Air University Review, November-December 1967
The reasons for the ouster of the Soviet “collective leadership” in June
1957 and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964 are both complex and simple. Much of
what really happened must remain in the realm of educated speculation. In both
instances, however, several preliminaries occurred which have a well-documented
parallel in the history of recent Soviet politics. Some of them are germane to
our discussion of the evolution of the military as a political force in the
In many respects the 1964 pattern closely resembled that of 1955-57 when
Khrushchev used the military to depose Malenkov and his associates. In both
instances the one major consideration that tended to draw the military into the
issue was the threat to Soviet military might and prestige through reduced
defense expenditures. The military supported the anti-incumbent faction on the
premise that the latter would continue to make Soviet defense policy its chief concern.
It was considered essential that Soviet military power retain its posture
vis-à-vis the
It is of little significance whether the real cause of the beginning of the end of the Khrushchevian era was the Cuban missile crisis and its disastrous aftermath, or the agricultural failures, or the Sino-Soviet rift. What is of interest to students of Soviet military history is the emergence of the military hierarchy for a second time in seven years to act as the balance of persuasion in toppling one dictatorship and supporting the installation of a successor. Although no single military leader emerged as a “hero of the day” as did Marshal Georgi Zhukov in 1957, the rise in influence of the military in the new Soviet government in 1964 was noteworthy and quite significant.
One Soviet affairs analyst in attempting to interpret the 1964 Soviet leadership crisis saw Khrushchev’s ouster as the loss of an uphill battle by those who opposed the military elements. Yuri V. Marin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. believed that the move was planned and carried out by a caucus of the orthodox top Party members under pressure from the armed forces supported by state security organs. Other Kremlinologists felt that political motives were absent from this particular military power play. However, the vast potential of the Soviet military machine as a practical political force had been awakened by Khrushchev in his drive to power in 1957, and now, seven years later, the same force that guaranteed his rise to Party leadership was instrumental in the demise of his political power.
It is of great import that at the present time another potentially
significant episode is taking place in the
Present Soviet policy seems to have settled for an ABM capability to enhance
the image of Soviet military power as a deterrent force vis-à-vis present
It seems quite certain that if
If a showdown were to occur over the issue of ABM defenses, a new element
would most likely be added to the preliminaries. It is believed that two deputy
premiers of the Soviet Union,
A conceivable military-political-industrial alliance in the
Not since the days of World War II have Soviet military leaders wielded such
domestic political influence as they seemingly do at the present time.
Indications are that the pressures and patterns of the nuclear age have had
far-reaching effects upon Communist doctrine. Soviet military power as an
insular tool of the Party has given way to a newer interpretation that the
military shares the leadership in the patriotic movement to counter the awesome
power of the
Soviet international affairs have forced the military to accept a role foreign to Marxist theory. The Party has had little recourse but to allow the Soviet military to be portrayed as a most awesome and feared force in order to carry out foreign policy goals in a nuclear environment. The military has welcomed this transformation, for it has released them from a past fraught with frustration, fear, and repression.
It is, therefore, logical that we consider the past in order to understand
present-day events as well as the theoretical foundations and historical
precedents underlying the Party and the military relationship. With some
knowledge of what has gone before, a more meaningful appraisal of the military’s
future role in Soviet political maneuvering can be more adequately determined.
In this manner it is possible to arrive at some feasible conclusions while
avoiding the penchant for comparing Soviet military tradition with the
evolution of the military profession in the
One of the chief continuing concerns of Soviet leadership has been to
maintain and maximize the loyalty of its armed forces. The totalitarian nature
of the
The position of the Soviet armed forces is crucial. The Kremlin is vitally concerned with its absolute strength and spares no effort in building up its military might. On the other hand the very existence of a professional corps of military men, wielding considerable power and gradually tending to develop their own esprit de corps, has been a constant threat to the totalitarian character of the system. The Kremlin, therefore, has had to absorb within itself the military machine and make absolutely certain that a second force capable of turning against it would never exist. The officers and men of the Soviet armed forces have been trained to conceive of themselves as being, first of all, willing supporters of the political system and the philosophical assumptions on which it is supposedly founded and only secondarily military men, professionally trained in the art of war. As we shall soon discover, the Soviet regime is today plagued to a greater degree by this last proposition, since the advent of nuclear weapons has thrust the military into a new and important role in Soviet power politics.
