Project Rapid Strike

PROJECT RAPID STRIKE, the third phase of a United States Strike Command evaluation program, included an examination of all Army and Air Force activities having a bearing on efficient and effective airdrop delivery of airborne units and their subsequent assembly. The project was designed specifically to test procedures and techniques necessary to achieve a higher density of paratroopers and heavy equipment on the drop zone and their rapid assembly into cohesive units ready for combat.

With the ever pressing and increasing possibility that an airborne force may at any time be introduced into combat, obviously the best possible techniques and procedures must be identified and employed by Army and Air Force units conducting joint airborne assault operations. Joint doctrine in the area of airborne operations has not kept pace with organizational and technological improvements. Changes in techniques, procedures, and organization over the past years have taken place piecemeal, largely without central focus or criterion against which each change could be measured to assure that each specific apparent improvement did not, in itself, have a detrimental effect on airborne operations in their entirety. Significant organizational changes and striking increases in combat equipment have occurred in airborne units. Concurrently, the Air Force has progressed from relatively slow and small aircraft, such as the C-119 and C-123, to the faster and larger C-130 and C-141, with accompanying, and sometimes forced, changes in capabilities and technical procedures. As a result of increases in total equipment and greater numbers of paratroopers per aircraft delivered during an airborne assault, as well as faster, larger aircraft, the parachuted force is now extended over a larger drop zone area, with many more items of equipment to retrieve. Follow-on assembly of the force on the ground is delayed by the increased problems of locating and derigging heavy equipment and assembling both personnel and equipment over extended surface distances.

Whereas much effort and expense have been concentrated on the airmobile concept and the development of associated units in recent years, no similar development and improvement program of major magnitude has been applied to joint airborne activities. When one realizes the contingency options offered by airborne and supporting Air Force units and the degree of national reliance placed upon this alert and ready joint tactical force, then the conclusion must be reached that procedures and techniques employed must keep pace with equipment changes, and current training must be in consonance with all three.

Close observation and evaluation of air-borne forces during a continuing series of USSTRICOM BOLD SHOT readiness exercises over the past two years have pointed up an urgent need for substantial improvement in achieving sufficient density of paratroopers and their equipment on the drop zone to ensure a capability for rapid assembly into airborne units ready for combat.

To test and evaluate those service-recommended procedures and techniques designed to improve drop density and more rapid assembly, CINCSTRIKE directed that Project RAPID STRIKE be conducted on a carefully documented and scientific basis.

Analysis of the broad task of achieving adequate paratrooper and equipment density on the drop zone and more rapid unit assembly indicated the need to examine the following primary operational matters:

Aircraft formations, A search for the optimum assault airlift formation to maximize paratrooper and equipment delivery rates on the drop zone and at the same time retain tactical flexibility while en route to the drop zone, during the final approach to the drop zone, and throughout the recovery phase of the mission.

Integration of the C-130 and C-141 in simultaneous assault airlift operations. An investigation into alternative methods of employing these two types of airlift aircraft to drop paratroopers and heavy equipment on single and multiple drop zones in a closely integrated operation.

Assault aircraft loading. An investigation into the comparative advantages of two methods; either cross-loading personnel of different units in single aircraft and dropping equipments of several units on multiple impact points, so that personnel and equipment of a specific unit land in a specified area; or straight loading of personnel of one unit in a single aircraft and employing a single heavy-equipment impact point, thus placing that unit down the entire length of the drop zone.

Drop sequence. A determination of the relative merits of dropping personnel first or dropping equipment first, and the effects of this determination upon serial separation.

Certain operational matters could economically be examined in relative isolation by USSTRICOM Component Forces, USARSTRIKE and USAFSTRIKE, prior to review by CINCSTRIKE in a larger joint test environment. Accordingly, a three-phase program was accomplished during the first half of 1966.

Phase I, conducted at Sewart Air Force Base, Tennessee, 14-25 February, under control of the Tactical Air Command’s Tactical Air Warfare Center, Eglin AFB, Florida, investigated the feasibility of modifying present assault airlift formation tactics to increase the density of paratroopers landing on the drop zone, thereby decreasing the total time for force delivery and contributing to more rapid assembly.

Phase I tests were conducted with up to 18 C-130 aircraft to determine whether, by varying formations, sizable numbers of aircraft could be flown accurately over a drop zone in less time than that presently required for similar numbers of aircraft employing the standard assault airlift in-trail formation configuration. (Figure 1) Army paratroopers rode in the C-130s to observe aircraft stability from a jumper’s viewpoint.

