Air University Review, November-December 1967
Research and development is charged today with the responsibility of being
in two places at once—at the frontier of future opportunities and on the
doorstep of present problems. The challenge of supplying the needs of our
operational forces, whether those needs are ten minutes or ten years away, is
resulting in a new order of responsiveness on the part of the Air Force Systems
Command. The contributions of research and development to
Historically, nations have entered into successive wars with the weapons and concepts that had been successful in the last war. If the conflict lasts any length of time, innovations in techniques or technologies will occur, and these tend to persist until other wars bring about other changes. However, the circumstances of recent years in the course of the cold, hot, and technological wars going on among nations suggest that the time interval for innovation and technological inventiveness is growing increasingly shorter. In fact, the day may be near when “leftover” weapons and on-the-shelf technologies will be inadequate, insufficient, or ineffective as a means of winning a war or discouraging an aggressor from starting one.
This eventuality brings into sharper focus the preventive mission of defense
research and development, which in the past decade or so has been eminently successful
in satisfying national policy requirements for weapons and system of a
strategic nature. These same channels of policy, budget, and technology
decision-making have been somewhat less successful in assuring
Accordingly, those of us charged with research and development responsibilities must ask ourselves two related questions:
· Is R&D delivering the goods today, in terms of today’s needs and in support of the current emphasis on tactical capabilities?
· Are we simultaneously addressing our talents and technologies to the needs of the future?
Recognizing that world conditions and national policies can change overnight but that weapons cannot, we must be continually aware of changing conditions, long-range prospects, and the possibility that unless development lead times are respected we could again be found wanting at some point downstream. The test is to determine how ably we are looking for new and better ways to do familiar things, seeking new technologies to overcome old problems. At the same time, are we trying to look ahead to the kinds of difficulties that might plague us in any future use of military forces in the defense of freedom, ours or other people’s?
Because
To avoid exploitation at the hands of the Communists or anyone else, the
First, we are seeking ways to serve the diverse needs of the operational
forces in
Second, beyond that immediate goal, we are searching the horizons of technology for those capabilities which will deter tactical threats as effectively as our long-range missile and bomber forces have deterred strategic threats.
Third, we are energizing all the technologies and resources at our command to assure the continued adequacy of our strategic forcefulness.
In every case our intention is to deter, discourage, or dissuade aggression, and in each facet of this three-part mission the meaning of deterrence is the same—assurance to the enemy that he cannot succeed.
We have come to understand that in a limited war the aggressor has the advantage of picking the time and place of confrontation. In the past, the choice of tactics and weapons from among those available to us has not always been broad enough to offset that advantage. The research and development community today has the opportunity to introduce new weapons and technologies either not available to the enemy or unsettling to his “style” of warfare. Ideally, these should be innovations that can overcome an enemy’s advantage decisively and at costs that are not prohibitive.
Despite the superiority of Free World forces opposing the Communists in
The novelty, to say nothing of the difficulty, of trying to fight a war
without front lines and in the absence of a readily distinguishable enemy has
been reported many times but is still not fully appreciated in terms of the
burden it places on the defender. The enemy’s ability to blend with his
surroundings and to use geography to maximum advantage represents the most
difficult obstacle to our success in
The mazes of trails, roads, and waterways, together with the seemingly endless resources of manpower for the repair and resupply missions, make interdiction of supply lines a difficult and constant job. Roads and bridges are quickly repaired or circumvented. So vehicles and supply lines must be hit directly, accurately, and repeatedly.
The real turn in the tide, not only in
The Systems Command’s key contribution to success in
These activities begin with an on-the-scene assessment of combat-area
problems. Our Systems Command liaison office in Saigon, located with Hq Seventh
Air Force, maintains close contact with all
Through a Southeast Asia Operational Requirement (SEAOR) procedure, the Seventh Air Force can address a requirement to the Systems Command. Upon receipt, the stated need generates an immediate search for a technical solution. This response first takes the form of a best preliminary estimate (BPE), expressed concurrently with Tactical Air Command’s determination of the best operational tactical solution.