The Marxists have always closely related the military to domestic politics, considering the military more as an instrument for a ruling class to maintain its power at home than as a tool of international combat. To the Marxists, the soldiers in any country are the second line of defense when the police have been overwhelmed. Lenin said often that a revolution could not be successful under modern conditions of warfare if it did not win to its side enough of the military to neutralize the effectiveness of this strongest weapon of the rulers. The military is thus recognized as one of the most important instruments in politics.
According to the official Soviet view, the Red Guard was the principal and decisive armed force in the November rebellion. The Red Guard was par excellence the military organization of the proletariat which was fostered and developed by the Bolsheviks in 1917, in preparation for the armed rebellion they were planning. However, at the first conference on military affairs after the revolution, there arose differing opinions as to the place of the Red Guard in the new society. The members of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), wanted to arm the workers and form them into separate armed units under political control. The professional military wanted to maintain the military as a fixed unit for national defense, using the Red Guard as the foundation of a new army. These latter views could not prevail against the Party’s wishes, and so the military was forced to accept second-best within its own profession.
The expression of these views marked the beginning of conflict within the Party military organization as to policy and tactics. These conflicts became an integral part of the military life of a regime under which the military was deposed from its position of political aloofness and made politically conscious—at times acutely conscious—of the political disputes within the Party. To this day the professional military officers have waged an unending battle against political controls in the armed forces. The ever present fear of military influence has caused the Party to use direct methods of control of the Soviet armed forces to a greater extent than in any other mass organization. The long-range success of the Soviet leaders in holding the loyalty of the armed forces is related directly to the general emotional acceptance of the Soviet system by the great majority of the high command. Sufficient military discipline exists within the armed forces to enable the high command to maintain its authority over the rank and file.
One of the chief concerns of the Soviet leaders has been to maintain and maximize the loyalty of the armed forces. The masses in a totalitarian state are deprived of even the smallest vestiges of political power, and so a crisis finds them unable to produce from the ranks any organizations ready and able to do battle on their behalf. They can only apply for assistance to groups already formed and persons possessing some sort of authority. In such a crisis, history points to the military as the governing factor. By means of the proceedings taken against the leaders of the Bolsheviks’ Old Guard and the Red Army in 1937, Stalin was insuring his totalitarian power against any such crisis into which the country might be thrown. The fear that the military was becoming an influential force automatically resulted in the destruction of the visible representatives of this group. Since de-Stalinization, the Party’s tasks have become much more difficult because of the present age of “enlightened existence” in the Soviet Union, the “elite” economic and social status of the military high command, and the apparent rise of the military into the higher levels of political activity (e.g., the Zhukov affair and Marshal Malinovsky’s role in the U-2 incident, the Cuban missile crisis, and Khrushchev’s downfall).
The Soviet government has attached exceptional importance to the political training of the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air Force, holding that in the hands of men who are ignorant of the object for which they are fighting military technique loses a great deal of effectiveness. In the hands of men who are fighting for definite ideals, however, military technique acquires added power. The shibboleth of the Party during the formative years of the Red Army was “political expediency”; military and other needs took a back seat to political needs. Even if the military took in illiterate and ignorant men, as long as they were “class-trustworthy,” they were accepted. The ex-czarist officers were not to be trusted but had to be utilized in the military for lack of other experienced military leaders. Because of this situation the Commissariat for Military Affairs was established in May 1918. It consisted of three commissariats, one military (which dealt with enlisted personnel) and two political (which dealt with officers and commanders). The political commissars shared command with the military specialist (the commander), and all orders had to be countersigned by both political commissars. This system originated because the Party was fearful of counterrevolutionary activity, especially from the ex-czarist officers who had been pressed into service with the Communists. Even the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, in the Revolutionary War Council, had to have his orders cosigned.
