Air University Review, September-October 1967

CHIEU HOI: 
THE SURRENDER PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Garry D. Brewer

Phuoc Tuy, 10 November 1966

TO ALL MY OLD FRIENDS IN THE C.41

I am Dao Van Roc of Ngai Giao hamlet, Duc Thanh district, Phuoc Tuy province. I was formerly with the C.41 in Chan Duc district. I rallied to the GVN on 2 Nov 1966 and was warmly welcomed at the Phuoc Tuy Chieu Hoi center.

The importance of a viable and effective surrender program as an alternative to continued guerrilla hostilities has been demonstrated in the Philippine Huk Campaign of 1946-52 and in the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60. Although in both instances the political, military, and environmental elements were unique, some of the lessons learned are proving relevant to the current surrender program of South Vietnam known as Chieu Hoi.¹

In the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay’s rise to power in 1950 as Secretary of National Defense marked the turning point in the government’s anti-Huk campaign.² Under Magsaysay the government was made into a more effective fighting and administrative force in an effort to carry the war to the Huk and to perform better and more equitably the expected functions of government. Magsaysay also inaugurated his “Attraction Program,” making a clear-cut alternative available to these same Huks for the first time since the conflict had begun. Until then, the government had pursued a narrow, no-alternative policy of military suppression against the Huks. (A brief amnesty in 1948 had failed for a number of specific reasons.) The no-alternative policy had meant that few Huk prisoners were taken and surrenders were few and unusual. The Attraction Program meant that the Huk could choose to stop fighting with some honor and with some guarantee of benevolence from the government: amnesty, virgin lands, agricultural assistance under the Economic Development Corps Program (EDCOR),³ and other opportunities constituted the “attractions.” The successful results of this Philippine experience clearly indicate the importance of 

(1) formulating a behavior alternative for the hostile elements,

(2) creating a firm but benevolent image of the incumbent regime in an effort to legitimize it through internal reform and reorganization by the exercise of determined leadership, and

(3) gathering and acting upon information about the guerrilla organization infrastructure.

Two significant events of the latter sort were the seizure of the Manila-based Politburo-In in October 1950, as a result of effective military intelligence activity, and the infiltration and compromise of the financial organization by an agent of the Philippine intelligence.

The Malayan Emergency has left many useful points as a legacy for present-day counterguerrilla operations in Vietnam. The relatively small-scale Chinese terrorist (CT) force, estimated to have been on the order of 5000 to 6000 combatants, and the relatively few defectors recovered, about 2700,⁴ meant that the British could execute the now famous “Briggs Plan” utilizing a maximum number of civilian officials. The predominance of civil administrators and civil national policemen was a feature of the Malayan campaign that enhanced the separation and classification of surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) from the captured enemy personnel (CEP).⁵ By so differentiating defections from captures, the “prisoner of war” image was generally avoided. The SEP’s were of great usefulness in terms of tactical intelligence and repenetration of the jungle as members of Security Force units known as Special Operational Volunteer Forces. British ingenuity came to the fore in the many diverse techniques and methods employed to secure defections. Loudspeaker aircraft or “voice craft” were used extensively to broadcast taped and live appeals from recent defectors to their former units. Personal family appeals were similarly made known, thereby capitalizing upon the characteristic Chinese attachment to family. Highly tactical⁶ leaflets were dropped from aircraft, left by ground troops, and otherwise widely disseminated to insure that the government’s surrender terms were understood, to tell the CT how to go about defecting, and to inform the largely pro-CT local Chinese population of the basic choices afforded the fighters and their supporters. A generous system of rewards and bounties was also developed to enhance the flow of defectors and to add to the CT’s general sense of insecurity.

A third experience, that of the French in Algeria, provides a somewhat negative lesson. With a clear-cut position of military superiority, the French under General Challe by mid-1959⁷ had adopted a firm, fear-inducing military campaign designed to (1) destroy the guerrilla communications, (2) destroy the guerrillas, and (3) re-educate captured guerrillas.⁸ This narrowly focused effort did satisfy most military objectives, but it was woefully inadequate in the crucial political and psychological areas. Thus the French in Algeria, by their failure, make a pressing case for an integrated political-psychological-military effort.

