Air University Review, November-December 1968

Aerospace Defense and National Security

Lieutenant General Arthur C. Agan

The strategic offensive capability of the Soviet Union is being strengthened across the aerospace spectrum. The Soviets are continuing to deploy improved ballistic missiles of intercontinental range at a rapid rate. In addition, they are making significant improvements in their submarine-launched missile force. There has been no apparent decline in Soviet long-range bomber strength despite the ballistic missile buildup. They are continuing to produce heavy and medium bomber aircraft. They also have the technical ability to develop a supersonic intercontinental bomber. In space, the Soviets are intensively testing a fractional orbit bombardment system. After launch into a low orbital profile, such a weapon could deorbit a nuclear warhead onto a chosen target during its first revolution of the earth. They are pursuing a large-scale military research and development program. Their expenditures on aerospace research have increased steadily, and they have greatly expanded their weapon testing operations.

Overall consideration of the Soviet activities described leads to several fundamental deductions which have significant implications for the future security of the United States.

The possibility of a strategic nuclear attack through the aerospace medium remains a most dangerous military threat to this country. The real intent behind the Soviets’ current military expansion is, of course, a matter of conjecture. It may be that they are seeking only to improve their deterrent posture vis-à-vis the United States. On the other hand, it is also possible that they are attempting to achieve a first-strike capability aimed at overcoming our deterrent. The fact remains that the forces involved in their current buildup are primarily those which could be used for direct attack on this country. Should the time come when they believe their relative strategic strength has reached a point where they could defeat the United States without suffering unacceptable (in their view) damage in return, the attempt might be made. The consequences of such a possibility are so awesome that it must be guarded against as a matter of highest priority.

If a direct attack on the United States were attempted, it could comprise a diversity of nuclear delivery vehicles employed against us through a region extending from the earth’s surface to low orbital altitudes. Such an attack might begin by discriminating strikes against selected targets for coercive purposes. On the other hand, it could entail a massive surprise attack in which the full range of available aerospace weapons would be initially used.

Ballistic missiles launched from land and sea would probably spearhead the attack. Early last year, then Soviet Defense Minister Malinovski stated categorically that in their military planning “first priority is being given to the strategic missile forces and atomic missile-launching submarines-forces which are the principal means of deterring the aggressor and decisively defeating him in war.”

Strikes by manned bombers delivering gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles could be expected to follow the ballistic missile attack. The significant role played by bombers in Soviet strategic exercises and their increasing use in probes around the U.S. perimeter attest to the importance which the Soviets place on this offensive weapon. In an official statement made in April 1966, the Soviet Minister of Defense pointed out that the Soviet Union continues to count on the additional contribution to its strategic delivery capability provided by long-range bombers equipped with missiles for “stand-off” attacks on enemy targets.

Additionally, certain targets in this country might be struck by nuclear warheads delivered by a fractional orbit bombardment vehicle launched on a low orbital profile across either the northern or southern approaches to the United States. While this system probably does not have a high order of accuracy at this time, the Soviets might believe it to be useful for surprise strikes against soft targets.

The cornerstone of our national military policy is deterrence of an attack on the United States and its allies. A would-be aggressor is deterred from such attacks only if he is convinced that our military power and national resolve will cause him unacceptable damage if he provokes war. An effective aerospace defense, able to provide warning and active protection against attack, is an essential ingredient in convincing a potential enemy that we do possess such power and resolve.

An effective aerospace defense introduces an element of uncertainty into any aggressor’s attack planning. It tells him, first, that he cannot count on surprise and, second, that an indeterminate portion of his attacking forces will be destroyed en route to target. As a result, he knows that he can never calculate with accuracy the effectiveness of a premeditated attack on this country.

A strong aerospace defense posture lends credence to the United States’ resolve to halt limited aggression that endangers our national interests anywhere in the world. It is a major indicator to both friend and foe of our willingness and intent to take whatever steps are necessary to support our positions-even at the risk of accepting direct attack. In other words, by bolstering our security at home, aerospace defense gives us freedom of action to deal with aggression abroad.

An economic deterrent is also served. By reacting to the U.S. aerospace defense posture, our most powerful adversary must divert resources into more sophisticated and costly offensive weapons. He is forced to increase his budget for qualitative and quantitative improvements to his offensive forces or fall behind in strategic posture. Although this form of deterrence is a two-way street, it works to the advantage of the nation with the better economic base. Also, small unfriendly countries are inhibited from acquiring nuclear delivery systems for use in an attempt to blackmail us.

These are the several ways in which aerospace defense strengthens our ability to deter. Nevertheless, we must face the possibility that deterrence can fail—and general war ensue—because of an aggressor’s miscalculations or irrational acts. If that occurs, aerospace defense may well be the deciding factor in whether or not the United States survives the conflict in an advantageous position.