The military commissars were the immediate political organ of the Soviet government in the ranks of the armed forces. They were appointed from “irreproachable revolutionaries, able to remain the embodiment of the revolution under the most difficult circumstances.” The persons of the commissars (both political and military) were declared inviolate, and an insult offered to a commissar while on duty was proclaimed equal to the most heinous crime against the Soviet government. The military commissars were tasked to see to it that the military did not become a thing apart from the entire Soviet system and that the various military establishments did not become the focus of conspiracies or instruments against the Party
The institution of political commissars had its origin in the political necessity of watching over the politically suspect ex-czarist officers and the guerrilla leaders who rose to command positions in the military. From these early shoots grew a mighty tree with roots penetrating deeply into the military. As time passed, the later aim of the political organs was not to watch over the ex-czarist officers but to supervise, from the political viewpoint, the entire military and its political indoctrination.
The military was a crucial problem for the Party. The latter needed a strong force for national defense, yet was exceedingly reluctant to allow any other group to develop a power situation that might present itself as a possible rival. There was a fear that certain groups might agitate, causing a counterrevolutionary element within the military. The Main Political Administration of the Red Army had been set up in May 1919 to serve under the Central Committee of the Party as its Military Department. In essence this gave the Party direct control over the activities of the military. To those even remotely familiar with the autocratic institutionalization of military systems, a curious conflict suggested itself: conflict between this new institution, breaking down the sacrosanct principle of unity of military leadership, and the general posture of military life. For example, as soon as the Red Army had become a regularly organized armed force, commanded by men welded into it by the fire and stench of battle, the commissar had no place in it. However, the Party could not lose contact and control; consequently, political and Party life continued to pulsate and to circulate within the body of the Red Army. Thus was born the principle of dual command.
An unsuccessful attempt was made (by the military) to have the institution of commissars abolished in the early 1920s. In 1924, however, the age-old military principle of unity of command was to a degree established in the spheres of combat, supply, and administration, while the political commissars were relegated to political and Party work. The Party leadership could not abdicate its control of the military without running a risk that the officer corps would develop into an independent power center. The military had entrenched itself in its principle of single command, and a definite power struggle ensued between the hopeful political commissars and the determined military commanders. Under the powerful influence of Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Commissariats of Army and Navy were replaced by the Commissariat for Defense in March 1934. At the same time the Revolutionary Military Council was abolished, its powers being transferred to the Commissar for Defense. Thus, at the top echelon, the collegial method of military command and administration gave way to the principle of single command. In like manner, the collegial system was discontinued throughout the military at every echelon of command in 1934, and in keeping with the single command principle its powers were transferred at least theoretically to the commander.
A reaction to this state of affairs by the Party leaders was fairly certain because the military was developing into a competing power-oriented organization. Marshal Tukhachevsky had put military loyalty above strict Party discipline. He had carried on a campaign against the Party’s interference in military matters and against the intolerable dualism. He had waged an intense campaign to cause Stalin to rid the military not only of the political controls with which it was bound but also of the shackles imposed by Stalin’ secret police. The antagonism between the military and the secret police (GPU) was of long standing and grew continuously sharper until 1936.
So it was that Tukhachevsky complained bitterly against this dualism, and suddenly in 1936 Stalin acceded to the High Command’s demand and ordered the GPU liquidated. Tukhachevsky had wanted to end the dualistic military system in order to suppress the GPU’s high-handed terroristic regime in the interests of Soviet democracy; Stalin eliminated the GPU in the interests of his own totalitarian terroristic despotism. Stalin used the support of the military to destroy the GPU as a state within a state; then he turned around and crushed the so-called “Soviet-democratic internationalistic opposition” within the military. The trend toward further unity of command was rudely halted with the Great Purge of the Red Army less than a year later.
