Some Politico-Military Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Rift

Air University Review, May-June 1967

Some Politico-Military Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Rift

The enemy of my enemy is my friend.
(old Arab saying)

The past several months have seen an unprecedented animosity between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic (C.P.R.) in all areas of political, military, economic, and sociological affairs. The Sino-Soviet rift, beginning in 1956 with the denunciation of Stalin in the U.S.S.R., widening with the withdrawal of Soviet technical advisers in 1960, and culminating in the rampages of the Chinese Red Guards ever since the summer of 1966, now seems irreconcilable.

While the rift began on ideological grounds shortly after Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, it has since developed into a struggle embracing principles and characteristics more nationalistic than ideological. As Dr. Hugo Portisch, the editor-in-chief of the Wiener Kurier (Vienna Courier) points out: “It is not just an ideological difference between Russia and China. It is a nationalistic power struggle.”¹ Ideology may have been the reason for the incipience of the rift, but the Soviet Chinese confrontation has been extended to the political, diplomatic, economic, military, and educational spheres, with each side attempting to place the blame on the other for creating a split in the monolithic structure of the Communist Parties of the world.

There are several politico-military points of conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. that focus on the nationalistic rather than the ideological character of the rift, even though lip service is paid by both states to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism, with the Chinese adding the names of Stalin and Mao Tsetung to their list of Communist theoreticians.

One of the conflicts has to do with the international boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R., which stretches for a distance of over 4000 miles from Afghanistan and the Pamir Range to Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan. The Chinese have accused the Russians of provoking over 5000 border incidents along this desolate line in just one year.² In turn, the Soviet government in a declaration of 21 September 1963 accused the Chinese of violating the Soviet frontier an equal number of times and of even carrying out “attempts at ‘occupation’ of certain small sections of Soviet territory.”³ The rugged terrain, lack of a natural boundary, and the low density of population make this border particularly conducive to violations, both intentional and unintentional.

Unlike the 3000-mile-long unfortified boundary between the U.S.A. and Canada, the Russo-Chinese border has never been without a certain number of forts and troop concentrations. The history of this boundary dates back to 1689, when the relatively young and dynamic dynasties of the Russian and Chinese Empires signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first treaty ever signed by the Middle Kingdom with a European power. The Romanov dynasty, established in 1613, and the Ch’ing (Manchu) dynasty, established in 1644, were in the throes of consolidating their respective political power; consequently, any seemingly equitable and mutually agreed upon boundary was to the advantage of both countries. Between 1689 and 1864 nine treaties were ratified in which the establishment of the Russo-Chinese border was either the exclusive subject or the major point. In addition, between 1896 and 1909 there were no less than eight agreements with respect to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which also touched upon questions of boundaries and the stationing of Russian troops along the right-of-way. Beginning in 1913, there were some half-dozen agreements or declarations concerning the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. Finally, there were numerous treaties signed between Russia, other European powers, and China with respect to trade, concessions, open ports, right of residence, and leases.⁴ These are commonly called the “unequal treaties.” The government of the Chinese People’s Republic has now gone on record in declaring all former treaties with Western powers as “unequal treaties” and has further stated that the question of the boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. is not yet satisfactorily resolved. For example, on 8 March 1963, Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese daily newspaper, recapitulated the different types of aggression that had been suffered by China. While passing lightly over Hong Kong and Macao, it directed the strongest attack against various cessions to Russia, including the Treaty of Aigun (1858), by which China ceded 185,000 square miles west of the Heilungkiang (Amur) River to Russia, and the Treaty of Peking (1860), which relinquished 347,000 square miles in today’s Soviet Central Asia region, as well as the provinces of Amur, Ussuri, and the area of (and including) Vladivostok. ⁵ A year and a half later Mao Tse-tung mentioned these areas, adding: “We have not yet presented our bill on this score.”⁶

It would be preposterous to assume that the U.S.S.R. would be interested in adjusting its borders in favor of the C.P.R. To the Chinese, however, it is a case of territoria irredenta, a touchy point of national pride that is just one more matter of rancor against the Soviet Union.