Chieu Hoi, 1963-65

The first official Government of Vietnam (GVN) reference to Chieu Hoi came in former President Ngo Dinh Diem’s Tet or Lunar New Year speech of 26 January 1963. An official Vietnamese decree of the following April out-lined the basic elements of Chieu Hoi, which remain, interestingly enough, little changed to this day. The broad purposes of the effort were much like those of the surrender program in Malaya, reflecting the assistance and experience afforded the United States Mission and the GVN by British and Australian veterans of that emergency. Most notable of this group is, of course, Sir Robert Thompson, who has served as a special adviser in Saigon for several years. Stated very generally, the Chieu Hoi surrender program is intended to

· weaken the Viet Cong as an effective fighting force

· create dissension and mistrust within the guerrilla political-military organization

· gather useful intelligence about guerrilla personnel, supplies, and techniques

· build an image of the Government of Vietnam that is firm but benevolent

· reintroduce the returnee into the mainstream of life under the GVN.

Chieu Hoi in the 1963-65 era was plagued by a peculiar set of debilitating circumstances. The Diem regime’s well-known no-compromise attitude toward its political opponents did little to infuse in government personnel a sense of “open arms” or forgiveness. Further supporting a general sense of impotence on the part of Chieu Hoi officials, who had been charged with the achievement of the five stated goals, was the fact that the administrative machinery was submerged within other elements of the government, resulting in little high-level support or interest and a high turnover of personnel. In spite of its buried status within other administrative services (Figure 1) and its relatively low priority, Chieu Hoi accounted for some 11,248 returnees in 1963, 5417 in 1964, and 3192 in the first six months of 1965 (up to the June coup that brought the Ky government to power).⁹ The trend was definitely not favorable and mirrored the generally deteriorating military situation and increasingly unstable political situation.

Joint United States Public Affairs 
Office (JUSPAO)

Created in early 1965 by order of President Johnson and placed under the overall direction of Carl Rowan, head of the United States Information Agency at that time, JUSPAO has been an experiment in psychological warfare. Devoting much of its energy to a revitalization of Chieu Hoi and the Vietnamese psychological warfare effort, JUSPAO has ensured that an alternative to continued guerrilla warfare is available and is widely and readily understood. The organization is unique in that coordination of all psychological warfare activities has been placed under the Director of JUSPAO. The policy of eschewing a “prisoner of war” image for returnees and of integrating political and psychological considerations into the information and surrender programs soon began to pay off. A summary of defections from January 1963 to 31 March 1967 (Figure 2)¹⁰ shows the reversal of the downward trend and a definite increase in the number of Viet Cong opting for the GVN since mid-1965.

Chieu Hoi, June 1965 to the present

JUSPAO now works in close cooperation with the Commissioner General for Information and Open Arms and his administrative subordinates in the Vietnamese Information Service and in the various Chieu Hoi services (Figure 3). Mr. Dinh Trinh Chinh, the head of Psy War and Chieu Hoi from 24 June 1965 to 13 July 1966 (during which time it was a subunit of the Ministry of War), has been elevated to the important Central Executive Committee, where Chieu Hoi is now given top-level Vietnamese priority and attention. Thus the Chieu Hoi surrender effort is now recognized as a separate and essential instrument of the government

The specific operational activities of Chieu Hoi have been executed by five services and seventeen functional bureaus (as shown in Figure 3). Of particular interest in this respect are the Intelligence, Armed Propaganda, Resettlement, and New Skill Training/Job-Finding Bureaus.

The Intelligence Bureau is generally patterned after the Special Branch operation of the Malayan experience, i.e., a police perspective as opposed to a military perspective. In Malaya, enemy orders of battle and leadership biographies were obtained from defectors through detailed interrogations designed to cull out of the individual’s history the reasons why he joined the movement, the identity and location of specific persons in the guerrilla units, and any other facts that might help to fill in these essential elements of intelligence.¹¹ To a currently voiced criticism about the overlapping and duplicative character of Chieu Hoi intelligence function, one might point out a fundamental difference between military intelligence and the type of information needed by a civil-administrative, paramilitary, or police operation. As opposed to attempting to locate military units at some given point in time and space, Chieu Hoi’s information gathering is aimed at longer range, more detailed, and infinitely more subtle objectives. In short, conventional military intelligence leaves much to be desired when one tries to develop, for example, intricate family relationships of known guerrilla leaders or when one is attempting to construct a detailed breakdown of a guerrilla unit’s organizational infrastructure.

