Air University Review, March-April 1968

Air Superiority
in Tactical Air Warfare

General Bruce K. Holloway

Twenty-six million living Americans are veterans of military service, and most of them have served in wartime. How many of these 26 million ever had to face an enemy who held air superiority?

Not many: the 20,000 Army, Air Corps, and Marine troops who were cut off and overrun in the Philippines immediately after Pearl Harbor; scattered units in the Pacific during the early days of World War II; the soldiers and airmen in the Southwest Pacific prior to our defeat of Japanese air power at Wewak in August 1943: U.S. forces in North Africa up to the battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943. In all, probably no more than one out of 50, for after February 1943 the U.S. and our allies had undisputed air superiority in the Mediterranean and Western Europe; after August of 1943 we had it in the Pacific. From that time on, there were isolated and relatively rare instances in which our opponents gained temporary, local air superiority, especially in the Pacific, but these were the exceptions.

In Korea we won air superiority twice—from the North Korean Air Force in the first two months of that war, and again from the Chinese Air Force after November 1950. The latter was a novel kind of air superiority, prophetic of things to come; I will discuss it later. In South Vietnam, our air superiority has come by default. In North Vietnam it has yet to be seriously challenged.

A generation of American fighting men has almost forgotten what it is like not to have air superiority—what it is like to lose mobility except by night; to be cut off from supplies and reinforcements; to be constantly under the watchful eye of enemy reconnaissance aircraft; to be always vulnerable to strafing and bombing attacks; to see one’s fighters and bombers burn on their hardstands; to be outnumbered, outgunned, and outmaneuvered in the air.

We sometimes forget, too, the cost of gaining air superiority from a well-equipped, well-trained, and determined enemy. In the European and Mediterranean Theaters alone, U.S. air forces lost 4325 fighters and bombers prior to June 1944. Nearly 17,000 of our aircrew people were killed in action, and more than 21,000 were missing or prisoners of war. The fighter losses were largely a result of the battle for air superiority. A major part of our bomber effort in preparation for the Allied invasion was devoted directly or indirectly to the air superiority mission.

From D-Day until the German surrender on 8 May 1945, a period of eleven months, the U.S. Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and the First Tactical Air Force flew 320,000 sorties to maintain the air superiority that we had won at so great a cost. This was about 25 percent of the total number of sorties flown during that eleven-month period. In addition to these sorties, fighters of the Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy gained air superiority there and carried fighter sweeps and escort missions deep into Germany.

Air superiority came hard and high. Although the Allied air forces had won air supremacy over Normandy and the Channel coast by the time of the invasion, Luftwaffe attacks on our bomber formations continued at a high level throughout the fall and winter of 1944-45. Not until the closing days of the war was theater-wide air supremacy finally achieved.

We entered World War II underestimating the importance of air superiority and the difficulty of winning it. We were unprepared both qualitatively and quantitatively. But we emerged from that war with an unrivaled mastery of the employment of air power. We learned the hard way that air superiority is the key to effective use of air power, which is in turn the key to successful surface operations.

In the years since then, that lesson seemed to be forgotten or ignored, or set aside, twice and relearned twice: first, in the period between World War II and the Korean War, when hopes for a stable, peaceful world were high. Korea at least temporarily changed that hope. Again between 1954 and the early 1960s there was a widely held belief that strategic nuclear superiority was virtually a universal deterrent and that any war which happened by accident or miscalculation was likely to be measured in terms of hours or days. In that context, tactical air superiority was again neglected.

The United States was not the only nation that learned in World War II the value of air superiority and the exorbitant cost of not having it. Hitler launched his attack on the Soviet Union with 164 divisions supported by 2000 German combat aircraft and 700 combat aircraft of his allies. The Russians opposed that force with about 119 divisions and some 5000 aircraft, most of them designed for support of ground forces. Within a week the Luftwaffe, with superior fighter aircraft and pilots, had achieved air superiority on the Eastern Front. Probably more than 4000 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air during that week. Luftwaffe fighter pilots scored phenomenal numbers of kills against inferior Soviet aircraft. They continued to shoot down Soviet aircraft wholesale until the Allied offensive had turned full-tide against Germany; her fighters were deprived of bases, fuel, and supplies; and the U.S.S.R. had achieved air superiority on the Eastern Front. This expensive lesson in air superiority was not lost on Soviet airmen.