SEAOR’s serve to bring a required operational capability to the surface for immediate exposure and prompt consideration. The intent of the SEAOR is to elicit swift response, both technically and procedurally. Problems demanding broad, long-term action may “graduate” from the SEAOR category once it has been determined that a quick-fix solution is not possible or attainable. The need for an airborne command post, for example, was originally identified through the SEAOR procedure, which led to the procurement of the C-130E aircraft equipped for the control of airborne and ground operations in battle areas. Another SEAOR stated the need for a long-range weather radar, and AFSC satisfied the requirement by procuring and developing suitable equipment that was commercially available.
The direct line that we have established from the origin of the need in a
In seeking ways to continually improve the timing and the quality of the
Command’s responsiveness, we have concentrated on making our technical
assistance efforts personal, prompt, and professional. One of the ways it has
become personal is through the direct contact our
Among other things, we have found from these and other experiences that “requirement” and “problem” are not necessarily the same thing. A requirement generally is a definite and definable need, while a problem may lack specific identity. On occasion, the cure for a problem may be available but unknown, or the problem may exist but remain unidentified. There may be technologies on the shelf which could lead to new or more effective ways of doing a particular job but the application of which has not been discovered or realized. This situation represents a solution looking for a problem.
To avoid the possibility of needed solutions going begging, we have attempted to improve and expand communications between the Air Force’s using commands and its technology teams. We have taken a number of steps to provide research and development personnel greater “visibility” in actual combat situations. These steps include short-term tours and orientation visits of research and development officers and civilians to the combat zone, for on-the-spot exposure to problems which they may be able to solve or alleviate.
Another effort in this direction aims at recouping as many
combat-experienced R&D officers as we can, following completion of their
SEA tours. At the moment, among the most precious resources we have in the
Command are the science and engineering officers lately returned from
As rapidly as possible we expose new ideas and new technologies to the
operational environment, through our liaison office in
Mating technology to operational needs involves considerable “imagineering”
as well as engineering. At the
Last June we established the Directorate of Technical Applications for
Throughout the Systems Command, as well as in other elements of the Air Force, other innovations in procedures and in the development of technologies and their applications are being encouraged and emphasized with a view toward improvements in combat effectiveness today and deterrent effectiveness tomorrow.
The primary problems we encounter are the classic ones of offense and
defense, but they are greatly complicated by the natural restraints and the
political and military constraints applicable to the
The offensive power of the Free World forces in
We are further handicapped by having to risk aircraft and other costly equipment in attacks on relatively low-value targets, such as truck convoys, bridges, river traffic, and the like. Such interdiction actions, of course, are necessary to cut down the flow of supplies and to reduce the infiltration from the north. Technological advances enabling us to carry out such strikes more effectually, while minimizing the risk to our own people and equipment, would contribute substantially to the value of our offensive power.
Defensively, we need better base security, with devices for detecting enemy intrusion, to safeguard our forces against surprise attack. Some of the answers to these problems are already realities; others are coming.
Sensor technology is being advanced rapidly under the impetus of the
In addition, detection devices sensitive to heat, odors, and even colors are under development. We are looking for ways to find tunnels, weapons, and concentrations of enemy troops. High on our list of priorities are better ambush detection equipment, fully effective base-intrusion detection devices, and foolproof booby-trap alarms.
Through the provision of better electronic and communications equipment,
munitions, and lifesaving, rescue, and evacuation techniques, field elements
already have witnessed the effects which up-to-date tactics and technologies
can make on battlefield situations. Compared to
Rescue and survival are more nearly the rule than the exception, and ground-to-air rescue devices have been developed which make it possible to pick up downed airmen from any type of terrain. A new crash-position indicator, also developed by the Systems Command, has been successfully tested and is in use, simplifying search and rescue procedures and speeding responsiveness. These are examples of relatively fast answers to combat problems.
To help control the air war over
Space systems also contribute to the effectiveness of
In the same time period, tests were begun on the early components of a tactical communications satellite system. Using an all-transistorized ultra-high-frequency repeater satellite, the LES-5, the Army, Navy, and Air Force conducted test transmissions that linked aircraft, ships at sea, and submarines. The high-power satellite, together with the small, lightweight, highly mobile terminal (which can be jeep-mounted or back-packed, for that matter), makes the tactical system under development ideally suited to combat situations.