—reducing the interval between aircraft from 2000 feet (approximately ten seconds’ separation) to 1000 feet (approximately five seconds), thus doubling the number of aircraft over the drop zone in a given period of time;

—employing two parallel in-trail formations simultaneously over a single drop zone, thus doubling the delivery rate; (Figure 2)

—employing multiple routes and approaches to the drop zone to reduce the size of each formation and the vulnerability of the entire air column during the enroute portion of the airborne operation;

—reducing drop airspeed below 125 knots, thus reducing the length of each stick of parachutists on the drop zone and reducing the dispersion of equipment.

As a result of this brief test, employing minimum essential resources, CINCAFSTRIKE reached these conclusions:

a. Reduction of the interval over the drop zone from 2000 feet separation (ten seconds) to 1000 feet separation (five seconds) is not feasible. Aircraft controllability and jump platform stability are detrimentally affected by increased turbulence in the condensed in-trail formation. Employing reduced-interval formations provided only slight improvement in density on the drop zone.

b. Employing two parallel formations to increase paratrooper density over the drop zone is feasible, providing a minimum lateral distance of 3000 feet between impact points and therefore between parallel streams is maintained. However, flexibility and maneuverability are compromised during the final run-in, and an extra wide drop zone is required.

c. Multiple routes and approaches to the drop zone enhance force survivability and are feasible either in conjunction with single formations or the parallel formation. Formation rendezvous time tolerance over the initial point is critical.

d. Reducing the drop airspeed below 125 knots for C-130s in formation was not considered safe by test personnel and was not attempted.

Phase II was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 21-25 March 1966, under control of the XVIII Airborne Corps This test phase investigated the effects of various aircraft loading and airborne unit assembly techniques. To facilitate rapid assembly, various personnel, equipment, and area assembly aids were introduced.

USAFSTRIKE employed 25 C-130s to support USARSTRIKE’s test series of three separate battalion-size drops of personnel and equipment. All drops were made from the standard in-trail assault airlift formation. Conclusions reached by USARSTRIKE were that unit assemblies adjacent to the drop zone can be accomplished more rapidly by using the following drop and assembly procedures:

a. Cross-load single aircraft and/or aircraft elements for the arrangement of personnel, and use multiple impact points for associated heavy equipment. (Primary-type heavy equipments associated with the airborne battalion were the 105-mm howitzer and prime mover; 106-mm recoilless rifle, ¼ -ton truck and trailer, field ambulance, and the Army mule.)

b. Drop door bundles from any aircraft in the formation and from any position in the stick so that these heavy, cumbersome bundles are placed close to an associated unit assembly area. (Door bundles contained those items of equipment or supplies assigned to combat units which were too heavy or bulky to be carried by individual paratroopers during a jump, e.g., the 81-mm mortar and base plate, sand-filled boxes to simulate ammunition and rations.)

c. Although heavy equipment can be dropped over paratroopers on the drop zone with an acceptable degree of risk, the separation time between the personnel and the heavy-equipment flight serials is critical and is something greater than 5 minutes and less than 15 minutes, the present standard serial separation time employed in training.

d. Remaining aircraft retain original positions in formation whenever an aircraft is forced to abort. This procedure permits personnel previously dropped on the drop zone to identify visually the aborted aircraft position in the formation stream and make immediate adjustments to compensate in assembly and attack actions for the personnel and/or equipment that could not be dropped. Although only the assault in-trail formation configuration was employed during the three live drops of Phase II, it was suggested that a more dense aircraft formation, such as the V of V’s, could contribute to more rapid assembly.

e. Drop personnel and equipment at one altitude. Personnel and equipment drops from 1000 feet were successful with the exception of piggyback mule loads. This was considered a minimum practical peacetime drop altitude.

f. In reference to markings, there is a definite assembly advantage if all personnel assigned to a unit wear a temporary distinctive unit marking, such as a tape over or around the helmet. Heavy equipment loads can be located and identified more readily if distinctive unit markings are placed on the bottoms of drop platforms as well as on the front, rear, sides, and top of each load. Finally, the marking of unit assembly areas with tethered balloons or smoke streamers assists rapid assembly. Unit assembly area marking is accomplished by members of the Army assault team who have been clandestinely dropped with the Air Force Combat Control Team in some near area and infiltrated overland to the drop zone, prior to the main airborne assault.