The question of Outer Mongolia is also a possible point of conflict. Outer Mongolia gained its autonomy in 1913 with a joint Russo-Chinese declaration, which also acknowledged the fact that Outer Mongolia was under Chinese suzerainty and a part of the territory of China. In 1924 the Mongolian People’s Republic (M.P.R.) proclaimed its independence, and in 1945 the Nationalist Government of China recognized the Mongolian People’s Republic, as did Red China later. Yet, as Vice-Premier Chen Yi has said: “There are Han chauvinists in China, who have always refused to recognize the Mongolian People’s Republic,” that the Mongolian leaders have been following the Soviet “revisionists” in opposing China, but that “it is for the Mongolian people themselves to decide whether cooperation with China is more in their interests.”⁷

It should be borne in mind what Mao Tse-tung said in 1936: “When the people’s revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will.”⁸ Despite Red China’s recognition of Outer Mongolia, it is doubtful that Mao’s words have been forgotten.

It does not seem plausible that China would try a military venture in Outer Mongolia, but Peking may attempt to bring Outer Mongolia back into the Chinese sphere of influence by provoking border clashes with the intention of serving notice to the M.P.R. that it had best change its allegiance. The Chinese argument that Outer Mongolia was traditionally Chinese, that it was only under pressure and duress that the Chinese Communist government recognized its independence, would hardly be accepted by either Outer Mongolia or its protector, the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Indian border is another potential trouble spot that has not yet been resolved. During the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the U.S.S.R. supported India by supplying aircraft. This fact alone strengthens the belief that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid of 1950 is now essentially abrogated.

Concomitant with these border conflicts with the U.S.S.R. is the Chinese feeling that the U.S.S.R. has intruded into what traditionally has been the Chinese sphere of influence, namely, southeast and central Asia. There is a conjecture that in North Vietnam Soviet influence may be on the rise, and in North Korea the leadership is turning to a more neutral stance rather than favoring China. The Japanese Communist Party also seems to be lending more support to Soviet policies than formerly. The C.P.R. has always regarded the territory of former Indochina as being within its sphere and deeply resents the wooing away of these areas by the U.S.S.R. In central Asia, Mongolia is politically closer to the U.S.S.R., fearing that a closer relationship with Peking might ultimately result in the loss of its independence, at the same time realizing that one reason the U.S.S.R. promotes its independence is to use Outer Mongolia as a convenient buffer state. The Soviet role in bringing together India and Pakistan at Tashkent in 1965 is also viewed by the Chinese as an unwarranted intrusion into their sphere of influence.

The history of Sino-Soviet military cooperation can hardly be looked back on with fondness by the Chinese. The systematic looting and dismembering of Manchurian industrial plants at the close of World War II by the U.S.S.R. marks the beginning of this “cooperation.” To be sure, great promises were made in the 1950 treaty, but Soviet insistence on holding Port Arthur somewhat dampened Chinese enthusiasm, even though the port was returned in 1955, two years after Stalin’s death. The Korean War cost China 400,000 casualties, and one theory is that China intervened at the suggestion of Stalin, who miscalculated American military strength.⁹

Subsequent Sino-Soviet cooperation included the defense conference of 1957, at which the U.S.S.R. allegedly promised China a “sample atomic bomb,” an atomic reactor (which became operational in 1958), and facilities for training Chinese physicists at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, Dubna, U.S.S.R. It is believed, too, that the U.S.S.R. promised China extensive military aid in the form of weapons and armament plants. In 1958, however, the U.S.S.R. apparently insisted on control of Chinese A-bombs and missiles, and on 20 June 1959, according to the Chinese, the U.S.S.R. broke its agreement to supply the atomic bomb.

It is possible that the U.S.S.R. wanted to create a “Far Eastern Defense Pact,” similar to the Warsaw Pact, providing the Soviet military with extensive controls over all aspects of the Chinese military establishment. The Chinese refused.

The final collapse of Sino-Soviet military cooperation came in July 1960 when the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew “all its military and most of its civilian technicians and advisers.” ^l0 Since then, Soviet citizens have been leaving Red China in a steady stream, and it is doubtful that many, if any at all, remain at this time. Too, the supply of weapons seems to have been terminated completely.