In mid-1937 the armed forces were struck by the purge. With the development
of their prestige and professionalism, they had reportedly formed a plot to get
rid of Stalin. The military had now regained much of its power, and certain
elements in the Party wanted its support. The purge was devastating. A dozen of
the top military leaders were executed, including, naturally, Tukhachevsky.
Thousands of other commanding personnel were executed, imprisoned, or
dismissed, or they simply disappeared. A conflict of major importance had
arisen between a large section of the military leaders and Stalin’s group, and
the purge reached out to the military to mitigate the Party’s fears of a rising
political force. No clearer illustration exists for the mistrust and fear in
which the military was held by the Party leaders (Stalin) than the
reintroduction, as a concomitant to the purge, of the collegial system (dual
command) and the political commissars in full vigor. Thus, the purge and consequent
closer supervision of the military resulted in the re-established equality of
the political commissars with the commanding personnel in both the military and
political phases of Soviet military life. The commissars—”the eyes and the ears
of the Party and government in the military”—launched a vigorous campaign for
increased political activity. The process of creating a professional officer
corps had suffered severely in the purge. A very great proportion of the higher
officers had been removed and many of them executed. This impressed all
military officers with the political nature of any authority in the
impact of World War II
The shortcomings of dual command showed up, however, in the Finnish campaign and brought back unity of command to the military units. Marshal Timoshenko, having assumed the office of Minister of Defense on 8 May 1940, called for the abolition of the political commissars, and this move was carried out on 12 August 1940. The political commissar now became an assistant commander for political affairs, subordinate to the unit military commander A few years later, in order to enhance officer prestige, the military salute was reintroduced, new uniforms were adopted for the officers, and stricter standards of discipline were established.
Just as suddenly as the commissars had lost their position of influence, they recovered it after Hitler’s attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941. This may be attributed to the mass defections that were taking place in the Soviet Army. Restoration of the political commissar was a desperate attempt to restore the loyalty of the crumbling political machine. The Army was disintegrating, the Party was in a state of panic, and to rescue his machine Stalin hoped for the same zealous leadership that had been shown by his first political commissars in the Civil War. This setting up of Communist to watch Communist in command positions (at this time almost 90 percent of the higher-ranking officers were Party members) was one of the anomalies brought about by the struggle within the Party and by the purge. It was not sufficient to be a Communist; it became necessary to be a staunch follower of Stalin.
On 9 October 1942, with the military situation improved, an effort to increase military efficiency was commenced by abolishing once again the political commissars and re-establishing the assistant commander for political affairs. This last pattern is essentially in effect today, with the main political directorate of the Soviet armed forces established as an entity within the Ministry of Defense.
By the conclusion of the Second World War the military had once again
regained prestige and prominence in Soviet society. The propaganda organs
hounded the people with praise for Stalin and his “military genius,” yet
greater tribute was paid to men like Marshal Zhukov by the Russian people. Once
again the Party acted to undermine the military, only this time the measures
were not so drastic, possibly because of the adverse effect on rebuilding
war-torn
Men like Marshal Zhukov were relegated to minor posts because they were too highly respected in the military. Some military officers who sensed Stalin’s desires were quick to denounce their fellow officers in the hope that they might replace those dismissed. Whatever Stalin’s reasons were in “exiling” his top generals and marshals, the fact remains that the military had become a powerful internal force to contend with. In early 1953 the favor of the military was solicited while a purge was begun of all other elements in the Soviet ruling circle. This occurred in conjunction with the so-called “doctor’s plot,” which also saw the Chief of Staff, General Sergei M. Shtemenko, removed twelve days prior to Stalin’s fatal illness. This had all the earmarks of a new Stalin purge.
