as the helicopters, nonjet fighters, and assault airlift are being considered now. ATC believes that the growing need for qualified replacements who are ready to be productively employed on arrival can only be provided by this type of training program. The complexity of today’s aircraft demands the cohesiveness of formal training in conjunction with practical work-area exposure.
Hq
Air Training Command
Major Frank F. E. Hense, Jr., (B.G.E.,
University of Omaha) is training manager for Air Training Command technical
training activities in support of the F/RF-4 weapon system, assigned at
Randolph AFB, Texas since 1966. After completing flying training in 1952, he
served with the 449th Fighter Interceptor Squadron in
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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