Military information from Red China is most difficult to obtain. Still, recent books and articles contain statistics on the Chinese Communist armed forces that have only slight deviations. The danger is that all these figures may have come from a single source and were altered slightly to give the appearance of having been obtained from different sources. In any case, the Chinese Army today purportedly has some 2,600,000 men in 130 combat divisions, or 155 divisions in all. The Navy is small at present, but Peking has embarked on an ambitious naval construction program. The Chinese Communist Air Force has around 2500 to 2600 aircraft: Mig-15s and -17s in large numbers, some seventy-five Mig-19s, and possibly one squadron (12 to 15 aircraft) of Mig-21s. The bomber force includes approximately ten Tu-16 jets, three hundred obsolescent medium-range I1-28s, and some old Tu-4s.¹¹

China’s State Aircraft Factory is currently manufacturing Mig-17s and two-seat Mig-15 trainers, but “engines, radio, instruments, and certain other items of equipment are imported from the USSR, which also supplies technical assistance.”¹² The accuracy of the last statement, however, is in grave doubt, in view of what has already been said. If, in fact, Soviet military assistance has been as completely cut off as is believed, the Chinese military industrial complex is in serious trouble, being incapable of independently producing all the necessary components required of a modern military machine.

In October 1964 Red China conducted its first nuclear test. It was followed in May 1965 by a second, and in May and December 1966 by the third and fifth, the latter two devices containing thermonuclear material. The fourth test, in October 1966, involved the firing of a nuclear-tipped missile. While not unexpected, Chinese entry into the exclusive nuclear club has understandably caused concern, no less in the U.S.S.R. than here. The fact, however, of being scientifically capable of exploding a nuclear weapon does not mean that Red China has the capability of either full-scale production or a method of delivery at this time. Too, there have been reports that China is short of uranium. If true, then China will be severely handicapped in its atomic development. One report states that “at the most, the Chinese Reds may be able to make three atomic bombs a year. If the Peiping regime cannot solve the technical problems of converting U-238 into Plutonium-239 or in using Thorium, its development of nuclear weapons will be strictly limited.”¹³ To date, there seems to be no precedent for using thorium to make atomic bombs, and it is doubtful that the Chinese with their primitive industrial plant can succeed.

It is not necessary to examine the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but merely comment on the fact that, in addition to more men, the Soviet armed forces have the utmost in modem equipment, from tactical firearms and short-range missiles to a strong coastal navy and submarine fleet, to the latest aircraft and, lastly, a sufficient stock (presumably) of intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

The meeting in Moscow of all the Eastern European (plus Cuban) Communist leaders in mid-October 1966 undoubtedly had on its agenda the discussion of the alienation of China in addition to policy matters with respect to the war in Vietnam. At the same time President Johnson attended in Manila a seven-power conference on Southeast Asia. While the Chinese Communists attacked the Manila conference with the usual diatribe against American imperialism, the U.S.S.R. maintained a discreet silence.

Negotiations on further exchanges between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., including air routes, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and so on, are now in the realm of feasibility, as stated by President Johnson in his last State of the Union address. It is true that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have serious differences, but in a Real-politik situation these discordances can be minimized and temporarily ignored, and agreements can be made on points of least resistance.

Militarily, the question of Vietnam is the most important one today facing the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and the C.P.R. Accused by the Russians of interfering with Soviet attempts to supply the North Vietnamese, and in turn accusing the Russians of splitting the unity of the world Communist movement and of cooperating with the U.S.A. to “dominate the world,” the Red Chinese may be facing a dilemma as to the extent of their commitment to North Vietnam. Although the Chinese stress the points that each country can be liberated mainly “as a result of its own people’s efforts,” that “revolution or people’s war in any country is the business of the masses in that country,” and that “foreign aid can only play a supplementary role,”14 there is always the possibility that the Chinese may intervene in Vietnam in an attempt to prove that the C.P.R., not the U.S.S.R., is the protector of North Vietnam. The Chinese may want to demonstrate that Soviet help is not needed and that China itself is capable of extending whatever aid is necessary. In view of the paucity of Chinese industry, this assistance, if rendered, would have to be mainly in terms of manpower, and it would help solve several Chinese problems:

· Much-needed propaganda would be supplied to China, focusing attention on external problems rather than internal.