The Armed Propaganda Teams (APT’s) represent a means by which selected Quy Chanh (“returnees”) may engage in direct contact with families and friends of known Viet Cong guerrillas. (The Special Operational Volunteer Forces, composed of surrendered enemy personnel, had much the same purpose and demonstrated decisively the impact of this type of mission.) Organized into some twenty-four platoons with light defensive armament, APT’s are used at the discretion of the province chief in whose area they have been assigned to operate. There have been problems connected with the use of APT’s, largely administrative in character, including problems of training, recruiting, employment, command, etc.; but the potential for access to specific individuals within the insurgent ranks is unmatched. Who should know more about the enemy than ex-guerrillas?

To solve the problem of what to do with a surrendered Viet Cong, the Resettlement Bureau has developed a program that assists the defector and his family to relocate in government-controlled areas. This relocation is usually necessary only in those instances when the returnee’s village is not under government control. In these cases the returnee and his family are accorded an allotment for house construction and a subsistence allowance for each family member for a period up to six months or until they are resituated. The Vietnamese have posited a long-range goal of one hamlet per province to be made up of returnees. Toward this goal, some eleven pilot hamlets are in various stages of funding and construction. Each of these hamlets will house about one hundred families.

These Chieu Hoi hamlets are advantageous for several interrelated reasons. The task of accounting for and assisting returnees is facilitated by having them physically located in one area.¹² Also the placing of returnees in a common hamlet all but eliminates adjustment and reintegration problems with respect to non-returnee families.

The problems, nevertheless, are still considerable. The most obvious, of course, is the ease of access that these settlements provide for potential retaliatory acts by the Viet Cong. The unavailability of suitable land is another problem of some consequence in a country like Vietnam. It would be extremely fortunate indeed if the Vietnamese had the vast, secure, and rich farmlands that were available to the Filipinos, but they do not. Another negative consideration is brought to mind by the North Vietnamese refugee villages: entire communities of North Vietnamese resettled in South Vietnam after the partition of Vietnam in 1954, but they did little to integrate into the local stream of events, instead creating small pockets of North Vietnam throughout South Vietnam. The inference to be drawn is that hamlets composed altogether of defectors might foster this type of exclusive behavior. One of the stated goals of the Chieu Hoi program is to bring the returnee and his family back into the mainstream of active, constructive participation in the affairs of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Although this goal and the inference seem to be at cross-purposes, at this time no clear trends or indicators are especially visible; however, this ranks as an area for some concern.

The importance of the operations of the New Skill Training/Job-Finding Bureau is not to be undervalued despite evidence to date that relatively few returnees are requesting vocational training. Most returnees have been rice farmers and have elected to return to that occupation or else to serve voluntarily in the Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) or other government agencies. The worth of the retraining program is presently accounted for in its propaganda or exploitational value. Visible proof of a successful vocational retraining and placement program goes a long way in countering the persistent Viet Cong contention that defectors are imprisoned and then starved by the GVN. The job training available includes tailoring, auto mechanics, radio repairing, first aid, brick making, carpentry, shoe making, typing, and simple courses in animal husbandry and improved agricultural methods. These training and placement functions could be most important in the event of continuing large-scale defections or a reduction in the intensity and scale of hostilities.

reasons for defection

How does one go about getting a Viet Cong to defect to the GVN? What makes a guerrilla surrender? Tentative assessments, based on the experience already acquired in interrogating and handling nearly 30,000 Quy Chanh since 1963, have indicated at least five frequently cited reasons for defection.¹³ It is useful to note that these factors motivating defections are being developed into psychological warfare themes and techniques for use at the local, tactical level.¹⁴

One general reason, perhaps the reason most regularly encountered, is the environmental and military hardship experienced as a guerrilla in the field. This hardship dimension is so diffuse that it effectively operates as the matrix into which all other reasons are fitted.