Five years after V-E Day the Soviets were putting into the field jet fighters that were technically the equal of any air superiority fighter in the world. Before the close of 1950 we were to find out in MIG Alley just how good their fighters were.

Air Superiority—
What and How Much?

Air superiority is a relative term, relative in both degree and scope. It is officially denned as “that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.” That official definition establishes a minimum requirement for air superiority: the elimination of prohibitive interference. We want always to do much better than that.

At the other end of the air superiority spectrum lies air supremacy, “that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.” That desirable goal may be unattainable, even unnecessary, against either a formidable opponent (such as the Japanese Air Force of World War II) or a less formidable enemy operating from sanctuaries (the Chinese Air Force during the second phase of the Korean War) or a minor power whose equipment is supplied by a noncombatant third power (as in Vietnam).

In China during World War II our air superiority was, indeed, relative. We were constantly outnumbered by enemy fighters and bombers; we were inadequately supplied and equipped with what was left over after the higher-priority theaters were taken care of. Despite these handicaps, we were able to maintain air superiority at times and places of our choosing. In three years of operations, the Fourteenth Air Force destroyed 2300 enemy aircraft at a cost of 500 of our own bombers and fighters lost from all causes, combat and noncombat. The 23d Fighter Group and its predecessor, the American Volunteer Group, shot down ten Japanese aircraft for every one of ours lost in combat—a total of 1238 kills. Our fighters and bombers sank and damaged more than two million tons of shipping, killed an estimated 60,000 enemy troops, and, together with the Chinese Army, tied down nearly a million Japanese troops in China.

Again, during the second phase of the Korean War, air superiority was relative, but in a different way. From November 1950 to June 1953, air battles between USAF F-86s and Chinese MIG-15s were waged continually along the Yalu. The kill ratio was heavily in our favor, but the Communist fighter force was never eliminated, since we were not able to attack its bases across the river in Manchuria. Nevertheless, we had a degree of air superiority approaching supremacy. The Communists were prevented from deploying their fighters to North Korea bases, which were continually neutralized by Far East Air Forces bombers and fighter-bombers as soon as they were completed. As a result of our bombers and fighters penning up the MIG’s, there were virtually no air attacks on U.S. troops or supply lines during the entire course of the war. Our interdiction attacks greatly complicated the enemy’s logistic problem, and by the war’s end USAF pilots claimed 145,000 enemy troops killed by air-to-surface firepower. Only three Americans are known to have been killed on the ground by enemy air action.

What constitutes an acceptable degree of air superiority will depend on a wide range of circumstances including the kind of war postulated, types of weapons employed, both geographical and political environments, and economic factors. This is a problem that has to be considered in our force planning. It involves some very difficult decisions on allocation of resources among mission areas, systems and subsystems, and force levels.

In a general nuclear war even immediate air supremacy would not be enough to prevent grave damage to our own country from an enemy’s striking force which included both missiles and bombers. A high level of air superiority could, however, decide the final outcome: which contestant emerged with the greater degree of viability. Whether such an outcome could be described as “victory” is another question. Losing less than an opponent seems at least better than losing more. But since there could be no winner in the traditional sense, our first-priority task is to deter general nuclear war on terms that do not involve a bargaining away of national objectives in order to avoid a nuclear exchange.

Air superiority is an important element in deterrence or in the outcome of general war. In many ways it is easier to plan for in general war than in other types of war, since the strategic bomber threat to this country is quite well known both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the options open to a potential enemy are fewer than in limited war or insurgency. We have available, or potentially available, warning systems, an advanced interceptor, and an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) to supplement missiles as a counter to the threat of general war. I do not propose to deal in any greater detail with this special area of air superiority but rather will limit my observations to theater air superiority, which is primarily a task for tactical air forces.

Air Superiority—
How and With What?

Air superiority begins far from the battlefield and long before the battle. Often the tendency is to look first and perhaps only at the end process, the battle itself, and to ignore that portion of the air superiority iceberg lying below the surface.

What are the elements that underlie the battle for air superiority? There are at least six.