· The Red Guards would have a new center of attention.

· Defense Minister Lin Piao could place the People’s Army of Liberation in the forefront and thereby help consolidate his own position and that of Mao Tse-tung.

· It would show China’s Communist Far Eastern neighbors that the proximity of Red China is such that it must be to China and not to the U.S.S.R. that they must turn. This is particularly true now that North Korea is adopting a more neutral line between Peking and Moscow.

The following conclusions can be reached with respect to the Sino-Soviet rift and the role of the U.S.A.:

(1) The Sino-Soviet rift seems to be irreconcilable, unless there are drastic changes in Chinese leadership and policies toward the U.S.S.R.

(2) The U.S.S.R. fears the future military potential of Red China and is striving to keep it within bounds, lest the Chinese threaten Soviet frontiers in Asia and eventually attempt to take over Outer Mongolia.

(3) Neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. would like to see the Chinese enter the Vietnam war: the U.S.A., because it would mean a prolongation of the war and a substantially larger drain on manpower and military equipment; the U.S.S.R., because it would undermine Soviet world leadership in the Communist movement, as well as provide a danger of provoking World War III in the event of irrational action on the part of the Chinese.

Two of the four tasks of American foreign policy are “to deter aggression,” and “to bring into more normal relations our ties to the nations now under Communist rule: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and ultimately China, when the Chinese are prepared for that kind of a relationship.”¹⁵ An East-West détente can accomplish both these objectives, for by pressure from all sides Communist China may indeed decide to embark on a foreign policy course more in keeping with a type of relationship desired by the United States of America.

United States Air Force Academy

Notes

1. “What’s Really Going On Inside China,” U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 61. No. 11 (12 September 1966), p. 53. Dr. Portisch is the author of Red China Today (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1966).

2. Malcolm Mackintosh, “The Sino-Soviet Dispute,” Survival (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies), Vol. 7, No.7 (October 1965), p. 248.

3. From the Declaration of the Soviet Government, 21 September 1963. Quoted in Alberto Ronchey, The Two Red Giants-An Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1965), p. 65.

4. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Russko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, 1689-1916 (Moscow: IZD. Vostochnoye Literatury, 1958). (USSR Academy of Science, Russo-Chinese Relations, 1689-1916, Official Documents.)

5. Ronchey, p. 67.

6. Quoted from Pravda, 4 September 1964.

7. “China’s Foreign Policy, Press Conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, 29 September 1965,” Survival, Vol. 7, No.9 (December 1965), Pp. 325-26.

8. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 99.

9. Malcolm Mackintosh, “Military Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” The Russian-Chinese Rift: Its Impact on World Affairs, ed. Irwin Isenberg (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1966), p. 41.

10. Ibid., Pp. 42-45.

11. See Ralph L. Powell, “Military Affairs of Communist China,” Current History, Vol. 51, No. 301 (September 1966), p. 141; Mackintosh, “The Sino-Soviet Dispute,’ Survival, pp. 248-49; “Red China,” Time, Vol. 88, No. 11 (9 September 1966), p. 31.

12. Jane’s All The World Aircraft, 1965-66, p. 26.

13. “Mao’s Nuclear Base and Prospects,” Free China Review (Taipei, Taiwan), Vol. 16, No.7 (July 1966), pp. 34-38.

14. “Lin Piao on the ‘People’s War,’” Current History, Vol. 51, No. 301 (September 1966), p. 180.

15. Walt W. Rostow, “Four Tasks of Foreign Policy,” from an address to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, Washington, D.C., 16-17 June 1966.

Contributor

Major Nicholas P. Vaslef (Ph.D., Harvard University) is Associate Professor of Russian, U.S. Air Force Academy. After graduating from the University of Washington, he served with the 7050th Air Intelligence Service Wing in Germany, 1952-56, and with the 4602d (1006th) Air Intelligence Service Squadron, Colorado Springs, 1956-58. He obtained the M.A. in International Relations from Stanford University and has been teaching at the Academy since 1960, except for his assignment at Harvard for doctoral studies in Slavic languages and literature. Major Vaslef is the primary author of Basic Russian Course Handbook, used at the Academy and Air Force-wide.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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