Other direct support items of limited-war value which have flowed from
Systems Command research and development efforts include expandable shelters,
new adjustable liners for air evacuation, a cold-water-cooled flying suit for
pilots flying low-altitude missions, and techniques for low-level parachute
supply deliveries. Four types of steerable parachutes, including one capable of
lowering a 2500-pound load, have been tested. Development work and field tests
have keen completed on radar sets small enough and compact enough to be
back-pack carried into remote sites where they can be quickly assembled and put
into use. Portable air traffic control equipment, mobile weather stations, and
rapid preparation of remote landing sites have also contributed to the
flexibility of
As another indication of the extent to which Systems Command resources have
been marshaled in support of limited-war forces, the eight Air Force
Laboratories under my Director of Laboratories have been searching their
specialized and highly advanced inventory of technologies for applications
useful in the
Research and development attention has also focused on flight control techniques designed to minimize the exposure of low-flying aircraft to radar detection. Other sophisticated equipments, like terrain-following radar and electronic countermeasures, are critically important to the penetration capability of attack aircraft and to their survival in the hostile environment of enemy planes, antiaircraft fire, and surface-to-air missiles.
As a safety measure, an explosion-proofing polyurethane foam material has been developed and qualified for use in aircraft fuel tanks. The foam virtually assures that an explosion will not occur as a result of the fuel tank’s being punctured by an incendiary projectile.
New and improved types of munitions, including better air-to-air and
air-to-ground missiles, also have been developed as part of the research and
technology approach to limited-war effectiveness. Bombs designed to penetrate
jungle foliage before detonating, bombs to assure low-flying attack aircraft
ample escape time, and various area denial devices are among the special types
developed for use in
Research and development work of a more traditional nature is exemplified in the design and acquisition of aircraft tailored to the conditions of counterinsurgency, limited war, and the needs of our general-purpose forces.
In the Concept Formulation Package stage are several aircraft systems, including the F-X tactical fighter for future assured air superiority and the A-X specialized close air support aircraft. The Concept Formulation Package is our basic means for advocating new systems and is the foundation for justifying the resources necessary to their development.
More immediate to the needs of Southeast Asia are a number of aircraft being acquired or modified to serve the various missions of close air support, interdiction, forward air controller, and psychological warfare. Among these are the A-37; A-7D, O-2A, O-2B, and OV-10.
The Air Force’s R&D assault on limited-war problems and obstacles ranges from armaments to aircraft and from laboratory ideas to field equipment. Since Systems Command technicians joined with tacticians to produce technical answers to tactical problems, a variety of items to meet a variety of needs have been developed and put to use in the combat zone.
In short, we are trying very hard in the Systems Command not to overlook any
area of opportunity that will improve our advantage in
Our operational forces find that their aircraft can still be shot down. Overall, there is a great need to improve our capability to detect the enemy, distinguish friend from foe, and strike small targets more precisely and—perhaps—more economically.
Despite all our advances in detection techniques, we can still benefit a great deal from any new-found means for obtaining real-time reconnaissance of ground targets that move, radiate heat, or reflect or consume power.
The Air Force’s success in the technological war is having a pronounced effect on the current “hot” war. Without the advances of a scientific or technical nature that have been developed and applied to the Vietnam situation, our losses there would surely be much greater and our effectiveness much less.
Air Force resources for research and development are pledged to the
continuing support of
“One should be very careful,” Secretary Brown has warned, “in remembering that [Vietnam] is not the only kind of war, and if we proceed to organize and procure equipment and train people only for this kind of war, we can very easily get a bad surprise if we find ourselves in a war where, unlike the one in South Vietnam, the enemy has rather advanced weaponry and can operate advanced surface-to-air equipment, missiles, artillery and aircraft themselves.”
This possibility alone is good reason to pursue the whole spectrum of
research and development programs designed to maintain and extend
Hg Air Force Systems Command
Another Role of the P-38
In response to “Three Bullets on a Knife: Saga of the P-38” (Air
University Review, XVIII, 2, January-February 1967), Brigadier General
Howard T. Markey of the
The RP-322 was a P-38 without turbos or armor plate and with both
propellers rotating in the same direction. A number of these RP-322s were built
for
General James Ferguson is Commander, Air Force Systems Command, and
Director, Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program. Commissioned from flying
cadet in 1937, he served in fighter units until 1943, when he organized the
405th Fighter-Bomber Group and took it to the European Theater. He was
Operations Officer, XIX Tactical Air Command, during the planning of the
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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