Perhaps the starting point is intelligence information concerning the quantitative and qualitative strength of the potential enemy’s forces, his research and development activities, and the courses of action open to him. This information is helpful in determining both the design characteristics of our fighters and our force levels. But because of the lead time required to take an advanced fighter from concept to flight line, intelligence is not an infallible index of long-range requirements. The Soviets may not themselves know what their newest fighters will be like in, say, 1975, and certainly they have not settled on force levels for that period any more than we have. Nevertheless, technical intelligence is a useful long-range guide, and in the short term it can provide us valuable information on hardware in-being, tactics, training programs, and deployments.

A second element of air superiority is our own scientific/technical/industrial competence and capacity. In this respect the United States enjoys a potential advantage that is unmatched by any other country, particularly in industrial capacity—and industrial capacity is a major determinant of success in a long war of attrition. In World War II we did not gain air superiority in any major theater of operations until we had achieved numerical superiority in fighter aircraft.

During that war the eleven leading U.S. aircraft companies produced 229,554 planes. Contrasting these figures with recent approved buys of military aircraft, including Army helicopters and light aircraft (between 2300 and 3000 a year), gives a rough indication of the additional capacity that could be generated in an emergency.

But we cannot count on throwing a switch and increasing production overnight by a factor of ten or five or even two. Hot production lines are a requisite for rapidly accelerating the output of current models. The lead time for developing and producing a new advanced aircraft is considerable; under optimum conditions it is probably between three and five years, depending on the type of aircraft. And production of aircraft does not alone bring a combat force into being. Crews have to be trained, a wide range of supporting systems and procedures provided. Scientific and technical competence are essential but not a safe substitute for forces-in-being.

One of the most important but least tangible elements of air superiority is doctrine. This is a great lesson of World War II, where faulty doctrine brought us close to disaster in the European Theater.

During the 1920s and ‘30s, air leaders had given lip service, but not much more, to air superiority. The belief was widely held that bomber attacks on enemy industry and population centers would force surrender early—perhaps without the commitment of huge ground forces. Most airmen agreed that enemy “pursuit” aviation, as it then was called, could not seriously interfere with a determined bomber attack.

As a result of the lack of emphasis on fighter aviation, VIII Fighter Command P-38s and P-47s based in England were severely range-limited when they first were committed to combat in 1943. They could escort the bombers only to the European coast or a little beyond and could not stage offensive fighter sweeps to clear the skies of enemy fighters. The myth of bomber invulnerability was exploded over Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Kiel, and other targets in Germany before the end of that first year of combat, with losses on some missions running as high as 50 percent. After the second Schweinfurt raid of 14 October 1943 (Black Thursday), no more unescorted bomber penetrations were attempted until the Luftwaffe fighter threat had been reduced.

Belated attention was given to fighter range extension in late 1943. P-47 combat radius was extended from 175 miles to 400 miles with belly tanks. Our fighters began scoring heavily on offensive fighter sweeps into Germany, and by the spring of 1944 the tables had been turned. The Allies were in control of the air over Germany. The arrival of the P-51 in the summer of 1944 tightened this control. By war’s end, the P-51’s radius of action was greater than that of the B-17, and our mastery of German skies was complete.*

Many of the World War II lessons are still relevant today, even though weapon systems have changed drastically in the intervening 25 years. One of the most important lessons is the early advantage held by the side that enters a war with sound doctrine.

After World War II, our doctrine—so far as air superiority was concerned—lay dormant while we adjusted to nuclear weapons and stringent budgets. We were concerned primarily with the fighter’s interceptor role, not with a possible battle for tactical air superiority.

The Korean War saw a revival of World War II doctrine, with some modifications. But after 1953, air superiority, so far as fighter aircraft were concerned, was again limited largely to the defense of the U.S. against enemy bombers. Our tactical fighters were designed primarily for nuclear war where penetration was more important than maneuverability, ordnance load-carrying ability more important than armament, alert status more important than sustained sortie rates. The tactical fighter became less and less an air superiority system, more and more what once was called an attack aircraft.

Since the beginnings of jet aviation, it is only in the last three years that real recognition has been given to the need for a true air superiority fighter in the types of war most likely to occur. With the exception of the F-4 we do not, even now, have a first-line tactical fighter that was designed primarily for air-to-air combat and only secondarily for the reconnaissance, interdiction, and close air support roles of tactical aviation. We now see quite clearly the need for one.