Phases I and II were unilaterally conceived tests with each service providing mutual support to the other as necessary. Forces involved were small and the duration of each examination necessarily brief. Following a thorough review of the separate and somewhat limited results of the first two test program phases, and with full realization of the broad impact that significant findings might have on future joint airborne operational and training requirements, CINCSTRIKE directed a thorough testing and evaluation of all associated aspects of joint airborne operations. The resultant Phase III, Project RAPID STRIKE, provided a series often joint field experiments that permitted careful scientific documentation. This documentation formed a basis for verification or disqualification of those procedures and techniques developed separately by service agencies in Phases I and II and for additional innovations that were natural developments of the earlier phases.

CINCSTRIKE assigned responsibility for this phase to Brigadier General William G. Moore, Jr., USAF, who commanded Joint Task Force RAPID STRIKE in the experiments conducted in the military complex of Pope AFB/Fort Bragg, 15 May—2 June 1966, using the following organization:

a. STRIKE JTF RAPID STRIKE Headquarters, including attached operations analysts, evaluators, and photographers.

Purpose. COMSTRIKEJTF RAPID STRIKE was directed to test and evaluate ways and means to achieve a higher density of paratroopers and heavy equipment on the drop zone and their rapid assembly into cohesive units ready for combat. He was also required to identify areas needing further study or evaluation beyond Phase III.

Specific objectives. Specific objectives established for Phase III, RAPID STRIKE, were as follows:

a. Determine the most feasible, practicable, and efficient formation or formations to achieve rapid and accurate placement of parachutists and essential combat equipment on the drop zone.

b. Determine the most efficient techniques and procedures for rapid assembly of parachutists and essential combat equipment into a viable fighting force after landing.

c. Identify and make recommendations concerning areas needing further study, test, or evaluation within the USSTRICOM, the services, or research and development agencies of the Department of Defense.

Scope and methodology. Practical consideration of force availability and overall costs caused the scope of Phase III, Project RAPID STRIKE, to be limited to the minimum number of experiments necessary to provide an acceptable level of confidence for the data collected. Eight basic field experiments, employing two battalions alternately and from 22 to 45 C-130 aircraft, were determined to be the minimum essential to satisfy the specific objectives. In the interest of economy, heavy drops were simulated on four events by prepositioning heavy equipment in a fully rigged configuration in varied patterns on the drop zone. Three experiments employing a combination of C-130 and C-141 aircraft were added in order to examine other areas, such as

—utilization of C-141 aircraft in combination with the C-130 in the airborne assault role

—effects upon unit assembly times of conducting an airborne assault over unfamiliar terrain.

A bonus return from these three additional events was the collection of additional confirmatory data similar to those obtained from the basic series of field experiments.

A Joint Evaluation Group of approximately 80 Army and Air Force officers and noncommissioned officers recorded detailed data concerning the following;

a. Times required to drop the personnel and equipment of an airborne Division Ready Force (DRF).

b. Locations of personnel and equipment on the drop zone with reference to intended impact points.

d. Times required to assemble company-size units at designated assembly areas adjacent to the drop zone.

e. In-flight data such as aircraft formations, timing, speed and altitude during drop, degree of turbulence en route to and over the drop zone, adherence to the computed air release point (CARP) procedures, circular error average, visibility, and safety factors.

About twenty Army and Air Force photographers recorded specific and general events during all airdrops, using a variety of equipment—16, 35, and 70-mm motion picture cameras, hand-held and stabilized mounts, timeframe cameras, and still cameras.

The Chief Scientist, USSTRICOM, the principal technical adviser to the JTF commander, directed activities of the operations analysts, reviewed data for completeness and accuracy, and assisted in the preparation of the final written and film reports.

Of the number of airborne assault techniques subjected to thorough scrutiny in Joint Exercise RAPID STRIKE, only those of principal concern to the Air Force will be discussed: assault airlift formations, integration of the C-130 and C-141 in simultaneous assault airlift operations, assault aircraft loading, and drop sequence and serial separation.

