Air University Review, January-February 1968

SAC: An Instrument of National Policy

General Joseph J. Nazzaro

We in Strategic Air Command have always believed that a full understanding of the capabilities of the command is essential to those we wish to deter, as well as to our own citizens. Any action or counteraction directed by our national authority and taken by the command demonstrates to the world SAC's role as an instrument of national policy and as a deterrent to war. 

Faced with the militant threat of world Communism, the Free World cannot afford to base its plans for survival on wishful thinking or hopes for a better world. Instead, to counter this threat and assure that the position of the United States is maintained, SAC operates from a strategy of deterrence—one which requires a strong force in being. While our opponents are the only men in the world who know what level of superiority will deter them, to date our decisive—if not overwhelming—capability has prevented a nuclear confrontation.

Superior, flexible offensive systems, with the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, are the vital ingredients of this force. This is the first principle involved in deterrence. Secondly, to a nation which shuns initiation of hostilities and is disinclined toward pre-emption, the survivability of this force is basic. A third element of this strategy is command and control. This force would fail to fulfill its mission if we could not-or the Communists thought we could not-maintain command and control of the force under the worst possible situations. With these three elements of a deterrent force in mind, I would like to discuss the Strategic Air Command as it is postured today and touch on a few of our interests in the future.

The mission of the command has been stated in a number of ways throughout its 21year history, but it remains essentially the same: the deterrence of general war. In fact, just before the War Department published the official directive establishing the command in 1946, the AAF Commander, General Carl Spaatz, in a note to the Commander, Continental Air Forces, wrote: "The Strategic Air Command will be prepared to conduct long-range offensive operations in any part of the world, either independently or in cooperation with land and naval forces. . . to conduct maximum range reconnaissance. . . to provide combat units. . . to train units and personnel in maintenance of the strategic forces in all parts of the world. . ."

That statement and the implementing directive heralded the beginning of SAC and assigned to the command some of its duties. Actually, the SAC capabilities for strategic aerospace conflict have developed until they apply across the warfare spectrum. These applications could include a "show of force" or demonstration of intentions during the cold war; long-range, all-weather conventional bombing support in limited warfare; and the deterrence of any aggressor from escalating to general war. A study of the record will show that SAC has been pre-eminently successful in meeting its stated and implied responsibilities in each of these categories during the past 21 years.

Although our bombers have always had the ability to deliver conventional weapons or "iron" bombs, the current use of B-52s in Southeast Asia has focused increased interest and emphasis on that capability. We effectively employ the B-52s, originally designed for a high-altitude nuclear role, in high-density bombing of South Vietnam areas that are controlled by the Viet Congo Targets are nominated by the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and executed by SAC.

It is important to understand that SAC'S conventional capability is not considered a replacement for, or in competition with, theater forces available to commanders. SAC is there to combat the enemy with a concentration of firepower that cannot be supplied in any other way. Although many observers point out the rather unusual application of heavy bombardment units in a guerrilla warfare situation, the use of the large-payload, all-weather capability of strategic bombers in support of ground forces is certainly not new.

In 1944 we used hundreds of B-17s to "carpet bomb" before Saint-Lô and assist with the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. 

In Korea we used B-29s to support front-line troops and saturate enemy buildup areas. In nine days after being alerted, SAC bomb groups flew their first mission against the Communists. These units took just three months to destroy every strategic industrial target in North Korea-with conventional bombs. With no industrial targets left, B-29 bombers systematically destroyed transportation lines, enemy airfields, and even flew close support missions. 

Today, in Southeast Asia, when the requirement arises for a large concentration of bombs, accurately delivered, under any weather conditions, the employment of SAC bombers offers the best solution.

The B-52 raids have been cited by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defectors as the "most feared" combat capability employed against them. This is understandable when one considers that each B-52 can deliver up to a 60,000-pound bomb load at any range, through the use of air refueling. In terms of bombs, this amounts to eighty-four 500-pound bombs or forty-two 750-pound bombs stored internally and twenty-four 750-pound bombs carried externally on racks under the wings. Contrast this with the maximum 20,000-pound capacity of the B-29 in Korea and the 3000- to 4000-pound load of the B-17 in Europe.

While our contribution to conventional warfare in Southeast Asia is made entirely by manned aircraft, SAC'S primary mission of deterrence of general war is best accomplished by a mixed force of bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. It should be recognized that both bombers and missiles are excellent weapon systems and that each has unique capabilities lacking in the other. In the overall SAC deterrent mission each system plays a complementary, not a competitive, role.

A quick enumeration of the advantages of each system will illustrate this point. Manned bombers best meet the requirement for flexibility. While an ICBM, by definition, follows a ballistic path to its target, the manned system can vary tactics, axis of attack, altitude, and penetration corridors and can circumnavigate known or detected concentrations of defense.

The manned bomber can seek out targets the precise locations of which are not known, determine if they have been neutralized by previous strikes, and attack as necessary. With our missile systems, the exact geodetic information for the target must be known, and success or failure of a missile strike must be determined by an outside reconnaissance effort.

