Air University Review, September-October 1967

Canada and the Organization of American States

Dr. Ludwil J. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski

The final act of the Third Special Inter-American Conference held from 15 to 27 February 1967 at Buenos Aires, Argentina, contains Resolution II entitled “Tribute to Canada on the occasion of the first centennial of the signing of the British North America Act, which established the Canadian Confederation.” Adopted unanimously, the resolution acknowledges that Canada “occupies an outstanding position among the nations of the Western Hemisphere” by reason of  “1) its high cultural level, 2) its accelerated agricultural and industrial development, 3) the stability of its democratic institutions, and 4) the cordiality of its relationships with the other American states.” The conference resolved “To salute the noble Canadian nation, and . . . To pay a special tribute of admiration to the people of Canada for their valuable contribution to the peace and progress of the Hemisphere and of the world.”

Delegations from twenty governments were accredited to the conference: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The governments of Canada, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados were represented by observers, as were the Secretary General and specialized agencies of the United Nations and other official inter-American organizations and entities. Non-American countries and other international agencies also sent representatives, who were granted facilities and courtesies so that they could follow the conference work.

The flattering Canada resolution cannot be explained entirely by the well-known chivalrous Latin American courtesy and propensity for elegant language. It confirms at least good friendly Canadian/inter-American relations.

This tribute prompts a review of the perennial subject of the possibility of Canada’s entry into the Organization of American States (OAS). Many factors must enter into the decision.

Canada and Latin America

There are several changes in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere which warrant a new examination of Canadian/inter-American relations, among which must be mentioned: the Protocol of Amendment to the OAS charter of 27 February 1967; the decision adopted at the April 1967 Punta del Este Conference, to transform the present Latin American Free Trade Association into a European-type common market; the emergence of independent American states, members of the British Commonwealth; the application by the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community; Canadian participation in inter-American organizations and projects; development of Canadian—Latin American trade and transportation links and of Canadian missions in Latin America; investments of Canadian private capital in Latin America.

The association of North, Central, and South American states was founded in 1899 as the Commercial Bureau of the Americas; in 1910 the name was changed to Pan American Union (PAU), and in 1948 to Organization of American States. 

At the founding convention of the United Nations in the spring of 1945, the Latin American delegates decided not to surrender the PAU’s powers for collective action to the new United Nations. In consequence the right of “regional self-defense” was written into article 51 of the U.N. charter.1 The treaty of reciprocal assistance, known as the Rio Pact, signed by all PAU member states at Rio de Janeiro in April 1947, was the first binding treaty, in contrast with previous “agreements” or “resolutions” of prewar inter-American conferences.2 The pact’s geographical scope, as defined under article 4, covers Canada whether or not Canada is a member, which is a significant feature in that previously the Monroe Doctrine and inter-American conferences of the PAU had excluded from the inter-American group the European and British colonial possessions and sell-governing territories.3

The new attitude towards Canada was demonstrated at the founding conference of the OAS in 1948 at Bogotá, Colombia, when the general Latin American opinion was in favour of Canada’s entry. The delegate of El Salvador as well as the delegation from the United States suggested replacing the word “republics” with “states,” so as to continue accurately reflecting the membership if Canada joined the organization.4

Although Canada did not join the OAS, it has participated in inter-American activities. Even before Canada began to establish its own direct diplomatic relations, it had trade representatives in Latin American countries—in Buenos Aires in the last century and in several other capitals before World War I. Trade with Latin America was trebled in the past 20 years, both in sales and in purchases. In 1965 Canada exported $315 millions worth of goods to Latin America and imported $411 million worth.5 Canada has joined the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (1961), the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History, the Inter-American Statistical Institute, and the Inter-American Radio Office.

Since November 1965 Canada has been represented by official observers at conferences of the Organization of American States, and the Canadian government has good working relationships with the OAS Secretariat. Canadian officials keep in touch with a wide variety of other developments in Latin America, too. Thus representatives of the Canadian Department of Labour attended the OAS Second Conference of Ministers of Labour in Venezuela in May 1966. Canada’s interest in religion in Latin America has been increasing. Some 1500 Catholic Canadian clerics, parish priests, teachers, nurses, and social workers, both men and women, are active in various Latin American countries. Representatives of the Baptist Church in Canada have been in Bolivia for some 60 years. Various Canadian evangelical churches run hospitals and schools and other institutions in Latin America. Canadian students work in Latin America through the Canadian University Service Overseas.6.As early as 1931 Canada became a member of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, a regional organization linked with the Universal Postal Union but not associated with the OAS.7