Assault airlift formations. The three C-l30 aircraft formations employed during the series of experiments were the in-trail, V’s-in-trail, and augmented-in-trail, which are depicted graphically in Figures 1, 3, and 4. The average paratrooper delivery rates per second for the three C-130 formations engaged in the delivery of an infantry battalion (reinforced) are as follows:

in-trail	7 paratroopers/sec
V’s-in-trail	11 paratroopers/sec
augmented-in-trail	10 paratroopers/sec

If larger than battalion-size airborne units are employed, the number of C-130s required increases; and as this occurs, the rates of delivery change in favor of the augmented-in-trail and in-trail formations. In Figure 5, it can be seen that at a total of 27 aircraft, the rates of delivery of the augmented-in-trail and the V’s-in-trail are equal. Now the in-trail and V’s-in-trail are also equal but at a slightly later point in time. The steps in the V’s-in-trail curve are reflections of the time-space separations between elements of 9 aircraft each and between serials of 27 aircraft each. These time-space separations are necessary to provide flexibility in the maneuver of blocks of aircraft in close formation. In-trail and augmented-in-trail formations require no such time-space interruptions, as maneuver of the formation is accomplished essentially by individual aircraft flying in a stream.

The formations flown and the indicated rates of delivery had no measurable effect on personnel or equipment assembly throughout the numerous battalion and brigade airdrops. This is not to say that delivery rates do not affect unit assembly, but it does indicate that differences in delivery rates of a reinforced battalion or brigade by any of the formations examined are so slight that the contribution to rapid assembly, if any, could not be detected. Although high initial density of personnel and equipment on the drop zone may have other tactical significance, it alone does not contribute to rapid unit assembly within the context of the RAPID STRIKE experiments.

In an actual airborne combat operation, if the choice of drop zones is limited and if an organized defense is encountered and engaged from the outset and prior to unit assembly, density of personnel and equipment on the drop zone could take on tactical significance. Maximum firepower would be essential. Such a venture would likely not be undertaken knowingly unless there was no other choice, and then tactical air support would be employed prior to and in conjunction with the initial and follow-on phases of the airborne assault.

Each of the formations tested has distinctive vulnerability factors for the enroute phase of the operation and for the flight over the drop zone. Although only a few bits of data taken during RAPID STRIKE contribute to an understanding of vulnerability factors, it was possible to apply a theoretical mathematical approach to the three formations employed, their airspeeds, altitudes, and ability to maneuver around known or suspected ground fire sites, and thus to arrive at relative vulnerability figures for the three formations. Both the in-trail and the augmented-in-trail formations permit lower enroute altitudes and higher speeds than does the V’s-in-trail formation. The V’s-in-trail formation, however, may have three aircraft in a ground-fire envelope simultaneously, thereby splitting the firepower on any one aircraft, whereas the in-trail formation, consisting of a stream of single aircraft ten seconds apart, may permit concentrated fire on one aircraft at a time, although for a relatively short time. Over the drop zone, however, each formation flies at or near 1000 feet altitude and 125 knots airspeed, and only the differences in length of the air columns contribute to differences in vulnerability. Suppressive and destructive fire from friendly aircraft would be concentrated in the vicinity of the drop zone to reduce the vulnerability of the joint airborne force in that area.

No factor evolved from RAPID STRIKE which suggests that any one airlift formation offers overriding advantage over the others. The augmented-in-trail formation, demonstrated (or the first time in this exercise, gives delivery rates comparable to the V’s-in-trail for a reinforced battalion-size force. At the same time it retains much of the flexibility of the in-trail formation and requires little or no additional aircrew training. The augmented-in-trail and the in-trail formations are adaptable to future all-weather delivery concepts incorporating station-keeping equipment. The V’s-in-trail, on the other hand, would be cumbersome under marginal weather conditions and might be disastrous under thick weather conditions.

With reference to formations demonstrated, it was concluded that each was adequate to assure rapid assembly of personnel and equipment; however, none demonstrated any measurable advantage over the others in terms of density of drop. Each type of formation, employing drop altitudes of 1000 feet for personnel and equipment, resulted in accurate drops. Revision of certain rigging procedures may permit standardizing heavy-equipment drop altitudes at 800 feet or lower, which would contribute to even greater accuracies and to more rapid assembly.

lntegration of the C-I30 and C-141 in simultaneous assault airlift operations. As indicated in the earlier description of Phase III, Joint Exercise RAPID STRIKE, six C-141s of the Military Airlift Command joined the 45 C-130s of USAFSTRIKE for the final three events: two reinforced battalion airborne assault operations, and one brigade-size operation. These live field experiments, although the first attempts at integration of these two aircraft, did indicate the feasibility and practicability of their simultaneous use in assault airlift operations.