The missiles, on the other hand, are unquestionably superior in their "quick kill" capabilities. Their fast reaction of one minute or less, plus the unprecedented speeds, enables them to destroy targets approximately thirty minutes after decision to launch. This speed of application is far beyond that of our present or foreseeable manned strike systems.

By mixing our strategic force, then, we take advantage of the superior features of both systems and can cover the entire spectrum of strategic requirements.

SAC'S mixed force today is composed of some 600 B-52 and B-58 bombers supported by a similar number of KC-135 jet tankers, to insure adequate range extension for complete target coverage. The missile force numbers more than 1000 Titan II and Minuteman I and II intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is the hardware employed by the command.

But for many years in SAC we have functioned under the established principle that the most important part of an in-being capability is people and that personnel proficiency and dedication are primarily responsible for our day-to-day capability. SAC's present position can be equated to the ingenuity and drive of its professional manpower over the years. Intensive training, great responsibility, frequent hardships, and intensive quality control have made the men of SAC the most professional military organization in history.

This continuous program of training, "no notice" operational tests, and improvements to tactics and techniques assure the capability of this force to carry out its mission.

Survivability, the second requirement mentioned earlier, means that a credible deterrent force must be able to survive the initial strike by an enemy and still deliver an unacceptable level of damage upon him and his war-making ability. To accomplish this, it is SAC's task to ensure, within the limits of the resources provided by Congress and the executive branch of the government, the maximum survivability of its force-in-being at any given moment.

In an age of ICBM'S able to strike halfway around the world within a half hour, only wide dispersal and a quick-reaction posture assure the survival of our manned systems. In October 1957 a limited number of SAC bombers and tankers at U.S. and overseas bases went on ground alert, and since early 1961 we have maintained approximately half our bomber and tanker force on ground alert. Dispersed at many operating locations, they are ready to react well within the warning time provided by the North American Air Defense Command Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Operation of a ground alert of this magnitude demands a professional force of crews and support personnel, with crews averaging a 74-hour duty week.

As a further step we have tested and proved the concept of airborne alert with several thousand training sorties. Under this concept, now known as the airborne alert indoctrination training mission, a percentage of the command's B-52s remains continuously airborne, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. This tactic would assure the survival of a portion of the command's retaliatory striking power even under an all-out missile attack executed in total surprise. It was during the highly volatile Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 that SAC first conducted an actual airborne alert, the first in the history of air power. This was maintained throughout the period of confrontation, convincing the Soviet leadership that its offensive missiles should be removed. In the face of this, plus other demonstrated American military strength, the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba.

Because ICBM'S, unlike bombers, cannot be recalled once they are launched, the survival considerations of this part of the mixed force are quite different from those of the bombers. The missiles must ride out an enemy attack and then function in the environment of a nuclear exchange. Our Titan II and Minuteman silos are widely dispersed, at least one bomb apart, so that one enemy weapon could not destroy more than one of our silos. In addition, they are hardened to withstand anything but a direct nuclear hit. Missile combat crews carry the same alert responsibilities as their aircraft counterparts: to be prepared 24 hours a day to respond to national command authority.

The quick reaction of our manned aircraft and the hardening of the missile sites, coupled with the wide dispersal of both systems, give us a high degree of confidence in our ability to survive an enemy's first strike. 

The third essential of the SAC force is command and control. Our national authorities must have not only day-to-day control of the strategic forces but positive communications and execution in wartime.

The SAC force is controlled from the underground command post at Offutt AFB near Omaha. From this command post our worldwide command and control communications network maintains instantaneous contact with all SAC units as well as with the National Military Command Center and other unified commanders around the world. Our three numbered air force headquarters maintain alternate command posts that could take over should SAC headquarters be destroyed.

A further backup is provided by another SAC innovation, the Airborne Command Post. Since 3 February 1961, we have had an Airborne Command Post aircraft continuously airborne, complete with communications equipment and manned by an experienced team of controllers. The availability of this airborne control team, headed by a SAC general officer designated as airborne emergency actions officer, gives further guarantee of effective control of the SAC force.

I have briefly described the essentials of a deterrent force and how SAC fulfills these requirements at this time. We are convinced that maintaining strategic superiority is one of the most critical defense problems the United States faces today and in the future. We believe our national strategic military effort should continue to develop the mixed force.

 First, we should retain the flexibility tested and demonstrated in manned bomber systems. The bomber version of the F-111 will become operational in the SAC inventory in the late 1960s. In conjunction with the newest model B-52s, the FB-111 will give us complete target coverage through about 1975. By that time, even the newest B-52s will be nearing obsolescence, and we see the need then for a larger aircraft than the FB-111 to cover the deeper targets. Such a system, the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), is being evaluated today.

Second, we should continue to improve our missile capabilities. This we are doing. Through force modernization, the Minuteman I is giving way to the improved Minuteman II, and a further development called Minuteman III will continue to expand and upgrade our missile capabilities.

With the deterrent force I have described now in being, our government has considerable freedom to use diplomatic, economic, and political instruments in international affairs as well as support our allies in limited wars or contingency operations. As a result of this current capability, our primary concern is not so much for today as for the continuation of this capability into the future.

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