Throughout history, doctrine developed in time of peace more often than not has failed to stand the test of war. Quite consistently, it has had to be drastically modified or scrapped altogether once the shooting started. The side that refused, or was unable, to change its doctrine fought at a disadvantage. Witness the Luftwaffe of World War II.

We have better methods and means for studying doctrine (and tactics) than in the past, and a better appreciation of its importance. We therefore should do better in the future, but with no guarantee of infallibility. Flexibility and depth of forces are two hedges against man’s inability to see into the future with clarity.

The other elements of air superiority that I’d like to discuss all relate directly to people. They are professional experience, training, and command judgment.

It probably is not possible to quantify the value of professional experience—of combat experience. We all know it is important; but how important and how to weight combat experience as compared to technical factors and to an opponent’s experience curve are questions with no clear answers.

Germany’s leading World War II ace, Erich Hartmann, is a good example of the value of experience. All of the 352 air-to-air victories credited to Hartmann were against Soviet pilots except for 7 U.S. fighters claimed over Ploesti. After 100 missions on the Eastern Front, he had scored 7 victories. Three months later, with 200 missions, his score stood at 34 kills. The following month (August 1943), he shot down 49 Russian aircraft; in September, 25; in October, 33. Several times in the later stages of his combat career he was credited with shooting down an enemy aircraft with a single cannon shell.

The value of experience also was clearly evident in Korea. Thirty-nine USAF pilots became jet aces in that war, but only five were below the rank of captain. As a group, they averaged about 2500 hours’ flying time, 2000 hours in fighters, 80 previous combat missions, and two World War II victories. These 39 jet aces accounted for 312 MIG kills, or 40 percent of all MIG’s shot down.

Our Vietnam experience has been somewhat comparable to Korea but not exactly parallel, since most of our World War II fighter pilots and many of the Korean veterans either are no longer on active duty or are not available for cockpit assignments. But the USAF pilots who have shot down MIG-17s and -21s over North Vietnam averaged 1779 hours’ flying time and 1250 hours in jets as of December 1967.

The level of recent combat experience in the USAF is higher than that of any other air force. We should not, however, overstress the kill ratios achieved by U.S. fighter pilots in the latter stages of World War II, when we had heavy numerical superiority over enemy air forces that had already lost a high percentage of their experienced pilots. Or in Korea, where combat-experienced USAF pilots were matched against new and inexperienced North Korean and Chinese air forces. It is tempting to assume that similar kill ratios would apply against the experienced, well-trained pilots of a major power; hence that we can accept technical parity or numerical inferiority or both. We cannot rely on experience as a substitute for technical excellence, sound doctrine and tactics, and adequately sized forces.

Obviously, not all pilots committed to battle will have had previous combat experience. Training, then, becomes an important element in air superiority. Between 1954 and 1962 the USAF training curriculum for fighter pilots included little, if any, air-to-air combat. This omission was partly a result of doctrine, which then regarded tactical fighters primarily as a means for delivering nuclear ordnance. It was part1y a reflection of concern for flying safety. In any event, as late as October 1963 it was reported that only four of 30 pilots in one fighter squadron had ever shot aerial gunnery. This deficiency has been corrected. Aerial gunnery, missile firing, and combat maneuvering are now important parts of the training program.

A final element in the air superiority equation is command judgment in the use of tactical air resources. That judgment has to be based on experience, assisted by the best operations analysis that can be done in an often fast-developing situation. It is a decisive element in the battle for air superiority. Correct allocation of effort among tactical air tasks spells the difference between success and failure. Without air superiority the other tasks, and hence surface operations, are much less likely to succeed.

A properly balanced force allows the commander maximum flexibility in the allocation of his resources. All tactical combat aircraft are effective in varying degrees in interdiction and close air support. But not all tactical aircraft were designed for or are effective in air-to-air combat (the A-7, for example, which is an attack aircraft rather than fighter). The Air Force is attempting to determine the mix of tactical aircraft types that will allow us to carry out most effectively our tactical air missions under combat conditions that can be reasonably postulated. It seems highly unlikely that there will again be an all-purpose tactical aircraft, like the P-51, that can meet standards of technical feasibility and cost effectiveness. An acceptable degree of design compromise probably will continue to narrow, but it is likely to remain greater in an aircraft intended primarily for air-to-surface missions than in an air superiority fighter.