Integration of the C-141 aircraft with the C-l30 proved particularly feasible in the vicinity of the drop zone. The two types of aircraft operated at compatible airspeeds and maintained proper spacing; however, basic design characteristics and fuel consumption differentials made a lengthy joint formation en route to the drop zone undesirable. The use of separate routes, speeds, and altitudes to a rendezvous point for join-up and drop is necessary to obtain maximum efficient performance from the two aircraft types.

While the C-141 has approximately double the capacity for personnel and equipment of the C-130, it was not possible to exploit this differential to provide higher density of paratroopers and their equipment on the drop zone.

Delivery methods, as demonstrated, required either multiple passes over a single drop zone or the use of two separate drop zones. No attempt was made to drop an entire C-141 load of 120 paratroopers in a continuous line because the ground pattern that would have resulted was deemed tactically unsound. Restricted to a drop zone normally associated with the C-l30, the C-141 was forced to make two passes on the same drop zone, discharging 60 paratroopers on each pass. The total time involved in this technique included the go-around time, resulting in a much slower overall paratrooper delivery rate than that demonstrated by the C-130.

Although the troop compartment space in the C-141 is approximately twice that of the C-130, the space available aft of the paratrooper in each aircraft is approximately the same. The Division Ready Force of a reinforced battalion normally carries with it 29 door bundles weighing 300 to 400 pounds each. Equally distributed, this averages approximately two bundles per C-130 or four bundles per C-141. Manhandling these bundles near open jump doors requires space as well as manpower. Space is extremely critical in the C-141; however, overhead rails might relieve the space and the handling problems to some degree. Techniques to significantly reduce paratrooper stick exit time and door bundle discharge time are required to capitalize on the larger capacity of this aircraft.

On one RAPID STRIKE event the C-141 was employed in the heavy drop role. Because of the length of the aircraft and the length of the tail aft of the main ramp, a 120-foot extraction line is required. On five and six platform drops from a single aircraft, the extended times between successive heavy drop platforms resulted in significantly longer and less dense heavy drop patterns on the drop zone. Certainly the state of the art must be extended to provide a positive discharge system that will contribute to greater density of heavy equipment on the drop zone and, as a bonus, be more reliable and accurate.

In spite of the differing characteristics of the C-l30 and C-141, their integration in the airborne assault role is feasible. Since this was an initial attempt to employ these aircraft simultaneously in the airborne assault role, there is obviously a fresh challenge to study and develop integrated tactics of various mixes of C-l30s and C-141s in assault airlift operations.

Assault aircraft loading. Two basic C-130 arrangements for personnel and equipment were examined: straight loading and cross-loading. The term “straight loading” applies to the technique of placing personnel of only one unit (e.g., personnel of A Company) in an aircraft designated for that unit. The term “cross-loading” applies to the technique of mixing units (e.g., personnel of A, B, and C Companies) in each aircraft so as to drop increments of each company in sequence and at specific locations down the length of the drop zone.

In Joint Exercise RAPID STRIKE the average exit time for a stick of 31 paratroopers, including door bundles, was 44 seconds. Sticks exited the two personnel jump doors simultaneously. At the normal drop speed of 125 knots, one second equates to 70 yards of flight. Individual parachutists in each stick landed about 100 yards apart. When A Company was straight-loaded it had personnel distributed over 3100 yards of varying terrain, while the company’s heavy equipment was dropped on an impact point near the center of the long narrow drop pattern. When A, B, and C Companies were cross-loaded, each had 20 or 22 paratroopers on a single aircraft. A Company personnel were dropped in the first third of the total drop pattern, B Company in the next third, and C Company in the last third. Successive aircraft, carrying personnel of those companies, rapidly dropped increments of the three companies in the same respective sectors. Heavy equipment for each company was dropped in the appropriate company sector of the drop zone from straight-loaded C-130s. The cross-loading technique theoretically permitted three times the concentration of company personnel and placed more of the company personnel closer to their equipment than the straight-loading method. In actuality, the cross-loading technique for personnel and the use of associated multiple impact points for heavy equipment did significantly speed up the personnel assembly of each company and did reduce confusion and congestion on the drop zone. However, data did not substantiate a similar finding for more rapid equipment assembly.

