Air University Review, May-June 1968

The Soviet Drive for Strategic Superiority

Harriet Fast Scott

In the fall of 1967 the United States Secretary of Defense informed the public of Soviet fractional orbiting bombardment systems (FOBS). The very few Americans who had read the 1967 edition of Soviet Rocket Troops were not surprised.* According to this book, Soviet military leaders had already advised their public:

. . . into the armaments of the troops constantly come new kinds of weapons and combat equipment, among which are orbiting rockets, small caliber solid-fueled intercontinental rockets on self-propelled launchers, and also fully automatic complexes of strategic rockets, characterized by exceptionally high reliability and combat readiness. (p. 5, 1967 ed.)

Colonel Astashenkov is the editor of the Soviet aerospace magazine Aviation and Cosmonautics. General Colonel Tolubko is First Deputy Commander in Chief, Strategic Rocket Troops. In January 1966 there was considerable speculation in the United States concerning the purpose of Tolubko’s visit to North Vietnam.

While military and civilian leaders in the United States were seeking a letup in the nuclear arms race, the Soviets were stating:

A remarkable novelty is the solid-fueled rocket of intercontinental and medium range on self-propelled launchers. Not one army in the world has a similar effective weapon. Such strategic rockets constantly change their position and cannot be reconnaissanced and detroyed by the enemy. . . .

Our stationary launch installations also have remarkable qualities. They are carefully camouflaged from air and space reconnaissance and are reliably protected from nuclear strikes. . . Especially indicative of the might of our rocket troops is the fact that they can launch from underground, not one rocket, but can give a rocket salvo. (p. 100, 1967 ed.)

For those interested in antiballistic missile systems, this official publication of the Soviet Military Publishing House informs that

One of our antirocket complexes includes long-range pilotless interceptors. During practice shots, with the help of such antirockets, the warheads of ballistic rockets were accurately intercepted while flying at cosmic speed. Still more effective are other Soviet antirockets. They can destroy warheads of ballistic rockets at enormous distances from protected objects. (p. 226, 1967 ed.)

It is seldom that one has an opportunity to compare two editions of a book on such a vital topic, with such an interesting period of history taking place between publication dates. For in 1964, when the first edition appeared in Moscow bookstores, Khrushchev was still in power. The second edition appeared after the regime of Brezhnev was well under way and after new guidelines had been established at the meeting of the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1966.

What are the significant changes that have taken place in the Soviet Armed Forces between 1964 and 1967, as reflected by these two editions of Soviet Rocket Troops? The 1964 edition had asserted:

Speaking in 1960 at the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev has stressed that in contemporary conditions war will little resemble previous wars. Now war will begin differently, if it begins, and unfold differently. In conditions when states have means of delivering nuclear weapons over thousands of kilometers, war will begin first of all in the depths of the belligerent countries. In this, there will not be one capital, not one major industrial or administrative center, not one strategic region, which will not undergo strikes not only in the first days, but even in the first minutes of the war. (p. 191)

This same paragraph was in the 1967 edition, with but one change in the first part of the first sentence:

Our press has stressed that in contemporary conditions war will little resemble previous wars. (p. 278)

The Soviets have reason to be so sensitive to Mao Tse-tung’s accusations that Brezhnev and Kosygin are, in fact, following a policy which can best be described as “Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.” No basic change in doctrine and strategy is reflected in the two editions of Soviet Rocket Troops. The statement is made in the first edition:

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, a genuine technical revolution has taken place in the Soviet Armed Forces. (p. 2, publisher’s note)

The second edition continues the explanation of this revolution and its impact upon the posture of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The major organizational change in the United States armed forces after World War II was the establishment of a separate Air Force. The Soviet Union, however, has formed five services: Strategic Rocket Troops, Aerospace Defense Troops, Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces. Each of these five services (Vidi) has its own commander in chief. The Strategic Rocket Troops, created in 1960, always is referred to as the “main service,” and its commander in chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Krylov, takes precedence over the other commanders. The next service, Aerospace Defense Troops (PVO), provides protection against manned aircraft and missile and space attacks. The antimissile component (PRO) is referred to as the most important part of the Aerospace Defense Troops. The antispace component (PKO) is mentioned with some frequency.

