Air University Review, January-February 1968

The Air Forces of Tropical Africa

Dr. Ross K. Baker

Considerable effort has been expended recently on analyses and descriptions of the armies of Tropical Africa.¹ There has not, however, been any extensive treatment of the air forces of these new states. The reason for this has undoubtedly been that Tropical African air forces, virtually without exception, are weak and essentially embryonic components of a military establishment dominated by the army. In Tropical Africa only Ethiopia, Ghana, and most recently Nigeria have air forces of any size. It is understandable, then, that observers should consider only the armies. Recent events in Africa, however, have indicated that the role of air power may not be as negligible as was once assumed.

In the Nigerian civil war, for example, the presence of two B-26s in the air force of the secessionist state of Biafra was, at the outset, a major psychological weapon. Opposing Biafra, the Federation of Nigeria initially employed its German Do-27 trainers and German-trained pilots to some advantage in the conflict. In mid-August 1967, the balance of air power drastically changed in favor of the Federation when it acquired 2 Mig-15s and 8 Mig-17s from the Soviet Union and 6 Delfin L-29 jet trainers from Czechoslovakia. In the continuing strife in the Congo, the decision by the U.S. government to supply logistical support in the form of three C-130s to the Kinshasa government for the purpose of ferrying troops has proved to be a major military and morale factor in combating mercenary and separatist forces.

That so few aircraft should have such a considerable impact is indicative of certain military realities in Tropical Africa. Initially, ground communication and transportation are intermittent and unreliable. Long rainy seasons and the lack of hard-surfaced roads mean that military operations must come to a virtual halt after the dry season. Road and rail networks are not extensive and do not adequately cover most countries. Few intercolony roads were built by the Europeans, who were more concerned with internal traffic than with access to neighboring colonies. Airports, on the other hand, are usually well dispersed and, although subject to the vagaries of weather and lack of navigational devices, can be used by light planes and medium transports most months of the year. Modifications on aircraft are usually required, however, in order to allow them to operate from dirt or grass landing strips.

The level of military training and discipline varies from country to country, but as a rule standards are not high. Most enlisted men are country people with no combat experience, and for them to face something as terrible as aerial bombardment (even on a modest scale) is likely to be demoralizing and destructive of discipline.

Air power in Africa, as modest as it is, has far outpaced air defense. Even those countries involved in conflict have been hard pressed to come up with a meaningful civil defense program in the urban areas. Some states, notably Nigeria, possess antiaircraft batteries, but military procurement as a whole has been characterized by the acquisition of mortars, light artillery, and ordinary automatic weapons. An aircraft, once aloft and competently piloted, has virtual sanctuary in the sky.

Given these obvious advantages which accrue to air power, why have the air forces of Tropical Africa been of limited size and importance? A number of factors contribute to this situation. First, aircraft are costly and most African states cannot afford them. Even prestige-conscious leaders have thought twice before buying military aircraft. As a prestige symbol, the airplane frequently loses out to the aluminum plant or the hydroelectric facility. Second, several African states, notably the former French colonies, have entered into bilateral and multilateral defense agreements with their former metropolitan power to provide military assistance in the event of invasion or internal unrest.²

Third, the main aircraft producers and vendors have been fairly restrained in their sales activities in Africa, and military aid in the form of aircraft has not been notable. There seems to be a tacit agreement among arms suppliers that expensive, high-performance military aircraft are not suitable or desirable for African states. The principal exception to this is Ethiopia, where the U.S. has provided significant training and equipment to the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force (IEAF). Aside from the recent shipment of Migs to Nigeria, surprisingly few Soviet military aircraft have appeared in Tropical Africa, although this situation is not expected to continue. ³

Another factor militating against large and powerful African air forces is that while most former colonies inherited armies, there were no colonial air forces per se to be transferred from colony to independent state. It was not until several years after independence that Ghana, for example, created an air force, although the colonial army, the Gold Coast Regiment, became the Ghana Army upon the attainment of independence. Given the choice of building up either military and police units or air forces, most African leaders opted for the former.

The problems of pilot training and aircraft maintenance also work against the growth of Tropical African air forces. A man reared in a basically non technological culture has difficulties in apprehending the sophisticated scientific principles involved in piloting a modern aircraft. Principles of physics to which most Americans and Europeans are exposed at an early age are unfamiliar and bewildering to a young man reared in a rural African village. That there is a significant number of African pilots is a tribute to the intelligence and ingenuity of those who have overcome these cultural limitations. ⁴ The same problems that cause difficulties in pilot training also hinder standards of maintenance, which as a rule are not high. This deficiency too can be overcome by patient but ambitious training of ground personnel.

Despite the factors operating against large sophisticated air forces, some small, useful air forces have evolved. These air forces are based primarily on light short-takeoff-and landing (STOL) aircraft, training planes, and medium transports, almost all piston-driven.  The main exceptions to this are Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, Ghana.