The constant shelling and bombing taken by many of these defectors have contributed to a sense of insecurity and a terror of being wounded and left to die or of being killed outright. A fairly typical reaction, expressed by one Quy Chanh, can be summed tip as follows:

…..the most important factor which led to my rally was the bombing and artillery shellings. I reconsidered my ideological stand and made up my mind to leave the Front,¹⁵

The need to work ever more regularly at night, in order to avoid detection and its concomitant punishment, has been singled out as another basic reason for surrender. Apparently the Viet Cong are not any more anxious than anyone else to operate at night and do so with some trepidation.

Family ties are strong in the Vietnamese society, and it is to return to family and friends that many a Viet Cong has become a Quy Chanh. The overall propaganda appeal has especially reflected this vulnerability in sentimental return-to-family leaflets. Direct contact is also made with the families of known Viet Cong, and then tape-recorded messages from them are airborne into areas where their relatives in the Viet Cong are known to be operating.

To a question aimed at determining how better to effect surrenders, the same Quy Chanh offered these fairly typical opinions:

The most important thing is to assure them of safe conduct when they come out….

Appeals from families and their own leaders are the most effective. I myself waited until I got word from my father before I rallied.

Appeals from parents or wives and children are the best because they were all homesick and family bound. Appeals from their own leaders are excellent because they would trust their own leaders more than regular leaflets.¹⁶

The Armed Propaganda Teams, as already stated, have as a fundamental mission the contacting of families and friends of known guerrillas to explain Chieu Hoi, by their very presence offering tangible evidence of the treatment that will be accorded them by the government.

The fifth basic reason commonly cited for defecting could be loosely classed as “loss of faith.” As military pressure has mounted in recent months, an ever increasing incidence of this attitude or mood has been evidenced as contributing to defections. One might cautiously allude to this fact in helping to catch the flavor or trend of the greater mass mood or pattern of what to expect. This dimension at the very least provides suggestive insights into these more complex issues and questions.

In response to these five typical or common reasons for defecting, a whole range of themes and attraction techniques has been developed.

attraction techniques

In a broad sense, the whole information and psychological warfare effort might be viewed as an attempt to win the entire Vietnamese nation over to the government side. From this perspective, leaflet and poster appeals stressing legitimacy¹⁷ themes (such as GVN development projects or efforts to improve political participation and representation) may be seen as having some diffuse effect on the attraction of Viet Cong to the Chieu Hoi program. Of more direct importance would be the highly tactical, tightly focused appeal which has rapidly become the backbone of Chieu Hoi.

In an analysis of leaflets and posters produced at the national (Saigon) level for distribution to specific areas around the country, it has been found that several primary themes dominated the materials specifically oriented toward Chieu Hoi ¹⁸ Not too surprisingly, the three themes most commonly encountered were return-to-family, environmental and military hardship, and isolation appeals. Throughout the year 1966, leaflets frequently employed pictures and handwritten messages from the returnee to his specific unit and often to specific individuals within that unit. Taped loudspeaker messages were being broadcast from aircraft, jeeps, and small boats in a like manner, disseminating the spoken word of returnees. A typical Quy Chanh message would include reassurances that the government had treated him well and that he had received medical and other required assistance. This uncertainty of treatment at the hands of the government is a salient point in the minds of many, if not most, Quy Chanh prior to their defection, as indicated by the one previously quoted:

I was very much afraid because [when] I was with the Front we were told and informed that when we rallied to the GVN one of the three following things would occur: (1) death, (2) imprisonment, or (3) getting drafted. [sic]¹⁹

Because a great many of the Viet Cong defect to Rural and Popular Force (paramilitary) units and because the awareness of forgiveness and Chieu Hoi (open arms, welcome return) somehow has not trickled down to many of these long-suffering, often-attacked rural outposts, a major re-education campaign has been undertaken. Among other things, short and simple cartoon-type movies explaining Chieu Hoi are being shown to all paramilitary and regular troops of the RVN armed forces in hopes of furthering the surrender program. Discernible in the leaflet appeals is a clear trend toward considerations of an immediate and personal nature (e. g., escape, care, and treatment when rallied) and a corresponding trend away from more abstract appeals (e.g., nationalism or fear of overt Chinese intervention). The face-to-face perspective of Chieu Hoi is perhaps emerging as one of its key characteristics.