The dominant role at the time of Stalin’s death and again at Beria’s crisis
was played by the military. At Stalin’s deathbed six top military men were
present. Marshal Zhukov was called back from obscurity to accept the position
of Deputy Minister of Defense. The fortunes of the armed forces rose and fell
in direct proportion to the intensity of the factionalism within the “collective
leadership.” The military appeared in many public and diplomatic displays, and
once they even tempered the political situation by having Zhukov (now top
military representative in the political power structure of the
post-Stalin era
Behind the Party scenes, a hard-fighting political professional struggled for power. In his climb to the top, Khrushchev made clever use of the military. Fearing unrest at home and desiring to capitalize on war hero Zhukov’s popularity, Khrushchev had induced the “collective leadership” to appoint him First Deputy Minister of Defense under Bulganin. Khrushchev had also succeeded in having Zhukov appointed a member of the Central Committee following Beria’s fall in June 1953. Although military power and prestige became greater through the mid-1950s, Khrushchev did not allow the military to become too powerful or too important. Certain demands were acceded to in keeping the favor of the military at his side; but Zhukov’s poor political judgment and the developing factionalism within the military high command allowed Khrushchev to force Malenkov’s resignation and to replace him with Bulganin without much fear of a military coup d’état.
Under the existing unstable conditions Zhukov, who was named Minister of Defense at the time Malenkov was ousted, felt able to demand stricter enforcement of the principle of unity of command. The military press campaigned vigorously for the abolition of political assistants, for a policy requiring subordinates’ unquestioning obedience to officers’ orders, and for the termination of interference in military decisions by the Party organization. Zhukov was able to reduce further the power of the Main Political Administration by making the company commanders responsible for both military and political training, by reducing the number of hours devoted to political indoctrination of enlisted men, and by making officer indoctrination voluntary rather than mandatory.
When it came to reducing the Party’s direct control over the military, Khrushchev and Zhukov clashed. In a series of speeches and articles, Zhukov criticized the Party groups for failing to back the officers in strengthening military discipline. Notwithstanding the dispute, Zhukov was elevated to full membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee following the June 1957 leadership crisis. Zhukov had backed Khrushchev in the purge of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, and Khrushchev had utilized his support. Having solidified his power position, Khrushchev was now ready to deal with Zhukov. Immediately following the purge, the press opened a campaign for increasing the role of Party organizations in the armed forces. Efforts were intensified to strengthen Party control, and Zhukov found himself isolated in a Presidium packed with Khrushchev supporters.
It was obvious that Khrushchev and the Party machine would not tolerate such conditions. Increasing autonomy of the armed forces, regardless of Zhukov’s possible personal ambitions, would in the end have created what has been noted many times before: a power center rivaling the Party. On the other hand, the Party leadership could not neglect the military support and loyalty that were necessary to guarantee its power position as well as to insure that its international aspirations remained feasible and viable. Thus, a dichotomous situation existed wherein the armed forces had to be kept in close check while the military high command was wooed and catered to by the Party leadership. Khrushchev, however, could not permit Zhukov to remain in his top post any longer because he was reaching heights of power unknown to the military of this Communist state. So Zhukov was dismissed, and the Party made it clear that an officer was first of all a Party member whose primary loyalty must be to the Party and to his professional military duties, rather than to his professional hierarchy or personal ambitions.
History has unfolded an unending struggle which has existed in the Soviet military since the early days of the Soviet state and which, as far as I am able to discern, exists at the present moment. This, of course, is the oft-mentioned struggle for unity of command. Actually the Soviet military has been much more interested in establishing itself on the pattern of Western powers, i.e., a military hierarchy internally free from political controls. The thought of becoming a rival political force has not focused into the Soviet military picture.
However, one of the most difficult issues to judge has been the extent to which the Soviet officer corps and particularly its high-ranking members have constituted a closely bound group with strong group loyalties that could have overridden loyalty to the Communist Party in time of crisis. Stalin thought there was such group loyalty, so it seems, for he had most of the Soviet High Command executed in 1937. The present generation of top Soviet officers may be solidified to some extent by fear that their careers would suffer a similar fate (figuratively) at the hands of the political leaders. Another solidifying influence, presumably, is resentment at the manner in which Stalin and the Communist Party leadership tried to avoid giving credit to the marshals and generals for their roles in World War II.