A Canadian observer group attended a special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) held in Uruguay in 1961, at which the Alliance for Progress was launched as a cooperative programme of self-help, local reforms, development plans, and outside financial and technical assistance. Since then Canada has been represented by observers at the annual meetings of ECOSOC.8

Since 1964 a new dimension has been added to Canadian-Latin American relations in the field of loans carried out in conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank. Canada has already put up more than $40 million for loan funds in cooperation with the Inter-American Development Bank, which is acting as administrator on behalf of Canada.9 To date these interest-free loans have amounted to $3,240,000 for El Salvador $1,260,000 for Ecuador, $800,000 for Paraguay, $756,000 for Argentina, $540,000 for Peru, $1,620,000 for Bolivia, $540,000 for Mexico, and $4,320,000 for Chile. Furthermore the Export Credits Insurance Corporation obtained credits of $15,000,000 for financing trade with Latin America,

In the field of private investment, Canadian capital continues to flow to various Latin American countries. It may be mentioned in passing that recently Canadian-Chile Mines S.A. has been created with a capital of $2,900,000.

In the cultural field a special affinity exists between French-speaking Canada and Latin America, which share the same broad Latin culture and legal system based on the common model of the Code of Napoleon. Latin American studies have been introduced at several Canadian universities. In 1964 the Canadian government granted letters patent to the Canadian Inter-American Research Institute, having its seat at Montreal. Many Canadians study Spanish, and some study Portuguese.

Canada and the United States

It hardly needs recalling that Canada has extremely close ties with its only neighbour, the United States, and that these close relations result from geographical proximity, interchange of population, similar political philosophies, and the habit of resolving outstanding problems by negotiation. After 1871, when the Treaty of Washington settled most of the points of disagreement between them, relations between the two countries rapidly improved. The last World War brought a change from a position of friendly cooperation to one of positive alliance. On 18 August 1940 the “Ogdensburg Agreement” established, with unique informality, a Permanent Joint U.S.—Canadian Board of Defence. The text of the agreement was published in the Canada Treaty Series and passed as an order-in-council, while in the United States the Ogdensburg Agreement was viewed as an executive matter that did not require the ratification of the Senate.10 The Board was established originally for the primary purpose of coordinating the plans of the two governments for the wartime defence of North America, but since the war it has gradually come to assume a somewhat different role, partly because of the changing nature of the task and partly because of the emergence of other bilateral consultative bodies in the defence field. Among these are the Military Cooperation Committee, established in 1946, the Senior Policy Committee on the Canada—United States Defence Production and Development Sharing Programme, and the Canada—United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence, both formed in 1958. After the creation of NATO the two countries, while actively supporting this multinational defensive alliance, continued to provide for the defence of North America on a bilateral basis, paralleling the joint defence organization established collectively by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries for Europe.11 The Board was closely involved in the planning of the three radar lines—Pinetree, Mid-Canada, and Distant Early Warning (DEW)—which were successively constructed across the continent at increasingly northerly latitudes to give warning of attack across the arctic. The Board’s role was less direct in the construction by the United States of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) with sites in Alaska, Greenland, and Britain, in the establishment of North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957, and in the resolution in 1963 of the troublesome problem of nuclear warheads for Canadian weapon systems.12

Reconciling the requirements of continental defence with the various other objectives of North American society is a complex and delicate task, involving the careful consideration many sensitive factors that often cannot be separated by the normal dividing line between military and political matters. It is in this area that the Board, with a mixed military and civil membership, has in recent years found its most useful role, a role not readily filled through any other of the several channels now available to the United States and Canadian governments for dealing with matters of joint concern.13

Many interlocking interests result from the links existing between the economies of the two countries—or rather from the impact of the United States economy on Canada.