Air Superiority
in the Future

Planning for air superiority in the future has to be based on three cardinal points:

(1) Control of the air will continue to be a first-priority military objective, since the effectiveness of all other tactical air force tasks, the freedom of maneuver of surface forces, and hence the likelihood of successful surface operations depend on it.

(2) We cannot assume that air superiority will be achieved by default at any level of conflict.

(3) As the Chief of Staff stated in his letter on air superiority to the major commands, dated 3 May 1965: “Regardless of the tactical air task or mode of attack, survival of the fighter aircraft we commit is at some time likely to hinge on air-to-air capability.”

Achieving or maintaining air superiority in the kinds of war that are most likely to happen depends in a major way on two things: the ability to counter enemy surface-to-air missiles and gun fire, and the ability to defeat opposing fighters in air-to-air combat.

Of all enemy aircraft destroyed by AAF fighters in World War II, about 60 percent were shot down in air-to-air combat and 40 percent destroyed by fighter strafing or bombing. After the early elimination of the North Korean Air Force by bombers and fighters in the summer of 1950, maintaining air superiority against the Chinese Air Force in the Korean War was largely an air-to-air fighter show. In Vietnam, attacks on enemy fighters have been conducted entirely by U.S. fighter pilots, who have destroyed some enemy aircraft on the ground and 101 in aerial combat as of 31 December 1967.

Success in defeating or neutralizing the effects of surface-to-air fire is largely a function of electronic subsystems, with which we have gained a great deal of experience in Vietnam, and of refinement of our stand-off air-to-surface missiles. Further development of both electronic countermeasures and missiles certainly is related to, but largely independent of, tactical fighter development.

On the other hand, success against fighter aircraft that are likely to be in the Soviet inventory in the mid-1970s (and hence available to other potential U.S. opponents) cannot be assured by economically or technically feasible modifications of current U.S. fighters. The most pressing single air superiority problem is that of developing a fighter that will be superior in air-to-air combat to any that may fly against us.

In order to establish performance parameters for an air superiority fighter, we must have in mind the kinds of future wars in which the United States could become involved and the special fighter requirements these wars might create:

(1) Small to medium conventional wars with no well-defined battle lines. In a war of this kind—similar but not necessarily identical to Vietnam in political, geographical, and military environments—there might or might not be air opposition. If there were, the fighter aircraft probably would be Soviet-designed and would likely include current (but probably not the most advanced) types. In order to control this type of war and contain it at the lowest possible level, rapid establishment of air superiority would be an important objective. Quick reaction and the ability to operate from relatively undeveloped bases would be necessary. In addition, performance characteristics superior to those of first-line Soviet fighters would be mandatory, as they would be in all other types of war.

(2) Medium to large conventional wars contiguous to Soviet, Communist Chinese, or other Communist-controlled territory. In this type of war, there could be well-defined battle lines, and probably there would be high-quality air opposition. The likelihood of sanctuaries and necessary restrictions on military operations would reduce the opportunity to defeat air opposition by attacking the enemy’s air forces on the ground. This would put a heavy premium on air-to-air combat and would very likely make a superior combat radius highly desirable in our air superiority fighters.

(3) Large-scale conventional war against a major opponent, in which his most advanced fighter aircraft would be used against us. This kind of war would very likely become a war of attrition in which all our air resources could be used to gain air superiority—and all the enemy’s resources would be used against us. It would involve, on a recurring basis, combat in the air and attacks on air bases, communications, POL, surface-to-air defense, production bases, and other air facilities. It is quite likely that there would be no sanctuaries and that the restrictions on use of air power necessary in (1) and (2) above would not apply. Our own active air defense and passive measures would be an important factor in the counterair battle.

(4) Theater war, with low-yield nuclear weapons. Air-to-air combat capability would be extremely important in this type of war because of the destructive potential of the nuclear ordnance carried by even a single aircraft.