Divisive forces probably exist among top Soviet military leaders, too. Intense rivalry, jealousy, and competition for favored positions certainly have been evident. It would not be surprising if Marshal Zhukov’s meteoric rise in 1953-57 stirred up jealousy among some of his associates. Beyond that there has been much speculation as well as factual evidence that some high Soviet military commanders―Marshal Konev, for one―worked very closely with Khrushchev, presumably hoping that his influence would help them attain their personal goals. The precedent of great military condemnation of Zhukov by Marshals Konev, Rlokossovsky, Yeremenko, Sokolovsky, Timoshenko, and Biryuzov makes it doubtful that the top Soviet military leaders would all work together against the Communist Party if the goal were conditioned by personal or political ambitions.
The Soviet military has managed to reduce the rigid controls of the secret police as well as limit to an extent the realm of responsibility of the political assistants. An article appearing in the 13 June 1959 issue of Sovetskaya Aviatsiya (Soviet Aviation) states that in October of 1958 the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the status of the “Statute of Political Organs (1957)” in the Soviet military. (This was a Khrushchev concession to Zhukov before the latter’ fall from power.) The article states that the political organs of the Party were directed to strengthen the one-man command in the military; protect the authority of commanders; help them to eliminate shortcomings which obstruct the increasing of combat readiness of the commands, units, and ships; and teach all personnel a high level of discipline. If nothing else, this is an indication of the increased power of the military to extract a standing concession concerning unity of command. It is worth noting that in recent years the regime has tried a compromise cross-training program, one in which political officers are trained to be commanders and given command of troops while military commanders are given “special military [political] training.”
In examining the past and current political role of the military, as well as speculating on the future, I see several points that seem worthy of emphasis. First, the military has become a political force of sorts. The death of Stalin in 1953 created a power vacuum that caused the unstable political forces to look to the military for support. The arrest of Beria and the sharp reduction of the role of the secret police and political commissars keynoted the newly achieved prestige and influence of the Soviet military leadership. The very issues which arose between the rival political leaders drew the military into important, even if passive, political action. Between 1953 and 1957 the military played the role of “balancer” in the power battle among the members of the “collective leadership.” It was Khrushchev who eventually achieved personal power with the overt support of the military. For their efforts, the military gained a new status, which survived the Zhukov affair, as top Party leaders vied for the support of the military as a hedge against the day Khrushchev would fall. Having been thrust onto the political scene, the military were less than eager to revert to the status of the Stalin era.
A second point worth mentioning deals more with the circumstances of time
and technology. The advent of the military as a key factor in Soviet nuclear-age
policy strengthened their new-found political role and destroyed the original
idea that the military was more an instrument for helping a ruling class to
maintain its power at home than a tool of international combat. The threat of
thermonuclear war forced the Soviet armed forces to be the tool of
international persuasion that is so necessary for the U.S.S.R. in countering
the
The current status of the Soviet military leaders was born of certain issues
seemingly influenced by a history of repression, the advent of the nuclear age,
and the reliance placed upon them by Khrushchev. Basic changes made during
Khrushchev’s rule continue to exist. The basic unity of the armed forces is
evident in the single High Command organization, the General Staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet military organization has been “Westernized” to
the extent that military leaders now participate in discussions and decisions
on major issues of military policy at the highest level. Soviet military
leaders have also been thrust into important Party and government positions
because of their knowledge and expertise in nuclear matters. It is obvious that
the Party looks to the military to make credible the deterrent vis-à-vis the
While the future political role of the military is somewhat speculative, it
will no doubt hold true that any future conflict among the political leaders,
or between the political leaders and the military, which directly affects the
military may force the latter to become active among the contestants for power.
If faced with a serious compromise of
Hq
United States Air Force
Major John F. McMahon, Jr., (M. A.,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of
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