Cameroon has several small Broussards and a C-47. –Congo-Brazzaville has several single-engine aircraft, a DC-3, and a helicopter; and its neighbor, Congo-Kinshasa has about 6 DC-3s and a half-dozen light aircraft. –Ethiopia, with 70 aircraft, has a large inventory by African standards: a squadron of F-86s, 5 T-33s, 10 C-47s, 7 F-5s, and 20 Saab-17s and 91s. – Gabon has a helicopter, a DC-3, and several Broussards. –Ghana has more than 70 aircraft, mostly of Commonwealth origin: over 25 Beavers and Otters from Britain and Canada, 8 Caribous, 12 Chipmunk trainers, 1 Heron VIB, a half-dozen Westland Whirlwind helicopters, and several Wessex and Hughes helicopters. In the early 1960s when an Indian mission was training the Ghana Air Force, a number of Hindustan HT-2 trainers were acquired. Eight Aermacchi M.B. 326Fs were sold to Ghana by Italy; only 3 are presently operational. –The neighboring Ivory Coast has a small number of Broussards and Pilatus Porters. –Libya began its air force in 1959 with 2 Egyptian Gomhouria fighters and later acquired 2 U.S. T-33s. - Nigeria, as previously mentioned, has some Dornier Do-27 s and a Heron transport, 6 Delfin L-29s, 2 Mig-15s, and 8 Mig-17s. The secessionist state of Biafra has 2 B-26s, although at least one of these was said to have been destroyed in recent fighting. –Kenya is receiving 6 Chipmunks, 11 Beavers, and 4 Caribous from Great Britain. –Senegal has 2 C-47s, light aircraft, and several Mig-15 trainers. –The Sudan has 20 light transports and British Provost training craft.⁵

 If Africa's new states are not troubled by international wars or internal disorders, the trend in acquisition and utilization of aircraft will continue along the lines already followed. There will be small, versatile air forces that concentrate on logistical support, patrol, and disaster duty. There is a strong case to be made for air force civic action to parallel the civic-action programs pursued by some African armies. The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force has already become involved in this sort of program. The small air forces can be used in crop spraying and insect eradication. The Ghana Air Force has used helicopter sprayers to combat mosquitoes in the Accra area. The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force has sent graduate pilots to the East African Locust Service, and it participated in the Somali Flood Relief Operation in 1961. The air forces could also be used to carry livestock to market. In many African states the cattle-raising areas are remote from the main population centers where most beef is consumed. Cross-country cattle drives in the dry season through areas infested by tsetse flies decimate the herds. Livestock lifts on a large scale, however, would be difficult in light of the number of aircraft now available. The -small air forces could also be used for disaster relief and relocation of game animals threatened by fire and flood. There is a significant role for the Tropical African air forces, and it need not be a combat role.

In the event of conflict, however, there will probably be great pressure exerted on the aircraft-producing countries to provide combat aircraft or at least trainers that can be fitted out with guns, rockets, or other ordnance. The U.S. may well be called upon to provide either aircraft, pilots, or supporting services as in the Congo recently. It will be difficult to refuse a beleaguered nation, even though our better judgment tells us that expensive aircraft are inappropriate for a struggling and financially burdened state. If the U.S. finds itself in this position, it would be better to provide the African air forces with multipurpose craft that could be used in a practical civilian role after their military utility had ended.

It is well to mention briefly the role of civil aviation in Africa. Many of the qualified African pilots obtained their training as second officers on the national flag carriers. The national airlines established shortly after independence, in most instances, were originally more useful as sovereignty symbols than as profitable enterprises. Many of these flag carriers are still heavily subsidized by the governments, but others have moved in the direction of paying their own way. Improved management practices and abandonment of unprofitable routes have helped the financial position of Ghana Airways. Air Afrique, a cooperative venture of several French-speaking West African countries, has the reputation of being an exceedingly well-run enterprise.

Future political events in Africa will probably determine, more than anything else, the future of military aviation. The necessity of maintaining territorial integrity and national cohesion may well call for military operations in which the role of air power—even a modest level of air power—will be a decisive factor.

Notes

1. See, e.g., African Forum (Summer 1966); W. F. Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

2. See "France's Military Role in Africa," West Africa (n.d.), reprinted in Africa Report, Vol. 9, No.1 (January 1964).

3. U.S. military aid to Ethiopia is discussed briefly in "Who's Armed Whom?" The Economist, 25 March 1967. The IEAF inventory includes one squadron of F -86s and 7 F-5s.

4. The Russians had promised the former president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, that they could train Ghanaian pilots in fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in six months. When a group of these trainees returned from the U.S.S.R., it was discovered that the Soviets had not succeeded and that the Ghanaians would have to be completely retrained by the British. Both of the antagonists in the Nigerian civil war have had to rely mainly on mercenary pilots.

5. These data were derived from Neville Brown and W. F. Gutteridge, The African Military Balance, Adelphi Papers No. 12 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, August 1964), passim; and George Weeks (comp.), "The Armies of Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No.1 (January 1964), pp. 5-21; and John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries: 1964-1965, Adelphi Papers No. 28 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1966). It was reported on 9 August 1967 in the New York Times that the Sudan was in the process of acquiring Mig-17s from the U.S.S.R., although 12 Sudanese cadets were being trained in the U.S., two as jet pilots.