(5) High-intensity nuclear war. This is the only type of war in which the tactical air effort would be secondary to strategic forces.

All the varieties of combat in which our tactical fighters might engage have one thing in common. The opposition probably would be equipped with first- or second-string Soviet-designed fighters. Among the levels of war outlined above, the differences in combat environment would be considerable, respecting numbers of aircraft committed, control and warning, equipment of bases, sortie rates, and rules of engagement. The overriding consideration, however, is the quality of fighter opposition that would be characteristic of air-to-air combat across the full spectrum of conflict. We must achieve technical superiority in as many parameters as possible—speed, acceleration, ceiling, maneuverability, rate of roll, climb, armament, and electronics—and must design our tactics to take advantage of the areas of superiority that we achieve.

Since the Korean War, Soviet-designed fighters have consistently had a ceiling advantage over U.S. fighters, somewhat better acceleration, and better maneuverability. Our fighters have consistently had better combat radius, firepower, avionics, and payload. As a result, our margin of superiority for interdiction and close support tasks has been great, but our margin of superiority in air-to-air combat has been extremely narrow and significantly dependent on the skill and experience of our pilots. This margin could become dangerously thin in a situation where we had to fight for air superiority against a well-trained enemy.

One approach to the problem of air superiority in the future would be to modify existing tactical fighters. The A-7 attack aircraft is not a candidate, because of its low speed. The F-100 is too limited by performance, and the F-105 was designed as a compromise fighter, heavily weighted in favor of the air-to-surface roles. The F -4 has by far the best air-to-air characteristics of our current tactical fighters, but by the mid-1970s its technology will be about fifteen years old. To make any of our current fighters at all comparable to fighter aircraft which the U.S.S.R. will almost certainly have in its inventory six or seven years hence either would be technically impossible or, if possible at all, would require very extensive airframe and engine changes, would not allow the advantage of mating these changes with integrated armament and avionics, and, most important, could not take full advantage of the most advanced technology.

For all these reasons, the Air Force has vigorously supported the development of an advanced fighter designed primarily for air-to-air combat but also able to perform other tactical air tasks without compromising its principal role as an air superiority fighter. We are working on the design of this fighter, the F -X, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Navy participation.

The technical characteristics of the F-X have been established with reasonable precision after more than a year of study. Of the advances incorporated in the contemplated design, these are the greatest:

·          A tremendously improved thrust-to-weight ratio, which, coupled with a low wing loading, will produce high mach and ceiling along with superior climb, acceleration, and turn ability throughout the flight envelope.

·         Advanced avionics and armament, which will provide the necessary ability to defeat any foreseen adversary with a wide variety of weapons, including missiles and guns, in a hostile electronic environment. Although the design is optimized for air-to-air combat, preliminary studies show that the range-payload characteristics of the F-X may be superior to those of the F-4E.

The armament systems proposed for the F -X are of particular interest to me. Even though the armament of our current fighters is superior to that of the MIG-21, I feel that we have not been as imaginative in the development of armament, particularly guns, as we should have been.

The F-X will have both air-to-air missiles and guns. No single air-to-air weapon can provide the range of coverage needed: that is, from less than 500 feet to a range in excess of that of weapons used by an enemy. Probably two types of missiles will be needed: a semiactive radar-guided missile for all-weather operations and attacks at long range, and an infrared (IR) or electro-optical missile for shorter ranges.

The effectiveness of fighter missiles can be significantly reduced by high-G maneuvers on the part of the target aircraft and by countermeasures. Also, there are limitations on use of missiles when friendly and hostile aircraft are mixed together in combat. These limitations are a major reason why an air superiority fighter must also be equipped with guns.

There are other persuasive reasons for developing new and better guns for our fighters, reasons that have been demonstrated repeatedly in Vietnam. In the most likely combat situations, the probability of surprise attack on an enemy fighter is very low. We would anticipate that most contacts will be made in areas where enemy fighters are operating under ground-controlled interception (GCl) procedures and hence will be aware of the presence of our fighters. Integral airborne electronic warning systems further reduce the likelihood of surprise. Also, while attacks beyond visual range are possible, they will depend on much better means of positively identifying an enemy aircraft than we now have or will have, probably, at the time the F -X could become operational. A tactical airborne warning and control system, similar to the AWACS, which is envisioned as a working partner of the proposed advanced interceptor, would greatly reduce the identification problem; but it seems unlikely that enough enemy fighters could be killed at very long range to determine the outcome of the air battle. In most cases, we probably would have to continue to close with enemy fighters, maneuver into firing position, and attack with guns.