One of the most significant contributions of an effective aerospace defense in case of a general war would be to provide warning of attack, giving us time to alert our offensive and defensive forces and implement our contingency plans at home and overseas.

Our retaliatory forces can be actively protected by the destruction of enemy weapons en route. In a controlled attrition situation, aerospace defense can be of particular value in preserving the integrity of forces we might withhold for various attack options. It would also provide surveillance data on the status and employment of enemy aerospace forces for use by our national command authorities in battle management. By reducing the destructive nuclear force delivered on this country, our aerospace defense can limit damage to our population and industrial resources and thereby increase the chances of our survival as a viable nation. For these reasons, an effective aerospace defense is essential to both the deterrent and the war-fighting capabilities of the United States. It will remain essential as far into the future as can possibly be seen.

Our forces must be equipped, trained, and employed for detection of potential aerospace threats, determination of intent of unknown objects, and destruction or neutralization of hostile weapons. The weapons and employment techniques used to perform these functions must keep abreast of advancing technology, which is drastically compressing time and distance parameters.

A fundamental concept of aerospace defense is to deploy a family of weapons in such a way as to provide area defense in depth. Under this concept, long-range weapons are used to engage hostile aerospace forces as close as possible to their point of origin. This permits a defense force of manageable size to provide a basic level of protection to all potential targets regardless of their specific location or relative importance. It lets the defense seize the initiative and engage the enemy when he is most vulnerable. It complicates the enemy’s tactics and destroys the orderliness of his attack. Thus it provides us the opportunity for reattacks, if required.

A weapons mix is needed because it permits engagement of the enemy force all along his route of attack, permits the advantages of one type of weapon to offset the limitations of another, insures that effective enemy counter of one type of weapon will not completely degrade the entire defense system, and allows the defense to be supplemented around selected vital targets.

In addition to providing aerospace defense of the United States, the Aerospace Defense Command provides forces for defense of overseas land areas, as required. One of the specific responsibilities assigned to ADC, as a major USAF command, is to propose requirements for new systems and equipment to meet our aerospace defense needs.

In this regard, boost and mid-course phase intercept of ballistic missiles would provide a defense in depth to counter the potential threat posed by multiple warheads and penetration aids, which are vulnerable to counter-measures in different ways in different parts of the trajectory.

Another objective is to improve our capability against atmospheric threats. The recently approved program for an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) will extend substantially our surveillance and warning capabilities against enemy bombers. But a better manned interceptor—having increased speed and range as well as more effective armament—is essential for the time when supersonic transports with bomber potential become operational. Such an interceptor could exploit more fully the range capabilities of AWACS. Also, when employed in combination with AWACS, it would provide a highly mobile air defense package that could be deployed rapidly to any part of the world.

We are working on expansion of our space surveillance and warning and control capability. At present, we have a good detection system, with the ability to maintain an ephemeris of objects in space. But we lack the ability to perform precise, continuous tracking of all satellites, and we are unable to determine their nature quickly and accurately. We require this capability in order to provide warning and battle management data for selective response and control of active defense weapons.

In summary, I believe that the United States must maintain a proper balance of offensive and defensive forces that can destroy any would-be aggressor, even after undergoing a massive nuclear attack, while simultaneously limiting damage to ourselves. This requires an effective aerospace defense able to provide surveillance, warning, and active protection against such attack. A family of weapons is needed to permit area defense in depth.

The need for an effective aerospace defense must be viewed in the context of its overall contributions to national security. It plays a significant role in deterring war. Should deterrence fail, an effective aerospace defense can mean the difference between our destruction and our survival as a sovereign nation.

Hq Aerospace Defense Command

Contributor

Lieutenant General Arthur C. Agan (B.B.A., University of Texas) is Commander, Aerospace Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado. Commissioned after flying training, 1937, he obtained a regular commission through competitive examination, 1939. He served as Chief of Tactical Operations, Hq Eighth Air Force, England, 1942-44. As Assistant Air Chief of Staff for Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Commander, 1st Fighter Group, he flew 45 missions before being shot down in March 1945 and interned as a POW. Postwar assignments have been as Chief, Personnel Services Division, Hq AAF, 1946; Deputy for Personnel and Administration, ADC and Continental Air Command, to 1949; Commander, 4th Fighter Wing and 33d Fighter Wing, to 1951. Commander, 32d Air Division; Chief of Personnel and Administration, Air Command and Staff School; student, Air War College, 1953; Commander, 58th Fighter Bomber Wing, Korea, 1953; Deputy for Operations, later Chief of Staff, Continental Air Defense Command, Eastern Region, 1954-57; Commander, 26th Air Division; Commander, New York Air Defense Sector, 1958-59; DCS/Plans, Hq ADC, to 1963; Commander, 26th Air Division (SAGE), to 1964; Director of Plans, DCS/P&O. Hq USAF, 1964, and ADCS/P&O, to 1966; and Vice Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Europe, until he assumed his present duties, August 1967.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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