It has been observed recently that among the factors which shape foreign policies of the United States and Canada three areas of contrast between the two countries can be distinguished: (1) the superpower status of the United States, which arises from great wealth and large population, as opposed to the smaller population and more limited power of Canada; (2) the bilingual and multicultural nature of Canada, as opposed to the more homogeneous makeup of the United States; and (3) the revolutionary origins of the United States, as opposed to the evolutionary development of Canada.14 While there is a great discrepancy between the power of the United States and that of Canada, Canadians do not consider their nation as any kind of satellite of the United States. They consider Canada to be a willing partner in an association to which it makes a contribution in the common interest commensurate with its resources and its points of view. From Canadian—United States discussions, negotiations, debates—and even disagreements—have come the most impressive results, as witness the gigantic Seaway stretching from the Atlantic to the heart of the continent, the immense Columbia River project, and the Canada-United States automotive agreement, which benefits the population on both sides of the border. Various financial measures that necessarily affect both countries have been taken after Canadian—United States consultations.15

Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean

Since the earliest times Canada has had a special affinity for and interest in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The economic and political development of Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries has led to the broadening and deepening of the contacts and cooperation. These Caribbean countries have in recent years achieved full or partial political independence. The growth of industry in the West Indies has brought about a greater participation by Canadians in many fields, such as engineering, architecture, and science. The Canadian relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean cover the whole spectrum of economic activity, and there is in this relationship much of mutual profit to the Commonwealth Caribbean and Canada.16 Canadian exports to this area amounted to $100 million in 1966. Canada has an important share of the West Indies import markets, averaging some 10 percent in 1966. The Canadian assistance programme for the Caribbean area was introduced in 1958 with an original commitment of $10 million over five years. On the conclusion of the commitment on 31 March 1963, funds for the succeeding fiscal year amounting to $2,100,000 were made available for Caribbean islands, as well as British Guiana (now Guyana) and British Honduras. When Canadian aid appropriations were increased in fiscal year 1964-65, an expanded programme for the Caribbean was approved, making available $3,500,000 in grant assistance and $5,500,000 in special development loans. The allocation in FY 1965-66 was $4,500,000 in grants and $5,500,000 in development loans. During 1965-66, a total of $1,970,000 was spent on technical assistance, financing 130 Canadian teachers and advisers in the Caribbean and 431 Caribbean students in Canada.17 On a per capita basis, Canada’s aid to Commonwealth Caribbean countries now exceeds that made to any other area. 18 The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin stated recently that while Canada desires to strengthen its special relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries it is not seeking to have a relation with any part of the region that would be in any way analogous to that which Britain had with those territories. Canadians are thinking rather of close practical cooperation for mutual benefit in various fields.19 The same theme was repeated by Mr. Martin in his speech at Michigan State University, East Lansing, on 25 February 1967, when he mentioned Canada’s “developing special relations with the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean.”20

Thus it is apparent that Canadian participation in inter-American affairs has been channeled in three main ways: 1) direct relations with each of the Latin American countries and participation in inter-American agencies, 2) relations with the United States, and 3) relations with Commonwealth Caribbean countries.

What would Canadian membership in the Organization of American States mean? The purposes of OAS as stated in the Bogotá Charter of 1948 and confirmed in the Preamble to the Protocol of Amendment signed at Buenos Aires on 27 February 1967 are: 1) to achieve an order of peace and justice, 2) to promote solidarity among the American states, 3) to strengthen their collaboration, and 4) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.

This Preamble reiterated what the Second Special Inter-American Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1965, had declared: that it was essential 1) to forge a new dynamism for the inter-American system and 2) imperative to modify the working structure of the OAS, as well as 3) to establish in the charter new objectives and standards for the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural development of the peoples of the hemisphere and 4) to speed up the process of economic integration. Finally, this Preamble stated that it is essential to reaffirm the determination of the American states to combine their efforts in a spirit of solidarity in the permanent task of achieving the general conditions of well-being that will ensure a life of dignity and freedom to their peoples.21

It seems safe to say that the first aim, “to achieve an order of peace and justice,” has been generally reached in Canada. As to defence, Canada is linked by defence agreements with the United States and, in a multilateral way, with the NATO countries. Whether membership in the OAS would improve Canada’s defence potential is debatable. As to the promotion of solidarity among the American states and strengthening of their collaboration, it is possible that Canada, if within the OAS, could contribute more to these aims than it does at present, although its attitudes could then be interpreted as more those of an interested party than they are while it remains outside the OAS voting system.

Among the arguments against Canadian membership is the contention that the Commonwealth connection weighs against full Canadian participation in OAS.22 This argument seems to be both unconvincing in principle and obsolete in fact due to the changing character of the Commonwealth. The recent application by the government of the United Kingdom to join the European Common Market shows that the Mother Country itself finds it opportune to enter into a regional organization that is much more closely knit than that of the American states. Furthermore, the United Kingdom is a member of the European regional organization, Council of Europe. As to the Western Hemisphere, one of the Caribbean Commonwealth countries, namely Trinidad and Tobago, has been recently admitted to OAS. It is possible that other Commonwealth countries of this region will follow the example of Trinidad and Tobago. While the entry of Caribbean Commonwealth countries (and possibly Guyana and British Honduras, although with the latter there is the problem of Guatemalan and Mexican territorial claims) would not significantly change the voting pattern within OAS, even with Canada’s membership, a situation would nevertheless be created wherein the United States would no longer be the only English-speaking OAS member. Also in the long run French-speaking Quebec could broaden its cultural aid to the only French-language OAS member, Haiti.