The only countermeasures to gun fire are target aircraft performance and pilot skill. But even the excellent M-61 gun, which has been so successful against MIG’s in Vietnam, will not be good enough in the future. As greater fighter speeds and altitudes have decreased maneuverability in absolute terms, aerial gunnery has become increasingly difficult. For example, kill claims in World War II were on the order of .5 or .6 of firing passes made. The ratio of kills to firing passes for the F-86 in Korea was reduced to .3. This reduction is a function of the difficulty of closing to effective range. As aircraft performance increases, the firing ranges increase, and firing angles-off target decrease. In World War II, the tactical cone of fire was about 20° at 1000 feet; in Korea, 6° at 1400 feet. Many Korean combat veterans attributed their success against MIG-15s in about equal parts to combat experience and the combination of superior armament, plus the radar range-computing sight then in use.

For the F-X, we will investigate a new gun with very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory, and a variable rate of fire up to about 6000 rounds per minute. Developing a gun that will be effective in combat up to mach 2+ is extremely important.

I believe we are approaching—or already have reached—the practical limitations of performance in a gun where all the energy is imparted to the projectile within the gun barrel. One feasible solution is a machine gun that fires rocket-propelled projectiles. A spin-stabilized rocket projectile, comparable in size and weight to a 20- or 30-mm shell and fired from a gun-type barrel, should give greatly reduced times of flight with at least as good accuracy as the M-61 gun at ranges from 500 to 1500 yards.

The outcome of the air-to-air battle for air superiority, and all which that battle determines, depends on four factors: airframe performance, armament effectiveness, pilot proficiency, and numerically adequate fighter forces. Because technical ability does not recognize national boundaries, our margin of superiority over a first-rate opponent is likely to be narrow in the first three areas, but there must be some margin of superiority in each one. We have the resources to assure numerical adequacy. Cumulatively, these four factors spell the difference between success and either stalemate or failure.

The Vietnam war has shown once more that the firepower of tactical aircraft is a decisive factor in conventional warfare, as it was in World War II and Korea. The ability to deliver that firepower accurately and effectively, when and where it is needed, depends on our control of the air. The effectiveness of all lines of communication depends on control of the air. The survival of helicopters and other low-performance air vehicles depends on it. The outcome of the ground battle depends on it.

In the final analysis, gaining and holding air superiority rest on our ability to defeat an enemy in air-to-air combat. That is a fact, whether we are free to attack his bases and supporting facilities and to destroy some of his aircraft on the ground, or whether his air resources are secure in a sanctuary area.

A recognized ability to win air superiority rapidly and decisively is a deterrent to conventional war, just as nuclear superiority is a deterrent to general war. Our objective is to deter both kinds of conflict.

The air superiority fighter is a most important key to that goal.

Hq United States Air Force

* For a detailed discussion of the fighter range problem and of the part Allied bombers played in gaining air superiority, see “The Defeat of the German Air Force,” Military Analysis Division, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947.

Contributor

General Bruce K. Holloway (USMA) is Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. After pilot training in 1938, he served two years with the 6th Pursuit Squadron and the 18th Pursuit Group in Hawaii before studying aeronautical engineering at the California Institute of Technology. In China from June 1942 to December 1943, he became a fighter ace while serving first with the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers), later, after its absorption into the U.S. Army Air Forces, as Commander, 23d Fighter Group. In 1946 he commanded the first jet-equipped fighter group at March Field, California. Other assignments have been as student, Air Command and Staff School (1947) and National War College (1951); as Chief, Air Defense Division, DCS/D, Hq USAF, to 1953; Deputy Director of Requirements, DCS/D, to 1955; Deputy Commander, Ninth Air Force, to 1957; Deputy Commander, Twelfth Air Force, to 1959; Director of Operational Requirements, DCS/O, Hq USAF, to 1961; Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command, to 1965; Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Commander, Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, Germany, until his present assignment in August 1966.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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