In a representative week, 25 September—1 October 1966, JUSPAO printed over 5.8 million leaflets and posters for use in Vietnam.²⁰ This total did not include the many small-scale production efforts fostered at the local level. Typically the Vietnamese and U.S. military psychological warfare battalions and Vietnamese Information Service and U.S. civilian psychological warfare personnel produce simple, highly tactical messages under their own cognizance in the field. This practice not only complements the “grass roots” nature of Chieu Hoi but also significantly reduces the time lag required to produce an appeal.

results and observations

One phase of the First World War has been referred to as the “war without weapons, in which the use of leaflets reached spectacular proportions. All told, 65,595,000 leaflets were snowed over the German lines.”²¹ In one massive, concerted effort between 9 and 31 January 1966, more than 132,418,000 leaflets and posters were disseminated in the Republic of Vietnam. This prodigious effort supported last year’s Tet campaign.²² In short, during little more than three weeks in Vietnam, more than twice as many leaflets were used as had been used by all the Allied nations in the entire First World War. (From time to time wholly unconfirmed reports circulate to the effect that some Viet Cong have defected so that they will not have to keep policing up leaflets that have been dropped all over the place.) During the 1966 Tet campaign, from 1 January to 11 February, some 1882 returnees rallied to the government side, then an all-time high for the program. In a similar period of time this year’s Tet campaign netted 3456 returnees.²³ To put this latter figure into proper context, the number of defectors that rallied to the GVN in the two preceding months should be noted: November 1966-2505, and December 1966-2516.

The defection trend over the last year is generally encouraging; however, one must consider the fact that most of these are not the leadership elements, i.e., the cadre. It is one thing to entice a teenage farmhand of limited and recent military exposure to respond to the GVN’s appeal; it is quite a different thing to convince a battle-hardened, well-disciplined, and thoroughly politicized officer or political cadre that the strife and struggling of a lifetime are no longer worth the effort.

When those key elements in the National Liberation Front organizational structure begin defecting in considerable numbers, then and only then will the end be somewhere in sight. To hasten this process in Malaya, the British quite regularly offered high status and leadership jobs to CT cadre personnel. Also the reward or bounty offered for these individuals was extraordinarily high in comparison to that offered for the average guerrilla.

It is a fairly well recognized and rather bothersome fact that the absentee rate in the RVN armed forces has been substantial. As a matter of interest, the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam has a regular proselyting program known as binh van. Douglas Pike sets the ARVN desertion rate in the years 1960-63 at about 400 soldiers per month. ²⁴ The frequently heard explanation that an AWOL soldier has merely “gone home for Tet” or “gone to help with planting or harvesting” in no way whatsoever mitigates the hard fact that the government has lost the services of one man. What this suggests is the need for some type of a “net flow” concept, whereby Viet Cong defections are balanced against this kind of government loss. While there may not be an exact one-to-one correspondence, there must be some allowance made for these losses if a more accurate understanding of the overall situation is to be achieved.

Another valid and perhaps obvious consideration is that Chieu Hoi (or any other surrender program) cannot stand alone and apart from the full diverse range of efforts being pursued in an attempt to put down a guerrilla war. In short, Chieu Hoi is but one important facet or the greater complex operation. That it contributes to a resolution of the conflict in some degree is indisputable; wherever any genuine and reasonable offer of amnesty and rehabilitation has been made to obtain guerrilla surrenders, there has been at the very least some positive, recognizable payoff.

Besides the favorable propaganda effect afforded by the numbers, rates, and trends in defection statistics, the underlying importance of Chieu Hoi is in its providing a clear-cut alternative to continued hostilities and its forcing the incumbent regime to maintain a modicum of conciliation toward dissident individuals, while simultaneously combating the more inclusive hostile movement.

New Haven, Connecticut

Notes

1. Chiêu Hôi has been interpreted as “open arms.” The literal meaning of the term is “welcome return.” The entire program has been called Chieu Hoi to indicate the spirit or attitude that the government is supposed to hold with respect to the returnee or Quy Chánh (or alternatively, Hôi Chánh).

2. For a good general summary see Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan, Counterguerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962).

3. Maynard W. Dow, Major, USAF, Nation Building in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Press, 1966), pp. 89-125.