It is true that Canada, as a member of OAS, would find itself in an awkward position on many issues, having to take sides with or against the United States.

The moral value of this argument is at least doubtful. As to its practical importance, with the development of international interdependence a clear position on international problems is in any case unavoidable. Canada already has to take sides within the United Nations, Why should it shy away from doing so in OAS? A more weighty argument is that countries outside a region of serious problems have frequently been able to play a more constructive role in helping to resolve problems than those which are closer and more immediately involved.23 Here once again it is submitted that, even if Canada remained outside OAS, the effects of this artificial isolation would gradually disappear through growing Canadian participation in inter-American activities. The lack of knowledge among Canadians about Latin America is still great,24 but the situation has now improved considerably, partly through commercial relations and partly through cultural relations and tourism, the latter facilitated by rapid air connections.

It has also been said that membership in the OAS will involve substantial costs for Canada; that Canada, with its limited resources, will find itself too heavily burdened as a consequence of membership in OAS; and that Canada should be expanding its foreign aid and other foreign commitments in other directions more in line with its historic affiliations and international interests (e.g., via the Colombo plan).25 It is true that Canada, notwithstanding its high standard of living, is still a capital-importing country, although it does export capital as well. While it is difficult to estimate the cost of Canadian membership in OAS, possibly it would not exceed substantially the present direct and indirect outflow of Canadian capital to Latin America and Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Canada could always continue its traditional economic relations with the latter area, which probably will become a part of the OAS.

economic factors

Whatever the cost of Canadian membership in the OAS, it could be considered a sound investment. The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), created in 1960 and comprising all the larger South American states plus Mexico, will be transformed into a European-type common market. The April 1967 meeting of presidents at Punta del Este estimated that this common market will be fully functioning by 1985 at the latest. At that time it is expected that it will involve 300 million inhabitants.

Although it is difficult to foresee offhand what role Canada could play in this organization, it seems of the greatest importance to study the question. It is also important not to lose time, as did the United Kingdom when it hesitated to join the European Common Market and in consequence has met with difficulties. Canadian membership in the OAS and possibly Canadian associate participation in the Latin American Common Market (to be called perhaps Inter-American Common Market) could in the future prove advantageous for the OAS, for Canada, and for the United States, Without it, Canada could run the risk of becoming a complete satellite of the United States, which would not be advisable for either Canada or the United States.

It is true that the Protocol of Buenos Aires (article 40) views the establishment of a Latin American common market, not an inter-American market. It does, however, exhort all the American states to make individual and united efforts to bring about the reduction or elimination of tariff and nontariff import barriers that affect the exports of members of the OAS; to maintain continuity in economic and social development by means of improved conditions for trade in basic commodities through international agreements, orderly marketing procedures that avoid the disruption of markets, and other measures designed to promote the expansion of markets; and to obtain dependable incomes for producers, adequate and dependable supplies for consumers, and stable prices that are both remunerative to producers and fair to consumers. It calls for improved international financial cooperation; for the adoption of other means for lessening the adverse impact of sharp fluctuations in export earnings experienced by the countries exporting basic commodities; and for diversification of export and expansion of export opportunities for manufactured and semimanufactured products from the developing countries by promoting and strengthening national and multinational institutions and arrangements established for these purposes. (article 37)

While it is impossible to cover here the entire treatment of economic matters as it is presented in the Protocol of Buenos Aires where it has been expanded from the original two short articles to fourteen articles (numbers 29 to 42), even this brief coverage indicates the importance of economic problems to the members of the OAS. One need not stress the importance of this new inter-American trend for Canada, a trading nation that exports approximately one-fourth of its gross national product.26 Some of these exports are within the category of basic commodities, like wheat, and it is an open question whether present main purchasers of Canadian Wheat (Communist China, the U.S.S.R., and the East European countries) will remain permanent customers when they develop their own agriculture.