Of course a mandatory prerequisite for rapid assembly is drop accuracy, whether on one impact point or on multiple impact points. When one considers the average ground speed of the combat-loaded paratrooper to be about three miles per hour or approximately 100 yards per minute, and the distance he must travel from his impact point to his unit assembly location off the drop zone, the need for airdrop accuracy is apparent. The distance reflected by one second of flight is roughly equivalent to 60 seconds of surface travel and exposure on the drop zone. Aircrews of MAC and USAFSTRIKE had opportunities to practice formations and run-ins to the drop zones prior to and between various live drop events. Overall crew training was excellent. Crew proficiency coupled with the 1000-foot drop altitude for both personnel and equipment did reflect in excellent drop accuracies. A circular error average of 123 yards was recorded for the lead paratrooper of each element lead, and a circular error average of 152 yards was recorded for the first item of each element lead dropping heavy equipment. If the ability to drop accurately is lost through inadequate training or for any other reason, the refinements of cross-loading techniques are of little value.

Drop sequence and serial separation. Any airborne force commander has the choice of dropping his personnel first or his equipment first. In the case of a large airborne force there could be a critical time in which some personnel would be on the drop zone without benefit of their heavy equipment. If equipment were dropped first, some of it could lie relatively unprotected for a critical length of time until personnel were dropped, disengaged themselves, and derigged and manned their heavy equipment.

Those who support dropping personnel first cite, among other reasons, the advantage of having personnel on the drop zone to identify and locate specific heavy equipment loads as they descend to the ground. Personnel can begin positioning themselves so that derigging may commence as soon as the heavy drop is complete. The primary disadvantage of this sequence is that a definite safety time delay is necessary between the last aircraft of the personnel serial and the first aircraft of the equipment serial, to insure that paratroopers on the drop zone have time to disengage from their parachutes and clear the drop zone. Present standards require a 15-minute interval for this purpose; however, in RAPID STRIKE the interval was reduced to five minutes. The majority but not all paratroopers had cleared the drop zone in this five-minute period.

Of course, the primary advantage of dropping equipment first is the reduction of the interval between the equipment serial and the personnel serial. This interval was reduced to two minutes in RAPID STRIKE. Paratroopers have a brief interval during descent to scan for and locate specifically marked heavy equipment. Once on the ground and disengaged from their chutes, those who have identified their assigned equipments can head directly for them.

Data from the multiple experiments show that when personnel are dropped first, assembly times for the first 50 percent of the unit personnel are improved; however, this effect rapidly diminishes for the assembly of the last 50 percent. The delay factor in equipment assembly approximated the time interval between completion of the personnel drop and the beginning of the heavy-equipment drop in each case.

In a tactical situation where the commander requires his heavy equipment as early as possible, or where it is desirable for any reason to shorten the total air column length, RAPID STRIKE results suggest he drop equipment first, then personnel. On the other hand, where assembly of at least certain of the airborne rifle companies near the drop zone is important and immediate recovery of heavy equipment is less critical, RAPID STRIKE results suggest that personnel be dropped first. RAPID STRIKE data do not suggest a single standard drop sequence. The choice of drop sequence, therefore, is one that the tactical commander should make, based upon his plan of action and the tactical situation at or near the time of the airborne assault.

As a result of Joint Exercise RAPID STRIKE, a body of quantitative data on airborne assault operations now exists. The data contributing to rapid assembly are based upon several formations: the in-trail, augmented-in-trail, and V’s-in-trail; and upon the two capable aircraft that make up the bulk of the airlift fleet: the C-130 and the C-141. Unfortunately, existing data are limited to daylight operations only, to pre-surveyed drop zones, and to a single tactical scenario. In recent USSTRICOM BOLD SHOT readiness exercises, supplemental data have been recorded on the effects of strange and unfamiliar drop zones and upon a variety of tactical situations. Still required are data on night airborne assault operations and on the ability to perform accurate station-keeping and blind positioning for all-weather drops.

Future USSTRICOM BOLD SHOT exercises will continue to add to the data now available. This large body of valid information is of greatest value when applied to the constant and necessary task of revising and updating joint airborne operational methods, procedures, and techniques for future combat use.

Colonel Arthur A. McCartan (USMA) is Chief, Joint Operations Analysis and Test Group, Hq U.S. Strike Command. At Strike Command since August 1963, he served as Chief, Field Test Division, Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force (JTETF), until its deactivation upon completion of mission 30 June 1965. He was Chief Evaluator, Joint Exercise RAPID STRIKE, 1966. Colonel McCartan served in the armed forces during World War II and the Korean War and is a 1948 graduate of the Naval War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Project Rapid Strike Evaluating a Joint Exercise

Project Rapid Strike
Evaluating a Joint Exercise