4. Malaya Mail, Kuala Lumpur, 30 July 1960. [Special “Roundup” issue on the Emergency]

5. Cf. Lucian W. Pye, Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts; CIS/MIT, Communist Bloc Program, C/57-17: n.d.).

6. “Tactical” leaflets are those addressed to specific units or even particular persons within units in a given geographical area, useful within a limited time frame.

7. A. H, Peterson, et al. (eds.), Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Algerian War (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, July 1963), pp.9-11.

8. Andre Souyris, “Réalité et aspects de la guerre psychologique,” Révue Militeire d’Information, CCCII (February 1959), 20-21.

9. Miên Nam Tu Do (“The Free Southern Region.”), Saigon, 20 January 1967, p, 1.

10. Data for the years 1963-1966 (inclusive) are from Mien Nam Tu Do. Fragmentary data for 1967 until 31 March are from Monte L. Osborne, Chief, Statistical Section, Chieu Hoi Division, Office of Civil Operations, USAID/Vietnam, 5 April 1967. Personal correspondence.

11. J. B. Perry-Robinson, Transformation in Malaya (London: Secker and Warburg, Ltd., 1956), pp. 159-62.

12. Similarly, one of the key features of the EDCOR resettlement farms in the Philippines was just this clustering of ex-guerrillas in central locations. A fundamental difference, however, would be that four out of six EDCOR farms and the bulk of the persons involved in the resettlement were on Mindanao while the insurgency was essentially concentrated in the more populous portions of Luzon. The Briggs Plan for Malaya also had vast resettlement implications, but in that instance it was the masses who became the object of relocation under the New Villages scheme, which eventually resettled upwards of 500,000 persons.

13. Both the RAND Corporation and the Simulmatics Corporation are engaged in intensive analyses of defectors in an effort to understand as thoroughly as possible the processes responsible for causing one first to become a guerrilla and then to reject this commitment by overt defection. The very general reasons cited in this article do not derive from either RAND or Simulmatics information but rather come from field interviews conducted by the author in 1965-66 while in Vietnam.

14. JUSPAO, “Viet Cong Morale and Vulnerabilities: June-December, 1965,” JUSPAO Guidances, No. 9, Enclosure 1, Supplement 1 (Saigon, Vietnam: 27 January 1966), (mimeograph).

15. This individual was a Viet Cong Local Force platoon leader who had defected and was being interrogated in Dinh Tuong Province, 45 miles southwest of Saigon. A complete summary of the lengthy Interrogation is found in “Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,” No. DT-70 (II) (Saigon, Vietnam: 18-19 August 1965), (mimeograph). p. 44.

16. Ibid., pp.8-9.

17. The term “legitimacy” may be understood in this usage:”…power…wins its title to be legitimate only by conforming to what is in the general view the legitimate form of Power; it wins its title to be beneficent only by making its ends conform to those which men in general esteem; . . its only strength is, at any rate in most cases, she strength which men think it their duty to lend to it.” Betrand de Jouvenal, On Power (New York: Viking Press 1949), p.25.

18. G. D. Brewer, “A KWIC (Key Word in Context) Content Analysis of Propaganda Materials Sampled from the Vietnamese Conflict” (unpublished research paper; Yale University, February 1967).

19. “Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,” p.27.

20. JUSPAO, Field Development Division, “Weekly Report: September 25—October 1, 1966,” (Saigon, Vietnam, n. d.), (mimeograph).

21. Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Meridian Books, The World Publishing Co., 1958), p.41.

22. USAID, “Monthly Report on Status of Rural Construction Program” (Saigon, Vietnam, February 1966), (mimeograph).

23. Ibid.; also personal correspondence, Monte L. Osborne.

24. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1966). p.255. [Cf. pp.253-68 for binh van.]

Contributor

Garry D. Brewer (M. S., San Diego State College) is a doctoral candidate, Department of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University. Commissioned ensign, USNR, in 1963, he served 14 months aboard the USS Henrico, then was assigned to the U. S. naval Amphibious School. He attended the USMC Counterguerrilla Warfare School, USN Survival School, and the Defense Language Institute Vietnamese Language Course. Released from active duty in August 1966, he is a lieutenant (jg), USNR. His article “Counterinsurgency Training for the Navy” appears in the U. S. Navy Institute Proceedings, June 1967

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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