Canada, a highly developed country with a high standard of living and a well-established democracy, is a middle power and a relatively sparsely populated one, still importing both human power and capital. Such a subcontinental state within the OAS would constitute a middle American power, possibly of a similar category of importance as the huge and still developing Brazil, thus adding to the stability of OAS, where the disparity of power between the United States and Latin American countries remains at present striking. Canada, a nation friendly both toward its powerful English-speaking neighbour, the United States, and toward Latin American states, could develop within the OAS the same moderate policy that it has followed in the United Nations and elsewhere. As Prime Minister Pearson said last year, Canada must remain an international nation, both at home and in the world: cosmopolitan, dynamic, outward-looking, up-to-date, looking ahead.27 Such a goal cannot be attained by avoiding the hemispheric organization of states.

the OAS charter

The brief review of the charter of the OAS as amended on 27 February 1967 by the Protocol of Buenos Aires may throw additional light on the possible Canadian membership in the OAS. In accordance with Article XXVI, the Protocol will become effective among the ratifying states when two-thirds of the 21 states signatory to the charter have deposited their instruments of ratification. It will become effective with respect to the remaining 7 states in the order in which they deposit their instruments of ratification. The original charter, which was signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá on 30 April 1948, became effective 13 December 1951, when the 14th ratification was deposited by Colombia. It was registered with the General Secretariat of the United Nations on 14 January 1952. The OAS charter does not impair the rights and obligations of the member states under the charter of the United Nations (article 137). The essential purposes of the OAS remain unchanged: a) to strengthen the peace and security of the continent; b) to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the member states; c) to provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression; d) to seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; and e) to promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development. (article 2)

The problem of security is again covered among the “principles,” where it is stated that an act of aggression against one American state is an act of aggression against all the other American states (article 3f). Furthermore, Chapter VI on collective security amplifies this principle by stating that every act of aggression against the territorial integrity or inviolability or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American states (article 27). While the next article deals not only with an armed attack but also with an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, an extracontinental conflict, a conflict between two or more American states, and any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, it does not provide for measures of defence. This article (number 28) mentions only that in such cases the American states shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject. This means that Canada’s obligations in the event of any aggression would not be increased by its membership in the OAS. Nevertheless the OAS could possibly vote on certain related measures. The OAS does not provide for a veto power like that in the Security Council of the United Nations, the OAS rule being that of a majority, or in several important cases a majority of two-thirds of the member states. Thus Canada could be outvoted in the OAS. This is also true in the United Nations, however, where Canada does not hold a power of veto.

The Protocol of Buenos Aires greatly expanded the chapters on social and cultural standards. While Canadians can contribute to the development in this field, it is also true that the rich Latin American cultural heritage and literature represent an interesting potential for Canadian students and scholars.

Extensive changes in part two of the charter of the OAS tend to make the organization more efficient by developing existing organs of the OAS and by providing for the permanence of their work or the increased frequency of their meetings. Thus the OAS hopes to accomplish its purposes by these means: a) the General Assembly to convene annually instead of every five years as did its predecessor, the Inter-American Conference; b) the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; c) the Permanent Council of the OAS, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture; d) the Inter-American Juridical Committee; e) the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; f) the General Secretariat, replacing the Pan American Union; g) the Specialized Conferences, being intergovernmental meetings to deal with special technical matters or to develop specific aspects of inter-American cooperation; h) the Specialized Organizations, being intergovernmental organizations established by multilateral agreements and having specific functions with respect to technical matters of common interest to American states.

Among the “transitory provisions,” article 149 provides that the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress shall act as the permanent executive committee of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council as long as the Alliance is in operation.

The new structure of the Organization of American States, more detailed and providing for important economic integration, supported by either permanent activities or by more frequent meeting of its organs, may prove to be a more efficient regional organization of states than it was before the amendments of Buenos Aires. Such an organization, not hampered by veto of great powers, could be a vital factor for harmonious development of the Western Hemisphere and also a valuable uniting force within the United Nations.

Canada is already cooperating closely with the United States and is linked traditionally with Commonwealth Caribbean countries, one of which is already a member of OAS and others of which may be expected to join. Canada is also extending aid in conjunction with Inter-American Development Bank and participates in three inter-American agencies. In addition Canada has friendly relations with all American states, develops its trade with this region, and has traditional links with Latin America through the efforts of Canadian religious groups, either by way of material aid or by the social, educational, and religious activities of Canadians in Latin American countries.

It seems, therefore, that the pros and cons of Canadian membership in OAS will find an answer in the gradual interdependence of Canada, not only in its relations with the United States but in its relations with most of the American countries.