It sometimes is assumed that the Strategic Rocket Troops is the only Soviet service concerned with rockets. In fact, however, the “revolution in military affairs” has resulted in the other four services being reorganized to give a central place to their own rocket capabilities. For example, the defense against manned aircraft in the Aerospace Defense Troops is based primarily upon the famed SA-2 surface-to-air missile, which is now well known in the United States as a result of its being supplied to North Vietnam. (In the Soviet Union the SA-2 likely would carry a nuclear warhead.) The antimissile and antispace components of the Aerospace Defense Troops also are armed with nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Ground Forces have a Rocket Troops and Artillery Branch which provides their tactical nuclear missiles. The tactics of the Soviet infantry and tank units are based primarily on tactical nuclear weapons, which would be fired by the Rocket Troops and Artillery Branch. (p.180, 1967 ed.) The rockets, many of which are mounted on self-propelled carriers, would not be effective weapons when using only conventional explosives.

The Soviet Air Forces also utilize rockets. Aircraft of long-range aviation would launch air-to-ground rockets well outside the opponent’s air defense network. Air-to-air combat is fought with air-to-air rockets, armed with conventional warheads in North Vietnam but probably nuclear-armed over the Soviet Union.

The submarine, carrying nuclear-armed missiles, is the main strike force of the Soviet Navy. Surface ships also are armed with nuclear missiles.

This technical revolution is one major aspect of the Soviet revolution in military affairs. There are three stages to the revolution: the first was the development of the nuclear weapon; the second, the combining of the weapon with the missile; and the third stage, which still continues, is the use of cybernetics in command and control, both of weapons and of personnel.

Both editions of Soviet Rocket Troops carry identical paragraphs on the Soviet concept of a future war if nuclear powers are involved:

With the nuclear rocket weapon present, the content and order of direct preparation of the armed forces for war has changed. The great range of action of strategic rockets excludes the necessity of moving them to the border, and permits carrying out strikes from the place of their permanent basing. This raises the danger of the surprise unleashing of war by the aggressor in contemporary circumstances and dictates the necessity to maintain constant readiness to frustrate and repulse a surprise attack by the enemy. . . .

The presence of rockets influences the cooperation of various services of the armed forces. It is well known that the firing means of ground forces in the past had a range of 20 kilometers into the depth of the enemy location. From this it is clear what sort of fire support, for example, they might give to fleet operation. Now it is a different matter—the ground troops and fleet can mutually support each other “with rocket fire” at a distance which is very significant and incomparable with anything in the past. (p. 192, 1964 ed.; p.279, 1967 ed.)

This book should be studied carefully by those who make or influence foreign and military policy in the United States. Our military leadership now is going to those officers who have had recent experience in Southeast Asia. Concerned with a technologically inferior opponent, these officers may fail to see the significance of the Soviet drive for strategic superiority in all aspects of warfare, with emphasis on nuclear weaponry and missiles. If strategic superiority does pass to the Soviet Union, or if even parity is reached, dare the United States risk a limited war on the Asian mainland, or elsewhere?

McLean, Virginia

*P. T. Astashenkov, Soviet Engineer Colonel, Soviet Rocket Troops, ed. General Colonel V. F. Tolublm (Moscow: Military Publishing House; first edition, 1964, 234 pages, price 37 kopeks, initial printing 30,000 copies; second edition, 1967, 344 pages, price 67 kopeks [about 75 cents], initial printing 11,000 copies).


Contributor

Harriet Fast Scott has lived and traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union as wife of Colonel William F. Scott, U.S. Air Attaché, 1962-64. Her fluency in the Russian language and her familiarity with Russian military writing have been reflected in articles in Military Review and in selections and translations from the Soviet military press appearing in the Pentagon’s Current News and The Friday Review of Defense Literature. With Dr. William R. Kintner, Mrs. Scott is co-author of a recent book, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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