Canada’s formal membership in the OAS would not change the present situation very much. Is such a step in the interests of both the Organization of American States and Canada? It may not be of decisive importance, but on the whole such a step would appear to be in the interest of all concerned. As the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said recently, there is “no doubt whatsoever that membership in the OAS is part of the ultimate destiny of Canada as a country of the Western Hemisphere.”28

Manchester, England


1. John D. Harbron, Canada and the Organization of American States (1963), Canadian American Committee sponsored by National Planning Association (U.S.A.) and Private Planning Association of Canada, 1963, p.11.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 18. See also E Lienwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America, 1965, p. 10.

4. Harbron, p. 18.

5. Speech by the Acting Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, at the opening of the Eighth American Regional Conference of the International Labour Organization, Ottawa, 12 September 1966, Statements and Speeches, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 66/37, p. 6. (“Statements and Speeches …..”hereafter cited as S&S.)

6. A speech by Senator John J. Connolly to the Sixth Inter-American Conference of Business Executives in Lima, Peru, on 9 November 1964, S&S, No. 64/34, p.4.

7. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, to the Second Annual Banff Conference on world Development, 24 August 1964, S&S, No. 64/16, p.4,

8. Ibid., p. 5.

9. The Canadian funds in the form of direct loans amounted to U.S. $27.8 million, and in the form of loan participation and parallel financing arrangements amounted to U.S. $13.95 million. Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund Sixth Annual Report, 1966, p.391.

10. The Canada-United States Permanent Board of Defence, Reference Papers, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No.116, August 1965, p.2. (Hereafter cited as PBDRP.)

11. Ibid., pp.4 and 5. See also John Gellner, “Canada in NATO and NORAD,” Air University Review, March-April 1967, pp.22-37. W. L, Morton, “The Fundamentals of Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy,” Air University Review, January-February 1967, pp.5-14.

12. PBDRP, p. 5.

13. Ibid.

14. “Aspects of Canada and United States Foreign Policies,” a speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Michigan Stale University, East Lansing, 25 February 1967, S&S, No.67/5, p.2.

15. Address by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a Dinner of the Mid-western Regional Conference of Attorneys General in Detroit, Michigan, 7 December1965, S&S, No.65/30, p.2.

16. “Canada’s Trade with the Commonwealth Caribbean,” a speech by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Robert H. Winters, to the Halifax, Nova Scotia, Board of Trade, 27 February 1967, S&S, No.67/6, p.1.

17. Canadian External Aid, Reference Papers, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 86 (revised September 1966).

18. Winters, p. 2.

19. “Canada and the Commonwealth Countries of the Caribbean,” address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Honourable Paul Martin, to the Toronto Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 24 May 1966,p.3.

20. S&S, No.67/5, p. 7.

21. OAS Doc. 11 (English), Rev. 5, 27 February 1967.

22. Harbron, p.22.

23. Ibid., p.22. See also John W. Holmes, “Canada’s Role in the United Nations,” Air University Review, May-June 1967, p.20.

24. Harbron, p.25.

25. Ibid., p.22.

26. See Muriel T. Baron in Waldmarck Encyclopedia of Nations: Americas, 1965, p. 57: “Canada ranks fifth in world trade, follows the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom and France . . . export of goods and services have been close to 20% of gross national expenditure, while imports have been even higher . . . In 1962 total trade (exports and imports together) were valued at over Cdn $12.6 billion, an increase of 8% over 1961.”

27. “The Identity of Canada in North America,” an address by the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, 19 May 1966, S&S, No. 66/72, p. 6.

28. “Canada and Latin America,” a speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Canadian Inter-American Association dinner, Ottawa, 31 May 1967, S&S, No.67/21, p.2.


Dr. Ludwik J. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski (Docteur en droit, University of Paris) is a member of the Bar of Montreal, Canada, with specialties in international and comparative law. Since 1948 he has lectured in French, English, and Spanish at universities in Canada, United States, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, and England. He became vice president of the Canadian Inter-American Research Institute, Montreal, in 1964. He was a Canada Council scholar in 1964-65; member of the center for studies and research in international law and international relations at the Hague Academy of International Law in 1964-65; an associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965-66; and a Simon Senior Research Fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of Manchester, 1966-67. His writings in the field of law and Canadian history have been widely published, and he is active in Canadian, American, British, French, inter-American, and international learned societies and professional legal associations.


The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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